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UGeneral abbreviations 
 
AbiH Armija Bosne i Hercegovine – Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Adjudicated facts List of facts adjudicated in previous proceedings and admitted 
pursuant to Rule 94(B) of the Rules by Decision on Third and 
Fourth Prosecution Motions for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated 
Facts of 24 March 2005 
ARK Autonomna Regija Krajina – Autonomous Region of Krajina 
Arkan’s men Serbian paramilitary force led by Željko Ražnatović (Arkan) 
(also called Serb Volunteer Guard or Arkan’s Tigers) 
Blue Eagles  Plavi Orlovi - Serbian paramilitary formation  
Bosnia-Herzegovina Socialist Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (later, 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Also abbreviated as 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, SRBH, BiH, or BH in documents 
Bosnian-Serb Assembly Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina (later, 
National Assembly of Republika Srpska) 
Bosnian-Serb Government Government of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(later, Government of Republika Srpska) 
Bosnian-Serb Presidency Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(later, Presidency of Republika Srpska) 
Bosnian-Serb Republic Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; on 12 August 1992, 
the name of the republic was officially changed to Republika 
Srpska 
Council for Coordination of 
Positions on State Policy 
Sav(j)et za Usaglašavanje Stavova o Državnoj Politici - Body 
comprising representatives of the various Serbian entities (such 
as Yugoslavia, Serbia, Montenegro, Republika Srpska, 
Republic of Serbian Krajina) meeting in Belgrade 
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CSB Centar Službi Bezbjednosti – Security Services Centre 
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Green Berets Zelene Beretke - Muslim paramilitary formation 
HDZ Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – Croatian Democratic Union 
(main political party of Bosnian Croats) 
Indictment municipalities Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bileća, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, 
Bosanski Petrovac, Bratunac, Brčko, Čajniče, Čelinac, Doboj, 
Donji Vakuf, Foča, Gacko, Hadžići, Ilidža, Ilijaš, Ključ, 
Kalinovik, Kotor Varoš, Nevesinje, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, 
Pale, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Rogatica, Rudo,TPF1FPT Sanski Most, 
Šipovo,TPF2FPT Sokolac, Teslić, Trnovo, Višegrad, Vlasenica, 
Vogošća, Zvornik 
JNA Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – Yugoslav People’s Army 
 
TP
1
PT The parties agreed to exclude Rudo; Rule 98 bis decision, T. 17133. 
TP
2
PT The parties agreed to exclude Šipovo, Rule 98 bis decision, T. 17133. 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Preliminary 
 
 
 
7 
Ministerial Council Ministerial Council of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly (later 
evolved into Bosnian-Serb Government) 
MUP Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova – Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Official Gazette Službeni Glasnik Republike Srpske - Official Gazette of the 
Bosnian-Serb Republic 
Patriotic League Patriotska Liga - Muslim paramilitary formation  
Red Berets Crvene Beretke - Serbian paramilitary formation  
Republika Srpska see Bosnian-Serb Republic 
SAO Srpska Autonomna Oblast – Serb Autonomous District 
SDA Stranka Demokratske Akcije – Party of Democratic Action 
(main political party of Bosnian Muslims) 
SDK Služba Društvenog Knjigovodstva – Social Accounting Service 
SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka – Serbian Democratic Party (main 
political party of Bosnian Serbs) 
SDP Socijal Demokratska Partija – Social Democratic Party (former 
communist party of Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
SJB Stanica Javne Bezbjednosti – Public Security Station 
SNB Savjet za Nacionalnu Bezbjednost – National Security Council 
SNO Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu – Council for National 
Defence 
SOS Srpske Odbrambene Snage – Serbian Defence Forces, 
paramilitary formation 
SRK Sarajevo-Romanija Korpus – Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the 
VRS 
SRS Srpska Radikalna Stranka – Serbian Radical Party 
SRSJ Savez Reformskih Snaga Jugoslavije – Alliance of Reformist 
Forces of Yugoslavia (political party of Ante Marković) 
SUP Sekretarijat za Unutrašnje Poslove – Secretariat of Internal 
Affairs 
TO Teritorijalna Odbrana – Territorial Defence 
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force – Initially established in 
Croatia to ensure demilitarization of designated areas. Mandate 
was later extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina to support the 
delivery of humanitarian relief, monitor “no-fly zones” and 
“safe areas” 
VJ Vojska Jugoslavije – Yugoslav Army, remainder of the former 
JNA was to become the army of the new Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
VRS Vojska Srpske Republike Bosne i Herzegovine, later Vojska 
Republike Srpske – Army of the Bosnian-Serb Republic 
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White Eagles Beli Orlovi – Paramilitary formation, also “Šešelj’s men” 
Wolves of Vučjak Vukovi s Vučjaka – Serbian paramilitary formation  
Yellow Wasps Žute Ose – Serb paramilitary formation headed by Vojin (Žućo) 
Vučković and Dušan Repić  
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U1. Introduction and overview 
 
U1.1 The Accused 
1. Momčilo Krajišnik was born on 20 January 1945 in Zabrđe, Novi Grad 
municipality, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF3FPT He studied economics and completed his 
military service in Sarajevo.TPF4FPT In 1968 he started working in the financial services of 
Energoinvest and some of its subsidiaries in Sarajevo.TPF5FPT In 1973 he married Milenka 
Mičević, with whom he had three children.TPF6FPT She died in August 1992.TPF7FPT 
2. The Accused first met Radovan Karadžić in 1983, who at the time was also 
employed at Energoinvest. It was through Karadžić that the Accused met Nikola Koljević.TPF8FPT 
In 1985 the Accused stood trial for embezzlement together with Radovan Karadžić and 
was acquitted four years later.TPF9FPT 
3. The Accused became member of the SDS at its founding, on 12 July 1990.TPF10FPT Soon 
after, the Accused attended two meetings of the Novi Grad SDS, where he accepted the 
post of local SDS chairperson.TPF11FPT He was put on the list of SDS candidates for the Chamber 
of Citizens in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.TPF12FPT During the election campaign, the 
Accused as the SDS representative on economic matters participated in four or five radio 
and television debates.TPF13FPT He also assisted in creating the Smiljevići and Zabrđe SDS 
boards.TPF14FPT On 20 September 1990 he was elected deputy (representative) to the Bosnia-
Herzegovina Assembly and, on 20 December 1990, became its President.TPF15FPT On 12 July 
1991 the Accused was elected to the SDS Main Board.TPF16FPT 
4. When the Bosnian-Serb Republic was created, the Accused held several high-
ranking positions in its institutions. From 24 October 1991 through November 1995 the 
 
TP
3
PT List of matters admitted by the Accused, 31 August 2001, p. 1; Krajišnik, T. 22981. 
TP
4
PT Krajišnik, T. 22981-2. 
TP
5
PT Krajišnik, T. 22982-4. 
TP
6
PT Krajišnik, T. 22984. 
TP
7
PT Krajišnik, T. 24789. 
TP
8
PT Krajišnik, T. 22985-8. 
TP
9
PT Krajišnik, T. 22990; Trbojević, T. 12161; P583.B (Prosecution interview with Milan Trbojević, 4 May 
2004), p. 13. 
TP
10
PT Krajišnik, T. 22988. 
TP
11
PT Krajišnik, T. 22992-4. 
TP
12
PT Krajišnik, T. 22994-6. 
TP
13
PT Krajišnik, T. 22990-2. 
TP
14
PT Krajišnik, T. 23000. 
TP
15
PT Treanor, T. 1301. 
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Accused was President of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. He was also a member of the 
National Security Council. From 12 May until 17 December 1992 the Accused was an 
active member of the Presidency of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. 
 
U1.2 Indictment 
5. The indictment charges Momčilo Krajišnik with eight counts. The counts are 
brought under Article 3 of the Tribunal’s Statute (murder – count 6), Article 4 (genocide, 
complicity in genocide – counts 1 and 2), and Article 5 (persecution, extermination, 
murder, deportation, inhumane acts – counts 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8). Criminal responsibility is 
charged under Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute. The crimes were allegedly committed 
in 35 municipalities between 1 July 1991 and 30 December 1992.TPF17FPT Four schedules are 
attached to the indictment: (A) killings not related to detention facilities; (B) killings 
related to detention facilities; (C) list of detention facilities; (D) cultural monuments and 
sacred sites destroyed. 
6. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused participated, as a co-perpetrator or aider 
and abettor, in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE), together with, among others, Biljana 
Plavšić, Radovan Karadžić, Nikola Koljević, Slobodan Milošević, Željko (“Arkan”) 
Ražnatović, General Ratko Mladić, General Momir Talić, Radoslav Brđanin, and other 
named and unnamed individuals. The objective of the JCE was the permanent removal, by 
force or other means, of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from large portions of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina through the commission of the crimes mentioned above. 
7. The indictment alleges that the Accused participated in the joint criminal enterprise, 
by formulating, initiating, promoting, or encouraging the development and implementation 
of SDS and governmental policies intended to advance the objective of the JCE. The 
Accused allegedly participated in the establishment, support, or maintenance of SDS and 
various Bosnian-Serb Government bodies at the Republic, regional, municipal, and local 
levels, exercised control over them, and directed, instigated, encouraged, and authorized 
the Government bodies and Serb forces to carry out acts in order to further the objective of 
the JCE. Moreover, the Accused allegedly assisted, participated in, or encouraged the 
arming of Bosnian Serbs, and requested the assistance, facilitated, or coordinated the 
 
TP
16
PT Treanor, T. 1272, 1276; P65, tab 29 (Record of session of SDS, 12 July 1991), p. 92. 
TP
17
PT Rule 98 bis decision, T. 17133. 
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participation of paramilitary formations from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia to further the 
objective of the JCE. He also aided and abetted or instigated the commission of further 
crimes by failing to investigate or punish subordinates. Through control of the above-
mentioned institutions, the Accused also allegedly supported, encouraged, facilitated, or 
participated in spreading propaganda and engendering fear and hatred against Bosnian 
Muslims and Bosnian Croats, and he allegedly participated in providing misleading 
information to the public as well as to the international community and non-governmental 
organizations about crimes committed by Bosnian-Serbs. 
8. The Accused allegedly held prominent positions in the Bosnian-Serb leadership and 
was associated with Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, other members of 
the Bosnian-Serb leadership, as well as other members of the joint criminal enterprise. He 
also held positions in various SDS and republican bodies. According to the indictment, the 
Accused was a member of the SDS Main Board, President of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly 
from 24 October 1991 until at least November 1995, and a member of the Bosnian-Serb 
National Security Council and of the Expanded Presidency of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. 
By virtue of these positions of superior authority, the Accused allegedly had de facto 
control and authority over the Bosnian-Serb forces and Bosnian-Serb political and 
governmental organs and is responsible for their acts or omissions which he did not 
prevent or punish under Article 7(3). 
9. More specifically, the indictment charges the Accused for acting individually, or in 
concert with other participants in a joint criminal enterprise, or for planning, instigating, 
ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting the planning, preparation, or 
execution of the partial destruction of the Bosnian-Muslim and Bosnian-Croat national, 
ethnic, racial, or religious groups in territories within Bosnia-Herzegovina, persecution, 
extermination, murder, forced transfer, and deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats in 35 indictment municipalities.TPF18FPT 
10. The Accused pleaded not guilty to all charges. 
11. On 3 April 2000, the Accused was arrested by SFOR in Sarajevo on the basis of a 
sealed indictment, issued on 25 February 2000,TPF19FPT and transferred to The Hague on the 
 
TP
18
PT The parties agreed to exclude Šipovo and Rudo. Rule 98 bis decision, T. 17133. 
TP
19
PT Indictment, 21 February 2000; Motion for Presentation of an Indictment for Review and Application for 
Warrant of Arrest and for Related Orders and a Decision Concerning an Order for Non-Disclosure, 21 
February 2000; Decision on Review of Indictment Pursuant to Article 19 of the Statute and Order for Non-
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same day. TPF20FPT On 23 February 2001 the joinder of two cases, Prosecutor v. Momčilo 
Krajišnik and Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, was granted and a consolidated indictment 
was filed by the Prosecution on 9 March 2001.TPF21FPT On 7 March 2002, the Prosecution filed 
an amended consolidated indictment.TPF22FPT 
 
U1.3 Bosnia-Herzegovina: geography, population, historyU 
12. Bosnia-Herzegovina, more than any other republic of the former Yugoslavia, has 
been multi-ethnic for centuries, with Serbs, Muslims, and Croats as the predominant 
nationalities.TPF23FPT The large Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina owes its religion and 
culture to the long Turkish occupation, during which time many Slavs adopted the Islamic 
faith.TPF24FPT 
13. During the Second World War, Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by the German 
and Italian armies.TPF25FPT Three distinct Yugoslav forces fought one another. Whereas the 
strongly nationalist Ustasha forces of the Croatian state supported the occupying powers, 
the Chetniks, Serb nationalist forces, and the partisans, a largely Communist and Serb 
group, both opposed the German and Italian forces.TPF26FPT Muslims were found in the ranks of 
both the Ustasha and the Partisans.TPF27FPT Bosnia-Herzegovina was particularly affected by 
serious crimes committed against the civilian population.TPF28FPT  
14. After the Second World War, Yugoslavia was reconstituted as the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), consisting of six republics – Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia – and two regions within Serbia – 
 
Disclosure, 25 February 2000; Warrant of Arrest – Order for Surrender, 25 February 2000; Motion for 
Presentation of an Indictment for Review and Application for Warrant of Arrest and for Related Orders and a 
Decision Concerning an Order for Non-Disclosure, 21 February 2000; Decision on Review of Indictment 
Pursuant to Article 19 of the Statute and Order for Non-Disclosure, 25 February 2000; Indictment, 21 
February 2000. 
TP
20
PT Order on Detention on Remand, 7 April 2000; Krajišnik, T. 23002. 
TP
21
PT Decision on Motion for Joinder, 23 February 2001; Consolidated Indictment, 9 March 2001. 
TP
22
PT Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Consolidated Indictment, 4 March 2002. The 
Defence’s Application for Leave to Appeal was rejected by a bench of the Appeals Chamber on 6 May 2002. 
TP
23
PT Adjudicated facts 1-2. According to expert witness Treanor, the two words translated as “ethnic” and 
“national” from Serbo-Croatian both refer, in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the three national 
communities (Serbs, Muslims, Croats) recognized in that republic. National identification in Yugoslavia was 
on the basis of self-declaration. Treanor, T. 1300, 1619-20. 
TP
24
PT Adjudicated facts 2-4. 
TP
25
PT Adjudicated facts 7-8. 
TP
26
PT Adjudicated facts 7-8. 
TP
27
PT Adjudicated fact 9. 
TP
28
PT Adjudicated facts 10-11. 
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Vojvodina and Kosovo.TPF29FPT The 1946 SFRY Constitution did not recognize a distinct 
Bosnian nation due to the fact that, unlike the other republics, there was no single majority 
national group in Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF30FPT 
15. It was only in the 1970s that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina came to be 
recognised as one of the nations of federal Yugoslavia.TPF31FPT As of 1991, some 44 per cent of 
the Bosnians described themselves as Muslims, 31 per cent as Serbs, and 17 per cent as 
Croats.TPF32FPT  
16. With Tito’s death in 1980 and the deterioration of the economy, the unity of the 
federal state began to weaken.TPF33FPT By the late 1980s, the leading political role of the League 
of Communists was formally abandoned.TPF34FPT 
17. In February 1990 a law was passed in Bosnia-Herzegovina allowing the formation 
of non-Communist parties. Parties established pursuant to this law included: the 
(predominantly Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (SDA), established on 26 May 1990; 
the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), established on 12 July 1990; and the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ), established on 18 August 1990.TPF35FPT 
18. The armed forces of the SFRY consisted of the active and reserve federal army, 
navy, and air force, collectively known as the JNA, and a separate system of Territorial 
Defence (TO) equipped with light weaponry stored mostly in municipal warehouses. Each 
republic had its own TO, which was under the control of the republic’s Minister of 
Defence.TPF36FPT In the early 1990s the traditional predominance of Serb officers in the JNA 
quickly increased. Very few non-Serb officers remained in the JNA. From 1991 to early 
1992 the Serb component of JNA conscripts rose from just over 35 per cent to around 90 
per cent.TPF37FPT 
19. On 18 November 1990, the first multi-party elections for the republican legislature 
and the municipal assemblies were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF38FPT The outcome essentially 
 
TP
29
PT Adjudicated fact 14. 
TP
30
PT Adjudicated facts 15-17. 
TP
31
PT Adjudicated facts 14-18; Treanor, T. 1518, 1612. 
TP
32
PT Adjudicated fact 6. 
TP
33
PT Adjudicated facts 24-6. 
TP
34
PT Adjudicated facts 24-5. 
TP
35
PT Treanor, T. 1263-6; P280 (Witness 623 statement), para. 9; Divčić, T. 17770-2; Savkić, T. 20461-2. 
TP
36
PT Adjudicated facts 73-80. 
TP
37
PT Adjudicated facts 81-2. 
TP
38
PT P64 (Treanor report), paras 7, 9, 10; Treanor, T. 1299; List of matters admitted by the Accused, 31 August 
2001, para. 48 (in part); Adjudicated fact 42. 
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reflected the ethnic census of the population, since each ethnic group voted for the party 
claiming to represent its nationality.TPF39FPT 
 
U1.4 Structure of judgement 
20. This judgement is divided into eight parts. Part 1 consists of this introduction. Part 2 
provides a short account of the background to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to 
and during the indictment period. Part 3 deals with the administration of the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic, and in particular with the Bosnian-Serb republican and municipal institutions. In 
part 4, the Chamber presents its factual findings regarding the Serb take-over of power in 
the indictment municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Part 5 addresses the legal findings on 
the crimes committed in the municipalities. In part 6, the Chamber presents its legal 
findings on the individual criminal responsibility of the Accused. Sentencing is set out in 
part 7, followed by the disposition in part 8. 
21. The trial record contains a vast amount of evidence. The presentation of evidence 
started on 4 February 2004 and ended on 14 July 2006, stretching over more than 27,000 
pages of transcripts. The mere number of exhibits tendered during the case (more than 
3,800 Prosecution exhibits, more than 330 Defence exhibits, and 27 Chamber exhibits 
were finally admitted into evidence) does not come close to showing the actual volume of 
material, since several exhibits contain dozens, or even hundreds, of pages.  
22. The Chamber has considered all of the evidence in accordance with the Statute and 
the Rules of procedure and evidence (Rules), in such a way as to best favour a fair 
determination of the case and consistent with the spirit of the Statute and the general 
principles of law, in particular the principle of in dubio pro reo. The Chamber has, on 
occasions, explicitly refuted some evidence. However, it has generally simply disregarded 
evidence when, after having considered the record as a whole, it deemed it unreliable or 
irrelevant for the purpose of reaching an informed decision.TPF40FPT 
23. This judgement also contains four appendices – (A) the sources and uses of 
evidence; (B) the procedural history; (C) a list of exhibits which have multiple exhibit 
 
TP
39
PT Adjudicated fact 45. 
TP
40
PT “Sources and uses of evidence” can be found in Appendix A to this judgement. 
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numbers; and (D) a table of cases with abbreviations and maps. The maps are considered 
important by the Chamber for the understanding of the present case. 
 16 
U2. Political precursors 
 
24. The purpose of this part of the judgement is to provide a short account of the 
background to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It includes some evidence on non-
indictment municipalities not related to crimes. 
 
U2.1 Political developments, 1990 to early 1991 
2.1.1 Creation of the SDS 
25. Radovan Karadžić, Aleksandar Buha, Velibor Ostojić, Rajko Dukić, and 
Aleksandar Divčić were some of the persons involved in the establishment of the SDS.TPF41FPT 
From the moment of its creation, the SDS political platform included an emphasis on the 
protection of the Serb nation, which was said to be disadvantaged by the purported lower 
birth rate of Serbs and by the way Bosnia-Herzegovina had been divided into 
municipalities, effectively making Serbs an ethnic minority in areas where they might 
otherwise have dominated. The SDS advocated the maintenance of a federal Yugoslavia, 
respect for the rule of law, and an equal distribution of power between the three main 
national groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF42FPT 
26. In 1990 and 1991 the SDS was funded by voluntary contributions and enjoyed the 
support of the overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs.TPF43FPT Its main organs included the 
party Assembly, formally the supreme body; the SDS Main Board, the highest party organ 
at times when the Assembly was not in session; the SDS Executive Board, the executive 
arm of the Main Board; the president of the party, who was also the president of the Main 
Board; and several advisory bodies, such as the SDS Political and Economic Councils and 
 
TP
41
PT Divčić, T. 17762, 17765-9, 17776, 17809. 
TP
42
PT P64 (Treanor report), para. 7; Treanor, T. 1268-71, 1295, 1501, 1528, 1617, 1760, 1872-4, 1897-8, 1978; 
P65, tab 1 (Remarks by Karadžić at SDS founding assembly, 19 July 1990), pp. 1-2; P65, tab 62 (Remarks by 
Velibor Ostojić at 3rd session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 11 December 1991), pp. 48-9; P65, tab 74 
(Remarks by Milutin Najdanović reported in Maksimović diary, 24 December 1991), p. 12; P65, tab 94 
(Remarks by Karadžić at SDS Deputies’ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 36; P65, tab 182 (Record of 
17th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), p. 85; P65, tab 2 (Programme of SDS, 12 July 
1990), items 6, 9; P65, tab 4 (Statute of SDS of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 12 July 1990), art. 4; P65, tab 3 
(Interview with Radovan Karadžić in Nin newspaper, 20 July 1990), P65, tab 13 (Interview with Radovan 
Karadžić in Nin newspaper, 9 November 1990), p. 8. 
TP
43
PT Divčić, T. 17789-90; Radojko, T. 21250. 
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the Commission for Personnel and Organization.TPF44FPT The party was a hierarchical structure, 
organized into municipal assemblies and boards resembling the republican organs.TPF45FPT 
Speaking in early November 1990, SDS president Radovan Karadžić said that SDS boards 
in the municipalities had the responsibility to maintain contact with “10 to 20 Serbian 
households, so that information from the most remote village reaches the Main Board in 
two hours at most.” TPF46FPT In the following months, the close relationship between SDS 
municipal organs and the apex of the party was enhanced: by July 1991, for example, 
members of the Main Board and of the Executive Board were instructed to be involved in 
the work of local boards in the areas they represented. Local officials frequently addressed 
the central leadership in order to solve local problems.TPF47FPT 
27. As mentioned in part 1 of this judgement, on 18 November 1990 the first multi-
party elections were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the municipal and republican levels. In 
the Republic’s Assembly, composed of the House of Citizens and the House of 
Municipalities, voters gave the SDA 86 seats, the SDS 72 seats, and the HDZ 44 seats, out 
of a total of 240. TPF48FPT The three parties went on to form a coalition Government.TPF49FPT 
 
2.1.2 Division of power among the coalition parties 
28. Despite calls by Radovan Karadžić as early as in October 1990 for each of the three 
recognized national groups to be given veto power over legislative measures which might 
adversely affect a national group’s interests, such a measure was never implemented.TPF50FPT The 
Chamber received some evidence on the Council for Ethnic Equality, an advisory body 
where each of the three recognized nationalities had the possibility to raise matters that 
 
TP
44
PT P65, tab 5 (Statute of SDS); arts 30, 31-2, 34-5, 37-43, and 49; P64 (Treanor report), para. 20; Treanor, T. 
1273-6, 1874-7, 1881-2; P64 (Treanor report), paras 14, 23-7, 28, 32-7, 39, 40; Divčić, T. 17779-89, 17795-
6. 
TP
45
PT Prstojević, T. 14499-501, 14769-85, 14807-8; Witness 646, T. 10230-4, 10402-3; Treanor, T. 1272-3; P64 
(Treanor report), para. 21. 
TP
46
PT P65, tab 13 (Interview with Radovan Karadžić in Nin newspaper, 9 November 1990), p. 1. 
TP
47
PT Nešković, T. 16621-2, 16630-2, 16641-2, 16672, 16738, 16760, 16808, 16829; P64 (Treanor report), p. 3; 
P65, tab 57 (Minutes of 6th session of SDS Executive Board, 20 November 1991), p. 3; P899 (Telephone 
conversation between Karadžić and Stanić, 26 September 1991); P898 (Telephone conversation between 
Karadžić, Nešković, Mišković, and Srdić, 10 September 1991); P292 (Telephone conversation between 
Karadžić and Đurović, 19 November 1991); P913 (Minutes from 13th session of Novo Sarajevo SDS, 28 
February 1992). 
TP
48
PT P64 (Treanor report), paras 7, 9, 10-11; Treanor, T. 1299-300; List of matters admitted by the Accused, 31 
August 2001, para. 48 (in part); Adjudicated fact 42. 
TP
49
PT P64 (Treanor report), paras 10-11; Treanor, T. 1300-1. 
TP
50
PT Treanor, T. 1286-7, 1891; P65, tab 9 (Request for adjustment of constitutional amendments, 8 October 
1990). 
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would affect its vital interests. This body was described by witnesses either as “dormant”, 
or as having functioned only on a couple of occasions.TPF51FPT 
29. Following the November 1990 elections, the SDA, SDS, and HDZ reached an 
agreement among themselves on a formula for the distribution of power. It was agreed that, 
at the most senior level, the Prime Minister would be from the HDZ, the President of the 
Assembly from the SDS, and the President of the Presidency from the SDA (the persons 
appointed were Jure Pelivan, Momčilo Krajišnik, and Alija Izetbegović, respectively).TPF52FPT 
Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević were appointed to the Presidency of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as SDS representatives.TPF53FPT Positions in all Government organs and public 
institutions with government appointees were distributed in accordance with party quotas. 
This meant that, for practical purposes, personnel were chosen on the basis of nationality 
and allegiance to the views of the three coalition parties. This arrangement stamped out 
opposition by smaller parties and sowed the seeds for the establishment of parallel ethnic 
structures.TPF54FPT The SDS, for example, received a vice-presidential position, two Ministers 
without portfolio, and five out of thirteen departmental portfolios in the Government, as 
well as eight out of thirty chairmanships of Assembly committees and commissions.TPF55FPT  
30. The three parties also divided among themselves top positions in the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MUP), which controlled the police. Alija Delimustafić (SDA) became 
MUP Minister, Vitomir Žepinić (SDS) became deputy Minister, Avdo Hebib (SDA) 
became assistant Minister for police affairs, and Momčilo Mandić (SDS) became assistant 
Minister for the prevention and detection of crime.TPF56FPT The regional organization of the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP was based on nine Security Services Centres (CSBs), located in 
Bihać, Banja Luka, Doboj, Tuzla, Livno, Mostar, Zenica, Sarajevo, and Goražde. Chief 
positions in three of these were assigned to the SDS. TPF57FPT 
31. At the local level, a similar division of posts was made, reflecting the percentages 
gained by each party in the elections. These percentages corresponded to the ethnic 
 
TP
51
PT Bjelobrk, T. 8285-7, 8379-80; Kecmanović T. 22333-5; Witness 623, T. 5792. 
TP
52
PT P64 (Treanor report), paras 10-11; Treanor, T. 1300; P280 (Witness 623 statement), paras 23-6. 
TP
53
PT C7 (Plavšić statement), para. 3; P64 (Treanor report), paras 10-11; Treanor, T. 1300. 
TP
54
PT Witness 623, T. 5671-4, 5679, 5894; P280 (Witness 623 statement), paras 30-2; Antić, T. 18157-9, 18164-
7, 18169-71, 18182-4, 19159; Bjelica, T. 22667-8; D160 (Bjelica statement), p. 1. 
TP
55
PT P64 (Treanor report), para. 11. 
TP
56
PT P763 (Nielsen report), para. 7. 
TP
57
PT P763 (Nielsen report), para. 8. 
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composition of each municipality. After the quotas were distributed, the three parties 
shared control over appointments made at every level of administration.TPF58FPT 
32. The municipal assembly was by law the highest organ of municipal authority. It was 
headed by the assembly president and one or more vice-presidents, who were elected by 
the assembly from its members for a four-year term. It consisted of a single chamber with 
quotas for its ethnic composition. The law provided that assembly delegates were to be 
chosen by secret ballot in popular elections for a four-year term.  
33. The municipal assembly was accorded a wide range of powers. In particular, the 
assembly was to issue the municipal statute, the defence plan, the municipal budget, and 
could call a municipal referendum. The assembly could also determine the organization 
and functioning of the executive board and other local government authorities. The 
assembly president was to convene assembly sessions, initiate debate, and sign assembly 
decisions, which were to be reached by majority vote.TPF59FPT 
34. An executive organ (a board or a committee), together with a number of 
administrative organs or departments, was to be in charge of the implementation of 
assembly decisions. This body consisted of the committee president, elected from among 
the municipal assembly delegates for a four-year term, and of functionaries directing 
various municipal administrative organs.TPF60FPT 
 
U2.2 Arming and mobilization of population  
35. Following the 1990 elections, mistrust grew among the three main ethnic groups in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the period between the multiparty elections and early 1991, 
the SDS relied on the JNA and the MUP to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Yugoslavia, which were the SDS’s main political objectives at the time. This meant that 
most Serbs felt protected by federal and republican institutions,TPF61FPT despite some 
 
TP
58
PT Davidović, T. 14155-6; P764 (Davidović statement), p. 4; Antić, T. 18142-8; 18151-2; Stavnjak, T. 17894, 
17899-913, 17972-4, 17982-3; P966 (Goražde SDS letter to Karadžić, 25 May 1991), p. 2; Savkić, T. 20455-
6, 20461-2; P934 (Donia report), p. 22. 
TP
59
PT P64 (Treanor report), paras 102-5; P64.A, tab 379 (Amendments to Statute of Banja Luka, 19 September 
1990); P64.A, tab 381 (Amendments to Statute of Prijedor municipality, 17 September 1990). 
TP
60
PT P64 (Treanor report), paras 106, 109; P64.A, tab 379 (Amendments to Statute of Banja Luka, 19 
September 1990), arts 16-18; P64.A, tab 380 (Statute of Prijedor municipality, 25 October 1984), arts 270, 
279; P64.A, tab 381 (Amendments to Statute of Prijedor municipality, 17 September 1990), arts 19-20. 
TP
61
PT Babić, T. 3350-3, 3376-7; P152 (Statement, 22 January 2004), para. 21; Divčić, T. 17797.  
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preparations for self-defence known to the SDS leadership.TPF62FPT At the same time, with an eye 
on the developments in Slovenia and Croatia, which were both moving towards 
independence, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims started storing weapons and even 
organized their own armed groups. This process intensified throughout 1991 and the first 
months of 1992.TPF63FPT The (Muslim) Patriotic League, for example, organized secret arming of 
Muslims in Herzegovina in the early summer of 1991, as well as secret military training in 
Croatia and in other countries between April and September 1991. The League grew to 
about 100,000 members between 1991 and early 1992.TPF64FPT Lazar Stavnjak, an engineer and 
politician from Goražde municipality, testified that in early 1991, Serbs at the Pobjeda 
explosives factory in Goražde, where the witness worked, were systematically replaced by 
Muslims. An explosion in October 1991 at the house of a Muslim Pobjeda employee 
helped spread fears that Muslims were appropriating explosives from the factory.TPF65FPT 
36. By spring of 1991, the SDS, in coordination with Yugoslav authorities, also started 
arming and mobilizing the Serb population in many municipalities throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina. JNA and MUP officers assisted them in acquiring and distributing weapons. 
37. An example of this process was described by Witness 636. In March 1991, the 
witness was hired by the SDS and joined a group of 60 to 80 men whose task was to 
receive, secure, and distribute weapons from the JNA in Croatia. The weapons were 
brought in trucks, with escort provided by the Drvar Public Security Station (SJB), and 
were stored in an old school building. The members of the group guarded the weapons 
round the clock. Witness 636 personally saw Vinko Kondić from Ključ, Dragan Ivanić 
from Bosanski Petrovac, and Simo Drljača of the Prijedor SJB visit the school to collect 
weapons. He also heard that weapons had been collected from the school by SDS members 
Vlado Vrkeš, president of the Sanski Most SDS, and Nedeljko Rašula, president of Sanski 
Most municipal assembly; by Miroslav Vještica, SDS deputy from Bosanska Krupa and 
later president of the local crisis staff; and by Stojan Župljanin, SDS chief of the Banja 
 
TP
62
PT Odobašić, T. 7689-90, 7711-12; P362 (Odobašić statement), paras 2, 7; P65, tab 16 (Maksimović’s diary, 4 
February 1991), p. 8; P910.A (Witness 79 statement), pp. 3-4. 
TP
63
PT P708 (Agić statement), p. 3; P498 (Muhamed Filipović statement), pp. 2-3; P498.A (Muhamed Filipović 
statement), p. 2; Divčić, T. 17797; Maričić, T. 21708-10, 21712; P718 (Witness 654 statement), p. 3; P582.B 
(Witness 458 transcript), pp. 3898-901; P582.D (Witness 458 transcript), p. 4070, 4105-6; Antić, T. 18173-4, 
18178-9; Banduka, T. 18649-52; 18842-3; Witness 165, T. 15727-8, 15779-82, 15788-91; P860 (Witness 
165 statement), pp. 1-3; Witness 636, T. 14449-50; P789 (Witness 636 statement), p. 5; Brown, T. 16425-31; 
P51 (Report of 2nd military district, March 1992), p. 3. 
TP
64
PT Bjelica, T. 22598-60, 22657; D167 (Report on crimes against humanity, FRY, January 1998), pp. 1-2; 
D120 (Excerpt from book Cunning Strategy by Sefer Halilović, 1997), p. 4. 
TP
65
PT Stavnjak, T. 17913-17, 17920, 18032-4. 
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Luka SJB. These delegations were received by the SDS president in Drvar, Dragan 
Knežević. Serb police officers from the Drvar SJB provided security for the transport of 
weapons from Drvar to other municipalities. Nenad Stevandić, who later became a member 
of the ARK crisis staff and was the head of a paramilitary group,TPF66FPT once said that the SDS 
leadership had taken the decision to use Drvar as a staging post for the supply arms to 
other municipalities. According to the witness, the weapons were finally distributed to 
individual Serbs via local SDS boards.TPF67FPT 
38. Witness 458 described how, in September 1991, thirty crates of military rifles, 
machine-guns, and ammunition manufactured at a factory in Serbia were seized at a farm, 
close to Banja Luka, owned by Veljko Milanković, a Serb leader of a paramilitary group 
which terrorized the Muslim population. Milanković explained that the weapons were 
given to him by the JNA 5th Corps, based in Banja Luka, for distribution to Serbs. Local 
(Serb) authorities released Milanković without prosecution.TPF68FPT 
39. During a speech delivered in 1993, Nemanja Vasić, president of the Prnjavor 
municipal assembly, stated that “the SDS played a key role ... in the prevention of a 
genocide against the Serbian people by having armed it on time.”TPF69FPT 
40. In a 1992 nomination for commendation by the Ilidža SJB, Tomislav Kovač was 
commended for having organized “illegal” meetings in 1991 in his capacity as commander 
of the SJB. According to the text of the nomination, “At those meetings which were held in 
Dobrinja, Ilidža and Blažuj, in addition to the obligations of gathering Serbs and their 
preparations for war, it was agreed to work intensively on the arming of citizens of Serbian 
nationality. The supplying of weapons was carried out from Ravna Romanija, Pale, 
Sokolac, Kalinovik, Nedavići village, Trnovo, Tošići village, Hadžići, Jusuf Džonlagić 
Barracks, Lukavica and Neđarići.” Kovač organized and was in charge of “the illegal work 
and arming of Serbian people.” The “illegal” meetings organized in Ilidža were held in 
cooperation with local SDS representatives and pursuant to SDS directives. TPF70FPT 
 
TP
66
PT P892, tab 54 (Report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), pp. 4-5. 
TP
67
PT Witness 636, T. 14446-52; P789 (Witness 636 statement), pp. 2-7. 
TP
68
PT P582.B (Witness 458 transcript), pp. 3873-93; P582.D (Witness 458 transcript), pp. 4094, 4100-4102; 
P582 (Witness 458 statement), paras 21, 23, 28; Witness 458, T. 11338-41; P582.H (Cover letter, 23 
September 1991); P582.I (Report on the activity of armed groups in Banja Luka, 23 September 1991). 
TP
69
PT P947 (Speech by Nemanja Vasić, September 1993); Vasić, T. 17516-17, 17520-23. 
TP
70
PT Nielsen, T. 13863-4, 13893-6, 13901-3; P763 (Nielsen report), para. 67; P763.C, tab 4 (Ilidža SJB, award 
commendations, 20 September 1993). See also: P529, tab 49 (Record of 50th session of Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly, 16 April 1995), pp. 323-4; P64 (Treanor Report), para. 82; Deronjić, T. 947-51, 956, 961-4; 
P46.A.1 (Telephone conversation between Kerteš and Karadžić, 24 June 1991); P184 (War record of 6th 
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41. Despite claims that the Serbs did not react effectively to the arming of Muslims and 
Croats and to their paramilitary formations,TPF71FPT the evidence shows that Serbs armed 
themselves in 28 indictment municipalities: Banja Luka,TPF72FPT Bileća,TPF73FPT Bosanska Krupa,TPF74FPT 
Bosanski Novi,TPF75FPT Bosanski Petrovac,TPF76FPT Bratunac,TPF77FPT Brčko,TPF78FPT Čelinac,TPF79FPT Doboj,TPF80FPT Donji 
Vakuf, TPF81FPT Foča,TPF82FPT Gacko,TPF83FPT Hadžići,TPF84FPT Ilidža,TPF85FPT Kalinovik,TPF86FPT Ključ,TPF87FPT Novi Grad,TPF88FPT Novo 
 
Infantry Brigade); P1001 (List of armed men, no date); Banduka, T. 18845-7; P910.A (Witness 79 
statement), pp. 3-4; P912 (Witness 114 statement), p. 3. 
TP
71
PT Savkić, T. 20468-84, 20486-92, 20524-9, 20532-3, 20541-2, 20545-53, 20634-7, 20644-7, 20681-9, 
20744-59, 20766-8, 20780-90, 20794-5; D131 (Vlasenica SJB report to CSB-SJB in Tuzla, 11 June 1991); 
D132 (Statement of Behto Kahrimanović, 8 June 1991); D130 (SDA party letter to SDA executive committee 
president, 11 July 1991); D133 (Letter from Bosnia-Herzegovina assistant to MUP, 12 March 1992); P1072 
(Declaration on ethnic distribution of selected names, 26 January 2006); P1073 (Bosnian-Serb MUP list of 
employees, 21 July 1992); P1060 (Minutes of Milići war presidency, 8 December 1992); P1061 (Report from 
Milići war presidency, 18 August 1995); D141 (Report of Vlasenica TO to Main Staff, 19 July 1992). 
TP
72
PT Witness 458, T. 11338-41, 11367-9, 11373-4; P582 (Witness 458 statement), paras 5-6, 9-14, 21, 23, 28, 
30, 40, 43, 79; P582.B (Witness 458 transcript), pp. 3860-3, 3873-74, 3890-3, 3897, 3908; P582.C (Witness 
458 transcript), pp. 3949, 4004; P582.D (Witness 458 transcript), pp. 4040-1, 4059, 4070-6, 4094, 4100-2; 
P582.H (Cover letter for exhibit P582.I, 23 September 1991); P582.I (Report on activity of armed groups on 
territory of Banja Luka CSB, 23 September 1991); 21, 28; Witness 636, T. 14429-30, 14446, 14450-2; P789 
(Witness 636 statement), pp. 5-7; P790.A (Telephone conversation between Nenad Stevandić and Radovan 
Karadžić, 17-18 August 1991). 
TP
73
PT P910.A (Witness 79 statement), pp. 3-4. 
TP
74
PT P307 (Report on work of Bosanska Krupa municipal assembly and war presidency, April 1992), p. 4; 
P529, tab 42 (Minutes of 3rd meeting of executive board of Bosanska Krupa, 24 December 1991), p. 1; P64 
(Treanor report), p. 151; P507 (Velić statement), pp. 2, 4-7. 
TP
75
PT Nielsen, T. 13863-4, 13893-6, 13901-3; P763 (Nielsen report), para. 67; P763.C, tab 4 (Ilidža SJB, award 
commendations, 20 September 1993), pp. 1-4; P468 (Hasan Alić statement), p. 3; P468.B (Hasan Alić 
statement), p. 1. 
TP
76
PT Witness 636, T. 14446, 14450-52; P789 (Witness 636 statement), pp. 5-7. 
TP
77
PT Deronjić, T. 863; 889-90, 936, 945-6, 964-7, 971-86, 988-91, 1004-11, 1184, 1187-90, 1193-5, 1200-1; 
P37 (Record of SDS party meeting, Sarajevo, 12 July 1991), p. 93; P52 (Letter sent by Rajko Dukić to 
Radovan Karadžić, 15 December 1992); P51 (Report of 2nd military district, March 1992), p. 6; P515 (Gušić 
statement), pp. 3-4; P515.B (Gušić transcript), 20100; Dubičić, T. 779, 800-1, 804-5; P481 (Dubičić 
statement), paras 11, 19, 22, 30. 
TP
78
PT Gaši, T. 390-2, 402-6, 535; P22 (Brčko war presidency situation report), p. 3; P514 (Redžić statement), pp. 
2-4; P514.B (Redžić transcript), pp. 762-6, 769-75, 778, 795-7. 
TP
79
PT P504 (Witness 428 statement), p. 3. 
TP
80
PT Witness 132, T. 12477, 12481, 12503; P636 (Witness 132 statement), para. 16. 
TP
81
PT P758.F (Report on setting up of Serbian SJB in Donji Vakuf, 4 October 1993), p. 1. 
TP
82
PT Witness 305, T. 12888, P683 (Witness 305 statement), pp. 2-3; Adjudicated facts 340-1; P696 (Witness 
577 transcript), pp. 455-6, 462-3; P912 (Witness 114 statement), p. 3. 
TP
83
PT P910.A (Witness 79 statement), pp. 3-6; P912 (Witness 114 statement), p. 3. 
TP
84
PT Nielsen, T. 13863-4, 13893-96, 13901-03; P763 (Nielsen report), paras 67-8; P763.C, tab 4 (Ilidža SJB, 
award commendations, 20 September 1993), pp. 1-2, 4; P763.C, tab 7 (Award commendation for Sreto 
Samardžija, no date), pp. 1-3. 
TP
85
PT P702.A (Čevro statement), pp. 2-4; P702 (Čevro statement), pp. 3-4. 
TP
86
PT Nielsen, T. 13863-4, 13893-6, 13901-3; P763 (Nielsen report), paras 67-8; P763.C, tab 4 (Ilidža SJB, 
award commendations, 20 September 1993), pp. 1-2, 4; P763.C, tab 7 (Award commendation for Sreto 
Samardžija, no date), pp. 1-3. 
TP
87
PT Egrlić, T. 4635-6, 4641-2, 4663-4, 4883. 
TP
88
PT Nielsen, T. 13863-4, 13893-6, 13901-3; P763 (Nielsen report), paras 67-8; P763.C, tab 4 (Ilidža SJB, 
award commendations, 20 September 1993), pp. 1-2, 4; P763.C, tab 7 (Award commendation for Sreto 
Samardžija, no date), pp. 1-3. 
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Sarajevo,TPF89FPT Pale,TPF90FPT Prijedor, TPF91FPT Prnjavor,TPF92FPT Rogatica,TPF93FPT Sanski Most,TPF94FPT Sokolac,TPF95FPT Trnovo,TPF96FPT 
Višegrad,TPF97FPT Vlasenica,TPF98FPT and Vogošća.TPF99FPT Evidence on the record shows that they also 
armed themselves in three non-indictment municipalities: Drvar, Kladanj, and Šekovići.TPF100FPT 
In addition to weapons, Bosnian Serbs were also often provided with training by JNA and 
police officers, and were in some cases organized into paramilitary groups.TPF101FPT 
42. A report on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1992 by General Milutin 
Kukanjac, commander of the JNA 2nd Military District (covering Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
small areas of Croatia) stated that “the leadership of Serbian people and all Serbs are ready 
for the war, in the case that the confederation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not accepted”, 
and indicated that the SDS had distributed 17,298 weapons to “volunteer units” in the 2nd 
Military District. Kukanjac acknowledged that the JNA and the SDS had armed 69,198 
Serbs, mostly volunteers outside the ranks of the TO and the JNA. The report also 
indicated that SDS leaders “at all levels” were trying to obtain weapons from the JNA and 
from the Serbian MUP.TPF102FPT On 31 August 1992 the 1st Krajina Corps reported to the VRS 
Main Staff that weapons and other military equipment were being issued, since 1991, to 
the TOs and other “structures outside the armed forces”, that is paramilitary units and the 
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Serb population in general.TPF103FPT This was for the protection of Serbs “from genocide in 
Croatia and the Serbian Republic”.TPF104FPT  
 
U2.3 State of fear 
43. There was fear among Bosnian Serbs that Muslims and Croats would engage in 
extreme violence against them. Several factors were seen to support this belief. First, some 
Bosnian Serbs had memories of crimes committed against Serbs during the Second World 
War,TPF105FPT and of injustices suffered during, and immediately after, World War I.TPF106FPT Second, 
some Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats expressed extreme and aggressive messages, 
even hinting at the physical annihilation of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF107FPT 
Third, armed gangs perpetrated crimes against Serbs or federal institutions – often viewed 
as “Serb-dominated” – based on ethnic motives.TPF108FPT This type of action fuelled fear and 
mutual distrust. Fourth, the SDS leadership did not discourage such fears, but rather shared 
them and made them public, thus exacerbating the mutual distrust among the ethnicities.TPF109FPT 
In the face of a growing divide between the SDA and the HDZ, on the one side, and the 
SDS, on the other, Bosnian Serbs experienced instances of “outvoting” by the other two 
main parties both at the central and the local levels, and feared for the future.TPF110FPT Moreover, 
Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, supported by their leaders, often did not respond to 
mobilization for the conflict in Croatia, and this deepened the rift between the national 
parties.TPF111FPT 
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44. According to Bogdan Subotić, JNA officer until early 1992 and Minister of Defence 
in the Bosnian-Serb Government from April 1992 onwards, Bosnian Serbs knew of, and 
were anxious about, an alleged plan by Alija Izetbegović to turn Bosnia-Herzegovina into a 
Muslim state within ten years pursuant to an “Islamic Declaration”, written by 
Izetbegović.TPF112FPT 
45. This state of fear, and the propaganda that went with it, did not abate. Herbert Okun 
was special advisor to Cyrus Vance from 1991 to 1993, and participated in negotiations on 
a peace plan for the former Yugoslavia as deputy chairperson of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. He met frequently with the Bosnian-Serb 
leadership.TPF113FPT Okun testified that Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan Milošević, the Accused, 
Nikola Koljević, and Alexander Buha repeatedly sought to justify the claim of the 
Bosnian-Serb leadership to extensive territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the 
“genocide” committed in the Second World War. When the issue of “ethnic cleansing” was 
raised, the Bosnian-Serb leadership again pointed at the genocide against the Serbs, linking 
it to the crimes that were being committed against the Serbs in 1991-1993. TPF114FPT  
46. In an interview published on 26 January 1992, the Accused stated that, in his view, 
an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina would become “an Islamic state” within ten years and 
added: 
As much as I do understand that the Muslims do not want to live in an Orthodox republic of 
BH, I also expect the Muslims to understand that the Serbs do not want to risk having to live 
in a republic that would resemble or be an Islamic republic.TPF115FPT 
47. The fear that the Bosnian Serbs could be left as a minority in someone else’s state 
was a paramount consideration in the minds of the SDS leadership. This theme was 
presented as justification for their claims to the territories where Serbs had been a majority 
before the genocide of the Second World War.TPF116FPT The question of the “national and 
physical survival of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who in recent history 
have been exposed to one of the worst genocides and policies of forced resettlement in 
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Europe” was highlighted in a document signed by the Accused and issued by the Bosnian-
Serb Assembly on 19 December 1991.TPF117FPT 
 
U2.4 Creation of Serb autonomous regions and districts 
48. During the first months of 1991 the SDS began to organize Serb-majority 
municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina into communities of municipalities, in some cases 
severing ties with pre-existing communities of municipalities. TPF118FPT This led to the creation of 
the Community of Municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina on 7 April 1991, followed by the 
associations of Romanija, and Eastern and Old Herzegovina, both formed in May 1991. TPF119FPT 
49. SDS party leaders justified the associations in terms of economic necessity.TPF120FPT 
However, among the functions the SDS assigned to the Bosnian Krajina community of 
municipalities was the organization of its defence in times of war or imminent threat of 
war.TPF121FPT The Chamber finds that, when considered together with the arming and 
mobilization of the Serbian population, this policy shows that the SDS was prepared to 
oppose even by force the possibility that Bosnia-Herzegovina would become an 
independent unitary state.  
50. The SDS party leadership, in agreement with the political establishment in Serbia, 
began considering options for a break-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines and a 
realignment of component parts with neighbouring states. On 14 February 1991 Slobodan 
Milošević briefed Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, and the Accused on the stance of 
each of the Presidents of the Yugoslav republics with respect to maintaining a federal 
Yugoslavia. A few days after this meeting, Karadžić gave an interview in which he stated 
that, should Croatia and Slovenia secede, the “core Yugoslavia” that remained would have 
to adjust its borders by applying “the ethnic principle”: to the extent possible, Serb villages 
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would remain in Yugoslavia, and Croatian villages would become part of the new Croatian 
state.TPF122FPT 
51. A confidential SDS document, dated 23 February 1991, considered specific actions 
to be taken should Bosnia-Herzegovina move towards independence.TPF123FPT In such a case 
municipal authorities were to ensure that only Yugoslav (federal) law would apply, 
suspending the implementation of republican regulations and thus creating “a legal 
foundation for direct communication (assistance, cooperation, and the like) between these 
municipalities and the Federation and its organs (such as the SFRY Assembly, Presidency, 
federal Executive Council …) and through them, this would provide particularly for the 
need to engage the Yugoslav People’s Army, [and] the Federal Secretariat for National 
Defence.” TPF124FPT This policy was adopted by the SDS Deputies’ Club, the parliamentary 
caucus of the party,TPF125FPT and was made public in a document dated 10 June 1991. TPF126FPT 
52. By June 1991 the SDS leadership ordered SDS organs in the municipalities to 
prepare maps of the municipalities showing as precisely as possible, in colour, the ethnic 
composition of each territory.TPF127FPT 
53. On 25 June 1991 Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from the SFRY. 
The JNA’s attempts to seize control of strategic assets in Slovenia were thwarted by the 
local TO, and the conflict in Slovenia effectively ended on 18 July.TPF128FPT 
54. The armed conflict in Croatia commenced in the summer of 1991 and the fighting 
continued into the autumn. In September 1991, as part of a wider JNA operation in Croatia, 
the JNA 5th Corps (based in Bosnia-Herzegovina during peacetime) was mobilized and 
deployed in Croatia.TPF129FPT The Yugoslav Government said that the military action in Croatia 
was necessary to protect Croatian Serbs from “physical liquidation”.TPF130FPT In connection with 
the conflict in Croatia, sporadic clashes occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina when federal 
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authorities attempted to mobilize part of the non-Serb population.TPF131FPT A cease-fire was 
reached in Croatia on 2 January 1992, with the acceptance of the Vance Plan.TPF132FPT  
55. The armed conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia increased animosity between the SDS, 
on the one hand, and the SDA and HDZ, on the other.TPF133FPT In late August 1991 the SDS 
leadership began to consider the creation of a separate Serb territory in Bosnia-
Herzegovina with a view to enabling Serbs to remain in Yugoslavia should the other 
national communities proceed with the creation of an independent republic. This plan 
envisaged the institution of separate Serb political, police, and military structures in order 
to institute, at a later stage, separate governmental functions uniting the Serbs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.TPF134FPT On the other hand, the possibility that Croatia and Slovenia might secede 
from SFRY worried the SDA and the HDZ, for it would leave Bosnia-Herzegovina in a 
Serb-dominated diminished Yugoslavia.TPF135FPT 
56. In July 1991 Karadžić expressed the view that the SDS, if needed, was able to 
create parallel state structures in a very short time.TPF136FPT In a conversation on 22 August 1991, 
Biljana Plavšić told her interlocutor that “if there is no other way to settle our Bosnian 
matters here, we shall, let me tell you, opt for secession [from Bosnia-Herzegovina] and 
get it over with”. She went on to state that it was unacceptable for Serbs to become a 
minority in an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. TPF137FPT 
57. On 7 September 1991, at a meeting in Pale, the SDS issued a “Decision on 
promulgation of autonomous regions as unquestionable parts of the federal state of 
Yugoslavia and as constituent parts of the federal unit of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on 
separation of settlements of one municipality and their integration into another 
municipality”.TPF138FPT During the same month the SDS implemented a policy of 
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“regionalization”. This consisted in the creation of “regions” in which Serbs were the 
relative majority. On 16 September the SDS Executive Board approved the appointment of 
a regionalization staff. At least three communities of municipalities – Eastern and Old 
Herzegovina, Bosnian Krajina (ARK), and Romanija – became Serb Autonomous Districts 
or Regions (SAOs) in September 1991. More SAOs were formed between September and 
November 1991: Semberija-Majevica, Northern Bosnia, and Birač.TPF139FPT 
58. The ARK, in particular, distinguished itself for strong independent action since its 
inception, when its authorities started taking over television and radio installations, and 
broadcasting “Serb” programs that intimidated persons of other nationalities. Muslim 
leaders were barred from the radio while SDS leaders had unlimited access.TPF140FPT 
59. The pursuit of regionalization, according to the Accused, was used by the SDS in 
response to the HDZ’s and SDA’s attempts to discuss independence of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Regionalization was a leverage, in his view, to suggest to the SDS’s coalition 
partners that the three parties should reach an overall agreement on the whole of Bosnia-
Herzegovina: its status within Yugoslavia as well as its internal organization.TPF141FPT 
60. However, the situation made the SDS leadership increasingly feel they were being 
pushed into a corner. They therefore resolved to start requesting loyal officials in 
republican organs to report along party lines. In September and October 1991, SDS 
officials and top-ranking personnel of republican (Bosnia-Herzegovina) organs met to 
exchange information and establish coordination and cooperation between SDS members 
in various organs.TPF142FPT They adopted a resolution to set up “a duty system in order to monitor 
activities, implementation of tasks in state organs, day-to-day problem management in 
different fields and serve as a liaison with the SDS.”TPF143FPT  
61. Witness Stjepan Kljuić was president of the HDZ and a member of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina Presidency.TPF144FPT In the summer of 1991 the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP Minister 
 
TP
139
PT Treanor, T. 1393-5; P64 (Treanor report), para. 136; P65, tab 40 (Record of 3rd meeting of SDS Executive 
Board, 16 September 1991), p. 2; P68, tab 13 (Map of SAOs); Deronjić, T. 922-4, 927; P41 (Minutes of 
Bratunac SDS, 19 October 1991); P39 (Minutes of Bratunac SDS, 25 October 1991). 
TP
140
PT Egrlić, T. 4665; Adjudicated fact 115; P564 (Sejmenović transcript), pp. 4480-1, 4553-6; P64 (Treanor 
Report), para. 136.  
TP
141
PT Krajišnik, T. 23020, 23026, 23030, 23039. 
TP
142
PT P65, tab 34 (Record of meeting of SDS officials, 12 September 1991), p. 1. 
TP
143
PT Treanor, T. 1386, 1390-1, 2218; P65, tab 34 (Record of meeting of SDS members working in Bosnian 
state organs, 12 September 1991), p. 7; P65, tab 38 (Confidential instructions from SDS president 
introducing a code system, August 1991); P65, tab 37 (Secret communication codes, no date). 
TP
144
PT P291 (Kljuić statement), para. 5. 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 2 
 Political precursors 
 
 
30 
presented Kljuić with a recording of a telephone conversation between Slobodan Milošević 
and Radovan Karadžić.TPF145FPT Kljuić understood from that conversation that the territories 
around Banja Luka, together with the existing Serb holdings in Croatia, were to become 
the western border of a “Serb” state, which would encompass 70 to 75 per cent of the 
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF146FPT In the autumn of 1991 Milošević confirmed this plan to 
the witness, adding that the left bank of the Neretva river (in southern Bosnia-
Herzegovina) belonged to the Serbs.TPF147FPT Also in the autumn of 1991 Kljuić met with the 
Accused and other SDS leaders in the Accused’s office. Kljuić suggested that Bosnia-
Herzegovina should recognize the existing borders of Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro, 
so that those states would not make territorial claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF148FPT The 
Accused, Karadžić, and Koljević all disagreed with this proposal and insisted that either 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole would remain in Yugoslavia, or it would be divided: 
Western Herzegovina would become part of Croatia, while the Bosnian Serbs would join 
Yugoslavia.TPF149FPT 
62. Thus, by autumn 1991, two political options for the settlement of the “Bosnian 
question” openly competed in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF150FPT One option, 
espoused by the SDA and the HDZ as well as the majority of opposition parties,TP F151FPT 
envisaged sovereign and internationally recognized statehood for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
other option, preferred by the SDS and some of the smaller parties, was that Bosnia-
Herzegovina should remain within Yugoslavia.TPF152FPT Each side radically opposed the other’s 
option, and the SDS was ready to have “Serb” territories secede from an independent 
Bosnia-Herzegovina if that was the only way for Serbs to remain in Yugoslavia.TPF153FPT 
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2.5 Creation of Bosnian-Serb Assembly 
63. By October 1991, the three-party coalition was crumbling.TPF154FPT The SDA and HDZ 
pressed the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly to discuss a declaration of sovereignty of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would pave the way for the republic to assert its independence 
from Yugoslavia. The SDS protested that such a declaration would be unconstitutional as it 
would infringe on the rights of one nationality recognized by the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
constitution, namely the Serbs, and it had not been vetted by the Council for Ethnic 
Equality.TPF155FPT 
64. In the course of the debate on whether to vote on such a declaration of sovereignty, 
during the night of 14 and 15 October 1991, Radovan Karadžić expressed strong 
opposition and warned that the SDS would make use of constitutional mechanisms to 
prevent a vote.TPF156FPT When the other parties decided to proceed with the vote, the Accused, as 
President of the Assembly, adjourned the session to the next morning. TPF157FPT The SDS 
deputies, as well as most Serb deputies not in the SDS, left the hall. However, the vice-
president of the Assembly then reconvened the session and the declaration was adopted. 
Without intervening, the Accused followed events on television from his office with some 
other deputies.TPF158FPT 
65. On 15 October 1991 the SDS Political Council met to assess the situation. 
Addressing the meeting, the Accused suggested that, since the decision to adopt the 
declaration was illegal and unconstitutional, the SDS had to find a method of denouncing 
it.TPF159FPT During this and other meetings, the idea emerged that the SDS should form its own 
institutions, which would function in parallel to those of Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF160FPT On 16 
October the SDS’s “Announcement to the Serbian people” stated that the SDA and HDZ 
had breached the constitutional order. It reiterated the SDS’s support for federal 
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institutions, including the JNA. TPF161FPT At the SDS Deputies’ Club meeting of 18 October the 
SDS leadership decided to hold a plebiscite on the question of secession from 
Yugoslavia.TPF162FPT 
66. On 23 October 1991, the Yugoslav presidency invited Radovan Karadžić, the 
Accused, Nikola Koljević, and Biljana Plavšić, among others, to a meeting. TPF163FPT The main 
object was to “calculate the percentage of the population from the territories of the former 
Yugoslavia who were supporting Yugoslavia, the concept of Federation, the policy 
promoted by Milošević.” TPF164FPT The next day, Karadžić spoke with Milošević on the phone, 
and stated:  
We will establish Yugoslavia in all the areas where we live … You can talk to [Izetbegović 
and] tell him that Karadžić and the others will not give up on establishing an Assembly and 
parallel organs of authority … We will establish full authority over the Serbian territories in 
BH and none of his lawyers will be, will be able to show his nose there. He will not be able 
to exercise power. He will not have control over 65% of his territory. That is our goal … No, 
we’re not excited at all. Our steps are calculated and we have to establish authority and 
control over our territories, so that he doesn’t get [a] sovereign Bosnia.TPF165FPT 
67. On 24 October 1991 the SDS deputies convened separately and established the 
Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnian-Serb Assembly).TPF166FPT The 
Accused was elected President of this Assembly. Nikola Koljević, Biljana Plavšić, 
Radovan Karadžić, Milutin Najdanović, and Miodrag Simović were “authorised to 
represent and protect the interests of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.” It was 
resolved that, for the time being, Serb representatives in republican bodies would not 
relinquish their offices and would carry out their duties “in accordance with the law”.TPF167FPT In 
practice, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly began as a gathering of the SDS Deputies’ Club, 
joined by a few Serb non-SDS deputies from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly. The 
Accused testified that the Assembly was only open to Serbian deputies elected in the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly because it was they who had a right to have a say when 
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“vital interests were decided upon”.TPF168FPT At that founding session the Accused said that the 
reason which prompted Serb deputies to establish the Assembly was the “serious attempt 
of transgressing against the national sovereignty of the Serbian people of Bosnia-
Herzegovina ... which, consequently, endangers its existence in the territory of Bosnia-
Herzegovina”.TPF169FPT 
68. During the same session, Bosnian-Serb deputies passed a resolution that “the 
Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina shall stay in the joint state of Yugoslavia together 
with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonija, Baranja, Western Sirmium 
[Zapadni Srem], and others who may declare that they wished to stay,” subject to 
confirmation by a plebiscite.TPF170FPT 
69. Twenty-three sessions of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly were held between October 
1991 and December 1992. The evidence shows that all were chaired by the Accused, 
except for the 15th session (held on 6 and 7 April 1992), when at least part of the session 
was chaired by Milovan Milanović.TPF171FPT Deputies attending these sessions came from the 
following indictment municipalities: Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bileća, Bosanska Krupa, 
Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Brčko, Čajniče, Čelinac, Doboj, Donji Vakuf, Foča, 
Gacko, Sarajevo, Ključ, Kalinovik, Kotor Varoš, Nevesinje, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski 
Most, Sokolac, Teslić, and Zvornik.TPF172FPT 
70. On 26 October 1991 all SDS presidents of the municipalities in the ARK as well as 
ARK government met with Radovan Karadžić. During this meeting an order was presented 
and “fully accepted” by those present.TPF173FPT (It is not clear whether the order pre-dated 26 
October, and whether it was distributed outside the ARK before that date). The order 
consisted of fourteen points and called for, among other things, a “town command” 
amounting to a military administration; intensified mobilization of the TO; formation of 
military units; subordination of the TO to the JNA; disbanding of paramilitary units and 
their reassignment to the TO; take-over of public enterprises, the post office, banks, 
judiciary, media, and the SDK (Social Accounting Service); coordination with local 
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directors and with the SDS in Sarajevo to ensure supplies for the population; and 
imposition of war taxes. The order was sent by telex on 29 October 1991 to presidents of 
all municipalities in the ARK by Radoslav Brđanin, in his capacity as “coordinator for 
implementing decisions”. TPF174FPT 
71. Already on 18 October 1991 Radovan Karadžić, as president of SDS, had declared 
a state of emergency in the SDS and ordered the organization of daily meetings of the SDS 
municipal boards and round-the-clock duty watches, indicating that instructions would 
follow on a daily basis.TPF175FPT There is evidence that two SDS municipal boards, Bosanski 
Petrovac and Bratunac, responded to the emergency by setting up crisis staffs in their 
municipalities.TPF176FPT 
72. The Chamber considers these events to be important, since they are early examples 
of SDS (party) documents requiring direct implementation of instructions by organs of the 
public administration, such as republican and regional institutions. 
73. At a rally in Banja Luka in November 1991 the Accused stated in reference to the 
Serb plebiscite: “All the dark forces have for various reasons harnessed to destroy our 
common fatherland, to tear us into pieces. And I hope we won’t allow that.”TPF177FPT The 
plebiscite was held on 9 and 10 November 1991. Although all ethnicities were allowed to 
vote in the plebiscite, ballots were of different colours depending on the ethnicity of the 
voter.TPF178FPT Few non-Serbs participated. TPF179FPT The figures reported at the Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly on 21 November were: 99.9 per cent of the 1,162,032 Serbs who voted and 99.1 
per cent of the 49,342 non-Serbs who voted, voted in favour of remaining in 
Yugoslavia.TPF180FPT  
74. On 21 November 1991 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly proclaimed as part of the 
territory of federal Yugoslavia all those municipalities, communes, and settlements where 
 
TP
174
PT P228 (Sarajevo SDS order, 29 October 1991); Egrlić, T. 4671-2, 4877-89. 
TP
175
PT Treanor, T. 1442-3; P528 (Hanson Report), para. 9; P65, tab 51 (Telegram by SDS president Karadžić to 
Zavidovići SDS, 18 October 1991, 18 October 1991); P529, tab 8 (Telegram by Karadžić to Donji Vakuf 
SDS, 18 October 1991); P65, tab 52 (Fax by Novi Travnik SDS to SDS Main Board, 19 October 1991); 
P529, tab 10 (Reply by Odžak SDS, 20 October 1991); P529, tab 11 (Minutes from SDS Sarajevo council 
and executive committee joint session, 27 November 1991), p. 4. 
TP
176
PT Hanson, T. 9622, 10001-2; Deronjić, T. 922-4, 927; P529, tab 14 (Conclusion of Bosanski Petrovac SDS, 
24 October 1991); P41 (Minutes of Bratunac SDS, 19 October 1991); P39 (Minutes of Bratunac SDS, 25 
October 1991), pp. 8-9; P529, tab 16 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Bratunac crisis staff, 26 October 1991). 
TP
177
PT P354.A (Record of SDS rally for plebiscite, November 1991); Radić, T. 7377. 
TP
178
PT Trbojević, T. 12206; P934 (Donia report), p. 34. 
TP
179
PT Treanor, T. 1476-81; P934 (Donia report), p. 34. 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 2 
 Political precursors 
 
 
35 
a majority of registered citizens of Serb nationality had voted in favour of remaining in 
Yugoslavia.TPF181FPT If the majority in one municipality had voted to remain within Yugoslavia, 
the whole of that municipality would remain. Municipalities where the majority of people 
had not participated in the plebiscite (and were, thus, presumably, non-Serb-majority 
municipalities), the SDS proposed to look at single communes or settlements: if local 
communities had voted to remain, then only that community would be considered part of 
Yugoslavia, while the rest of the territory of the municipality would be allowed to join an 
independent Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF182FPT 
75. Also on 21 November, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly adopted a resolution declaring 
full support for the JNA in defence of the common state of Yugoslavia and in conducting 
mobilization of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to reinforce military units. 
The resolution added: “Serbian people and other people who wish to preserve Yugoslavia 
are called upon to respond to military call-ups”.TPF183FPT 
76. The third act of the Assembly on 21 November was to certify the proclamation of 
the SAOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF184FPT The ARK had its seat in Banja Luka and comprised 
the following indictment municipalities: Banja Luka, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, 
Čelinac, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, “as well as parts of other 
municipalities from this region with a majority Serbian population”.TPF185FPT  
77. Fourth, the Assembly appointed a commission on the adoption of a constitution. 
The Accused was elected to this commission.TPF186FPT  
78. Fifth, the Assembly recommended to the SDS Deputies’ Club in the Bosnia-
Herzegovina Assembly to foster a division of the joint mass media and the creation of 
separate radio and television channels, “which shall provide objective, true and just 
accounts of the Serbian people.”TPF187FPT  
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79. Moreover, the Assembly voted to authorize Radovan Karadžić, Nikola Koljević, 
Biljana Plavšić, the Accused, Aleksandar Buha, and Vojislav Maksimović to negotiate 
with Muslim and Croat representatives “on the organisation of the future common life” in 
the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. TPF188FPT The Accused, Koljević, and Karadžić remained 
negotiators until at least 2 August 1992.TPF189FPT 
80. During the same session of 21 November 1991, the Accused declared that “these 
are crucial times for the survival of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I 
would dare to say – even more broadly – when it comes to the Serbian people as such.” He 
cautioned that “All proposed solutions must be based on the Constitution and the laws, 
reflecting the interests of the Serbian people, but not at the expense of other peoples in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”.TPF190FPT 
 
2.6 SDS Instructions of 19 December 1991 
81. It soon became clear to the Bosnian-Serb leadership that the creation of a parallel 
Assembly and the calls for support of federal institutions (primarily the JNA) would most 
likely not result in Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining in Yugoslavia. Between November and 
December 1991, therefore, the SDS leadership began practical preparations for a separate 
state, should Bosnia-Herzegovina secede. 
82. A letter signed by the Accused as President of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on 19 
December 1991, addressed to the government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian 
Krajina (on the territory of Croatia), reflected not only the shared goal that all Serbs live in 
one state, but also the idea that Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were, even as 
minorities, on territory which historically belonged to them:TPF191FPT 
Your struggle for freedom and your demands represent the demands of the entire Serbian 
people. They all add up to the realization of our basic right not to allow any power, whatever 
it may be, to divide us into several states and transform us into a people without a future. All 
Serbs are engaged in a struggle for the same goal ... and we are all convinced of our ultimate 
victory. Every Serb, and particularly we who have been elected to lead our people, is 
individually responsible for those obligations of ours which we have not yet fulfilled ... not 
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individually to the Serbs of Krajina, Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, but to all Serbs in Yugoslavia and the 
world. TPF192FPT 
83. On 2 December 1991 Herbert Okun and Cyrus Vance met with Radovan Karadžić 
in Belgrade. According to Okun, Karadžić expressed his concern that Bosnia-Herzegovina 
would become independent. He strongly advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia as a 
federal state, in order to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs would not become a minority in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. He expressed fear that the Muslims wanted to control all of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and that they expected to achieve this through their higher birth rate. He also 
said that unless the Bosnian-Serb municipalities formed a lawful connection with 
Yugoslavia, war would result. Okun and Vance understood Karadžić to mean that unless 
the Bosnian Serbs were able to satisfy their demands through peaceful means, they would 
attempt to satisfy them through war.TPF193FPT 
84. At the third session of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, held on 11 December 1991, the 
Accused told the deputies:  
In municipal assemblies where Serb representatives are in the minority, such as Novi Grad, 
Olovo, where decisions against the Serbian people are imposed on them by the majority, 
they should form municipal assemblies just like we formed the Assembly of the Serbian 
people here ... The initiative has come from numerous municipalities, which claim that the 
representatives cannot achieve anything, that everything is being done by outvoting and the 
will of others imposed on them that way.TPF194FPT 
85. A recommendation was passed that separate (Serb) municipal assemblies should be 
formed in areas where Serbs were in the minority.TPF195FPT Nonetheless, the Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly emphasized that the deputies should continue to work in their (Bosnia-
Herzegovina) municipal assemblies and organs “unless such work is inconsistent with the 
need for preserving the equality and interests of the Serbian people”.TPF196FPT 
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86. On 19 or 20 December 1991 a document entitled “Instructions for the Organisation 
and Activity of the Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
Extraordinary Circumstances”, dated “Sarajevo, 19 December 1991”, was introduced to 
the participants of a meeting of high-level SDS representatives. The text of the document is 
under the heading “Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Main Board” 
and is marked strictly confidential. The words “SDS Crisis Staff” appear on the last page 
of the document.TPF197FPT Various exemplars of the document exist, with different handwritten 
marks and numbers on them, sometimes indicating that the document was faxed to SDS 
municipal boards.TPF198FPT Karadžić, in addressing the meeting, said that SDS municipal boards 
would become responsible, pursuant to these Instructions, for creating a network that 
would cover all Serbs living in the municipalities.TPF199FPT All members of the SDS Main Board, 
including the Accused, were present at that meeting. TPF200FPT 
87. The Instructions begin with the following paragraphs: 
1. The adoption of the following Instructions was prompted by well-founded suspicions that 
certain forces were working, in a persistent, thorough and organised manner, toward a forced 
separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thereby of the Serbian people, from Yugoslavia. 
The standardised tasks, measures and activities outlined here will be carried out within the 
Serbian national community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to implement the 
plebiscitary decision of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina to live in one state, 
both under existing conditions and in any circumstances that might arise from the current 
political and security situation. 
2. The tasks, measures and other activities described in these Instructions will be undertaken 
in order to enhance the preparedness of the Serbian people and its readiness to defend its 
interests. 
3. The tasks, measures and other activities described in these Instructions shall be 
implemented on the entire territory of the SR BiH, i.e. in all the municipalities inhabited by 
the Serbian people, to wit:  
- in their entirety, in municipalities where the Serbs are a majority (Variant “A”) and, 
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- partially, in municipalities where the Serbs are not a majority (Variant “B”). 
4. In order to ensure uniform and timely implementation, the tasks, measures and other 
activities shall be implemented in variants “A” and “B”, each consisting of two stages.TPF201FPT 
88. The “first stage” of Variant A, applicable in municipalities with Serbs in the 
majority, includes the following instructions: 
The SDS municipal board shall immediately form a crisis staff of the Serbian people in the 
municipality, to be composed of: 
- all members of the secretariat of the SDS municipal board; 
- municipal officials who are also SDS nominees in the following organs: president of the 
municipal assembly or president of the municipal executive committee; chief of the 
public security station or commander of the police; commander or chief of the municipal 
territorial defence staff; secretary of the municipal national defence secretariat or another 
SDS-nominated official from the secretariat; 
- assemblymen in the Assembly of the Serbian people of BH 
- members of the Main Board of the SDS of BH from the municipality in question. TPF202FPT 
89. The Instructions set out a number of other actions to be taken at the municipal level: 
Convene and proclaim an assembly of the Serbian people in the municipality ... Carry out 
preparations for the setting up of state organs in the municipality (executive committee, 
administrative organs, magistrates’ court, public security station, etc.) and propose 
individuals for posts and duties in these organs. Prepare the take-over of staff, facilities and 
equipment of security services centres and their incorporation into the newly established 
internal affairs organ ... Upgrade the protection and security of vital buildings and facilities 
in the municipality ... Make an estimate of the necessary size of active and reserve police 
forces, TO units, and Civil Defence units; on the basis of the estimate, these structures shall 
be reinforced and other necessary measures shall be taken for their activation, as may be 
required by further developments. The order to activate these units shall be issued by the 
crisis staff in each municipality ... Carry out preparations (create organisational means and 
other conditions) for: 
- ... reinforcing combat units as classified by the JNA with manpower as well as 
inventoried materiel and livestock, according to federal regulations, based on the Serbian 
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principles of fairness and humanity, with SDS officials, other leaders and distinguished 
Serbs serving as personal examples; 
- the protection of material resources important for defence and resistance, as well as for 
the survival and activities of the population. 
90. The main actions of the second stage include the establishment of state organs in the 
municipality; the mobilization of all Serb members of the police forces in cooperation with 
“JNA commands and staffs”; the implementation of orders to mobilize reserve JNA forces 
and TO units; the assumption of control over public finances; and the take-over of the staff, 
premises, and equipment of the security services. 
91. The second stage of Variant A also includes the following instruction: “In the 
implementation of all these measures, ensure respect for the national and other rights of 
members of all peoples and, subsequently, ensure their involvement in the administrative 
authorities to be set up by the assembly of the Serbian people in the municipality.” 
92. The instructions forming part of the first stage of Variant B, relating to 
municipalities where Serbs did not constitute a majority, are substantially the same as those 
relating to Variant A, including the membership in the crisis staffs. The only significant 
difference in the first stage of Variant B is the instruction qualifying the actions for setting 
up state organs in the municipality, which states: “Ensure proportionate representation in 
government organs of members of other nations and nationalities who have expressed their 
loyalty to federal Yugoslavia.” 
93. In some respects the instructions relating to the second stage of Variant B demand 
less forceful action. They are focused primarily on municipal sub-regions in which Serbs 
were in the majority. Thus, for example, unlike in Variant A, there is no instruction to take 
over the staff, premises, and equipment of the security services in the municipality. 
Instead, at this point Variant B states: “At the approaches to places inhabited by Serbs, 
organize covert surveillance and set up a system for reporting all possible threats to the 
Serbian population.” 
94. The Instructions have a general section on their mode of implementation. This 
requires the crisis staff to “obtain and respect expressions of loyalty (in written form, if 
possible) to the constitutional order and judicial system of the federal state of Yugoslavia 
by citizens of other nationalities.” Implementation of the Instructions was to be “in 
accordance with the federal Constitution, federal laws and other federal regulations, as well 
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as regulations issued by the Republic, when these do not conflict with federal 
regulations.” TPF203FPT 
95. The Instructions conclude: “The tasks, measures and other activities set out in these 
Instructions may be implemented only by order of the president of the SDS BH, according 
to a secret procedure especially established for the purpose ... at a later date.”TPF204FPT 
96. The authorities of Republika Srpska, in a letter to the Tribunal’s Office of the 
Prosecutor dated November 2001, stated that the Instructions “were given by a certain 
number of retired officers of the former Yugoslav People’s Army”, and not by the SDS 
Main Board or another SDS body.TPF205FPT 
97. Some witnesses heard by the Chamber claimed that the Instructions never existed or 
that they did not reflect official SDS policy.TPF206FPT However, despite some uncertainty about 
who authored the Instructions and how they were disseminated, the Chamber finds that 
they reflected SDS policy and that they found their way to local SDS leaders between 20 
December 1991 and the early months of 1992. Moreover, the Instructions were received 
and implemented, fully or partially, in several municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF207FPT 
The SDS in several municipalities relied on the Instructions for actions, in particular when 
proclaiming the municipality as being Serb.TPF208FPT As detailed below, Karadžić also referred to 
their implementation in the weeks following 20 December 1992. 
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98. Preparations for take-over in municipalities started immediately after the 
Instructions were announced. On 21 December 1991 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly 
appointed a coordinator of the work of governments and executive bodies of the SAOs, 
Jovan Čizmović, who was tasked with, among other things, the implementation of the 19 
December Instructions.TPF209FPT Despite differences due to the circumstances of each 
municipality, several SDS officials in Bosnia-Herzegovina deemed the Instructions as 
providing guidance during that exceptional period.TPF210FPT 
99. The majority of the Serb crisis staffs were created by the first months of 1992.TPF211FPT 
Among the exceptions are the crisis staffs in Bratunac and Bosanski Petrovac,TP F212FPT 
established already in October 1991, as discussed above, and the crisis staffs of Foča,TPF213FPT 
Brčko,TPF214FPT Sokolac,TPF215FPT Bosanski Novi,TPF216FPT and the ARK,TP F217FPT which were not established until 
April or May 1992. 
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2.7 Proclamation of Bosnian-Serb Republic 
100. Around 20 December 1991, SDS members Nikola Koljević and Biljana Plavšić 
voiced their opposition to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency’s decision to apply to the 
Badinter Commission – established by the European Community to issue advisory 
opinions on legal matters relating to the Yugoslav crisis – for recognition as an 
independent state.TPF218FPT 
101. On 21 December 1991 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly adopted a statement pointing 
out that the decisions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency in favour of independence 
were taken unconstitutionally and contrary to the equality of the three ethnicities.TPF219FPT It also 
decided “to commence preparations for the establishment of the Republic of Serbian 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal unit within Yugoslavia”,TPF220FPT despite the fact that, by 
that time, Milošević had informed Karadžić and the Accused that the international 
community intended to foster an independent, federal, Bosnia-Herzegovina and that 
Yugoslavia would only consist of Serbia and Montenegro.TPF221FPT  
102. The deputies proceeded to establish a Ministerial Council, which was to act under 
the Assembly.TPF222FPT Vitomir Žepinić and Mićo Stanišić, high-level officials in the Bosnia-
Herzegovina MUP, were named to the Council, the former as Minister of Internal Affairs 
and the latter as Minister without portfolio.TPF223FPT The proclamation of a Bosnian-Serb 
Republic was set for 14 January 1992.TPF224FPT Radovan Karadžić suggested that a solution to 
the crisis might lie in the creation of three entities, each with ties to different states. He said 
that while his proposal might seem complicated, 
we can accommodate everything; everything is better than civil war; everything is better than 
imposing one’s solution onto others. Everything is better than chaos and hell ... we are 
committed not to take part in any such thing, unless it is imposed upon us in the way that it 
was imposed on our brothers in Croatia.TPF225FPT 
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103. On 9 January 1992 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly unanimously proclaimed “the 
Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina” to be: 
a federal unit of the Yugoslav federal state in the territories of the Serbian autonomous areas 
in the region and of other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the 
regions in which the Serbian people remained in minority due to the genocide conducted 
against it in World War II, and on the basis of the plebiscite held on 9 and 10 November 
1991, at which the Serbian people decided to remain in the joint state of Yugoslavia.TPF226FPT 
The Assembly added that the “territorial delimitation with political communities of other 
peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the solution of other mutual rights and 
obligations, shall be performed in a peaceful manner and with mutual agreement”.TPF227FPT The 
implementation of the proclamation was conditional upon the recognition of independence 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the international community.TPF228FPT Nevertheless, the SDS-backed 
arming of the Serb population during this period shows that the Bosnian-Serb leadership 
was also simultaneously preparing for another course of action. 
104. The SDS leadership had lost hope that a compromise could be reached with the 
other parties. On 31 December 1991 the Oslobođenje newspaper published an interview 
with Alija Izetbegović, in which he called for the establishment of a sovereign and 
independent Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF229FPT In a conversation the following day, Radovan 
Karadžić and the Accused reacted to this development. Karadžić said that “We will release 
our tigers and let them do their job ... we shouldn’t hold them back.” The Accused replied 
“We have to, but they’ll do it anyway, whether you want them to or not.” They both agreed 
that following Izetbegović’s proclamation they would no longer be able to calm the Serb 
people, as they had managed to do until that moment. Karadžić said that “he [Izetbegović] 
wants war. He’s playing with fire thinking Serbs wouldn’t ...”; the Accused interjected, 
saying “We have to use the first opportunity to tell him that he’s playing with fire.”TPF230FPT  
105. The SDS leadership thus decided to proceed on two tracks, in order to keep its 
options open for as long as possible. On the one hand, they participated in negotiations 
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with the other parties to find acceptable arrangements for the three nationalities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. On the other hand, they actively prepared for unilateral separation of what 
they considered Serb territories from Bosnia-Herzegovina in case the negotiations failed to 
achieve results. Karadžić warned that international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
without the necessary transformation would lead to armed conflict.TPF231FPT For this second 
option, they could build upon the solid SDS structure throughout the republic. 
106. On 11 January 1992 Radovan Karadžić and the Accused attended the first meeting 
of the Bosnian-Serb Ministerial Council, where they participated in a discussion on 
“execution of tasks resulting from the Declaration … of the Republic of the Serbian People 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina” which, as mentioned above, had been adopted two days 
earlier. The list of priorities identified at the meeting included definition of Bosnian-Serb 
ethnic territory and the establishment of government organs in that territory.TPF232FPT Following 
this meeting, Bosnian-Serb authorities moved ahead with the organization of a separate 
Serb MUP. TPF233FPT This meeting also shows the officialization of the SAOs within the structure 
of the nascent Serb state: SAO presidents were made ex officio members of the Ministerial 
Council.TPF234FPT 
107. On 17 January 1992, at a session of the Ministerial Council, at which the Accused 
was also present, a draft programme of work for the Council was presented. It called for 
the adoption of the Constitution and for the organization of the territory in such a way so as 
to “enlarge the territory of the regions and encompass a larger number of inhabitants 
wherever possible in order to consolidate the regions both ethnically and economically.” It 
placed “particular stress ... on the need for political and territorial organization of the 
regions by the formation of new municipalities in border areas of these regions.”TPF235FPT At that 
same session it was decided that the Commission on the Constitution, of which the 
Accused was a member, and the Ministerial Council, would be tasked with preparation, by 
15 February 1992, of draft legislation to enable the Bosnian-Serb Republic to start 
functioning.TPF236FPT 
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108. During this period, the SDS started contemplating military conflict as a likelihood, 
and no longer as a mere possibility. Thus, as mentioned above, arming and mobilization of 
the population in cooperation with the JNA increased. For example, the SDS formed its 
own military unit in Milići, Vlasenica municipality, which was equipped by the JNA’s 
216th Brigade. Furthermore, in order to replace Croat and Muslim soldiers who refused to 
mobilize in Rogatica and Sokolac municipalities, two exclusively Serb battalions of the 
216th Brigade were formed with the assistance of the SDS. These battalions then armed 
and equipped Serb civilians in neighbouring villages and, from March 1992 onwards, their 
commanders reported exclusively to the brigade commander, Colonel Dragomir Milošević 
who, in turn, reported directly to General Vojislav Đurđevac,TP PTcommander of the JNA 4th 
Corps.TPF237FPT Rajko Kušić, a prominent SDS leader of Rogatica, created his own unit 
composed of Serb volunteers, under the auspices of Colonel Milošević. Between January 
and March 1992, Colonel Milošević had frequent meetings with SDS leaders, including 
Rajko Dukić.TPF238FPT 
109. A confidential document, contextually dated January or early February 1992, from 
the “organs of the Republic of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina” to the JNA Chief of the Main 
Staff in Belgrade and the commanders of the 2nd and 4th Military Districts (covering 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and small areas of Croatia), noted that the Bosnian-Serb Assembly 
had decided to “institutionalize” a situation, in which the “Serbian territories” of Bosnia-
Herzegovina would remain in federal Yugoslavia. The document stated that this was to be 
done through peaceful means, but went on to note that the organs of the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic were soon to establish full control over these Serb territories, and requested 
various forms of assistance from the JNA in this respect. First, the “organs” requested the 
JNA to assign officers to assist municipal TOs, SJBs, and CSBs, and to supply materiel, 
including weapons, ammunition, vehicles, helicopters, communications equipment, and 
uniforms, all of which was required by 20 February 1992 at the latest. Second, the 
“organs” asked the JNA to support them in taking over “Serbian territories in [Bosnia-
Herzegovina] that remain part of Yugoslavia”. The requested support included deploying 
JNA units to positions, from which they could protect the borders of Serb territories and 
preparations for providing rapid assistance in establishing control of territory by securing 
important areas. The “deadline” for completion of tasks in relation to the second request 
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was 25 February. In their turn, the “organs” undertook to enlist volunteers through 
municipal organs, and to designate persons (municipal presidents and TO commanders) to 
coordinate cooperation and joint operations with the JNA – a list with the phone numbers 
of these persons was to be provided to JNA Military District commands.TPF239FPT 
110. On 11 February 1992 Momčilo Mandić attended a meeting of Serb officials from 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP.TPF240FPT Mićo Stanišić, then a member of the Bosnian-Serb 
Ministerial Council, stated that the Council and the Bosnian-Serb Assembly had decided to 
create a separate Serb MUP, and that it would be organized at state, regional, and 
municipal levels.TPF241FPT The minutes of the meeting record a resolution to create a steering 
committee, a “Serbian advisory board” within the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP under the 
direction of Momčilo Mandić “to carry out all preparations necessary for the functioning of 
the Serbian MUP after the adoption of the constitution of the Serbian Republic of BiH.” TPF242FPT 
On 13 February 1992 Mandić directed the CSB chiefs in Banja Luka, Doboj, and Goražde, 
the SJB heads in Nevesinje, Sokolac, and Bijeljina, and the chief of the SUP in Sarajevo to 
prepare for the Serb MUP.TPF243FPT Part of the preparation for separation included the arming of 
Serb police officers and Serb police stations. The CSBs and SJBs reassigned stockpiled 
weapons belonging to the reserve police force to the new Serb MUP.TPF244FPT 
111. On or about 12 February 1992 a meeting of representatives of three SAOs was held 
in Doboj, which Karadžić, the Accused, and Maksimović attended. During the meeting, an 
exchange of population was discussed to achieve territorial continuity between Croatian 
and Bosnian Krajina, on the one side, and Semberija and Serbia proper, on the other.TPF245FPT 
This shows that, at this point in time, the SDS leadership considered a transfer of 
population at least as a possible corollary to the establishment of authorities in order to 
create entities that were geographically and ethnically homogeneous. 
112. On 14 February 1992, at a joint meeting of the SDS Main Board and the Executive 
Board, Karadžić called for a “slow” implementation of the second “stage” of the 19 
December Instructions, in particular the part relating to control of police and local 
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authorities with a view to monitor the movement of people.TPF246FPT Three days later, the 
Prijedor SDS municipal board noted that “it is necessary to activate the second stage of the 
position stated by the SDS BH Main Board. It is absolutely necessary to cover the territory 
and population (Serbs) by activists and representatives. Each should secure his own 
area.”TPF247FPT 
113. On 15 February 1992 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly discussed a draft Constitution, 
according to which the Bosnian-Serb Republic would become part of federal Yugoslavia. 
The Assembly also discussed the adoption of a Law on the Implementation of the 
Constitution.TPF248FPT 
114. On a parallel track, by 23 February 1992, representatives of the SDS (among them 
Karadžić and the AccusedTPF249FPT) and of the other two national groups had agreed on a 
statement of principles for a new constitutional arrangement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
According to this statement, the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina would keep its external 
borders. It would become an independent state made up of three constituent units which 
would group municipalities according to the nationality principle based on the last three 
censuses (1971, 1981, and 1991). Freedom of movement would be allowed only within 
each unit, while resettlement from one unit to another would be subject to a “special 
permit”.TPF250FPT  
115. During the session of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly held on 25 February 1992, the 
Accused told the deputies that the Serb people had two options before them, namely to 
“fight by political means, to make the most out of the present time, as a first phase; or, to 
break off the talks and go for what we have done over the centuries: win our own 
territories by force.”TPF251FPT He added: “We have the opportunity to preserve the Serbian people 
in a single state, to preserve the entire Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to 
have it become part of the Serbian empire.”TPF252FPT 
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116. During the negotiations, the SDS advocated the establishment of security links 
between Bosnian Serbs and Serbia, ethnic division within Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the 
possibility of relocating populations. This statement of principles was later rejected by the 
SDA. TPF253FPT 
117. On 28 February 1992, at a meeting of the SDS Deputies’ Club, the Accused 
reiterated the objective of dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina and mentioned that the European 
Community had also started to think along the same lines. He said: “every Serb has a pistol 
and a map.” TPF254FPT Radovan Karadžić elaborated: “until two or three months ago we were 
hoping to be able to play the “Yugoslav card” and to say, the Yugoslav army, Yugoslavia, 
legality, etc. This is slipping out of our grasp. That’s why we started on another track: a 
Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our sovereign right, our army.” TPF255FPT 
118. On the same day, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly unanimously adopted the 
Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,TPF256FPT along with a Government 
Act, a Law on Defence, and a Law on Internal Affairs. The Constitution defined the 
Bosnian-Serb Republic as part of federal Yugoslavia, and not of Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF257FPT It 
stated: 
Citizens of the Republic have equal rights in their freedom, rights and obligations. They are 
equal before the law and enjoy the same legal protection regardless of race, sex, language, 
ethnic origin, social background, birth, education, financial situation, political and other 
beliefs, social position or other personal attributes. TPF258FPT 
Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević became the two acting Presidents of the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic.TPF259FPT 
119. In January 1992 the Badinter Commission had indicated that the “will of the 
peoples” of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be fully established, “possibly by means of a 
referendum”, as a precondition of independence from Yugoslavia. On 25 and 26 January 
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1992, the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the SDS deputies once again 
withdrawing from the proceedings, scheduled such a referendum for the end of February or 
beginning of March 1992.TPF260FPT 
120. The SDS’s position on this matter was discussed in a telephone conversation 
between the Accused and Karadžić. The Accused’s view was that the decision to hold a 
referendum should not be frustrated, but should be considered valid only for Muslims and 
Croats. Serbs would take part only if an agreement on the ultimate status of Bosnia-
Herzegovina were to be reached by political parties.TPF261FPT On 26 January 1992 the Accused 
put this view before the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, which endorsed it.TPF262FPT  
121. The referendum took place on 29 February and 1 March 1992. The vote was 
overwhelmingly in favour of independence, but Bosnian-Serbs abstained en masse. Despite 
evidence of local disturbances,TPF263FPT the SDS abided by its pledge to boycott, but not to 
obstruct, the referendum. TPF264FPT 
 
2.8 Establishment of Bosnian-Serb Republic 
122. The looming crisis was poorly handled in March and early April 1992 by the 
republican organs, weakened by dissent among the coalition parties. For example, the 
Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order, a body constituted of representatives of 
the three constituent peoples from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and the Assembly, 
issued recommendations to the parties and the organs of public administration, but they 
were not followed up.TPF265FPT Armed clashes among ethnic groups occurred throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina: checkpoints and barricades were erected in and around Sarajevo by people 
associated with the three national parties. Word of extensive arming by paramilitary forces 
and of attacks by the (Muslim) Green Berets, on the one side, and by Serb employees of 
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the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP headed by deputy MUP Minister Momčilo Mandić, on the 
other, increased tensions and led to localized skirmishes.TPF266FPT 
123. After the republican referendum, and due to the fact that the Yugoslav leadership 
had by then clearly expressed its position to SDS leaders that a Bosnian-Serb entity would 
not be allowed to be part of the new Yugoslavia in the near future,TPF267FPT negotiations 
persisted, but mainly turned on the nature of what an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina 
would be like (unitary or federal) and what the division of power among the entities would 
be.  
124. For example, on 11 March 1992 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly decided to continue 
international negotiations on a confederative arrangement for the three national groups, 
albeit on its own terms.TPF268FPT The Accused, Karadžić, Koljević, Plavšić, Buha, and 
Maksimović TP PTremained members of the negotiating delegation.TPF269FPT In response to an 
invitation from José Cutileiro, international mediator, to continue the multi-party 
negotiations, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly unanimously rejected a draft of constitutional 
arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During that session, the Accused tabled a proposal 
that the Bosnian-Serb delegates would continue the negotiations, subject to the restriction 
that the negotiators, at a minimum, seek to preserve Yugoslavia or pursue “three sovereign 
national states which may be linked up on the confederal principle.” Both the proposal and 
the restriction were adopted by the Assembly.TPF270FPT 
125. On 18 March 1992 the negotiators once again reported to the Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly. The new draft proposal, they explained to the deputies, aimed at a division of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into three constituent units based not only on nationality, but also on 
economic and geographic considerations. Each component nation would moreover be 
allowed special ties with other states. The proposal was marked as “basis for further 
negotiations.” TPF271FPT During the 18 March session, Karadžić also predicted the imminent 
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withdrawal of Bosnian Serbs from the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP.TPF272FPT More evidence about 
this period, which is essential for understanding the role of the Accused and of the rest of 
the Bosnian-Serb leadership, is presented in parts 3 and 6 of this judgement. 
126. On 24 March 1992 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly elected Branko Đerić as Prime 
Minister,TPF273FPT and he was sworn in on the same day.TPF274FPT The Bosnian-Serb Assembly 
proceeded to instruct the new Government to prepare, by 27 March, 
an operational plan for assuming power, that is, for establishing power in the Serbian 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular in the field of internal affairs, national 
defence and money transactions ... in all municipalities where we already have Serbian 
authorities, and in those municipalities where we have only recently established Serbian 
municipalities. TPF275FPT 
127. On 24 March 1992 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly also issued a decision verifying the 
proclamation of various Serb municipalities.TPF276FPT Parts 4 and 6 of this judgement provide 
more detailed explanations on how Bosnian Serbs implemented the take-over of 
municipalities from April 1992 onwards. It is apparent to the Chamber that, by this time, 
the Bosnian-Serb leadership was increasingly losing its confidence in diplomatic efforts, 
into which the Accused and the other negotiators had invested so much of their political 
capital. 
128. On 6 April 1992 the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized by the 
European Community. TPF277FPT The next day, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, chaired by Milovan 
Milanović, declared the independence of the Bosnian-Serb Republic (on 12 August 1992, 
the name of the republic was changed to “Republika Srpska”TPF278FPT). Plavšić and Koljević 
resigned from their positions in the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF279FPT On 17 April 
Radovan Karadžić called upon all employees of Serb ethnicity, appointed by the SDS to 
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serve in institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to withdraw from their positions and to be re-
appointed in the corresponding Bosnian-Serb institutions. TPF280FPT 
 
TP
280
PT P64.A, tab 366 (Decision by Radovan Karadžić, 17 April 1992). 
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3. Administration of Bosnian-Serb Republic 
 
3.1 Bosnian-Serb Assembly 
3.1.1 Statutory framework 
129. The Constitution of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, adopted by the Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly on 28 February 1992, vested the Bosnian-Serb Assembly with constitutional and 
legislative authority. It stipulated that the Assembly was to consist of 120 deputies 
reflecting as closely as possible the national composition of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. 
Chaired by a President (Speaker) and two vice-presidents, this legislative body could adopt 
laws and determine the budget and territorial organization of the Republic. It could also 
call referendums, elections for deputies, and elections for the President of the Republic.TPF281FPT 
130. Proposals for legislation could be launched by the deputies, by the Government, or 
by the President of the Republic. Thereafter, a draft would be prepared by the relevant 
Ministry, adopted by the Government, and then forwarded to the Assembly. This meant 
that, regardless of who initiated the legislation, the body officially proposing it would 
always be the Government. A legislative and a constitutional commission examined the 
text before it was voted on by the Assembly. TPF282FPT 
131. The Bosnian-Serb Assembly was to exercise control over the matters within the 
competence of the Bosnian-Serb Government. It elected the Prime Minister and voted to 
appoint the Government Ministers.TPF283FPT In addition, the Assembly debated matters related to 
the work of the Supreme Court, the Public Prosecutor, and the constitutionality of the laws 
of the Republic upon advice given to it by the Constitutional Court.  
132. The Assembly was also tasked with cooperating with the assemblies of other 
republics, autonomous provinces, and municipalities, through information exchange and 
visits by Assembly deputies.TP F284FPT 
133. The President of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly controlled the procedure of the 
legislative body. The Accused, as President, had the power to propose the agenda of 
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Assembly sessions and to convene the Assembly at his initiative, or upon demand of the 
Bosnian-Serb Government or one-third of the deputies of the Assembly.TPF285FPT  
134. Rules of procedure were to regulate the Assembly’s legislative work. The rules 
stipulated that, prior to adoption, all bills were to be debated on the Assembly floor. The 
Assembly President was to sign laws following their adoption. The procedure also allowed 
for a shortened draft adoption of laws. In a state of war or imminent threat of war, the 
Assembly President could propose that laws be adopted without debate.TPF286FPT 
135. In certain circumstances, the Assembly President was to assume the duties of the 
President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. For example, the former was to act on the latter’s 
behalf if the term of the latter ended prior to its official expiration.TPF287FPT 
 
3.1.2 Assembly operations 
136. As explained in part 2 of this judgement, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly was created 
on 24 October 1991. The Accused held the position of the President of the Assembly from 
that date onwards, until at least November 1995.TPF288FPT  
137. On 27 March 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly established the National Security 
Council (SNB).TPF289FPT It was to be an advisory organ to the Assembly, on political, legal, 
constitutional, and other issues relevant to the security of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and it was to be responsible to the Assembly. TPF290FPT Its decisions were sometimes published in 
the Bosnian-Serb Republic’s Official Gazette. The President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic 
was to preside over the SNB and, in practice, SNB decisions were not approved by the 
Assembly but by the President (or acting Presidents) of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF291FPT The 
Accused, as President of the Assembly, was an ex officio member of the SNB.TPF292FPT 
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138. Assembly sessions were often attended by the President of the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic, other members of the Presidency, Ministers of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, 
members of the SDS Main Board, presidents of municipalities, and representatives of the 
Orthodox clergy. Following the establishment of the VRS on 12 May 1992, Generals 
Ratko Mladić, Milan Gvero, and Momir Talić, as well as Colonel Zdravko Tolimir, would 
also often attend. They, together with other military officials, would address the Bosnian-
Serb Assembly on the strategic situation and proposed plans of action. TPF293F PT he deputies 
were regularly informed about the political and military situation by Radovan Karadžić, 
Biljana Plavšić, and the Accused. TPF294FPT 
139. In its early days, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly was composed of 82 deputies. All but 
seven were SDS members. Other parties represented in the Bosnian-Serb Assembly were 
the Reformist Party, the former Communist League, and the Serb Renewal Movement.TPF295FPT 
According to Milan Trbojević, the deputy Prime-Minister of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, 
decisions taken in the Assembly were often taken under pressure from the SDS.TPF296FPT The 
members of the SDS Main Board would at times be allowed in the hall where the 
Assembly was meeting to put pressure on the deputies.TPF297FPT In addition, the activities of the 
Assembly were supported financially by the SDS. TPF298FPT 
140. The Assembly’s composition and operating methods thus ensured that the decision-
making process was heavily influenced by SDS policy. The Accused, both as President of 
the Assembly and as a prominent member of the SDS, played an important role in effecting 
the SDS’s influence over the Bosnian-Serb Assembly.TPF299FPT 
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3.2 Bosnian-Serb Government and judiciary 
3.2.1 Statutory framework of the Government 
141. The Bosnian-Serb Constitution vested the Bosnian-Serb Government with executive 
authority, under the formal control of the Assembly. Headed by the Prime Minister, two 
deputy Prime Ministers, and thirteen Ministers, the Government functioned through the 
work of its Ministries and permanent working bodies. As mentioned above, the Bosnian-
Serb Assembly elected the Prime Minister and voted for or against ministerial candidates 
proposed by the Prime Minister. The Bosnian-Serb Government was to implement the 
enactments of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, as well as those of the Republic’s President. It 
was to report to the Assembly on its progress in policy implementation and law 
enforcement. Based on an evaluation of the Government’s work, the Assembly could hold 
a vote of no-confidence.  
142. The Government was to make its decisions by a simple majority vote, in sessions 
with a majority of the members attending. It was to cooperate with municipal executive 
organs by having their representatives participate in Government sessions, as well as by 
having Ministers participate in sessions of the municipal organs.TPF300FPT 
 
3.2.2 Establishment of the Government 
143. As mentioned in part 2 of the judgement, the Ministerial Council established on 21 
December 1991 became the Bosnian-Serb Government following the Assembly’s passage 
of the Government Act on 28 February 1992.TPF301FPT 
144. While still a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, Branko Đerić was 
nominated by Biljana Plavšić for the post of Prime Minister in the Bosnian-Serb 
Government. He was elected by the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on 24 March 1992 and, for a 
while, worked as Prime Minister from his Bosnia-Herzegovina Government office. Serbs 
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who had been serving in ministerial posts in the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina were 
appointed by the Bosnian-Serb Assembly as Ministers to equivalent positions in the 
Bosnian-Serb Government.TPF302FPT Where no Serb sat as Minister or deputy Minister in the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, the Prime Minister was to propose candidates for 
ministerial posts in the Bosnian-Serb Government to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. Radovan 
Karadžić, in his capacity as SDS president, would suggest candidates to Branko Đerić. 
Đerić testified that his “hands were tied” and described his role as one of a mere “formal 
nominator”.TPF303FPT Persons chosen in this manner included Momčilo Mandić, Minister of 
Justice (from 19 May 1992 to November 1992); Mićo Stanišić, Minister of Interior; and 
Bogdan Subotić, Minister of Defence.TPF304FPT  
145. Aleksandar Buha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was in charge of contacts with 
international representatives, including those from the United States and OSCE. The 
Ministry of Information, under Velibor Ostojić, dealt with general public information, and 
would distribute and report on the statements from Government sessions, press briefings, 
and news conferences.TPF305FPT The Bosnian-Serb Republic’s news agency (SRNA) produced 
press clippings in Serbo-Croatian, summarizing foreign press releases and submitting them 
to the President of the Republic, the President of the Assembly, the Prime Minister, and 
other Government Ministers.TPF306FPT Dragan Kalinić, Minister of Health and Social Affairs, was 
in charge of cooperation with international humanitarian organizations.TPF307FPT The Ministry of 
Interior (MUP) will be discussed below, in part 3.5 of this judgement. 
146. The Accused participated in the first two meetings of the Ministerial Council in 
January 1992 and in joint meetings of the SNB and the Government. He did not attend 
Government meetings after 20 May 1992.TPF308FPT The Government sat for the first time as an 
independent executive body, distinct from the SNB, at its 13th session on 23 May 1992.TPF309FPT 
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147. In the first days of April 1992, following international recognition of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as an independent state and the beginning of the conflict, the Bosnian-Serb 
leadership relocated to Pale, about 20 kilometers from Sarajevo. The Accused moved there 
on or about 15 April.TPF310FPT At that time roads to Sarajevo were cut off and the resources and 
facilities of the Bosnian-Serb leadership were elementary. Aleksandar Divčić, a member of 
the SDS Political Council and the vice-president of the Dobrotvor charity, assisted 
Bosnian-Serb leaders to find accommodation. The Kikinda Hotel functioned as the seat of 
the Bosnian-Serb institutions (Assembly, Presidency, Government) until June 1992. It had 
little office space and only two intermittently working telephone lines.TPF311FPT However, 
military telecommunication lines were used to share information and transmit orders 
between Pale and local authorities.TPF312FPT  
148. As a result of its growing size, the Government moved to the Bistrica Hotel on 
Mount Jahorina.TPF313FPT The Accused remained in the Kikinda Hotel, as did Koljević, Plavšić, 
and Karadžić. By the end of July 1992, Biljana Plavšić moved to Mount Jahorina.TPF314FPT  
149. In April 1992, Nikola Koljević proposed to JNA colonel Bogdan Subotić that he set 
up a Bosnian-Serb Ministry of Defence. Branko Đerić and the Assembly were aware of 
this approach. Subotić accepted the assignment, moved to Pale, and with the assistance of 
the SFRY Ministry of Defence, started organizing the Ministry and preparing drafts of the 
Law on Defence and Law on the Army. These drafts were eventually adopted by the 
Government and submitted to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. The Ministry’s central office 
was located at the Bistrica Hotel and consisted of approximately 30 staff members. 
Branches of the Ministry existed in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and Sarajevo. Since 
communication was often disrupted in the first months, local military detachments were 
asked to dispatch messages through deputies travelling to Pale for Assembly sessions.TPF315FPT  
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TP
312
PT Radić, T. 7530-6. 
TP
313
PT Krajišnik, T. 24350; Đerić, T. 27060-1; Subotić, T. 26430, 26595-6; Lakić, T. 21530, 21666-8. 
TP
314
PT Lakić, T. 21530-2, 21666-8; Witness D24, T. 22795-6, 22911-12; Trbojević, T. 11382, 11408, 11413-15, 
11497, 11587, 11660, 11707-10, 11765-6. 
TP
315
PT C3 (Subotić statement), paras 4, 9; C5 (Subotić statement), paras 3, 15-18; Subotić, T. 26430, 26469, 
26496, 26592-6; Kapetina, T. 19946-8, 19954, 19957, 19961. 
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3.2.3 Government operations 
150. In the course of 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Government held around 90 sessions. 
Nedeljko Lakić, secretary of the Government from 27 April 1992 onwards, would see 
Prime Minister Đerić about twice a week and would liaise with him and other Ministers to 
organize the sessions. After each session, Lakić would write the minutes of the meetings, 
and show them to Đerić. Legislative proposals were forwarded to the Assembly, while 
decisions within the competence of the Government were published in the Official 
Gazette.TPF316FPT 
151. As far as its input on the municipal level is concerned, the Government exercised a 
certain amount of control over, and cooperated with, municipal authorities and crisis staffs. 
For example, on 15 May 1992, Đerić ordered that a number of people from Bratunac who 
were detained in Pale be transferred to Visoko, in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
outside Bosnian-Serb control. According to Lakić, this was “for safety reasons”. Đerić 
ordered the Sokolac crisis staff to provide three trucks for their transportation, the Pale 
crisis staff to arrange their escort, and the Ilijaš crisis staff to allow the convoy to pass. The 
letter to the Ilijaš crisis staff bore the following request: “please destroy that approval [for 
passage] the moment when the prisoners leave Ilijaš municipality.”TPF317FPT  
152. The Government was also concerned with the issue of deserted houses and 
apartments in the municipalities, as well as the issue of Muslim-owned property in 
general.TPF318FPT It would send individual Ministers to visit municipal assemblies in order to be 
kept up to date on the situation.TPF319FPT 
153. By early May 1992, the Government had at its disposal in Pale a Republican 
Information Centre which connected with regional communication centres in the Bosnian-
Serb territory. It operated 24 hours per day and had five employees. By June 1992, written 
reports, as well as dozens of telegrams, were received daily by the Centre and sent on to 
the intended recipients. Most of those were addressed to the Presidency, the Government, 
 
TP
316
PT Lakić, T. 21529-31. 
TP
317
PT Lakić, T. 21557-60, 21635-8; P583, tab 123 (Order by Branko Đerić to Sokolac crisis staff, 15 May 
1992); P583, tab 124 (Request from Nedeljko Lakić to Ilijaš crisis staff, 15 May 1992). 
TP
318
PT P1113 (Letter from Nedeljko Lakić to Ilidža municipal assembly, 5 June 1992); Lakić, T. 21613-18; P529, 
tab 350 (Decision by Sanski Most Crisis Staff on Departure 2 July 1992); P65, tab 173 (Minutes of 36th 
session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 4 July 1992), pp. 4-5. 
TP
319
PT Lakić, T. 21580. 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 3 
 Administration of Bosnian-Serb Republic 
 
 
61 
“units and institutions in Pale”, and “units in Sokolac”.TPF320FPT Some of the delivered 
documents were long and confidential.TPF321FPT 
 
3.2.4 Judiciary 
154. The Bosnian-Serb Constitution vested the Constitutional Court and lower courts of 
the Bosnian-Serb Republic with judicial authority. The judicial system of the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic, with the Constitutional Court at the top of the hierarchy, was to be autonomous 
and independent and was entrusted with protection of human rights and freedoms. 
Members of the judiciary, including judges and public prosecutors, were to be elected by 
the Bosnian-Serb Assembly.TPF322FPT The Assembly discussed and voted on appointment and 
dismissal of judges and prosecutors at its 19thP Pand 22nd sessions on 12 August 1992 and 
23-24 November 1992, respectively. The discussions on the Assembly records show 
unwillingness on the part of deputies to elect non-Serbs to the posts, even when they had 
been provisionally appointed earlier on by Karadžić – who was worried of the image 
portrayed by the fact that Serbs held posts in Bosnia-Herzegovina institutions, while few 
non-Serbs held posts in Bosnian-Serb institutions.TPF323FPT 
155. The lower courts were to ensure that all coercive actions on behalf of the state 
authorities were conducted in accordance with the rule of law. For example, no state 
official could enter a dwelling against the tenant’s will without a court warrant. No-one 
could be deprived of his or her freedom without a valid court decision. In addition, pre-trial 
detention could not exceed two months, unless extended by the Constitutional Court for up 
to another two months. The Constitution set forth the principle of a fair trial in criminal 
proceedings. An accused person had the right to be informed of the nature of the allegation 
against him or her in the shortest time provided by the law, and guilt could not be 
established except by pronouncement of a valid court verdict.TPF324FPT 
 
TP
320
PT P1114 (Request from Bosnian-Serb Information Centre to Ministry of Defence, 14 June 1992), p.1. 
TP
321
PT Lakić, T. 21623-8, 21662-5; P1115 (Letter from Nedeljko Lakić to Regional Information Centre, 9 May 
1992); P1116 (Article in Glas newspaper, 9 May 1992); P529, tab 189 (Fax from Bosanski Šamac crisis staff 
president to Bosnian-Serb Prime Minister, 15 May 1992). 
TP
322
PT P65, tab 96 (Decision on proclaiming Bosnian-Serb Constitution, 28 February 1992), arts 10, 69, 121, 
124, and 135; P65, tab 97 (Rules of Procedure of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 15 February 1992), art. 179. 
TP
323
PT P583, tab 87 (Record of 19th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 12 August 1992), pp. 11-29; P65, tab 
213 (Record of 22nd session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 23-24 November 1992), p. 7; Krajišnik, T. 26119-
49. 
TP
324
PT P65, tab 96 (Decision on proclaiming Bosnian-Serb Constitution, 28 February 1992), arts 15, 18, 20, and 
24. 
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3.2.5 Exchange Commission 
156. On 24 April 1992, at a joint session of the SNB and the Bosnian-Serb Government, 
it was agreed that the exchange of prisoners of war would be handled by the Ministry of 
Justice.TPF325FPT On 8 May 1992, the Government established a Central Commission for the 
Exchange of Prisoners of War and Arrested Persons. On 10 May the SNB and the 
Government appointed the members of the Commission, who included representatives 
from the Bosnian-Serb Ministry of Defence, the MUP, and the Ministry of Justice. The 
commission was initially headed by Rajo Čolović and, from 26 June 1992, Slobodan 
Avlijaš, an official with the Ministry of Justice. A network of regional and municipal 
exchange bodies reported to the Commission.TPF326FPT  
157. The Commission’s official role was to coordinate exchanges and provide 
information on captured persons.TPF327FPT As part of that role the Commission was to 
differentiate between civilians and prisoners of war, with a view to releasing the former 
and preventing crisis staffs or paramilitary formations from committing crimes against the 
latter.TPF328FPT In practice, however, exchanges of prisoners were left to the authority of the 
individual exchange commissions in each region.TPF329FPT 
 
3.3 Bosnian-Serb Presidency 
3.3.1 Statutory framework 
158. In accordance with the Bosnian-Serb Constitution, the President of the Republic 
would represent the Bosnian-Serb Republic. Until direct popular elections could take 
place, the Bosnian-Serb members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, elected on 18 
 
TP
325
PT Trbojević, T. 11503, 11596-7; P583, tab 2 (Minutes of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-Serb 
Government, 24 April 1992), p. 2. 
TP
326
PT P436 (Decision to form a Central Commission, signed by Prime Minister Branko Đerić, 8 May 1992); 
Mandić, T. 8746, 8754, 8770; Lakić, T. 21561-6; P583, tab 5 (Minutes of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-
Serb Government, 10 May 1992), p.2; P583, tab 19 (Minutes of 24th session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 9 
June 1992), p. 1; P583, tab 28 (Minutes of 33rd session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 26 June 1992), p. 5; 
P435 (Order from president of Central Commission for exchanged persons, 6 June 1992), p. 4; P437 
(Minutes of 24th session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 9 June 1992), pp. 1-2. 
TP
327
PT P436 (Decision to form a Central Commission, signed by Prime Minister Branko Đerić, 8 May 1992); 
P443 (Order from Minister of Defence on treatment of captured persons, 13 June 1992), p. 2.  
TP
328
PT Mandić, T. 8762-3. 
TP
329
PT Trbojević, T. 11503, 11575; P64.A, tab 785 (Communication of VRS Main Staff on treatment of prisoners 
of war, 12 June 1992). 
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November 1990, were to carry out the functions of the President of the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic.TP F330FPT  
159. The President was to conduct affairs of state in compliance with the Constitution. 
Other constitutional duties included proposing to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly a candidate 
for the post of Prime Minister and proclaiming laws by edict.TPF331FPT The President was the 
commander-in-chief of the Army, with authority to define the Army’s organization, 
establish the system of Army command, prepare the Army for war, and issue basic 
regulations related to combat. TPF332FPT  
160. Furthermore, the President of the Republic had a legislative function in case of 
emergency situations. In contrast to the situation in peace time, when the President could 
merely propose laws, in a state of war or immediate threat of war, the President, on his or 
her own initiative, could enact laws on questions falling within the jurisdiction of the 
Bosnian-Serb Assembly, subject to confirmation by the Assembly as soon as it was able to 
reconvene.TPF333FPT The President of the Republic could also set up war presidencies in the 
municipalities.TPF334FPT 
 
3.3.2 National Security Council as predecessor to Presidency 
161. As explained earlier, on 27 March 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly established the 
SNB. Radovan Karadžić performed the role of the president of the SNB between 27 March 
and early May 1992, even though he was not the President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic at 
the time.TPF335FPT Ex officio members of the SNB also included the President of the Bosnian-
Serb Assembly (the Accused) and the Bosnian-Serb Republic’s Prime Minister, and the 
Ministers of Defence and Interior.TPF336FPT The Accused did not dispute that he attended 
meetings of the SNB.TPF337FPT  
 
TP
330
PT P65, tab 96 (Decision on proclaiming Bosnian-Serb Constitution, 28 February 1992), arts 69 and 83; P65, 
tab 99 (Law for Implementing the Constitution, 28 February 1992), arts 4 and 5. 
TP
331
PT P65, tab 96 (Decision on proclaiming Bosnian-Serb Constitution, 28 February 1992), arts 80 and 83. 
TP
332
PT P65, tab 146 (Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 174. 
TP
333
PT P65, tab 96 (Decision on proclaiming Bosnian-Serb Constitution, 28 February 1992), arts 76, 81. 
TP
334
PT P65, tab 144 (Law amending the Law for Implementing the Constitution, 2 June 1992), art. 1. 
TP
335
PT P65, tab 118 (Letter to Bosnian-Serb Assembly signed by Radovan Karadžić as “Council President”, 4 
April 1992); P64 (Treanor report), para. 236. 
TP
336
PT Treanor, T. 1683-4; P65, tab 116 (Decision to establish the SNB, no date), p. 1; List of matters admitted 
by the Accused, 31 August 2001, paras 7 and 34(b). 
TP
337
PT Krajišnik, T. 23927-30. 
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162. By early April 1992, the SNB developed into an executive organ issuing 
instructions to, and receiving reports from, municipal crisis staffs and TOs. TPF338FPT As 
mentioned earlier, the SNB would meet in joint sessions with the Bosnian-Serb 
Government for the purpose of taking decisions on military, political, and administrative 
matters.TPF339FPT  
163. The idea of creating a collective presidency for the Bosnian-Serb Republic first 
emerged when the Assembly was drafting the Law for Implementing the Constitution. 
Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević, as elected Serb members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Presidency, became ipso facto members of this collective body.TPF340FPT According to Milan 
Trbojević, deputy Prime Minister in the Bosnian-Serb Government, Radovan Karadžić 
insisted that he should be appointed to the Presidency as well. TPF341FPT 
164. On 12 May 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly passed a constitutional law instituting 
a three-member Presidency until a President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic could be elected 
by the people.TPF342FPT Radovan Karadžić, Nikola Koljević, and Biljana Plavšić were appointed 
to the Presidency on that same day.TPF343FPT  
165. Also on 12 May, the Presidency held its first session, and Karadžić was elected 
President of the Presidency, thus becoming the President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF344FPT 
The President was bestowed with the authority to appoint, promote, and discharge military 
officers, military judges, and military prosecutors.TPF345FPT  
 
TP
338
PT Treanor, T. 1696-8; P65, tab 118 (Public announcement on activation of crisis staffs, 4 April 1992); P65, 
tab 122 (Minutes of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-Serb Government, 22 April 1992); P65, tab 124 
(Minutes of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-Serb Government, 28 April 1992). 
TP
339
PT P65, tab 122 (Minutes of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-Serb Government, 22 April 1992); P65, tab 
124 (Minutes of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-Serb Government, 28 April 1992); P65, tab 126 (Minutes 
of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-Serb Government, 10 May 1992); P65, tab 136 (Minutes of joint session 
of SNB and Bosnian-Serb Government, 15 May 1992). 
TP
340
PT Trbojević, T. 11431-2. See, for example, P65, tab 113 (Record of 12th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 
24 March 1992), pp. 24-5. 
TP
341
PT Trbojević, T. 12199. 
TP
342
PT P64 (Treanor report), para. 260; P65, tab 127 (Minutes and record of 16th session of Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly, 12 May 1992), p. 58; P65, tab 132 (Amendment to the Law for the implementation of the 
constitution, 12 May 1992). 
TP
343
PT P64 (Treanor report), para. 260; P65, tab 133 (Decision on election of members of Bosnian-Serb 
Presidency, 12 May 1992); List of matters admitted by the Accused, 31 August 2001, paras 34(d) and 10 (in 
part). 
TP
344
PT P64 (Treanor report), para. 260; P65, tab 134 (Minutes of 1st session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 12 May 
1992). 
TP
345
PT P65, tab 135 (Decision on proclaiming amendments I-IV to constitution of Bosnian-Serb Republic, 12 
May 1992), p. 2; P65, tab 145 (Defence Act, 1 June 1992), art. 7; P65, tab 146 (Law on the Army), art. 174. 
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166. The Accused, in his capacity as President of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, was 
present at the first session of the newly established Presidency. He also attended 
Presidency’s second session, on 31 May 1992. TPF346FPT  
167. Following the establishment of the Presidency, the last reported meeting of the SNB 
took place on 15 May 1992.TPF347FPT The SNB was effectively replaced by the Presidency.  
 
3.3.3 Presidency operations 
168. The sessions of the Presidency were regularly attended by five persons, namely, 
Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, Branko Đerić, and the Accused. The 
three members of the Presidency envisaged by the Constitution, that is, Karadžić, Koljević, 
and Plavšić, never once met alone.TPF348FPT The Accused was present at all recorded official 
sessions in 1992, except possibly for one. TPF349FPT 
169. The sessions were informal and were usually chaired by Karadžić or, in his absence, 
the Accused.TPF350FPT Members of the Bosnian-Serb Government, such as Minister of Defence 
Subotić, participated when a particular topic within their field of competence was 
discussed.TPF351FPT Occasionally, people from municipal authorities also attended, as did 
lawyers, experts, and military officials. In addition, according to Plavšić, Karadžić’s wife 
was often present, simply because she felt bored at home.TPF352FPT  
170. There was no official summons: Karadžić would call the meetings when necessary. 
An agenda was not distributed in advance. Some meetings discussing military and policy 
matters appear not to have been minuted at all.TPF353FPT When minutes were prepared, they were 
not taken during the sessions. Instead, Karadžić preferred to dictate them to his secretary 
 
TP
346
PT P64.A, tab 693 (Minutes of 2nd session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 31 May 1992); Krajišnik, T. 24409-
10. 
TP
347
PT P64 (Treanor report), p. 175. 
TP
348
PT C7 (Plavšić statement), paras 4, 27, 29; C8 (Excerpts from Biljana Plavšić’s book I Testify), p. 201; 
Plavšić, T. 26853; P64 (Treanor report), pp. 186-7. 
TP
349
PT P64 (Treanor report), pp. 186-7; Krajišnik, T. 24789. 
TP
350
PT For example: P65, tab 203 (Minutes of session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 9 October 1992); Treanor, T. 
1783-4; C7 (Plavšić statement), para. 29; C8 (Excerpts from Biljana Plavšić’s book I Testify), p. 201. 
TP
351
PT Subotić, T. 26478-81; C5 (Subotić statement), paras 27, 43. 
TP
352
PT Đerić, T. 27073-5, 27096; C7 (Plavšić statement), paras 27-9; C8 (Excerpts from Biljana Plavšić’s book I 
Testify), pp. 201, 216; Witness D24, T. 22820. 
TP
353
PT For example P892, tab 59 (Diary of Colonel Novica Simić), pp. 38-39; Brown, T. 16327-8. 
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afterwards. At the beginning of the Presidency sessions the minutes of the previous 
session, sometimes abridged, were looked at, but not formally adopted.TPF354FPT  
171. Decisions by the Presidency were not taken through formal voting. The Presidency 
operated on the basis of a consensus.TPF355FPT The different opinions were not reflected in the 
minutes.TPF356FPT 
172. As stated earlier, while legislative power normally rested with the Assembly, in the 
state of imminent threat of war, declared on 15 April 1992 during a joint session of the 
SNB and the Government,TPF357FPT it was the President of the Republic who wielded legislative 
power. TPF358FPT In the period between April and August 1992, the Presidency often invoked a 
provision of the Constitution allowing it to pass laws. For example, on 1 May 1992, the 
Presidency, pursuant to its emergency powers under the Constitution, issued a “Decision 
on the establishment of penitentiary re-education organization in the territory of the 
Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. This authorized the Minister of Justice to 
establish detention units for pre-trial detention within prisons.TPF359FPT Moreover, Karadžić 
appointed judges and prosecutors in the Bosnian-Serb Republic through decisions ratified 
later by the Assembly.TPF360FPT The Presidency also had authority to pardon “prisoners”, and the 
ARK Assembly addressed it with such requests.TPF361FPT Occasionally, laws passed by the 
Presidency were discussed by the Government and then forwarded for approval to the 
Assembly.TPF362FPT 
173. As far as being informed, Presidency members had contacts with foreign 
negotiators and would go to Belgrade for consultations on negotiations and on the general 
situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Second, as will be explained later in more detail, the SDS 
 
TP
354
PT Witness D24, T. 22798, 22813-19, 22925-6, 22937; Đerić, T. 27075-8; Krajišnik, T. 24782-3; Plavšić, T. 
26800-1, 26852, 26854, 26885-6; C7 (Plavšić statement), para. 30; P65, tab 178 (Minutes of 19th session of 
Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 13 July 1992), item 8. 
TP
355
PT Krajišnik, T. 24418; Đerić, T. 27079-80, 27100; Witness D24, T. 22826-30; Đokanović, T. 10621-6, 
10678. 
TP
356
PT P65, tab 157 (Minutes of 5th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 10 June 1992, p.1; P65, tab 178 
(Minutes of 19th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 13 July 1992, p.1; Đerić, T. 27078. 
TP
357
PT P65, tab 120 (Minutes of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-Serb Government, 15 April 1992); P65, tab 
121 (Declaration of imminent threat of war, 15 May 1992); P64 (Treanor report), para. 178. 
TP
358
PT Mandić, T. 9111-13, 9391-2, 9430-1; P65, tab 96 (Decision on proclaiming Bosnian-Serb Constitution, 28 
February 1992), art. 81. 
TP
359
PT Treanor, T. 1701-4; P65, tab 125 (Decision of 1 May 1992). 
TP
360
PT Trbojević, T. 11429. See also D174 (Minutes of 21st session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 2 August 1992), 
p. 2. 
TP
361
PT P64.A, tab 565 (Request for pardon of 13 Muslim prisoners in Manjača, 1 October 1992). 
TP
362
PT Trbojević, T. 11776, 12190-2, 11429; P65, tab 141 (Minutes of 17thP Psession of Bosnian-Serb Government, 
31 May 1992), p. 2. 
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party structure and the municipal crisis staffs reported on different matters to the Accused 
in his capacity as President of the Assembly. They also reported to the Presidency. Third, 
various Ministers and army commanders reported directly to the Presidency. Finally, on 
several occasions, Presidency members went out in the field.TPF363FPT Accordingly, the 
Presidency was well informed about the overall situation in the Republic. Indeed, it was 
generally the members of the Presidency, often Karadžić, who reported to the Assembly on 
the military and strategic situation in the Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF364FPT 
 
3.3.4 Expanded Presidency 
174. On 1 June 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Presidency amended the Constitution pursuant to 
its emergency powers in time of war or immediate threat of war.TPF365FPT The amendment 
provided that “during a state of war” the three-member Presidency was to be expanded by 
two members, thus becoming an Expanded Presidency. The two additional members were 
to be the President of the Assembly and the Prime Minister.TPF366FPT 
175. A “Declaration of the Ending of the War” was issued by the Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly, and signed by the Accused as its President, on 17 December 1992. TPF367FPT However, 
a state of war had not been officially declared by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency prior to this 
date. As stated earlier, only a state of imminent threat of war was declared on 15 April 
1992 during a joint session of the SNB and the Government. TPF368FPT The Presidency appears to 
have decided not to declare a state of war. TPF369FPT This means that the formal condition for the 
establishment of the Expanded Presidency was not met at any time in 1992.  
 
TP
363
PT Trbojević, T. 11718-23, 11789-91; P65, tab 155 (Minutes of 4th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 9 
June 1992); Subotić, T. 26536-8, 26596; C5 (Subotić statement), para. 40. See also part 3.6.3 of this 
judgement. 
TP
364
PT P65, tab 182 (Record of 17th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), pp. 9-20, 37-8 
(Plavšić and Karadžić reporting); Trbojević, T. 11530, 11631-2; P65, tab 127 (Minutes and record of 16th 
session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 12 May 1992), pp. 7-15 (Karadžić reporting); P65, tab 200 (Record of 
20th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 14-15 September 1992), p. 1 (Karadžić and Mladić reporting). 
TP
365
PT P65, tab 96 (Decision on proclaiming Bosnian-Serb constitution, 28 February 1992), art. 81, para. 2. 
TP
366
PT Treanor, T. 2187; P65, tab 144 (Law amending the Law for Implementing the Constitution, 2 June 1992); 
P64 (Treanor report), para. 261. 
TP
367
PT Treanor, T. 1801-2; P64.A, tab 657 (Minutes of 20th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 19 September 
1992), p. 11; P65, tab 216 (Record of 23rd session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 17 December 1992), pp. 8-9. 
TP
368
PT P65, tab 120 (Minutes of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-Serb Government, 15 April 1992); P65, tab 
121 (Declaration of imminent threat of war, 15 May 1992); P64 (Treanor report), para. 178. 
TP
369
PT Trbojević, T. 11708-9; Lakić, T. 21579-80; P583.B (Prosecution interview with Milan Trbojević), p. 38. 
See also: P892, tab 86 (MUP report to President of Presidency and Prime Minister, 17 July 1992), p. 4; P529, 
tab 198 (Decision by crisis staff of SAO Birač on state of war, 29 April 1992). 
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176. Nonetheless, the Chamber finds that the ordinary Presidency did not function as 
envisaged by the Constitution. From 12 May 1992, the very first session of the three-
member Presidency, the Accused and Đerić attended, in addition to the three constitutional 
members.TPF370FPT Prior to this, the same persons had already been convening as members of the 
SNB. Furthermore, at the third session of the Presidency, on 8 June 1992 (which was the 
first session held following the constitutional amendments of 1 June), the attendees were 
Karadžić, Plavšić, Koljević, the Accused, and Đerić. This was the first time the Accused 
was recorded present at a Presidency session not in his capacity as “president of the 
Bosnian-Serb Assembly” but simply as “present”. TPF371FPT 
177. The fact that the Accused was a member of the Presidency, as this body operated in 
practice, is supported by other evidence. The record of the Presidency meeting of 2 August 
1992 reads: “Members of the negotiating delegation, who were also members of the 
Presidency (Dr. Karadžić, Dr. Koljević and Krajišnik), reported [on] the last conference on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina held in London”. TPF372FPT At its session on 9 October 1992 the 
Presidency functioned with only the Accused, Koljević, and Đerić present; the record is 
signed by the Accused as chairman.TPF373FPT On three occasions known to the Chamber, between 
June and October 1992, the Accused signed Presidency documents over Karadžić’s printed 
name.TPF374FPT Moreover, while the majority of the minutes bear the heading of “Presidency 
meeting held during an imminent threat of war” or some variant thereof,TPF375FPT other minutes 
are under the heading of “Presidency”,TPF376FPT or “expanded meeting of the War Presidency”.TPF377FPT 
 
TP
370
PT P64 (Treanor report), pp. 175, 186-7; Treanor, T. 1737, 1796-9, 2187-91; P65, tab 214 (Minutes of 
session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 30 November 1992); Witness D24, T. 22804, 22807; 22927-8; Đerić, T. 
27071, 27074; Trbojević, T. 11436-40, 11723, 12203-4; P583.B (Prosecution interview with Milan 
Trbojević, 4 May 2004), pp. 29-31; Đokanović, T. 10438, 10450-1, 10460-1, 10621-6, 10678; D39 
(Đokanović statement, 16-18 December 2003), p. 7; Radić, T. 7434; D35 (Prosecution interview with 
Predrag Radić), p. 41; Prstojević, T. 14595, 14620-1, 14818-19; Okun, T. 4154, 4338; Antić, T. 18195, 
18206-7. 
TP
371
PT P65, tab 152 (Minutes of 3rd session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 8 June 1992).  
TP
372
PT P65, tab 184 (Minutes of 21st session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 2 August 1992), p. 1; D24, T. 22817-
18. 
TP
373
PT P65, tab 203 (Minutes of session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 9 October 1992); Treanor, T. 1783-4. 
TP
374
PT Treanor, T. 1784-6; P65, tab 204 (Certificate of appointment of state commissioner, 16 June 1992); P65, 
tab 205 (Certificate of appointment of state commissioner); P65, tab 206 (Certificate of appointment of state 
commissioner, 2 October 1992). 
TP
375
PT For example: P65, tab 152 (Minutes of 3rd session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 8 June 1992); P65, tab 
157 (Minutes of 5th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 10 June 1992); P65, tab 161 (Record of 6th session 
of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 13 June 1992); P65, tab 163 (Minutes of 7th session of Bosnian-Serb 
Presidency, 16 June 1992). 
TP
376
PT P65, tab 142 (Minutes of session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 31 May 1992); P65, tab 174 (Record of 
15th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 6 July 1992). 
TP
377
PT P65, tab 155 (Minutes of 4th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 9 June 1992); D24, T. 22804-5. 
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178. The Bosnian-Serb Presidency thus operated in fact with five members from its 
inception on 12 May 1992. Several witnesses denied the existence of an “Expanded”, 
“Extended”, or “War” Presidency,TPF378FPT and at a formal level they might have been correct. 
But the Chamber here looks to the substance, not the form. 
179. The Accused forcefully denied that he was a member of the Presidency,TPF379FPT and 
much of the Defence case rests upon this denial.TPF380FPT However, it is ultimately irrelevant 
whether an Expanded Presidency existed de jure. What is relevant, as mentioned above, is 
that the Accused was present at practically every recorded meeting of the Presidency from 
12 May 1992 onwards, as well as in informal meetings for which minutes are not available 
but which were confirmed by witnesses and documents.  
180. The Accused was an active member of a five-member Presidency or a de facto 
Expanded Presidency. According to Biljana Plavšić, he was more important than both 
herself and Koljević, as he would have informal meetings with Karadžić during which 
important decisions would be made.TPF381FPT The establishment of the Presidency did not change 
or affect the division of power. It merely formalized the authority already wielded by the 
Accused and Karadžić. The Accused’s membership in the SNB confirms that, regardless of 
formal names and titles, he was always at the centre of power. 
181. It is for all these reasons that the Chamber will use the term “Presidency” to denote 
a body consisting of five members, including the Accused. This Presidency acted as the 
commander-in-chief of the Bosnian-Serb Republic until 17 December 1992 when the 
Bosnian-Serb Assembly elected Karadžić as President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, with 
Koljević and Plavšić as vice-presidents.TPF382FPT 
 
TP
378
PT Plavšić, T. 26859; C7 (Plavšić statement), paras 34-5; C8 (Excerpts from Biljana Plavšić’s book I Testify), 
pp. 201-2, 216, 294, 308-9; P65, tab 174 (Minutes of 15th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 6 July 1992), 
item 1; Subotić, T. 26556-8, 26575-7; C3 (Subotić statement), paras 14, 49; C4 (Subotić statement), p. 5; 
Trbojević, T. 11442-3, 11448; P583.B (Prosecution interview with Milan Trbojević), p. 31; Hrvačanin, T. 
19351-2; Lakić, T. 21577-82; Divčić, T. 17844-6; Savkić, T. 20608-9, 20628-9; Witness D24, T. 22805-6, 
22826; Kapetina, T. 19951; Ostojić, T. 26761-4. 
TP
379
PT For example Krajišnik, T. 24409-10, 24420, 24433-4, 24679-80, 24713-17, 24783-4, 24799. 
TP
380
PT For example, Defence Final Brief, paras 298-328. 
TP
381
PT Plavšić, T. 26859; C7 (Plavšić, witness statement, 7 July 2006), para. 34; C8 (Excerpts from Biljana 
Plavšić: I Testify), pp. 216, 308-9. See also Đerić, T. 27093, 27099-100, 27155-6; Trbojević, T. 12157-9, 
12169-73, 12177, 12179; P583.A (Prosecution interview with Milan Trbojević, 23 March 2004), pp. 22-3; 
P583.B (Prosecution interview with Milan Trbojević, 4 May 2004), p. 33; Đokanović, T. 10626-7, 10723-5; 
D39 (Đokanović, witness statement, 16-18 December 2003), pp. 7-8. 
TP
382
PT Treanor, T. 1803; P65, tab 216 (Record of 23rd session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 17 December 1992), 
pp. 86-7. 
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182. The members of the Presidency were assigned different tasks. The Accused was, for 
example, in charge of commissioners – the link between the (republican) centre and 
municipal authorities – and the economy.TPF383FPT However, considering the informal nature of 
the body, and in view of the evidence reviewed above, assignment of a task to a member 
may not be interpreted as excluding the involvement of other members in that matter. 
 
3.3.5 Relationship between Presidency and Government 
183. According to the constitutional provisions referred to above,TPF384FPT individual Ministers 
should have been under the authority of the Prime Minister, Branko Đerić. In addition, the 
Government as a whole should have been accountable to the Assembly. However, on 22 
November 1992, Branko Đerić openly complained before the Bosnian-Serb Assembly that 
the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior were reporting directly to the President 
of the Republic and to the President of the Assembly.TPF385FPT  
184. The Chamber received evidence that there was a falling out between Mićo Stanišić, 
Minister of Interior, and Momčilo Mandić, Minister of Justice, on the one side, and Branko 
Đerić, Prime Minister, and Milan Trbojević, deputy Prime Minister, on the other. The 
former two often failed to attend Government sessions and would instead report directly to 
Radovan Karadžić and the Accused. TPF386FPT Stanišić, for example, would report to the 
Presidency on his consultations with the Ministry of Interior of Serbia. On at least one 
occasion, the Presidency directly ordered the Bosnian-Serb Ministry of Interior to examine 
the conduct of authorities and individuals guarding prisoners of war and report back.TPF387FPT 
Only on rare occasions would Stanišić report to Đerić.TPF388FPT When Đerić tried to have Stanišić 
 
TP
383
PT P64.A, tab 726 (Minutes of 15th Bosnian-Serb Presidency session, 6 July 1992); Krajišnik, T. 24431-2, 
24435, 24451, 24502, 24504, 24510, 24513, 24679; C7 (Plavšić statement), para. 31; C8 (Excerpts from 
Biljana Plavšić’s book I Testify), p. 242. 
TP
384
PT See supra, part 3.2.1. 
TP
385
PT P583, tab 106 (Record of 22nd session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 22-23 November 1992), p. 17. 
TP
386
PT Lakić, T. 21654-9; Trbojević, T. 11417, 11452-7, 11498, 11549-50, 11701, 11720-3; Mandić, T. 9301. 
TP
387
PT Mandić, T. 8813-14, 8885, 8902-3, 9300-2; P583.B (Prosecution interview with Milan Trbojević), pp. 17; 
Trbojević, T. 11690-3, 11718-20; P65, tab 213 (Minutes of 24th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 6 
August 1992), p. 2; Đerić, T. 27147-8. 
TP
388
PT Trbojević, T. 11777-88; P65, tab 141 (Minutes of 17th session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 31 May 
1992), p. 5; P65, tab 148 (Minutes of 19th session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 2 June 1992), p. 2; P64.A, 
tab 662 (Minutes of 21st session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 5 June 1992), p. 2; P64.A, tab 671 (Minutes 
of 27th session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 13 June 1992), p. 3. 
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and Mandić replaced, he consulted with the Accused and Karadžić. They did not allow 
Đerić to proceed despite the fact that Plavšić, and Koljević both sided with him.TPF389FPT  
185. Other Ministers would also report directly to Karadžić and the Accused. Bogdan 
Subotić, the Minister of Defence, would report on legislative developments, decrees to be 
issued, or instructions being prepared by the Ministry.TPF390FPT Dragan Kalinić, Minister of 
Health, reported directly to Karadžić after an agreement was signed on 23 May 1992 under 
the auspices of the ICRC, whereby the parties to the conflict agreed to undertake the 
necessary steps regarding release of prisoners.TPF391FPT Further, according to Đerić, Velibor 
Ostojić, Minister of Information, was “more in the Presidency than he was in the 
government”.TPF392FPT 
186. Already in June 1992, the Government publicly expressed its dissatisfaction with 
the lack of relevant information coming from the Ministries of Internal Affairs and 
Defence, as well as from the Main Staff of the VRS.TPF393FPT This situation eventually led 
Branko Đerić to resign from his post as Prime Minister on 9 October 1992. Đerić himself 
testified that he resigned from his post as Prime Minister because he considered that the 
authorities of the Bosnian-Serb Republic did not function and that “the party structures 
outweighed the rule of law aspect of the state”.TPF394FPT Similarly, deputy Prime Minister 
Trbojević observed that the Government was merely an agency implementing policies 
dictated by the Presidency.TPF395FPT 
187. The Presidency was composed entirely of SDS members, and the Assembly almost 
exclusively. This meant that, when the Bosnian-Serb institutions started operating, control 
over the SDS meant control over the policies of the Bosnian-Serb state-to-be. Soon 
enough, party operations and the policies of state organs became almost indiscernible. The 
two were essentially one in the same. Furthermore, the functions and roles performed by 
 
TP
389
PT Trbojević, T. 11457-9. 
TP
390
PT Đerić, T. 27103, 27141, 27158; C5 (Subotić statement), paras 9-12; C3 (Subotic statement), paras 14, 49; 
C4 (Subotić statement), p. 5; Subotić, T. 26581-2. 
TP
391 
PT 583.B (Prosecution interview with Milan Trbojević), pp. 17; Trbojević, T. 11693-6; Trbojević, T. 11478-
80; P583, tab 109 (Agreement among parties to the conflict, 23 May 1992). 
TP
392
PT Đerić, T. 27238.  
TP
393
PT Lakić, T. 21619-23; 21669-70; P64.A, tab 671 (Minutes of 27th session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 13 
June 1992), p.3; P583, tab 87 (Record of 19th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 12 August 1992), pp. 62-3. 
TP
394
PT Đerić, T. 27066, 27080, 27104, 27148, 27241-2; Lakić, T. 21610-12; P1112 (Handwritten notes of a 
meeting of Bosnian-Serb Government, 14 September 1992), pp. 4-5. This appears to have been an informal 
session of Presidency and the Government during the two-day 20th Assembly Session held in Bijeljina as 
recorded in P64 (Treanor Report), p. 184. 
TP
395
PT Trbojević, T. 11427-8; 11433-5, 11711-4, 11760, 11788; P583.A (Prosecution interview with Milan 
Trbojević), pp. 23-5; P583.B (Prosecution interview with Milan Trbojević), pp. 8, 10; Lakić, T. 21582. 
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the Accused (President of the Assembly, member of the Presidency) and Karadžić 
(President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic and president of the SDS), left no gaps in their 
power: the already existing links between the party and the state structures were fortified 
while, at the same time, new ones, de jure or otherwise, were created. All were under 
substantial de facto control of the two men. This meant that the Bosnian-Serb Government, 
and by extension, the Bosnian-Serb Republic, was nothing more than an agency 
implementing policies dictated by the leadership of the SDS under the watchful eyes and 
strong hands of Karadžić and the Accused. 
 
3.4 Armed forces 
3.4.1 Statutory framework 
188. According to the Bosnian-Serb Constitution, citizens of the Bosnian-Serb Republic 
had the right and obligation to be part of the armed forces of the JNA and the TO. The 
Constitution defined the members of the armed forces as citizens taking part in the defence 
of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF396FPT On 1 June 1992, the Law on the Army proclaimed the 
Army of the Bosnian-Serb Republic (VRS), which was charged with defending the 
Republic’s sovereignty, territory, and independence. TP F397FPT  
189. As explained earlier, the Bosnian-Serb President was commander-in-chief and had 
authority to define the VRS organization, establish the system of command, establish a 
plan for deployment, and make decisions on deployment, define the demarcation of 
military territory, and issue regulations related to combat.TPF398FPT Other important functions 
relevant to the armed forces were to be carried out by the Ministry of Defence, the 
Ministry of Interior, and by the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. The Government had the 
authority to propose a defence plan and carry out defence preparations. The Ministry of 
Defence was to be in charge of mobilization efforts. The MUP would deploy the police 
force in case of conflict. The Assembly was responsible for adopting a defence 
development plan, determining sources of defence finance, and enabling the acquisition of 
material supplies.TPF399FPT 
 
TP
396
PT P65, tab 96 (Decision on proclaiming Bosnian-Serb Constitution, 28 February 1992), arts 109, 112. 
TP
397
PT P65, tab 146 (Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), arts 1-2. 
TP
398
PT P65, tab 146 (Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), arts 173-4. 
TP
399
PT P65, tab 145 (Defence Act, 1 June 1992), arts 6, 10 (paras 1-7), 75. 
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190. In accordance with the Bosnian-Serb Republic’s Defence Act, defence equipment, 
funds, and other property previously belonging to Bosnia-Herzegovina were to be 
transferred to the Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF400FPT JNA officers, Bosnian-Serb Republic citizens, 
and citizens of other Yugoslav republics who wished to serve in the VRS, could be 
transferred to the Bosnian-Serb Republic’s Army.TPF401FPT 
 
3.4.2 Establishment of VRS 
191. Early on in its existence, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly became concerned with 
defence of the state and started debating the issue of armed forces. Already on 11 
December 1991, at the 3rd session of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, Dragan Kapetina, chief 
inspector in the Ministry for National Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented a paper 
to the deputies. It contained two proposals for the composition of defence forces. Both 
proposals, which were dependent on whether Bosnia-Herzegovina gained independence, 
were prepared “from the aspect of the interests of the Serbian people.”TPF402FPT Kapetina testified 
that he was tasked to do so by Miodrag Simović, vice-premier in charge of defence in the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Defence.TPF403FPT On 11 January 1992, at the 1st session of the 
Ministerial Council, Kapetina was tasked with ensuring that cooperation with JNA organs 
and command was incorporated into the Rules of Procedure of the Ministerial Council.TPF404FPT 
This decision merely formalized the situation that already existed, since some of the Serb 
TOs had already mobilized and coordinated with the JNA.TPF405FPT 
192. The Accused was adamant that the JNA was neutral prior to 12 May 1992, and that 
General Kukanjac, commander of the JNA 2nd Military District (covering Bosnia-
Herzegovina and small areas of Croatia), would have stayed neutral had the Muslims not 
attacked the JNA first.TPF406FPT This is contradicted by the evidence. Part 2.2 of this judgement 
already dealt with the level of involvement of the JNA in the arming of the Bosnian Serbs. 
Moreover, in addition to the already mentioned preparations by the Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly to coordinate with the JNA, on 27 March 1992, at a Bosnian-Serb Assembly 
 
TP
400
PT P65, tab 145 (Defence Act, 1 June 1992), art. 81. 
TP
401
PT P65, tab 146 (Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 377. 
TP
402
PT P65, tab 62 (Record of 3rd session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 11 December 1991), pp. 58-9.  
TP
403
PT Kapetina, T. 20042-3. 
TP
404
PT P64.A, tab 660 (Minutes of 1st session of Ministerial Council, 11 January 1992), p. 3; Kapetina, T. 20043-
4.  
TP
405
PT Prstojević, T. 14540-1. 
TP
406
PT Krajišnik, T. 23892, 24101-2. 
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session, Karadžić ordered the deputies to place the Serb TO, which was essentially a 
municipal defence force, under JNA command, where possible.TPF407FPT On 15 April 1992, at a 
joint meeting of the SNB and the Government, a JNA colonel was appointed commander 
of the Serb TO and tasked with supervising and controlling local TOs.TPF408FPT On 16 April 
1992, the Ministry of Defence of the Bosnian-Serb Republic publicly affirmed the state of 
imminent threat of war declared the day before by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency pursuant to 
its emergency powers, and informed the ARK, other SAO governments, and all Serb 
municipalities of the decision made the previous day by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency that 
the Serb TO would become “an armed force” of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. The Ministry 
also ordered mobilization and called for coordination of TOs with the JNA, where 
possible, under unified command. TPF409FPT 
193. Despite these measures geared towards coordination between the TO and JNA and 
the establishment of a unitary armed force, the Bosnian-Serb leadership was not satisfied 
with the progress of the two armed forces, especially the TOs since they 
failed to achieve the main strategic objectives of the armed struggle of the Serbian people in 
[Bosnia-Herzegovina]. They failed to open up and secure corridors ... between the Krajina and 
the FRY, or a corridor [through the] Drina river valley, they failed to gain control over a 
considerable part of the territory of former BH which historically and ethnically belongs to the 
Serbian people.TPF410FPT 
194. On 12 May 1992, at a session of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, the Accused 
promoted the creation of the VRS, explaining that acquisition of territory was the ultimate 
goal.TPF411FPT At the same session, a decision was passed formally establishing the VRS, 
renaming TO units to VRS units, and appointing Ratko Mladić as commander of the VRS 
Main Staff. TPF412FPT The Accused conceded that, in this capacity, Mladić was directly 
subordinated to the Presidency.TPF413FPT 
 
TP
407
PT Brown, T. 16285-6; P65, tab 115 (Record of 14th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 
23. 
TP
408
PT Subotić, T. 26440-1, 26545-6; C3 (Subotić statement), paras 12-13; C5 (Subotić statement), paras 7, 25, 
41; P64.A, tab 618 (Minutes of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-Serb Government, 15 April 1992), item 3. 
TP
409
PT Prstojević, T. 14540-1; P892, tab 47 (Decision of Bosnian-Serb Ministry of Defence on declaration of a 
state of imminent threat of war, 16 April 1992); P901, pp. 2474-8;  
TP
410
PT P892, tab 6 (Analysis of VRS Combat Readiness and Activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 69. 
TP
411
PT P65, tab 127 (Minutes and record of 16th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 12 May 1992), pp. 50-2. 
TP
412
PT P891 (Brown report), paras 1.39, 1.63-1.64. 
TP
413
PT List of matters admitted by the Accused, filed on 31 August 2001, para. 65. 
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195. Despite the creation of the VRS, TO units were not disbanded completely and the 
role of the TO remained significant. On 15 May 1992, Mićo Stanišić mobilized the TO 
further pursuant to a decision of Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević.TPF414FPT 
196. The formal withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred on 19 and 20 
May 1992, which is also the period when the transformation of what remained of the JNA 
in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the VRS was completed.TP F415FPT On 21 May 1992, 
the Bosnian-Serb Presidency called for general mobilization of able-bodied citizens of the 
Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF416FPT In addition, in the months that followed, and despite some 
delay,TPF417FPT many Serb TO units were renamed “light brigades” of the VRS.TPF418FPT 
 
3.4.3 Composition and logistics 
197. In June 1992 the VRS comprised 177,341 personnel divided into five Corps, as well 
as some units not attached to any specific Corps, all under the command of an Army Main 
Staff headed by Ratko Mladić. The five Corps were the 1st Krajina Corps (formerly the 
JNA 5th Corps, headed by Momir Talić from 17 March 1992); the 2nd Krajina Corps 
(formerly the JNA 10th Corps); the East Bosnia Corps (formerly the JNA 17th Corps); the 
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (formerly the JNA 4th Corps); and the Herzegovina Corps 
(formerly part of the JNA 9th Corps). In November 1992 the Drina Corps was created on 
territory previously under the authority of the East Bosnia Corps and the Sarajevo-
Romanija Corps.TPF419FPT 
198. Following the establishment of the VRS, the army continued to receive substantial 
financial and material support from the JNA and SFRY. VRS officers continued to receive 
 
TP
414
PT P763 (Nielsen report), para. 184. 
TP
415
PT Adjudicated facts 83-6; Witness 680, T. 14966-73, 15001, 15060-3, 15099, 15112-14; P891 (Brown 
report), paras 1.73, 1.75, 1.88. 
TP
416
PT P529, tab 271 (Order of 1st Krajina Corps command on general mobilization of VRS, 21 May 1992); 
P891 (Brown report), para. 1.77; P910 (Witness 79 transcript), pp. 27761-3; P910.A (Witness 79 statement), 
pp. 5, 9.  
TP
417
PT P583, tab 120 (Order from Birač Brigade command to Zvornik TO, 28 May 1992). 
TP
418
PT Brown, T. 16298; P892, tab 52 (Proposal of 1st Krajina Corps command to VRS Main Staff, 27 May 
1992); P891 (Brown report), paras 1.76, 1.81, 3.10. 1; P871 (Order to rename TO staffs and TO units, 6 June 
1992), arts 1, 2 3 and 4; Witness 666, T. 16028; C5 (Subotić statement), para. 46; Krsman, T. 21950-2.  
TP
419
PT P891 (Brown report), paras 1.62-1.64; P892, tab 6 (Analysis of VRS Combat Readiness and Activities in 
1992, April 1993), p. 71; Brown, T. 16236. On the area of responsibility of the 1st Krajina Corps, see: 
Brown, T. 16206-7; P891 (Brown report), paras 1.90-1.93, 2.1 (footnote 237); P892, tab 5 (Map of 
responsibility zone of 1st Krajina Corps, no date). 
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their salaries and pensions from the JNA.TPF420FPT Its assistance was not limited to financial 
resources. Large quantities of military and medical supplies, as well as foodstuffs and 
means of communication, were delivered in the course of 1992 from Yugoslavia both to 
the VRS Main Staff and to the various Corps of the VRS. TPF421FPT 
199. The VRS had control over several weapons-production plants in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. They manufactured air-jet engines, radar and telecommunications systems, 
artillery and non-guided rocket munitions, armoured vehicles, optical electronics, and 
engines for military vehicles. The Pretis artillery and rocket-manufacturing plant in 
Vogošća municipality was the only plant to manufacture ammunition.TPF422FPT  
200. The communication systems of the VRS were more than adequate on the most 
important matters such as enemy activity, the situation in the field, logistical issues, and 
staffing issues. TPF423FPT The Presidency received written and oral reports on “crisis areas” and 
the situation in the field regularly, as recorded by the minutes of the Presidency 
sessions.TPF424FPT 
201. The ethnic make up of the armed forces changed significantly in the first half of 
1992. Already in early 1992, and partly due to the refusal of non-Serbs to mobilize for the 
war in Croatia,TPF425FPT the JNA units in Bosnia-Herzegovina were progressively becoming all-
Serb units.TPF426FPT By April 1992, more than 90 per cent of all JNA officers were Serbs or 
Montenegrins, and the JNA was openly favouring Serbs in its personnel policy.TPF427FPT The 
 
TP
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PT P733 (Selak, transcript, 17 January 2003), p. 13112-13; Subotić, T. 26573-5; P979 (Guidelines on modes 
of action in state of war, July 1992), para. 6; P65, tab 182 (Record of 17th session of Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), pp. 22, 101; P892, tab 6 (Analysis of VRS Combat Readiness and Activities in 
1992, April 1993), pp. 127-9. 
TP
421
PT P891 (Brown report), paras 2.254-2.259. 
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422
PT Zečević, T. 13752-4, 13870, 13873-8; P753 (Zečević statement), paras 25, 31-4, 38; P757 (Report from 
Pretis factory to Bosnian-Serb Ministry of Defence, 11 February 1993), p. 10; P755 (Information on 
resuming production in certain enterprises, 8 June 1992); P756 (Decision appointing the director of Pretis, 18 
June 1992). 
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423
PT Brown, T. 16207-13; P892, tab 6 (Analysis of VRS Combat Readiness and Activities in 1992, April 
1993), pp. 33-41; Treanor, T. 1800-1; P65, tab 215 (Decision to establish VRS Supreme Command, 30 
November 1992), p. 1; Brown, T. 16455-7; P892, tab 44 (Record of 16th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 
12 May 1992), p. 16; P65, tab 165 (Minutes of 8th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 17 June 1992); 
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political leadership often exerted influence on the military leaders to remove the remaining 
non-Serbs from the armed forces. There was also pressure from within the JNA on non-
Serb officers to resign which was expressed in the form of threats coming from Serb 
soldiers and reassignments to menial jobs. On 9 June Colonel Vukelić, assistant 
commander for moral guidance in the VRS 1st Krajina Corps, reported to the VRS Main 
Staff and the Bosnian-Serb Presidency about a decision taken by the ARK crisis staff. The 
decision was an ultimatum to the Corps and other military units to remove Muslims and 
Croats from “vital and command posts” before 15 June, or the crisis staff would take 
control of the armed forces. Colonel Vukelić described the ultimatum as “reasonable”, but 
considered it impossible to find replacements for the 67 Muslim and Croat officers 
remaining in the Corps. He stated that the Corps was already excluding those persons from 
important decision-making processes. The VRS Main Staff’s response on the same date 
was that officers of Muslim and Croat nationality should be sent on leave immediately and 
that they should be referred to the JNA in order to resolve their status in the service.TPF428FPT 
202. Most non-Serb officers were indeed dismissed. By late 1992 or early 1993 out of 
2,579 VRS officers, the majority were Serb (2,165, or 84 per cent) or Yugoslav (204, or 8 
per cent). Only 62 (or 2 per cent) were Croat and 33 (1 per cent) were Muslim.TPF429FPT The fact 
that a few non-Serbs did remain appears to be due to the circumstance that, after 16 July 
1992, in view of lack of qualified personnel, non-Serbs who proved themselves in combat 
and declared that they wanted to become citizens of the Bosnian-Serb Republic were 
allowed to remain in the VRS.TPF430FPT 
203. The JNA was not the only armed force in the Bosnian-Serb Republic whose 
composition changed in such dramatic fashion. The TO was also struggling to fill up its 
ranks following the departure of non-Serbs. In a letter dated 27 April 1992 Minister of 
Defence Subotić requested reinforcements from the JNA’s 2nd Military District, pursuant 
to an order received by Prime Minister Đerić. The letter provided as follows:  
 
TP
428
PT Selak, T. 13332-3, 13365-6; P733 (Selak transcript), p. 12890; P733.A (Selak transcript), pp. 12030, 
12959, 13036-43; P733.B (Selak transcript), pp. 13049-50, 13058-61, 13065, 13068; P733.C (Selak 
transcript), pp. 13194, 13202-3; 1; P192 (Conclusions adopted at a sub-regional meeting of political 
representatives of different municipalities, 7 June 1992); P739 (Report by Command of 1st Krajina Corps to 
VRS Main Staff and Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 9 June 1992); P736 (Order by VRS Main Staff to the 
Command of 1st Kajina Corps, 9 June 1992); Brown, T. 16248-50; P892, tab 38 (Report from Milutin 
Vukelić to VRS Main Staff, 9 June 1992); P891 (Brown report), para. 1.131-1.135; D58 (Brown transcript), 
pp. 21584-90; P735 (Document from command of 30th Partizan Brigade, 21 June 1992).  
TP
429
PT Brown, T. 16529-31; P892, tab 6 (Analysis of VRS Combat Readiness and Activities in 1992, April 
1993), p. 80. Subotić, T. 26433-4; Krajišnik, T. 24113. 
TP
430
PT P891 (Brown report), paras 1.131, 1.135; D58 (Brown transcript), pp. 21592-4. 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 3 
 Administration of Bosnian-Serb Republic 
 
 
78 
In view of the essential need to bring the TO in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina up to the basic level of manpower, in accordance with an agreement reached 
and a promise made in Belgrade, we request your urgent assistance in providing us with the 
following officers. TPF431FPT 
 
3.4.4 Control over and operations of VRS 
204. The close relationship between the SDS leadership, the TO, and the JNA before the 
JNA’s withdrawal from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was explored, in part 3.4.2, as 
well as in part 2 of the judgement.  
205. The supreme military commander of the VRS was the President of the Republic, 
Radovan Karadžić. Directly below him was Mladić, who was the Commander of the VRS 
Main Staff. Despite the Accused’s attempts at downplaying the role of the Presidency,TPF432FPT 
the Chamber received sufficient evidence to conclude that, from May to November 1992, 
General Mladić would consult the Bosnian-Serb leadership regularly.TPF433FPT The Presidency 
would frequently discuss military-related issues and make decisions on those matters.TPF434FPT In 
addition, the Presidency had the authority to initiate investigations on alleged crimes 
related to combat activities,TPF435FPT order cease-fires,TPF436FPT and halt military operations if political 
or diplomatic needs so dictated.TPF437F PTIt was the Presidency that had the power to secure the 
release of prisoners of war.TPF438FPT The Chamber heard about one incident in July 1992, in 
which Minister of Justice Mandić arranged the release of a number of Croats held in the 
military detention facility at Manjača camp in Banja Luka municipality by contacting his 
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“boss”.TPF439FPT According to Mandić, this was Karadžić, whom he would go to in order to effect 
such exchanges. Mandić also testified that he would see Mladić or the Accused for the 
same purpose.TPF440FPT Other examples of the powers of the Presidency and its members in 
military affairs are detailed in part 6 of the judgement.  
206. The chain of command and the resulting close relationship between the members of 
the Presidency and the Main Staff also meant that the former were well briefed on the 
military situation throughout the Bosnian-Serb Republic by the latter.TPF441FPT Orders were then 
passed from the political leadership to military officers. This included, when the structure 
of the Bosnian-Serb Republic became more hierarchical, oral orders and orders given to 
military officials attending Presidency sessions.TPF442FPT  
207. The chain of command described above created an unusual relationship between the 
Ministry of Defence and the VRS. There was not much room for input in VRS affairs from 
the civilian authorities other than the Presidency.TPF443FPT Minister of Defence Subotić was not 
in the chain of command nor was he extensively briefed by the VRS. He and the other 
Ministers were called to meetings of the Presidency for consultations concerning specific 
matters only occasionally.TPF444FPT The Ministry of Defence did not receive reports on combat 
operations, but only on supply and logistics of military operations, promotions, and 
appointments. These came not from the field, but from either the “Supreme Commander”, 
or the Prime Minister.TPF445FPT Although Subotić often travelled to the field, Mladić would not 
allow him to visit units and barracks on the front lines during military actions, nor would 
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he let Subotić take an active part in the preparations for war operations.TPF446FPT The Ministry 
could not therefore take any decisions relating to military affairs.  
 
3.4.5 Paramilitary formations 
208. Even before the hostilities began in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there existed a centre in 
Belgrade where volunteers were gathered to be sent to fight in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Furthermore, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) recruited volunteers from within Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Karadžić, the Accused, and others from the Bosnian-Serb leadership were 
informed about this.PF447FP  
209. Many paramilitary units were seen operating independently at first. Often, 
paramilitary units were later incorporated within the TO structures and eventually ended up 
being either disbanded or integrated within the VRS structures. The Bosnian-Serb 
leadership teetered between endorsing anybody who would fight for the “Serbian cause” 
and accepting among their ranks only those who would subordinate themselves to the 
chain of command of the army.TPF448FPT This discussion lasted during most of 1992, at both the 
top levels of the Bosnian-Serb Republic and at the Corps’ level. 
210. A VRS Main Staff intelligence report on paramilitary formations dated 28 July 
1992 was sent to the five VRS Corps, the President of the Presidency, the Prime Minister, 
and the commander of the Main Staff. According to the report, the paramilitary groups 
operating in the Bosnian-Serb Republic at that time (about 60 groups, totalling 4,000 to 
5,000 men) were mostly formed of individuals of low morals, many of them convicted 
criminals, whose interest was looting. The paramilitaries were said to be weak or non-
existent in those areas where the administrative, judicial, and executive branches of 
Government functioned. According to the report, paramilitaries did not express an 
affiliation with the SDS, but rather with parties in Serbia.TPF449FPT 
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211. The VRS Main Staff intelligence report also listed Dragan Jočić’s special company 
of about 80 members as being among the most important paramilitary groups operating in 
the Bosnian-Serb Republic at that time. According to the report, this company, while 
formally part of the local VRS Brigade, actually operated under the influence of 
individuals from the Teslić municipal authorities.TPF450FPT 
212. The SOS paramilitary group under Nenad Stevandić, a member of the ARK crisis 
staff, was operative in Banja Luka in spring and summer 1992. It included convicted 
criminals and had links to SJB and CSB officials. Members of the SOS even acted as 
escorts for SDS leaders such as Radoslav Brđanin. At the time of the republican 
referendum on independence, on 29 February and 1 March 1992, members of the SOS 
blockaded the municipality building in Banja Luka town. TPF451FPT SOS groups were also active 
in Sanski Most, where the local crisis staff decided to transform them into a TO unit on 22 
April.TPF452FPT Although the ARK assembly formally placed the SOS under the control of the 
Banja Luka CSB on or about 29 April 1992, the group retained a certain degree of 
autonomy.TPF453FPT  
213. In Zvornik, in the period April to May 1992, the Yellow Wasps, a paramilitary unit 
consisting of around 100 heavily armed men, cooperated closely with the TO and was even 
issued arms by the TO’s logistics staff. Once the VRS was established and the Zvornik 
Brigade formed towards the end of May, the Yellow Wasps were subordinated to it.TPF454FPT 
This paramilitary unit had direct contact with the Pale leadership. On 11 July 1992, the 
leader of the Yellow Wasps, Vojin (Žućo) Vučković, went to the Pale SJB to collect arms 
and ammunition. While in Pale, Vučković met with Plavšić.TPF455FPT He also met with the 
Minister of Defence Subotić. At this meeting, Subotić explained to Vučković that whoever 
took orders from VRS officers was considered to be a full member of the VRS, irrespective 
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of whether that person was a reservist, a Serbian volunteer, or a member of a 
paramilitary.TPF456FPT 
214. In Prnjavor, the “Wolves of Vučjak” were a paramilitary group, consisting of 
approximately 150 men. They were headed by Veljko Milanković, a convicted criminal, 
trained in Knin (Croatia) in the summer of 1991.TPF457FPT The Wolves were transferred from the 
Prnjavor TO to the command of the 327th Motorized Brigade on 5 June 1992, by General 
Talić, commander of the 1st Krajina Corps. General Talić commended the Wolves on 
several occasions. This despite the fact that they meddled in civilian affairs in Prnjavor 
town and committed crimes. The civilian police in Prnjavor, numbering at the time about 
50 active members, was unable to stop this behaviour and requested the military police, the 
ARK crisis staff, and Radovan Karadžić to intervene. However, in September 1992, 
General Talić ordered that the military police would no longer operate in the town, but 
only at the front lines, and that police matters were to be taken care of by the civilian 
police only.TPF458FPT 
215. Local SDS boards, crisis staffs, and regional (SAO) governments often invited and 
assisted paramilitary groups. This occurred, for example, with the Yellow Wasps, the Red 
Berets, Mauzer’s men, and Arkan’s men, operating in north-eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Bijeljina, Brčko, and Zvornik).TPF459FPT Crisis staffs only ceased to tolerate the paramilitaries 
when they lost control of them.TPF460FPT  
216. On 28 July 1992, and as a result of the VRS Main Staff Intelligence report 
mentioned earlier, Mladić issued an order regarding the disarmament of paramilitary 
formations. The order noted that paramilitaries engaged in looting were operating in all 
territories under the VRS. It ordered all paramilitary formations with “honourable” 
intentions to place themselves under the command of the VRS. No individual or group 
responsible for crimes was to be incorporated into the army, and any member of a 
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paramilitary unit who refused to submit to the unified command of the VRS was to be 
disarmed and arrested.TPF461FPT 
217. The report, while aimed at bringing law back to areas now under Bosnian-Serb 
control, also shows that the VRS was more concerned with looting and the breakdown of 
order than with the widespread crimes committed by the paramilitaries, as described in 
more detail in part 4 of the judgement. The report also does not account for the fact that 
incorporation of paramilitaries had already been the rule even before July 1992 and that 
crimes were committed, and were continuing to be committed, by the paramilitaries under 
the auspices of the Bosnian-Serb armed forces.TPF462FPT  
218. For example, the Prijedor paramilitary units named in the report took part in the 
attacks on Kozarac, Hambarine, and other areas in Prijedor as part of the VRS in May 
1992. The group led by Veljko Milanković, active in Prnjavor, was integrated into the 1st 
Krajina Corps in 1992 and was subsequently involved in military operations in June 
1992.TPF463FPT  
219. On 1 June 1992, General Momir Talić of the 1st Krajina Corps ordered his officer 
Osman Selak to distribute weapons to paramilitary formations that had been trained at 
Manjača (Banja Luka).TPF464FPT On 9 June a report of the 1st Krajina Corps command 
complained about the slow pace of disarmament of paramilitary formations by civilian 
authorities.TPF465FPT On 18 June, Talić issued an order according to which all paramilitary 
formations in the Corps’ area of responsibility were to be disarmed. This was decided at a 
meeting of the ARK crisis staff attended by Talić. However, instead of disarming the 
paramilitaries, the VRS incorporated them into regular forces.TPF466FPT 
220. In the period May to August 1992, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps also incorporated 
a paramilitary group into its ranks. Paramilitary formations that would oppose 
subordination were not allowed to remain in the Corps’ area of responsibility (Sarajevo 
and adjacent municipalities).TPF467FPT 
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221. In addition, and despite General Mladić’s order of 28 July, some paramilitaries 
remained active in relative independence from the VRS. For example, an order of the 
commander of the Zvornik Brigade shows that as late as 13 October 1992 a paramilitary 
unit, the White Eagles, was operational in Zvornik. For that reason, the commander of the 
VRS Zvornik Brigade, Dragan Petković, ordered the temporary transfer of the White 
Eagles unit from the Zvornik Brigade to the Birač Brigade, for the purpose of “combat 
assignments”.TPF468FPT 
222. In Chamber’s view, the evidence shows that, from very early on following its 
creation, the VRS was aware of the serious problems posed by the paramilitary formations 
in various municipalities, as well as their unruly behaviour. The same can be said of the 
Bosnian-Serb leadership. Nevertheless, instead of suppressing these groups, the leadership 
and the VRS attempted, on several occasions to incorporate them into the regular VRS 
units. Some groups, “invited” by SDS local boards, crisis staffs, and regional government, 
were accepted as fighters for the “Serbian cause” despite their record of lawlessness and 
ruthless efficiency. Others were tolerated as long as they did not pose too much of a 
problem for Bosnian-Serb “legitimate” authorities.  
 
3.4.6 Military justice 
223. The Law on the Army regulated the administration of justice within the Bosnian-
Serb Republic’s armed forces. The law provided for criminal responsibility in accordance 
with the Republic’s criminal law. It created disciplinary offences, which included “overt 
nationalistic, racial or religious hatred.” Disciplinary offences were to be punished by such 
measures as suspension of promotion, discharge from the Army, or correctional custody.TPF469FPT 
The President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic had the power to reduce or rescind a 
disciplinary measure or punishment.TPF470FPT  
224. The Law on the Army vested superior officers with the authority to adjudge minor 
disciplinary infringements.TPF471FPT Serious offences were to be tried by disciplinary courts 
martial, conducted by a court-martial president, judges, and a military disciplinary 
prosecutor, all appointed by the President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic for a term of two 
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years. To that end, on 24 July 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Presidency (at a session attended by 
Karadžić, Plavšić, Koljević, the Accused, and Đerić), adopted a decree on the appointment 
of the president and judges of military disciplinary courts, military disciplinary prosecutors 
and their deputies, and secretaries of military disciplinary courts.TPF472FPT  
 
3.5 Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) 
3.5.1 Statutory framework 
225. The Bosnian-Serb Law on Internal Affairs was enacted by the Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly on 28 February 1992, on the same day that the Assembly adopted the 
Constitution. The law was published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 1992. TPF473FPT Article 
81 of the Constitution provided for the police to be commanded by the Presidency where 
an imminent threat of war had been declared.  
226. The new Law on Internal Affairs was based to an overwhelming extent on the 17 
April 1990 Bosnia-Herzegovina Law on Internal Affairs. TPF474FPT One of the differences was that 
the 1992 law referred to “national security” whereas the 1990 law referred to “state 
security”.TPF475FPT Another difference was that the new law made reference to the MUP’s ethnic 
composition and invited “employees of Serbian nationality and other employees who so 
desire” to take employment in the MUP. TPF476FPT 
227. The Bosnian-Serb MUP was to handle security affairs on behalf of the 
Government.TPF477FPT In accordance with the law, two divisions within the MUP executed the 
Ministry’s security functions: the National Security Service and the Public Security 
Service. The function of the former was mainly to collect intelligence and make security 
assessments.TPF478FPT Its performance was to be evaluated by the President of the Republic, who 
would report on the agency’s work to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly.TPF479FPT The Public Security 
Service, on the other hand, was responsible for administrative and technical affairs related 
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to protection from threats to state security, crime prevention, and detection and 
confiscation of illicit weapons; in other words, regular policing tasks.TPF480FPT 
228. The 1992 law provided for five Security Services Centres (CSBs) in the Bosnian-
Serb Republic: Banja Luka for the territory of the ARK; Trebinje for the SAO of 
Herzegovina; Doboj for the SAO of Northern Bosnia; Sarajevo for the SAO of Romanija-
Birač; and Bijeljina for the SAO of Semberija.TPF481FPT Each of the five CSBs was in charge of a 
number of Public Security Stations (SJBs) found in municipalities covered by that 
particular CSB. In this structure the SJBs would continue to play the role of the main organ 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the municipal level.TPF482FPT 
229. The new law stipulated that CSBs and SJBs were to cease cooperating with the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP. TPF483FPT The law specified SJB competencies as including protection 
of life and personal security of citizens, prevention and detection of criminal acts, and the 
tracking down and apprehension of perpetrators.TPF484FPT The law tasked SJBs to cooperate with 
any “organs” or “organizations” that had been legally charged with maintaining order in a 
given area.TPF485FPT 
230. The 1992 law extended the maximum period of allowable detention on the premises 
of CSBs and SJBs to three days (from the maximum of 24 hours permitted by the 1990 
law). In addition, persons of unknown identity suspected of serious criminal offences could 
be detained indefinitely under the 1992 law.TPF486FPT 
231. According to internal regulations, the MUP’s head office was to coordinate the 
work of CSBs, and, in circumstances that jeopardized the security of the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic, to activate reserve police forces and supply police units with arms.TPF487FPT In addition 
to tasks assigned to them by the MUP’s head office, the CSBs and SJBs were to implement 
the regulations of municipal assemblies in connection with the maintenance of law and 
order.TPF488FPT 
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232. The Law on Internal Affairs authorized the MUP Minister to form additional police 
units to carry out specific tasks, if needed to preserve peace and public order.TPF489FPT The 
Minister could also limit public movement and assembly if the security of the Republic, 
the work of republican organs, or the freedom and rights of the citizens of the Republic 
were threatened, although before doing so the Minister was obliged to consult the 
Assembly – or, if the circumstances made it impossible to consult the Assembly, the 
Republic’s President.TPF490F PT 
233. The new law tasked all MUP personnel to “preserve the lives of people and human 
dignity” in the course of carrying out their duties.TPF491FPT Moreover, it provided that 
“Authorized officials shall execute orders issued by the Minister, or by their immediate 
supervisor, given in order to carry out matters and tasks of national and public security, 
except when such orders are contrary to the constitution of the law.” TPF492FPT 
234. On the question of the division of existing assets, the Law on Internal Affairs 
stipulated that fixed assets, equipment, and archives were to be transferred to the Bosnian-
Serb MUP in proportion to the percentage of the representatives of the Serb people in the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly. Fixed and movable assets of the CSBs and SJBs in 
districts, parts of which had become part of SAOs, were to be transferred to the Bosnian-
Serb Republic in proportion to the size of the parts separated from the districts.TPF493FPT 
 
3.5.2 Establishment of MUP 
235. As mentioned in part 2 of this judgement, the Bosnian-Serb MUP was one of the 
first institutions of the nascent Republic to start functioning effectively. At its session of 11 
March 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly unanimously called for the implementation of the 
new Law on Internal Affairs by the Ministerial Council.TPF494FPT At the next session, one week 
later, Radovan Karadžić predicted the imminent withdrawal of Bosnian Serbs from the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP, TPF495FPT and Miroslav Vještica, an SDS delegate from Bosanska 
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Krupa, described the establishment of a Bosnian-Serb MUP as a precondition for Bosnian 
Serbs to seize control of “their territories”.TPF496FPT On 24 March 1992, Mićo Stanišić was 
appointed Minister of Internal Affairs by the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. TPF497FPT 
236. The Law on Internal Affairs, published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 1992 
was to enter into force on 31 March 1992.TPF498FPT From that date, all CSBs and SJBs of Bosnia-
Herzegovina throughout the territory of the Bosnian-Serb Republic were to stop 
functioning.TPF499FPT On 24 March, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly instructed the Ministerial 
Council to prepare an operational plan for “assuming power, that is for establishing power 
and rendering operational the authorities in the territory of the [the Bosnian-Serb Republic] 
and in particular in the field of internal affairs” and to submit it to the Assembly on 27 
March.TPF500FPT On 27 March, the Constitution of the Bosnian-Serb Republic was adopted by the 
Bosnian-Serb Assembly. TPF501FPT No operational plan was on the agenda that day.TPF502FPT The plan 
was eventually issued on 26 April 1992.TPF503FPT 
237. Already on 30 March 1992, the Bosnian-Serb MUP was set up in SAO 
Romanija.TPF504FPT On 31 March 1992, Momčilo Mandić sent a dispatch to the Bosnia-
Herzegovina Minister of Interior, as well as to all SJBs, CSBs, and to the Secretary of the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina SUP in Sarajevo. The dispatch reads: 
At its meeting held on 27 March 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in accordance with the political orientation of the Serbian people and the 
Sarajevo Agreement, promulgated the Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In addition, the Assembly of the Serbian People passed a number of laws and 
other regulations necessary for the functioning of the Republic of the Serbian people in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that respect, it passed a law on internal affairs, which shall be 
uniformly applied on the territory of the Republic of the Serbian people in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as of 1 April 1992, and appointed Mićo Stanišić, until now an adviser in the BH 
MUP, as Minister. This law, among other things, regulates a unified Public Security Service, 
regulates and organises the National Security Service within the framework of the rights and 
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duties of the Republic of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regulates the duties 
and powers of MUP employees, mutual relationships and cooperation between the organs of 
the Interior, and the education, professional training and specialist training of employees. In 
order to conduct internal affairs on the territory of the Republic of Serbian people in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Ministry of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina based in Sarajevo, is setting up the following security services centres as 
territorial units: [Banja Luka, Trebinje, Doboj, Sarajevo, Ugljevik]. Within the above-
mentioned Security Services Centres, in order to carry out specific tasks and duties within 
the competence of the organs of internal affairs, Public Security Stations are set up for the 
territories of municipalities. On the day this law comes into force, the Security Services 
Centres and Public Security Stations of [Bosnia-Herzegovina] MUP on the territory of [the 
Bosnian-Serb Republic] are abolished and cease to function, and their authority, i.e. tasks 
and duties, within the competence of organs of internal affairs, are taken over by the above-
mentioned organisational units of MUP of the [Bosnian-Serb Republic] … The contents of 
this dispatch should be made known to all the employees of the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] MUP, 
in order to provide objective and timely information and to avoid incidents or disagreeable 
situations. TPF505FPT 
238. The Chamber finds this chronology of events enough to dispel any doubt raised by 
the Accused during his testimony as to the creation of an operative Bosnian-Serb MUP by 
the end of March 1992.TPF506FPT 
239. On 6 April 1992, Momčilo Mandić organized the take-over of the Vraca police 
academy, which became the first headquarters of the new MUP and the CSB Sarajevo.TPF507FPT 
The MUP headquarters was later moved to two locations in Pale.TPF508FPT At the beginning of 
July 1992, CSB Sarajevo was moved to Lukavica.TPF509FPT 
 
3.5.3 Composition and logistics 
240. In its early days the Bosnian-Serb MUP coordinated with, and was helped by, the 
forces of the Republic of Serbia. Reports prepared by the (Yugoslav) Federal State 
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Security Services in March 1992 confirm formal cooperation between the Federal SUP in 
Belgrade and the Bosnian-Serb police in the take-over of power and maintenance of power 
in the territories claimed by the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The coordination 
plan included the deployment of members of the Serbian MUP and the Federal SUP in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF510FPT In addition, in March and April 1992, the Federal SUP used JNA 
helicopters to send weapons and military equipment for use by the Bosnian-Serb MUP, in 
Pale and Banja Luka.TPF511FPT  
241. By September 1992, the Bosnian-Serb MUP numbered 11,240 employees, which 
was more than the 10,195 employees in all of the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP in January 
1990.TPF512FPT 
242. Already in April 1992 the Bosnian-Serb MUP started establishing special police 
units armed with weaponry up to and including 120 mm mortars.TPF513FPT The commander of the 
first Bosnian-Serb MUP special unit was Milenko Karišik.TPF514FPT By 29 April, Stojan 
Župljanin, head of the Banja Luka CSB, had at his disposal armed combat vehicles, anti-
aircraft artillery, and helicopters. The SOS units discussed above would, he said, be 
absorbed into the special police detachment.TPF515FPT By early May, Župljanin had established a 
“counter-sabotage and counter-terrorist” police unit equipped for combat and numbering 
150 men who had had combat experience in Croatia.TPF516FPT At the end of June 1992, the MUP 
noted the presence of special police units at Sokolac and Pale. By September 1992 the 
Special Brigade of the police had five detachments, one based at each of the five CSBs. 
Some SJBs, such as those in Ilidža and Novo Sarajevo, also had their own special police 
units.TPF517FPT  
 
3.5.4 Control over and operations of MUP forces 
243. As stated earlier, on 16 April 1992, the Minister of Defence, Bogdan Subotić, 
declared that a state of imminent threat of war existed in the Bosnian-Serb Republic, and 
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ordered full mobilization. Subotić’s order allowed the authorities to take “all necessary 
measures appropriate to the situation.” The measures decreed by the ARK on 4 May 
pursuant to Subotić’s order included a general mobilization, introduction of a curfew, and a 
deadline of 11 May for the surrender of illegal weapons.TPF518FPT These orders were 
disseminated to all SJBs within CSB Banja Luka.TPF519FPT  
244. The MUP was responsible to the Minister of Interior which in turn was responsible, 
first and foremost, to the Presidency and then to the Government. Instructions went down 
from the Minister to the CSB, and from there to the SJBs. Reports went up to the Minister 
and thus to the Presidency.TPF520FPT At a joint meeting of the SNB and the Bosnian-Serb 
Government on 22 April 1992, the MUP was directed to report daily on the situation in the 
territory of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF521FPT Witness 665 testified that every day a police 
report was sent to the Ministry, detailing the number and modalities of arrests made during 
that day, and informing the Minister of all important events.TPF522FPT In a report on the work of 
the MUP produced at the end of June 1992, the MUP noted that the Prime Minister had 
received almost 60 “Bulletins of Daily Events”.TPF523FPT Subotić confirmed that the “President” 
of the Bosnian-Serb Republic received daily reports from the field, including reports from 
the MUP and from the VRS.TPF524FPT Subotić suggested that the MUP may have had the best 
communication system, among the branches of the Government, due to the presence of 
police stations throughout the territory.TPF525FPT  
245. The MUP also cooperated closely with the VRS. On 15 May 1992, Stanišić ordered 
that all employees of the MUP organize into “war units”.TPF526FPT This order formalized the 
cooperation by explaining how MUP units should cooperate with the VRS. Stanišić 
authorized the CSB heads to implement these arrangements.TPF527FPT  
246. A report dated 17 June 1992 on aspects of the MUP’s work states that the MUP 
“co-operation was immediately achieved with other parts of the Serb defence forces, i.e. 
 
TP
517
PT P763 (Nielsen report), para. 210. 
TP
518
PT P763 (Nielsen report), para. 191. 
TP
519
PT P763 (Nielsen report), para. 192. 
TP
520
PT Radić, T. 7439-40; P763 (Nielsen report), para. 218. 
TP
521
PT P65, tab 122 (Minutes of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-Serb Government, 22 April 1992). 
TP
522
PT Witness 665, T. 13620, 13621-3. 
TP
523
PT P763 (Nielsen report), para. 223. 
TP
524
PT C5 (Subotić statement), para. 40; Subotić, T. 26536-8. 
TP
525
PT Subotić, T. 26596. 
TP
526
PT Nielsen, T. 13949; P763 (Nielsen report), para. 205. 
TP
527
PT P763 (Nielsen report), para. 205. 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 3 
 Administration of Bosnian-Serb Republic 
 
 
92 
with the army.”TPF528FPT Momčilo Mandić testified that MUP special-purpose units, as well as 
the police force, were placed under army command, and that for the purpose of war 
operations, all MUP forces were subordinate to the army.TPF529FPT According to Mandić, this 
subordination was in accordance with a Presidential order and with military law as 
applicable in a situation of immediate threat of war.TPF530FPT Following this order, the Bosnian-
Serb police force in Prijedor cooperated closely with the military, and the police units took 
part in military operation under army command.TPF531FPT 
247. Thus, in addition to the TO units and the VRS, the MUP personnel played a major 
role in the armed conflict of 1992, both as combatants and as the responsible organs of 
security in the daily lives of the population.TPF532FPT  
248. There is also evidence of both cooperation at first, and then discord later, between 
the Bosnian-Serb MUP and paramilitary formations. The problems between the two 
usually started at the moment when the paramilitaries began committing crimes against 
Bosnian Serbs and when the MUP could not control them anymore.TPF533FPT Eventually the 
MUP took some action against the paramilitary formations and even made arrests.TPF534FPT 
However, prominent MUP members continued to cooperate selectively with the 
paramilitaries without suffering disciplinary consequences. For example, Tomislav Kovač, 
chief of the Ilidža SJB, noted on 5 August 1992 that he had relied on “Serbian volunteers” 
since the outbreak of the war due to non-cooperation of local VRS units. TPF535FPT 
249. In the course of 1992, the Bosnian-Serb MUP also became heavily involved in the 
operation of detention centres. On 20 July 1992 Stojan Župljanin, head of the Banja Luka 
CSB and a member of the ARK war staff,TPF536FPT explained this aspect of MUP operations to 
Mićo Stanišić. Župljanin noted that the processing of detainees had resulted in a three-fold 
categorization. The first comprised of persons suspected of the commission of criminal 
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acts. The second comprised of persons suspected of aiding and abetting those in the first 
category. The third category comprised of “adult males concerning whom the Service has 
not to date gathered any security-relevant data on the basis of which these persons may be 
treated as hostages.”TPF537FPT 
250. The Bosnian-Serb MUP officials complained throughout 1992 about the impact of 
frequent and extensive combat engagements on policing.TPF538FPT MUP’s first annual report, 
covering the period April to December 1992, stated that participation in combat activities 
stood at “1,451 police officers, on average, every day.” The Ministry had put 6,167 police 
officers at the disposal of the VRS, most of them from the reserve.TPF539FPT 
251. In July 1992 Radovan Karadžić issued “Guidelines on tasks, modes of action and 
functioning of defence forces, state organs, and all economic and social subjects of the 
Bosnian-Serb Republic in the state of war”. Pursuant to the guidelines, the MUP Minister 
was to pass an act adjusting the internal structure of the Ministry to wartime conditions, 
and to issue instructions on how members of the MUP were to perform tasks and duties. 
Active and reserve police, as well as special units which would not form part of the MUP’s 
wartime structure, were to be transferred to the Army or used for other wartime tasks.TPF540FPT 
252. Minister Stanišić stated in several orders that his subordinates would be held 
responsible for not carrying out his orders, and also expressed an awareness that MUP 
employees had been involved in the commission of illegal acts such as theft and plunder, 
but no disciplinary committees or courts were ever established. TPF541FPT The MUP Ministry and 
the Bosnian-Serb leadership would only go so far as placing those who misbehaved under 
the auspices of the VRS.  
253. On 6 September 1992, Mićo Stanišić issued an order pertaining to the confiscation 
of property. Confiscations were to be in accordance with the law and were to be properly 
documented. Confiscated property could not be given to municipal assemblies or other 
municipal organs. Those found to have violated the provisions cited in the order would 
face disciplinary and legal consequences. Stanišić referred to specific incidents in which 
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property had been illegally confiscated and commented that such unlawful actions 
damaged the image of the MUP. TPF542FPT 
254. In an interview with the newspaper Javnost on 3 October 1992 Mićo Stanišić gave a 
very positive account of the functioning of the Bosnian-Serb MUP. He asserted that it has 
“never happened that anybody in the entire territory of the RS ignored any of my orders 
issued, in compliance with the law of course.” He also said he believed that the MUP was 
the only Ministry to have disciplined staff members in those “rare” instances when they 
succumbed to “basic instincts”.TPF543FPT 
255. As more fully described in part 4 of this judgement, MUP forces were involved in 
criminal activities in the indictment municipalities. These activities ranged from mere war 
profiteering to the running of detention centres where Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats were subjected to ill-treatement. Units also participated in forcing non-Serbs to 
leave municipalities that ought to become “Serb” territory. Although there were some 
investigations, they were mostly aimed at stopping looting and the disruption of order. The 
evidence shows a conscious decision to use MUP forces in combat and “mopping 
up”operations rather than to protect the civilian population, especially non-Serbs.TPF544FPT 
 
3.6 Crisis staffs, war presidencies, and war commissions 
3.6.1 Statutory framework 
256. The Bosnian-Serb Constitution provided for the territorial division of the Bosnian-
Serb Republic into local units of self-management, such as cities and municipalities. 
Organization and operation of municipal authorities was to be determined and regulated by 
municipal statutes.TPF545FPT Each assembly had an executive committee and a network of 
municipal administrative organs charged with the implementation of the assembly 
decisions.TPF546FPT The Bosnian-Serb Constitution also bestowed on the municipalities the right 
and obligation to manage and organize territorial defence.TPF547FPT 
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para. 235; P763.C, tab 39 (Summary of 11 July 1992 meeting of MUP officials in Sarajevo, July 1992), p. 10. 
TP
545
PT P65, tab 96 (Decision on proclaiming Bosnian-Serb Constitution, 28 February 1992), arts 100, 103, and 
106. 
TP
546
PT P64 (Treanor report), paras 101, 106, 109; P64.A, tab 379 (Decision on amendments and supplements to 
the Statute of Banja Luka municipality, 19 September 1990), arts 16-18; P64.A, tab 381 (Decision on 
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257. Although the Bosnian-Serb Constitution did not specify the mechanisms of 
municipal decision-making in times of conflict or envision the existence of crisis staffs, the 
1974 Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 1984 Law on All-People’s Defence 
suggested that certain mechanisms could come into being if regular municipal authorities 
were unable to function properly. Thus, the 1974 Constitution provided for collective 
municipal presidencies. A collective presidency was to be formed in time of war or 
imminent threat of war to replace a municipal assembly, and was to remain in existence 
until the assembly was able to reconvene. This war presidency, consisting of the municipal 
assembly leadership and some additional members, was accorded extraordinary powers in 
dealing with situations of war or imminent threat of war.TPF548FPT 
258. The 1984 Law on All-People’s Defence provided for “operational and policy” 
committees. These committees were to consist of municipal leaders, the JNA, the TO, and 
the secretariats of national defence and internal affairs. The main function of a committee 
of this kind was to lead resistance in case of foreign occupation and act within the 
competence of government organs that were not able to function at the time. TPF549FPT 
259. The Accused and other witnesses testified that crisis staffs were not uncommon, 
under the previous (Yugoslav) system, when extraordinary situations arose, and had no 
political connotation.TPF550FPT However, the crisis staffs that came into being in the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic in late 1991 and early 1992 were created without reference to the legal 
instruments mentioned above. Instead, they started out as SDS organs and were only later 
transformed into organs of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. 
 
3.6.2 Functions of crisis staffs 
260. As explained in part 2 of this judgement, the SDS crisis staffs in the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic were all fully set up and operational by April or May 1992. Once they became 
municipal organs they functioned as the municipal authority when municipal assemblies 
could not operate due to the state of emergency, replacing both the municipal assembly and 
 
amendments of Statute of Prijedor municipality, 17 September 1990), arts 19-20; P64.A, tab 380 (Statute of 
Prijedor municipality, 25 October 1984), art. 279. 
TP
547
PT P65, tab 96 (Decision on proclaiming Bosnian-Serb Constitution, 28 February 1992), art. 110. 
TP
548
PT P528 (Hanson report), p. 3. 
TP
549
PT P528 (Hanson report), p. 4. 
TP
550
PT For example: Krajišnik, T. 23673, 24780-1; C3 (Subotić statement), para. 8; Subotić, T. 26440-1; C5 
(Subotić statement), paras 47-8. 
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the executive committee.TPF551FPT As the leading governing body in the municipality, the crisis 
staffs exercised control over civilian, military, and paramilitary affairs.TPF552FPT  
261. In addition, throughout the period of their existence, the crisis staffs functioned as 
the coordinating body between municipal authorities, the SDS, and the central republican 
level (both state and SDS) on the one side, and the military, the police, and other forces on 
the ground in the municipalities, on the other.TPF553FPT For example, from 1 April to 15 June 
1992, municipal and regional SDS organs played a major role in organizing TO units. 
These units, sometimes working together with JNA,TPF554FPT then proceeded to secure Serb 
municipalities, especially in the ARK.TPF555FPT  
262. On 24 February 1992, the SDS Executive Board assigned “coordinators” for the 
ARK and the different SAOs. Among other tasks, these coordinators were to ensure the 
implementation of decisions of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly and the Bosnian-Serb 
Government and to take part in the work of the regional crisis staffs.TPF556FPT The municipal 
crisis staffs in the ARK received instructions from, acted upon decisions of, and reported to 
the ARK crisis staff. TPF557FPT Municipal crisis staffs in the Sarajevo area, on the other hand, 
coordinated their work directly with the central organs of the Bosnian-Serb Republic and 
the JNA. TPF558FPT  
 
TP
551
PT Hanson, T. 9820, 9699, 9731; P528 (Hanson report), para. 40; P529, tab 468 (Record of 46th session of 
Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 9-11 and 23 November 1994), pp. 347-8; P529, tab 158 (Report from Novo 
Sarajevo crisis staff to President of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 5 June 1992), p. 1; P529, tab 145 (Decision of 
Bratunac crisis staff proclaiming a state of emergency, 1 January 1992), art. 2. 
TP
552
PT P901, pp. 2486-7, 2529-30, 2539-40; P901.A, pp. 2642, 2644.  
TP
553
PT Hanson, T. 9729-31; P528 (Hanson report), paras 35-6, 45; P991 (Article in Glas newspaper, 9 June 
1992); Kasagić, T. 18597-8, 18602-3, 18714-20; P990 (Minutes of ARK assembly session, 17 July 1992), p. 
1; P512.A (Džonlić transcript), p. 2409-11, 2418, 2423-7; P512.B (Džonlić transcript), pp. 2444-8, 2473-6, 
2504-6; P512.C (Džonlić transcript), pp. 2582, 2585; P512.D (Džonlić transcript), pp. 2640-6, 2689; P512.E 
(Džonlić transcript), p. 2722.  
TP
554
PT P892, tab 46 (Order from Command of JNA 5th Corps, 1 April 1992); P892, tab 47 (Decision of Bosnian-
Serb Ministry of Defence, 16 April 1992); P892, tab 48 (Conclusions of Sanski Most crisis staff, 28 April 
1992); P892, tab 50 (Report from Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), p. 1.  
TP
555
PT Brown, T. 16285-9, 16291-5; P892, tab 6 (Analysis of VRS Combat Readiness and Activities in 1992, 
April 1993), pp. 10, 69. 
TP
556
PT P529, tab 62 (Decision by SDS Executive Board on appointing Rajko Dukić as coordinator for SAO 
Semberija and Birać, 24 February 1992); P529, tab 63 (Decision by SDS Executive Board on appointing 
Radislav Vukić as coordinator for ARK, 24 February 1992); P529, tab 64 (Decision by SDS Executive Board 
on appointing Vojo Krunić and Radomir Nešković as coordinators for SAO Eastern Herzegovina, 24 
February 1992); P529, tab 65 (Decision by SDS Executive Board on appointing Jovo Šarac and Milovan 
Žugić as coordinators for SAO Romanija, 24 February 1992); P529, tab 67 (Decision by SDS Executive 
Board on appointing Simo Mihić and Slobodan Babić as coordinators for SAO Northern Bosnia, 24 February 
1992). 
TP
557
PT Witness D14, T. 20321-2; P334.A (Transcript of video from Krajina television to situation in Kotor 
Varoš), p. 2; P528 (Hanson report), para. 44. See for example P529, tab 148 (Report of work of Ključ crisis 
staff, July 1992), p. 5.  
TP
558
PT Prstojević, T. 14499-501, 14565-85, 14807-8.  
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263. The crisis staffs were transformed from SDS organs to republican organs with the 
public announcement of 4 April 1992, in which the SNB ordered their activation and 
instructed that the TO and reserve police be put in readiness.TPF559FPT As explained earlier, 
already on 24 March 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly asked the Government to draw up 
a plan on assuming power and rendering operational the new governmental authorities, for 
example in the field of internal affairs and national defence, in the territory of the Bosnian-
Serb Republic.TPF560FPT Such a plan was then issued by the Government about a month later, on 
26 April 1992, and concerned the functioning of crisis staffs in the municipalities: 
In the conditions of war, the Crisis Staff shall take over all the prerogatives and functions of 
municipal assemblies when they are not able to convene ... The operation of the Crisis Staffs 
shall be based on constitutional and legal provisions and also on the decisions of the 
Assembly, the Presidency and the Government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
... The Crisis Staffs shall collect information on the situation in the field and notify and 
consult competent authorities of the Serbian BiH, that is commissioners of the Government 
who shall be appointed especially for the communities and areas threatened by the war ... 
The Crisis Staffs shall ... prepare weekly reports which shall be submitted to the regional and 
state organs of the Serbian BiH. TPF561FPT 
264. This plan was distributed and implemented in municipalities throughout the 
Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF562FPT During the transformation from SDS to republican organs, 
which differed in speed and character in different municipalities, there was significant 
overlap between party and municipal functions.TPF563FPT Although the transformation, which did 
not include any change of membership, generally was completed by the end of April 1992, 
some crisis staffs continued to regard themselves as SDS organs after that time. TPF564FPT 
 
TP
559
PT Hanson, T. 9688; P529, tab 73 (Announcement by National Security Council, 4 April 1992). This 
announcement was acted upon in at least the Autonomous Region of Birač. See P529, tab 198 (Decision by 
crisis staff of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Birač on the proclamation of the state of war for the entire 
Serbian Autonomous Region of Birač, 29 April 1992); P56 (Bratunac crisis staff order, 1 May 1992); P57 
(Bratunac crisis staff order, 6 May 1992). 
TP
560
PT Hanson, T. 9690-1; P65 tab 114 (Record of 13th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 25 March 1992), pp. 
8-9. 
TP
561
PT Hanson, T. 9692-3; P529, tab 76 (Instructions for Serbian People’s crisis staffs in Municipalities, 26 April 
1992). 
TP
562
PT Hanson, T. 9694-8 ; P528 (Hanson report), para. 26 ; D115 (Report on work of Bosanski Novi crisis 
staff), p. 7. 
TP
563
PT Hanson, T. 9675-6, 9820-1, 9862-3, 9950, 9984; P529, tab 101 (Decision by Bihać crisis staff on 
appointment of TO commanders, 3 May 1992); P529, tab 105 (Order by Trnovo crisis staff, 2 May 1992); 
P529, tab 250 (Announcement signed by Jovan Tintor about general mobilization of Vogošća TO, 11 May 
1992); P272 (Order by Pale crisis staff, 7 May 1992); Mičić, T. 19467.  
TP
564
PT P528 (Hanson report), para. 26. 
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265. As for the membership, the crisis staffs included leaders at the municipal level but 
also people with ties to the republican level of the SDS.TPF565FPT Members of the SDS Main 
Board but, in particular, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly deputies “were the link from the 
republic level to the municipal”.TPF566FPT Almost every crisis staff in the municipalities covered 
by the indictment included at least one deputy from the Bosnian-Serb Assembly or 
member of the SDS Main Board. Their role was to transfer authority from the central to the 
municipal level,TP F567FPT and also to convey information between those two levels.TPF568FPT 
266. This composition of the municipal crisis staffs reflected the coordinating role of the 
body, between political, military and other forces in the municipality, as well as the 
dominant influence of SDS.TPF569FPT For example, in Ključ municipality, the members of the 
crisis staff were the president of the municipal assembly, the chief of the SJB, the SNO 
secretary, the TO commander, the president of the SDS municipal board, a local deputy to 
the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, and the vice-president of the municipal executive 
committee. TPF570FPT 
 
3.6.3 Control over crisis staffs 
267. As stated above, the central republican level ensured that the members of the crisis 
staffs would include at least one Assembly deputy. By prescribing the membership of crisis 
staffs in this way, the central republican bodies and the Bosnian-Serb leadership exercised 
a substantial amount of control over them and were able to exert central influence on the 
municipal level. Due to the crisis staffs’ exceptional role as local legislative power, as well 
as the fact that the Bosnian-Serb Assembly deputies were linked to the crisis staffs, 
Nedjeljko Prstojević, the president of the Ilidža crisis staff, perceived this system as one of 
organisational subordination of the crisis staffs to the President of the Assembly himself.TPF571F 
PTMomčilo Mandić, deputy Minister of Interior for the Bosnian-Serb Republic from April to 
May 1992, testified that the Bosnian-Serb leadership, during the first phases of the conflict, 
 
TP
565
PT Hanson, T. 9632. 
TP
566
PT Hanson, T. 9677. 
TP
567
PT Hanson, T. 9770; P65, tab 182 (Record of 17th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), p. 
58. 
TP
568
PT Hanson, T. 9947-9, 9955-6. 
TP
569
PT Hanson, T. 9733-4 ; P528 (Hanson report), paras 35-6, 45. 
TP
570
PT P529, tab 41 (Minutes of 6th meeting of Ključ executive board, 23 December 1991). 
TP
571
PT Prstojević, T. 14619-20, 14809, 14813-16; P65, tab 115 (Record of 14th session of Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 23. 
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did not always know what was happening on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and was 
unable to direct events on the ground.TPF572FPT The Chamber, in view of the evidence on the 
record, does not accept that the Bosnian-Serb leadership ever lost overall control of what 
was happening. Moreover, as further explained below, as well as in part 6 of this 
judgement, it was not through direct or operational control of crisis staffs that the Bosnian-
Serb leadership managed to achieve its objectives on the ground.  
268. The Bosnian Serb leadership saw the crisis staffs as an extension of the leadership’s 
authority in the municipalities. For example, the Bosnian Serb leadership, through the 
party or the republican organs, issued direct orders or instructions both to crisis staffs in 
general and to individual crisis staffs,TPF573FPT and these were received and acted upon. TPF574FPT The 
crisis staffs themselves would cite orders and decisions from regional and central organs as 
the basis for their actions.TPF575FPT  
269. On 15 April 1992, in pursuance of this goal of subordination and centralization of 
power, the Bosnian-Serb Government and the SNB concluded that the political leaderships 
of all the SAOs should be notified that cooperation and all contacts between them were to 
be conducted through the central organs of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. According to the 
Accused, the aim was to avoid having every SAO acting on its own, and “behaving like a 
state in its own right”.TPF576FPT  
270. Other examples of attempts at centralization exist. The central authorities would 
support the crisis staffs materially, in the form of loans,TPF577FPT direct funding,TPF578FPT and material, 
 
TP
572
PT Mandić, T. 9101-2.  
TP
573
PT Hanson, T. 9737, 9957; P528 (Hanson report), paras 20, 41. See for example P529, tab 157 (Letter from 
Nedeljko Lakić, Secretary of Bosnian-Serb Government, to Ilijaš crisis staff, 15 May 1992); P529, tab 433 
(Diary), pp. 19-20; P839 (Order by Bosnian-Serb Government to Sokolac crisis staff, 15 May 1992). 
TP
574
PT P528 (Hanson report), paras 41-2; Hanson, T. 9742-3, 9772, 9827. 
TP
575
PT Hanson, T. 9735-40, 9742-3, 9749-51, 9772, 9827 ; P528 (Hanson report), paras 24-5, 41, 42; P529, tab 
165 (Decision by Bosnian-Serb Presidency on Return of Displaced Persons to Territory of Bosnian-Serb 
Republic, 2 June 1992); P529, tab 185 (Kotor Varoš crisis staff Bulletin No. 6, 24 July 1992), pp. 4-5; P529, 
tab 357 (Revenues and costs of Ilijaš for period 11 May 1992 to 30 June 1992, 30 June 1992), p. 1; P554 
(List of TO members paid by Ilijaš crisis staff, 16 May 1992), pp. 2-3.  
TP
576
PT Krajišnik, T. 23938-9, 24063; Savkić, T. 20659-62; P64.A, tab 618 (Minutes of joint session of SNB and 
Bosnian-Serb Government, 15 April 1992), item 3; P64.A, tab 697 (Minutes of joint session of Bosnian-Serb 
Government and the SNB, 24 April 1992), p. 2; P64.A, tab 611 (Record of 12th session of Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 1, 23-4. 
TP
577
PT Hanson, T. 9745-6; P65, tab 137 (Minutes of session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 18 May 1992), item 1. 
TP
578
PT Hanson, T. 9746-7, 9868-71; P65, tab 137 (Minutes of meeting of Bosnian-Serb Government, 18 May 
1992), item 2; P65, tab 138 (Minutes of 12th session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 21 May 1992), item 4; 
P529, tab 357 (Spread sheet balance of Ilijaš municipal assembly for the period 11 May to 30 June 1992, 30 
June 1992); P529, tab 220 (Recapitulation of cashier’s office of Vogošća crisis staff between 1 and 31 May 
1992, 1 June 1992); P529, tab 212 (Minutes of meeting of Trnovo crisis staff, 29 April 1992). 
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including weapons and ammunition.TPF579FPT Such support was often requested by the crisis 
staffs.TPF580FPT The crisis staffs would report on their activities to the Bosnian-Serb leadership, 
although not necessarily formally or in written form. Reflecting the conflation of state and 
party organs, such reporting was sometimes done via the SDS Main Board,TPF581FPT sometimes 
via the Bosnian-Serb Assembly,TPF582FPT sometimes via individual leaders such as Karadžić or 
the Accused,TPF583FPT and sometimes directly to the Bosnian-Serb Presidency.TPF584FPT  
271. Accordingly, the Chamber finds that, despite the occasional loss of direct or 
operational control in some municipalities, the Bosnian-Serb leadership still held a tight 
grip over the crisis staffs in the majority of the municipalities and, through them, over the 
municipalities themselves. 
 
3.6.4 War presidencies and war commissions 
272. In June 1992, in order to further centralize the power and streamline its authority, 
the Bosnian-Serb leadership pursued efforts to transform the municipal crisis staffs first 
into war presidencies and then, later, into war commissions. The three were, however, 
essentially the same body.TPF585FPT One distinction between them was that while the crisis staffs 
 
TP
579
PT Hanson, T. 9747; P529, tab 176 (Letter by Božidar Antić, Minister of Economy, about issuing certain 
specified weapons and ammunitions to Grbavica crisis staff); P529, tab 178 (Letter by Branko Đerić to 
company “Boksit” in Milići); P529, tab 212 (Minutes of meeting of Trnovo crisis staff, 29 April 1992). 
TP
580
PT Hanson, T. 9829-30; P529, tab 244 (Letter by President of Ilijaš crisis staff to President of Bosnian-Serb 
Presidency); P529, tab 462 (Request by Trnovo crisis staff to Bosnian-Serb Government, 30 April 1992). 
TP
581
PT P528 (Hanson Report), paras 20 and 43; P529, tab 69 (Report from Bijeljina crisis staff to SDS Main 
Board, 1 April 1992).  
TP
582
PT Hanson, T. 9677, 9679-88, 9755-7, 9761-5, 9767-9, 9774-7; P528 (Hanson Report), paras 20 and 43; P65, 
tab 109 (Record of 11th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 18 March 1992), pp. 38-9; P65, tab 113 (Record 
of 12th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 17, 20 and 22; P65, tab 115 (Record of 14th 
session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 27 March 1992), pp. 20-1; P65, tab 127 (Minutes and record of 16th 
session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 12 May 1992), pp. 16-17, 19-20, 24-, 48; P65, tab 182 (Record of 17th 
session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), pp. 65, 70.  
TP
583
PT P528 (Hanson Report), paras 20 and 43; P529, tab 406 (Telephone conversation between Jovan Tintor and 
Momčilo Krajišnik, 4 April 1992); P67 tab 29 (Telephone conversation between Momo Garić and Momčilo 
Krajišnik, 21 April 1992).  
TP
584
PT Hanson, T. 9678, 9754-5, 9773-4; P843 (Letter from President of Sokolac crisis staff to Bosnian-Serb 
Presidency, 15 July 1992); P65, tab 124 (Minutes of joint session of SNB and Bosnian-Serb Government, 28 
April 1992), items 9-10; P529, tab 158 (Report from Novo Sarajevo crisis staff to President of Bosnian-Serb 
Presidency, 5 June 1992); P65, tab 151 (Minutes of 22nd session of Bosnian-Serb Government, 7 June 1992), 
item 6. As part of informal reporting, Bosnian-Serb leadership also visited the municipalities, P65, tab 93 
(Minutes of 8th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 25 February 1992); P529, tab 195 (Radio announcement 
about visit of a delegation, headed by Momčilo Krajišnik, to Ilijaš municipality, 29 June 1992); P65, tab 113 
(Record of 12th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 15, 17, 20, 22; P65, tab 115 
(Record of 14th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 27 March 1992), pp. 20-1; P65, tab 114 (Record of 13th 
session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 25 March 1992), pp. 8-9. 
TP
585
PT Hanson, T. 9699-700, 9723, 9728-9 ; P528 (Hanson report), paras 27, 34.  
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were meant to be replacing the municipal assemblies only, the war presidencies and war 
commissions were to replace both the assembly and the executive committee.TPF586FPT There 
might not have been any practical difference, however, since, as explained above, the crisis 
staffs already acted as executive organs. 
273. Abolition of the crisis staffs and establishment of war presidencies were first 
discussed within the Bosnian-Serb Government on 23 May 1992.TPF587FPT On 24 May 1992, the 
Bosnian-Serb Presidency gave “instructions for organization and work of presidencies in 
municipalities in conditions of the imminent threat of war and a state of war”, clarifying 
that the war presidencies had “to organize, co-ordinate and synchronize activities for the 
defence of the Serbian people, and to establish governmental power”.TPF588FPT The same 
instructions provided for a commissioner, appointed by the “state leadership of the Serbian 
Republic of BiH”, who was responsible for appointment of members to the municipal war 
presidencies, for their organization and work, and for the coordination and implementation 
of the policy of the state organs and the Main Staff of the VRS.TPF589FPT  
274. On 31 May 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Presidency took the formal decision to form 
war presidencies in the municipalities.TPF590FPT The war presidencies were to consist of the 
president of the municipal assembly or another prominent figure in the municipality and “a 
representative of the Republic”.TPF591FPT This representative was in fact the commissioner 
mentioned in the Bosnian-Serb Government instructions above.TPF592FPT One representative 
could cover several municipalities “in conformity with the organization of the Army of the 
Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.TPF593FPT This was essentially an exercise in 
renaming municipal crisis staffs and changing their name to “war presidencies”, without 
altering their membership.TPF594FPT 
 
TP
586
PT P528 (Hanson report), para. 30; P65, tab 143 (Decision on formation of war presidencies, 31 May 1992), 
arts 1 and 3. 
TP
587
PT Hanson, T. 9700; P529, tab 107 (Minutes of meeting of Bosnian-Serb Government, 23 May 1992). 
TP
588
PT P529, tab 108 (Instructions from Bosnian-Serb Presidency for municipalities during conditions of 
imminent threat of war or state of war, 24 May 1992), item 1. 
TP
589
PT P529, tab 108 (Instructions from Bosnian-Serb Presidency for municipalities during conditions of 
imminent threat of war or state of war, 24 May 1992), item 4. 
TP
590
PT Hanson, T. 9702-3; P65, tab 143 (Decision on formation of war presidencies, 31 May 1992). 
TP
591
PT P65, tab 143 (Decision on formation of war presidencies, 31 May 1992), art. 2. 
TP
592
PT Hanson, T. 9702-3; P65, tab 143 (Decision on formation of war presidencies, 31 May 1992), art. 4. 
TP
593
PT P65, tab 143 (Decision on formation of war presidencies, 31 May 1992), art. 4. 
TP
594
PT Đokanović, T. 10576, 10773-4. 
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275. The presidents of SAO Herzegovina, SAO Romanija, and SAO Semberija were 
informed about this decision in a letter by the SDS Executive Board on the same date.TPF595FPT In 
the letter, the Executive Board informed the presidents that if they had any question 
concerning the implementation of the decision they should direct them to the Bosnian-Serb 
Presidency.TPF596FPT On 1 June 1992, the Constitution of the Bosnian-Serb Republic was 
amended by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency to allow war presidencies at both the republican 
and municipal levels.TPF597FPT It was clear from this amendment that the power to form the 
municipal war presidencies, as well as “the manner, composition and competence” of 
these, was a prerogative of the Bosnian-Serb Presidency.TPF598FPT The decision to establish war 
presidencies was acted upon in some municipalities.TPF599FPT 
276. In order to further tighten the central grip over the municipalities, the Bosnian-Serb 
Presidency decided to replace municipal war presidencies with war commissions. TPF600FPT 
Accordingly, on 10 June 1992, it issued an official decision establishing war 
commissions. TPF601FPT The war commissions were to consist of “four members from the ranks of 
the most influential citizens within the crisis staff, the economy and the ruling party” and a 
“state commissioner”, appointed by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency.TPF602FPT The state 
commissioner was responsible for appointing municipal war commissions and providing 
them with his expertise and other assistance.TPF603FPT A list of commissioners was drawn up on 
the same day and included Dragan Đokanović, Nikola Poplašen, Milimir Mučibabić, 
Miroslav Radovanović, Jovan Tintor, and Danilo Veselinović.TPF604FPT Soon thereafter, Dragan 
Đokanović was appointed state commissioner for Zvornik, Vlasenica, Skelani, Bratunac, 
 
TP
595
PT Hanson, T. 9722; P529, tab 68 (Memo by Secretary of SDS Executive Board to Presidents of SAO 
Herzegovina, SAO Romanija – Birač and SAO Semberija, 31 May 1992). 
TP
596
PT Hanson, T. 9722; P529, tab 68 (Memo by Secretary of SDS Executive Board to the Presidents of SAO 
Herzegovina, SAO Romanija – Birač and SAO Semberija, 31 May 1992). 
TP
597
PT Hanson, T. 9703-4; P65, tab 144 (Law amending the Law for Implementing the Constitution, 2 June 
1992). 
TP
598
PT Hanson, T. 9703-4; P65, tab 144 (Law amending the Law for Implementing the Constitution, 2 June 
1992). 
TP
599
PT Witness D14, T. 20271-2, 20324-6; Kapetina, T. 20099-103; P528 (Hanson report), para. 33; P342 
(Minutes of 31st meeting of Kotor Varoš crisis staff, 24 June 1992), item 2. 
TP
600
PT Đokanović, T. 10574-8, 10678-84, 10697-700, 10772-8, 10807; Divčić, T. 17837; D38 (Đokanović 
statement), pp. 13-15, 17; D39 (Đokanović statement), pp. 6-7. 
TP
601
PT P529, tab 112 (Decision by Bosnian-Serb Presidency on establishment of war commissions, 10 June 
1992). 
TP
602
PT P529, tab 112 (Decision by Bosnian-Serb Presidency on establishment of war commissions, 10 June 
1992), arts 2 and 4. 
TP
603
PT P529, tab 112 (Decision by Bosnian-Serb Presidency on establishment of war commissions, 10 June 
1992), art. 4. 
TP
604
PT P65, tab 157 (Minutes of 5th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 10 June 1992), p. 1. 
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Šekovići, and Novo Sarajevo.TPF605FPT The Bosnian-Serb Presidency appointed state 
commissioners on several occasions during the summer of 1992, TPF606FPT including the 
appointment of Biljana Plavšić as commissioner for the war commission of Pale 
municipality.TPF607FPT Nikola Poplašen, was appointed state commissioner in Vogošća 
municipality on 10 June 1992.TPF608FPT Once a state commissioner was appointed he or she 
would appoint the remaining members of the war commission,TPF609FPT which would then have 
to be confirmed by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency.TPF610FPT  
277. Nikola Koljević at first, and the Accused later, were the Presidency’s contact 
persons for war commissioners in the Bosnian-Serb Presidency. As such, they had the 
responsibility to report about their work to the other members of the Presidency.TPF611FPT The 
Accused was officially assigned this task at the Presidency meeting of 6 July 1992.TPF612FPT  
278. In this capacity, the Accused signed at least two decisions appointing state 
commissioners,TPF613FPT and at least one decision requiring all civilian and military authorities to 
cooperate with the state commissioners.TPF614FPT He would also regularly meet with municipal 
 
TP
605
PT Đokanović, T. 10442-4, 10581; D38 (Đokanović statement), p. 14; P533 (Document proposing members 
of Zvornik war commission, 13 June 1992); P529, tab 397 (Decision appointing members of Zvornik war 
commission, signed by Radovan Karadžić, 17 June 1992); P534 (Document proposing members of Vlasenica 
war commission, 16 June 1992); P535 (Document proposing members of Skelani war commission, 16 June 
1992). 
TP
606
PT P529, tab 396 (Certificate appointing Vojislav Maksimović state commissioner for Foča municipality, 4 
June 1992); P529, tab 458 (Certificate appointing Dragan Đokanović state commissioner, 10 June 1992); 
P65, tab 204 (Certificate of appointment of state commissioner, 16 June 1992); P529, tab 395 (Certificate 
appointing Stari Grad and Centar Sarajevo commissioners, 10 July 1992); P65, tab 205 (Certificate of 
appointment of state commissioner, 21 August 1992); P529, tab 399 (Certificate appointing Milan Trbojević 
state commissioner for Herzegovina, 1992). 
TP
607
PT Plavšić, T. 26806; C7 (Plavšić statement), para. 44; P529, tab 196 (Confirmation by Bosnian-Serb 
Presidency on appointment of members of Pale war commission, 25 June 1992). 
TP
608
PT P65, tab 157 (Minutes of 5th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 10 June 1992); P529, tab 400 
(Confirmation by Bosnian-Serb Presidency on appointment of members of Vogošća war commission, 18 
June 1992).  
TP
609
PT P529, tab 434 (Decision by Dragan Đokanović, state commissioner, and Ljubo Simić, President of 
Bratunac, 16 June 1992). 
TP
610
PT P529, tab 397 (Confirmation by Bosnian-Serb Presidency on appointment of members of Zvornik war 
commission, 17 June 1992); P529, tab 398 (Confirmation by Bosnian-Serb Presidency on appointment of 
members of Bratunac war commission, 17 June 1992); P529, tab 400 (Confirmation by Bosnian-Serb 
Presidency on appointment of members of Vogošća war commission, 18 June 1992); P64.A, tab 739 
(Confirmation of the appointment of members of Novo Sarajevo war commission, 21 July 1992); P692 
(Decision on appointment of Čajniče war commissioners, 17 September 1992). 
TP
611
PT Poplašen, T. 20942-59; P65, tab 157 (Minutes of 5th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 10 June 1992).  
TP
612
PT P65, tab 174 (Minutes of 15th session of Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 6 July 1992); Đokanović, T. 10630-2, 
10728-9. 
TP
613
PT Hanson, T. 9709, 9712-14, 10005-7; P65, tab 205 (Certificate of appointment of state commissioner, 21 
August 1992); P65, tab 206 (Certificate of appointment of state commissioner, 2 October 1992). 
TP
614
PT Hanson, T. 9712-14; P529, tab 139 (Decision by Momčilo Krajišnik, 2 October 1992). 
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representatives in his office in the Kikinda hotel.TPF615FPT Illustrating further his personal interest 
in the municipal operations and work of war commissioners, the Accused explained, 
during a session of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly in late November 1992, that the 
commissioners were people sent out from the Bosnian-Serb Assembly to collect 
information about the problems faced by the municipality, assist in establishing 
governments, and assist in governing. TPF616FPT 
279. The exact setting up and transformation from crisis staff, to war presidency, to war 
commission varied from municipality to municipality. Some of the factors determining this 
variation were location, time, and personalities.TPF617FPT Nevertheless, as illustrated by the fact 
that many state commissioners were appointed by the Presidency, and sometimes even the 
Accused himself, the main role of the war commissions was to keep the Presidency and the 
Bosnian-Serb Assembly informed about the situation on the ground.TPF618FPT As the connecting 
link between these bodies, the Accused was a prominent figure. 
 
3.6.5 Crisis staffs, war presidencies, war commissions, and armed forces 
280. The relationship between crisis staffs and the various military forces present in the 
municipalities (JNA units, the TO, paramilitary units, and the VRS), differed from 
municipality to municipality. At a minimum, however, the relationship involved a 
coordinating and supporting role for the crisis staffs.TPF619FPT In at least one municipality, 
Zvornik, the local JNA commander was listed as member of the crisis staff.TPF620FPT 
281. Generally there was a progression from SDS-formed military units to infantry units 
under the command of the crisis staffs, to full VRS control of military units by mid-June 
1992.TPF621FPT Thus, the crisis staffs filled the gap between the withdrawal, disintegration, or 
 
TP
615
PT Plavšić, T. 26846-8, 26897-9; C7 (Plavšić statement), para. 8. 
TP
616
PT Hanson, T. 9785-6; P65, tab 213 (Record of 22nd session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 24 November 
1992), p. 104. See also other speakers during the same session, pp. 106-7 (Maksimović) and pp. 109-11 
(Mijatović). 
TP
617
PT Hanson, T. 9944-5 ; P528 (Hanson Report), para. 33. 
TP
618
PT Nešković, T. 16593, 16680, 16684-5; Tupajić, T. 15402-3, 15494-5; Prstojević, T. 14594-6; Krsman, T. 
21901-3, 21978-9, 21983-4; P529, tab 126 (Speech commemorating the declaration of Rajlovac municipality, 
no date). 
TP
619
PT P528 (Hanson Report), paras 46, 55-6; Hanson, T. 9759-60, 9791, 9873, 10004. 
TP
620
PT P529, tab 40 (Conclusions from Zvornik SDS municipal board, 22 December 1991), item 3. 
TP
621
PT Hanson, T. 9790-1, 9828, 9843; P528 (Hanson report), para. 48; P529, tab 255 (Analysis of combat 
readiness of VRS in 1992, April 1993). 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 3 
 Administration of Bosnian-Serb Republic 
 
 
105 
general failure of command structures within the JNA, and the establishment of a VRS 
with effective control of the armed forces on the ground.TPF622FPT  
282. The Chamber will now examine the individual relationship that existed between the 
crisis staffs on one side and the JNA, VRS, MUP, TO, and the paramilitaries, on the other.  
283. Relations with the JNA. At the time when the SDS crisis staffs were being formed, 
the JNA was the dominant military structure in the municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
As mentioned earlier, the Zvornik SDS municipal board elected a crisis staff for the 
municipality, consisting of leading SDS persons from Zvornik, as well as the municipal 
command staff of the JNA.TPF623FPT In a formal sense no other relationship existed, however, in 
practice, the military presence in the crisis staffs ensured a high degree of commonality of 
purpose.TPF624FPT  
284. In April 1992, in apparent implementation of Radovan Karadžić’s instruction of 27 
March 1992 that crisis staffs should organize municipal TOs and place them under JNA 
command where possible,TPF625FPT Prime Minister Đerić issued detailed instructions outlining 
the responsibilities of crisis staffs. Karadžić’s 27 March instruction and its implementation 
in the ARK municipalities show that crisis staffs and the military had common objectives, 
but that one did not have authority over the other.TPF626FPT  
285. Relations with the TO. According to the Bosnian-Serb Constitution, it was “the right 
and the obligation of regions and municipalities to set up and organize the national defence 
in their territories and to manage the territorial defence”.TPF627FPT As the municipal defence 
force, the TO came to have close links with the crisis staffs. Many crisis staffs appointed 
and dismissed municipal TO commandersTPF628FPT and received reports from TO units.TPF629FPT In 
some cases, crisis staffs issued orders to the TO on military matters.TPF630FPT On a few occasions 
 
TP
622
PT Hanson, T. 9791, 9848; Brown, T. 16321-4; P529, tab 264 (Record of meeting of presidents of 
municipalities, 14 May 1992), pp. 1, 3-4;  
TP
623
PT P529, tab 40 (Conclusions from Zvornik SDS municipal board, 22 December 1991); Mehinagić, T. 
12606; P644 (Mehinagić statement), pp. 5, 12. 
TP
624
PT Hanson, T. 9801-4, 9809, 9826-8; P528 (Hanson report), paras 16, 46; P43 (Variant A and B instructions, 
19 December 1991), pp. 5 and 9; P529, tab 263 (Report from the JNA 2nd military district reserve to the 
operation centre, 6 April 1992). 
TP
625
PT P65, tab 115 (Record of 14th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 27 March 1992), pp. 23-4. 
TP
626
PT P891 (Brown report), para. 1.107. 
TP
627
PT P65, tab 96 (Decision on proclaiming Bosnian-Serb Constitution, 28 February 1992), art. 110. 
TP
628
PT Selak, T. 13353-4; Hanson, T. 9820-1; P528 (Hanson Report), para. 50. 
TP
629
PT P528 (Hanson Report), para. 50.  
TP
630
PT P528 (Hanson Report), para. 50; Hanson, T. 9987; P529, tab 101 (Decision by Bihać crisis staff on 
appointment of TO commanders, 3 May 1992), item 5; P529, tab 248 (Order by Bosanska Krupa crisis staff, 
5 April 1992); P529, tab 252 (Decision by Zvornik Provisional Government on forming a special unit of TO, 
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crisis staffs or their members assumed a very direct military role and got involved in 
military activities.TPF631FPT Crisis staffs also provided various forms of general assistance to the 
TO, calling for mobilization within their municipalitiesTPF632FPT and providing financial 
assistance.TPF633FPT As stated earlier, at the Bosnian-Serb Assembly session of 27 March 1992, 
Karadžić recommended that TO units formed by the crisis staffs should, where possible, be 
placed under the command of the JNA. TPF634FPT Some of these units were integrated into the 
JNA, TPF635FPT while other existing Bosnian-Serb forces were integrated into the TO.TPF636FPT Once the 
JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina they all became part of the VRS.TPF637FPT 
Thus, even though the local TOs had certain autonomy prior to the establishment of the 
VRS, soon after they were subordinated to the Presidency.TPF638FPT Nevertheless, the local crisis 
staffs were often responsible for logistical support to the TO.TPF639FPT 
286. Relations with paramilitary units. The contacts between municipal crisis staffs and 
paramilitary units varied from municipality to municipality. The crisis staff of Ilijaš 
 
18 April 1992), art. 3; P529, tab 198 (Decision by Birač crisis staff on proclamation of state of war for Birač, 
29 April 1992), art. 3; P529, tab 275 (Order of Bosanska Krupa war presidency); P186 (Conclusions of 
Sanski Most crisis staff, 30 May 1992), item 4; P529, tab 50 (Order by Bosanska Krupa crisis staff for full 
mobilisation, 5 April 1992). 
TP
631
PT Hanson, T. 9829-36, 9989-90, 10003; P529, tab 244 (Letter by Ratko Adžić, President of Ilijaš crisis staff 
to President of Bosnian-Serb Presidency); P529, tab 223 (Transcript of interview with Jovan Tintor, August 
1994), pp. 7-8; P529, tab 447 (Minutes of meeting of Trnovo crisis staff, 30 April 1992); P529, tab 446 
(Minutes of meeting of Trnovo crisis staff, 2 May 1992); P529, tab 445 (Minutes of meeting of Trnovo crisis 
staff, 3 May 1992); P529, tab 229 (Minutes of meeting of Trnovo crisis staff, 9 May 1992); P529, tab 435 
(Minutes of meeting of Trnovo crisis staff, 11 May 1992); P529, tab 274 (Minutes of meeting of Trnovo 
crisis staff, 18 May 1992); P529, tab 440 (Minutes of meeting of Trnovo TO Command, 15 May 1992); 
P529, tab 119 (Minutes from the Šipovo crisis staff, 19 May 1992).  
TP
632
PT Hanson, T. 9805, 9809, 9825-6, 9862-3, 9987; P644 (Mehinagić statement), p. 8; P657 (Order of Zvornik 
crisis staff, 5 April 1992); P613 (Order of Novo Sarajevo crisis staff, 22 April 1992); P699 (Witness 109 
statement), pp. 1-2; P529, tab 158 (Report from Novo Sarajevo crisis staff to President of Bosnian-Serb 
Presidency, 5 June 1992), item 5; Witness 84, T. 12351-2; P702.A (Čevro statement), p. 4; P703.A (Witness 
86 statement), p. 2; P699.A (Witness 109 statement), p. 2; Witness 84, T. 12313-14; P610 (Witness 84 
statement), pp. 1-2; P609 (Witness 84 statement), p. 11; P528 (Hanson Report), para. 49; P307 (Report on 
work of Bosanska Krupa municipal assembly and war presidency, April 1992), pp. 4, 6; P529, tab 252 
(Decision by Zvornik provisional government, 18 April 1992); P64.A, tab 260 (Record of 50th session of 
Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 16 April 1995), pp. 323-4; P529, tab 255 (Analysis of combat readiness of VRS in 
1992, April 1993), pp. 10 and 13; P529, tab 148 (Report of work of Ključ crisis staff, July 1992), pp. 5-6; 
P529, tab 226 (Minutes of meeting of Trnovo SDS municipal board, 7 March 1992), item 1; P529, tab 450 
(Minutes of meeting of Trnovo crisis staff, 20 March 1992), item 2; P529, tab 245 (Order of Bratunac crisis 
staff, 12 April 1992); P529, tab 198 (Decision by Birač crisis staff on proclamation of state of war, 29 April 
1992), art. 3. 
TP
633
PT Hanson, T. 9867; P802, tab 2 (Ledger of expenses for Ilijaš crisis staff, 30 June 1992).  
TP
634
PT P65, tab 115 (Record of 14th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 23. 
TP
635
PT P529, tab 261 (Memo from Dragoljub Simonović to 2nd military district, 3 April 1992), p. 2.  
TP
636
PT P529, tab 241 (Conclusions from meeting of Sanski Most crisis staff, 22 April 1992), item 6. 
TP
637
PT Hanson, T. 9808, 9826; P529, tab 255 (Analysis of combat readiness and activities of VRS, April 1993), 
p. 13; Radomir Pašić, T. 19568, 19644-6, 19691; D15 (Conclusion by Bosanski Novi municipal assembly, 16 
June 1992). 
TP
638
PT Prstojević, T. 14541-6. 
TP
639
PT Vasić, T. 17376, 17395, 17445, 17525-6. 
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municipality invited Arkan’s men to come to its assistance.TPF640FPT The crisis staff in the 
municipality of Ilidža also had extensive dealings with various paramilitary groups, 
including Arkan’s men, and Nedjeljko Prstojević, the president of the Ilidža crisis staff, 
was visited by Vojislav Šešelj several times.TPF641FPT In some cases the municipal authorities 
extended financial and logistical support to paramilitary groups operating in the 
municipality.TPF642FPT Other examples show that paramilitary units on certain occasions worked 
together with the TO, under the command or supervision of the municipal crisis staffs, on 
specific military tasks.TPF643FPT There are however also examples of municipal authorities 
attempting to ban paramilitary groups from acting in the municipality.TPF644FPT 
287. Relations with VRS. With the establishment of the VRS, the central role envisioned 
for the crisis staffs when it came to defence became less pertinent, as the aim was then to 
place all armed forces under the unified command of the Main Staff of the VRS. TPF645FPT 
Coordination and contacts between the crisis staffs and the armed forces continued, 
however.TPF646FPT Indeed, the relationship between the two became closer and more 
institutionalized at this point.TPF647FPT One example of this is the fact that some VRS officers 
 
TP
640
PT P528 (Hanson Report), para. 49; P529, tab 240 (Request for manpower, 14 June 1992). 
TP
641
PT Prstojević, T. 14546-8, 14551-9, 14586-93, 14618-19; P794 (Telephone conversation between Nedjeljko 
Prstojević and unknown man, 21 April 1992); P793 (Telephone conversation between Milosav Gagović and 
Nedjeljko Prstojević, 14 May 1992). 
TP
642
PT P528 (Hanson Report), para. 49; P529, tab 232 (Record of statement given by Svetislav Mitrović, 3 
August 1992), p. 1; P529, tab 234 (Pay list for members of Serbian volunteers’ guard from Teslić); P529, tab 
238 (Payment order by Zvornik provisional government to Žuća unit, 4 May 1992); P529, tab 239 
(Document and related receipt regarding transport of volunteers, Zvornik provisional government, 30 April 
1992); P529, tab 415 (Telephone conversation between unknown male, Legija, and Arkan, 15 May 1992), 
pp. 7, 13. 
TP
643
PT P529, tab 122 (Report by Bijeljina police station to the MUP, 9 April 1992), p. 2; P529, tab 415 
(Telephone conversation between unknown male, Legija, and Arkan, 15 May 1992), p. 4. 
TP
644
PT P56 (Bratunac crisis staff order, 1 May 1992); P57 (Bratunac crisis order, 6 May 1992). 
TP
645
PT Hanson, T. 9857, 9860; P529, tab 273 (Order from Commander Major General Momir Talić to 1st Krajina 
Corps Command, 1 July 1992). 
TP
646
PT Witness 382, T. 11255-6; P579 (Report from Rogatica brigade command of VRS to Sarajevo Romanija 
corps command, 11 June 1992), p. 1; Tupajić, T. 15361-2, 15403; Hanson, T. 9850-7, 9840-1; P529, tab 265 
(Telephone conversation between Unković and Ratko Mladić, 13 May 1992); P529, tab 266 (Telephone 
conversation between Gliša Simanić and Ratko Mladić, 25 May 1992); P529, tab 417 (Telephone 
conversation between Nedjeljko Prstojević and Milosav Gagović); P529, tab 368 (Minutes of meeting of 
Kotor Varoš war presidency, 11 November 1992), item 2; P529, tab 55 (Report on work of Rogatica 
municipal assembly, 1 October 1993), p. 24; Brown, T. 16331-2, 16338-41, 16344; P892, tab 66 
(Conclusions of Sanski Most crisis staff, 30 May 1992); P892, tab 67 (Conclusions of Sanski Most crisis 
staff, 18 June 1992); P341 (Minutes of 26th session of Kotor Varoš crisis staff, 19 June 1992); P344 
(Minutes of 40th session of Kotor Varoš crisis staff, 26 June 1992); P892, tab 68 (Minutes of Kotor Varoš 
crisis staff, 7 July 1992); P892, tab 74 (List of phone numbers of ARK war staff, 6 May 1992); P891 (Brown 
report), para. 1.101; P892, tab 61 (Report on military consultations, 14 September 1992), p. 1; P709 (Dobrača 
statement), p. 8; Witness 382, T. 11255-6; P579 (Report from Rogatica brigade command of VRS to 
Sarajevo Romanija Corps command, 11 June 1992), p. 1; Tupajić, T. 15361-2, 15403. 
TP
647
PT Radojko, T. 21192-3; 21333-4, 21351, 21464-5, 21448, 21466; Witness D14, T. 20136, 20156, 20164, 
20211; P528 (Hanson report), para. 54; P529, tab 124 (Interview with Bogdan Subotić in Glas newspaper, 7 
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were members of the crisis staffs, or participated in the meetings of these organs.TPF648FPT In at 
least one municipality, Ključ, these officers reported on their activities to the crisis 
staffs.TPF649FPT In addition, the crisis staffs also issued orders to the armed forces. TPF650FPT  
288. Relations with MUP. The relationship between the crisis staffs and the police was 
much closer than the relationship between the crisis staffs and the army.TPF651FPT Some crisis 
staffs were active in setting-up Serb police forces in the municipality, including appointing 
and dismissing police officers.TPF652FPT In many municipalities, including Bosanska Krupa, 
Sanski Most, Zvornik, Prijedor, Prnjavor, and Sokolac, the crisis staffs issued direct orders 
to the police on various subjects.TPF653FPT There are also examples on how the police reported 
back to the crisis staff on its activities.TPF654FPT Although usually in control of the regular police, 
 
July 1992), p. 1; P1100 (Minutes of 17th meeting of Bosanski Petrovac crisis staff, 24 May 1992), pp. 3-4; 
P90.FF (Minutes of 34th session of Bosanski Petrovac crisis staff, 14 June 1992), p. 1; P342 (Minutes of 31st 
meeting of Kotor Varoš crisis staff, 24 June 1992), item 2; P528 (Hanson report), para. 53. 
TP
648
PT Hanson, T. 9857-9, 9951. 
TP
649
PT P529, tab 87 (Minutes of Ključ crisis staff, 4 June 1992), p. 11-12; P529, tab 89 (Minutes of Ključ crisis 
staff, 5 June 1992), p. 13; P529, tab 90 (Minutes of Ključ crisis staff, 6 June 1992), p. 14; P892, tab 70 
(Report on work of Ključ crisis staff, July 1992), pp. 3-6. 
TP
650
PT Tupajić, T. 15330-9, 15361-2, 15403; P804, tab 2 (Minutes of crisis staff meeting, 15 May 1992), p. 3; 
P828 (Decision on mobilization status of members of Sokolac crisis staff, 29 May 1992); P829 (Conclusion 
from meeting of Sokolac crisis staff, 20 April 1992); P833 (Crisis staff order to municipal secretariat for 
national defence, 21 April 1992); P834 (Order from Sokolac crisis staff to Sokolac SJB, 20 April 1992); 
P837 (Record of meeting of Sokolac crisis staff, 10 April 1992); P843 (Letter by President of Sokolac crisis 
staff to Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 15 July 1992; P830 (Letter by Secretary of Bosnian-Serb Government to 
Sokolac crisis staff requesting food for Vogošca crisis staff, 11 May 1992); P831 (Letter by Secretary of 
Bosnian-Serb Government to Sokolac crisis staff requesting food for Ilijaš crisis staff, 9 May 1992); P840 
(Order by Bosnian-Serb Government to Sokolac crisis staff, 15 May 1992); P842 (Telegram signed by 
Radovan Karadžić, undated); P690 (Fax from Bosnian-Serb Presidency, 14 July 1992). 
TP
651
PT P528 (Hanson report), para. 57; Hanson, T. 9874. 
TP
652
PT P528 (Hanson report), para. 57; Hanson, T. 9879; P529, tab 285, p. 2 (Statements by Muslim police 
officers of, 24 March 1992); P529, tab 290 (Conclusions of Sanski Most crisis staff, 27 April 1992), item 4; 
P529, tab 91 (Minutes of meeting of Ključ crisis staff, 9 June 1992), p. 15; P529, tab 183 (Public statement 
issued by Ključ crisis staff, 7 May 1992); P529, tab 461 (Decision by Trnovo crisis staff, 30 April 1992). 
TP
653
PT Hanson, T. 9876, 9883-8; P529, tab 50 (Order by Bosanska Krupa crisis staff, 5 April 1992); P529, tab 
248 (Order by Bosanska Krupa crisis staff, 5 April 1992); P186 (Conclusions of Sanski Most crisis staff, 30 
May 1992), item 4; P529, tab 418 (Order by Zvornik crisis staff, 8 April 1992), art. 3; P529, tab 278 
(Conclusions, Orders and Decisions by Prijedor crisis staff, 29 May to 24 July 1992), pp. 2-3; P529, tab 289 
(Report by Prijedor public security station to Prijedor crisis staff, 1 July 1992); P529, tab 291 (Order by 
Sanski Most crisis staff to public security station, 6 June 1992); P529, tab 301 (Decision by Bosanski Šamac 
crisis staff, 15 May 1992); P529, tab 428 (Decision of Prnjavor crisis staff, 22 June 1992), art. 2; P529, tab 
342 (Order by Bosanska Krupa war presidency, 22 May 1992); P529, tab 82 (Minutes of meeting of Ključ 
crisis staff, 29 May 1992), p. 5, item 3; P834 (Order by Sokolac crisis staff, 20 April 1992). 
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654
PT P529, tab 87 (Minutes of Ključ crisis staff, 4 June 1992), p. 11; P529, tab 88 (Minutes of Ključ crisis staff, 
4 June 1992), p. 12; P529, tab 89 (Minutes of Ključ crisis staff, 5 June 1992), p. 13; P529, tab 90 (Minutes of 
Ključ crisis staff, 6 June 1992), p. 14; P529, tab 122 (Report by Bijeljina police station to Ministry of 
Interior, 9 April 1992); Radojko, T. 21192-3, 21298-9, 21448-9; P64.A, tab 265 (Diary of Jovo Radojko, 4 
January 1992 – 2 September 1992), p. 105. 
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some crisis staffs did not have much power over the special police units, which were under 
the control of the CSBs.TPF655FPT 
 
TP
655
PT P343 (Minutes of 36th session of Kotor Varoš crisis staff, 24 June 1992); Witness 144, T. 7154-7, 7201-2; 
P348 (Decision on formation of ARK crisis staff, 5 May 1992; P344 (Minutes of 40th session of Kotor Varoš 
crisis staff, 26 June 1992). 
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4. Take-over of power and crimes in the municipalities 
 
4.1 Introduction 
289. The following part of the judgement contains the Chamber’s factual findings with 
regard to the Bosnian-Serb take-over of power and crimes committed in 35 of the 109 
municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some of the 35 municipalities are located in the 
north-west bordering with Croatia, some in the north-east bordering with Serbia, and others 
in the south-east bordering with Montenegro.  
290. In 1991, 4,377,033 persons lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ethnic composition of 
the territory was 1,902,956 Muslims, 1,366,104 Serbs, 760,852 Croats, 242,682 Yugoslavs, 
and 104,439 of other or unknown ethnicity. In the 35 municipalities, there lived a total of 
1,692,313 persons, among them 675,657 Muslims, 742,100 Serbs, 128,275 Croats, 100,911 
Yugoslavs, and 45,370 persons of other or unknown ethnicity. Serbs were in the relative 
majority in fifteen municipalities, and Muslims were the relative majority in another 
fifteen. In five municipalities there was no clear relative ethnic majority. 
291. The Chamber heard a large amount of evidence relating to take-overs and crimes 
allegedly committed in the municipalities. The Chamber had to decide upon 97 incidents of 
killings listed in Schedules A and B of the indictment and also upon numerous other 
alleged killings not listed in the indictment. Schedule C of the indictment lists 
approximately 400 detention centres, whereas Schedule D lists about 120 religious 
monuments. Reference to these incidents of killings, detention, and destruction listed in the 
schedules is made by use of special codes.TPF656FPT The Chamber further made numerous 
findings on persecutorial acts committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in 
the indictment municipalities, such as discriminatory and restrictive measures imposed on 
non-Serbs; physical, psychological, or sexual abuse; forced labour; as well as 
appropriation, plunder, or destruction of private property belonging to non-Serbs. 
Furthermore, the Chamber made findings on evidence relating to forced transfer of 
 
TP
656
PT Codes are used in the following way: [A1.1], for example, stands for Schedule A, first listed killing 
incident in the first listed municipality in the schedule (Bijeljina), [B2.1] stands for Schedule B, first listed 
killing incident in a detention facility in the second listed municipality in the schedule (Bosanska Krupa), 
[C5.2] stands for Schedule C, second listed detention centre in the fifth listed municipality in the schedule 
(Bosanski Novi), and [D16.4] stands for Schedule D, fourth listed cultural monument or sacred site in 
sixteenth listed municipality in the schedule (Kotor Varoš). In some cases, the same killing incident, 
detention centre, cultural monument, or sacred site has been referred to twice in one of the schedules. This 
has been indicated here by “=” between the two codes. 
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Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats out of the indictment municipalities to other parts of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether occupied by Bosnian-Serb forces or not, or to other states in 
the region. 
292. The Chamber notes that there is no practical way of presenting in detail all the 
evidence it has heard and received during the trial. The Chamber has been able to present 
only the most relevant parts of the evidence in detail, but generally has had to confine itself 
to presenting evidence in a summarized form.TPF657FPT The term “forces”, for example, is used in 
this part as a general term, and stands for armed soldiers, paramilitary units, police, or any 
other armed persons. The way in which the population in the municipalities was armed has 
already been dealt with in part 2.2 of the judgement, and will therefore not be further 
explored in relation to the municipalities in the present part. Likewise, the establishment of 
new local administrative structures in the municipalities, in particular the setting up of 
crisis staffs and war commissions, has already been described in part 3.6 of the judgement, 
where references to municipalities are given. 
293. Documents like SJB reports often contain euphemistic language. The Chamber 
interpreted the text and content of such documents in light of other evidence relating to the 
events described, thus revealing the frequently obfuscatory nature of these documents. 
Likewise, the Chamber interpreted statements of witnesses about individual incidents in 
light of all other evidence received. The Chamber thereby took into consideration patterns 
of conduct that become evident when the evidence on all municipalities is considered in its 
totality. For example, the expression “voluntary departure” was used for what was often a 
forced removal of persons. Another example is the expression “to leave property in 
custody” which in fact often meant the forced hand-over of property. With regard to the 
term “ethnic cleansing”, which was sometimes used by witnesses or in reports, the 
Chamber wishes to note that it has not treated the term as legally significant. 
294. The Chamber has heard evidence about attacks and crimes committed against 
Bosnian Serbs. One witness testified, for example, that on 18 or 19 December 1992, sixty-
three Serb civilians who had been celebrating St Nicholas Day, including women and 
children, were killed by Muslim forces near the village of Josanica in Foča municipality.TPF658FPT 
Another witness testified that, between 26 and 27 August 1992, Serbs from Goražde left in 
a convoy towards Rogatica and that several persons, including members of the witness’s 
 
TP
657
PT The footnotes refer to the relevant witness statements, documents, or other exhibits.  
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family, were killed by Muslims during an attack on a bus north of Mesići, near the 
predominantly Muslim village of Kukavice, in Rogatica municipality.TPF659FPT The 60-year-old 
father of another witness, who was living in the Muslim-controlled side of Hadžići 
municipality, was allegedly taken prisoner and died while incarcerated in a silo in Tarčin 
where 700 to 800 Serb men between the ages of 17 and 70 from Tarčin and Pazarići were 
held.TPF660FPT Also, in Pale, the son of another witness was allegedly physically abused by the 
Green Berets due to his Serbian background. After the witness had left Pale, the apartment 
he was living in was severely damaged. TPF661FPT The Chamber is thus aware that it was not only 
Serbs who conducted military operations or committed crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
during the indictment period.TPF662FPT However, the Chamber is called upon to decide on 
whether the Accused, as a member of the Bosnian-Serb leadership, is responsible for 
crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Therefore, the Chamber 
has not made findings on crimes committed by Muslims or Croats against Serbs, unless it 
was evident that these crimes triggered events that led to the commission of crimes by 
Serbs. 
295. The events that unfolded in the municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
eventually led to the commission of crimes by Serbs, Muslims, and Croats against people 
of other ethnicities are better understood when taking into account the increasing ethnic 
tension in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the mutual fear of being outnumbered and dominated 
by other ethnicities. As discussed in part 2 of the judgement, a number of witnesses 
described that already around the time of the multiparty elections of 1990, tensions existed 
among the different ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Inter-ethnic relations 
deteriorated after the elections.TPF663FPT According to Witness 629, members of each ethnic 
community were trying to prevent a war, but they were also fearful that they would be 
deceived by members of another ethnic group.TPF664FPT 
296. The factual findings in this part are presented in relation to each indictment 
municipality. The municipalities are arranged in four regions: North-eastern Bosnia-
Herzegovina, North-western Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo municipalities, and South-
 
TP
658
PT Đorđević, T. 18111-15.  
TP
659
PT Stavnjak, T. 17943-5, 18022-4; P970 (Article in New York Times newspaper, 18 September 2002), pp. 1-
2. 
TP
660
PT Kapetina, T. 19945-6. 
TP
661
PT Lakić, T. 21522-5. 
TP
662
PT Banduka, T. 18696-7, 18707-8; Witness D24, T. 22793-5; 22882-3; Mičić, T. 19447-9.  
TP
663
PT See also part 2.3 of the judgement.  
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eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. Maps at the end of this judgement identify the geographical 
location in Bosnia-Herzegovina of each indictment municipality. 
 
4.2 North-eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina 
4.2.1 Bijeljina 
297. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Bijeljina municipality was 57,389 (59 per cent) Serbs, 30,229 (31 per cent) Muslims, 492 
(1 per cent) Croats, 4,426 Yugoslavs, and 4,452 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF665FPT 
The municipality of Bijeljina is located in the north-east of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Approximately two-thirds of its municipal boundaries form part of the border between 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Bijeljina is the closest municipality in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to Belgrade. One of the roads connecting Sarajevo and Belgrade crosses the 
municipality.TPF666FPT 
298. Bijeljina was the first municipality in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be taken over by the 
Bosnian Serbs in 1992. This seizure of power established a pattern which was later 
repeated in other municipalities in north-eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, paramilitary 
groups, or so-called “volunteer units”, from Serbia arrived, and started intimidating and 
terrorizing local Muslims, as well as Serbs they considered “disloyal”. Many Muslims 
were killed. As a result, many of the remaining Muslims would eventually leave the 
territory.TPF667FPT  
299. Actual fighting started in Bijeljina town on 31 March 1992. Members of Željko 
(Arkan) Ražnatović’s paramilitary group came to Bijeljina and, in cooperation with a local 
paramilitary group under the command of Mirko Blagojević, took control of important 
town structures. On 1 or 2 April 1992, armed JNA reservists surrounded the town and 
columns of JNA tanks and other vehicles were seen in the area.TPF668FPT Despite some resistance, 
Serb forces quickly took control of Bijeljina, and by 4 April, Serb flags had been hoisted 
 
TP
664
PT Witness 629, T. 11163.  
TP
665
PT P954 (Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991 census, April 1995), pp. 52-5. 
TP
666
PT P527 (Book of maps), pp. 1-2, 5.  
TP
667
PT Deronjić, T. 1016-17; P857 (Tokača report).  
TP
668
PT P511 (Witness 57 statement), p. 3; P511.A (Witness 57 statement), p. 2; Gaši, T. 417-20; P727, tab 3 
(Excerpt from interview with Mirko Blagojević, 1995), pp. 8-9. 
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on the two mosques in the town.TPF669FPT Arkan’s men were installed in the local SDS building 
and, for several days, accompanied all regular police patrols and were involved in arresting 
members of Bijeljina’s SDA presidency.TPF670FPT At this time, members of the White Eagles and 
the local TO were also present in Bijeljina town.TPF671FPT  
300. At least 48 civilians, most of whom were non-Serbs, had been killed by Serb 
paramilitaries during the Serb take-over of Bijeljina [A1.1].TPF672FPT Around 3 April 1992, 
Witness 57, a police officer, was sent by his commander to protect a hearse collecting dead 
bodies in Bijeljina town. A total of 48 bodies, including those of women and children, were 
collected from the town’s streets and houses, 45 of these victims were non-Serbs and none 
wore uniforms. Most of the dead had been shot in the chest, mouth, temple, or back of the 
head, some at close range.TPF673FPT  
301. The removal of bodies from the streets of Bijeljina was ordered by Serb forces in 
anticipation of a visit on 4 April 1992 of a delegation of high-ranking Bosnia-Herzegovina 
officials, including Biljana Plavšić, Fikret Abdić, Minister of Defence Jerko Doko (a 
Croat), and chief-of-staff of the JNA 2nd Military District General Praščević.TPF674FPT At the 
time of the visit, the roads to Bijeljina town were blocked by checkpoints attended by Serb 
soldiers in olive-green uniform. Journalists and European monitors were prevented from 
entering the town with the delegation.TPF675FPT On arrival in Bijeljina, the delegation visited the 
crisis staff to inform itself about the situation,TPF676FPT as well as the military barracks a few 
kilometres from the town centre. At the military barracks [C2.2], a large number of 
displaced persons of different ethnicities were surrounded by ten to fifteen JNA soldiers. 
At the time, General Janković, commander of the 17th Corps of the JNA, claimed he was 
providing shelter to 309 Muslims and Serbs at the barracks, and that another 1,500 
Muslims were at the Patkovača barracks [C2.8]. However, his official report placed the 
 
TP
669
PT P511 (Witness 57 statement), p. 4; P727, tab 3 (Excerpt from interview with Mirko Blagojević, 1995), 
p. 10; P1177.B (Confidential report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), p. 2; Omeragić, T. 11946, 11950, 
11994-5, 12017.  
TP
670
PT P511 (Witness 57 statement), p. 6; P511.A (Witness 57 statement), p. 2.  
TP
671
PT Omeragić, T. 11979, 12009-10; P511 (Witness 57 statement), pp. 4-5. 
TP
672
PT P584 (Article in Slobodna Bosna newspaper, 10 April 1992), pp. 1-4; Omeragić, T. 11948, 11951-2, 
12041-51; P857 (Tokača report). 
TP
673
PT P511 (Witness 57 statement), pp. 2, 4-7; P511.A (Witness 57 statement), p. 2. 
TP
674
PT Omeragić, T. 11946, 11948-9, 11957-8, 12017; P511.A (Witness 57 statement), p. 2; Plavšić, T. 26917; 
C7 (Plavšić statement), para. 14. 
TP
675
PT Omeragić, T. 11949-50; P584 (Article in Slobodna Bosna newspaper, 10 April 1992), p.1. 
TP
676
PT P591.A (Interview with Biljana Plavšić); C7 (Plavšić statement), para. 15. 
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total number of displaced persons at 3,000.TPF677FPT The Chamber finds that both the Bijeljina 
barracks and the Patkovača barracks were used by Serb authorities to detain mainly 
Muslims, if not at this time then subsequent to the events described.TPF678FPT  
302. At one stage during the official visit, Arkan took the delegation on a tour of the 
town.TPF679FPT A Serb journalist who had slipped into town by avoiding the checkpoints 
approached the group and told Arkan: “You’ll never be forgiven for what you have done to 
the Muslims in Bijeljina. History will judge you”.TPF680FPT  
303. Arkan and the SDS appeared to be in control of the town.TPF681FPT When, in the course of 
the visit, Plavšić asked Arkan to hand over control of Bijeljina to the JNA, he replied that 
he had not yet finished his “business” there, and that he would settle the situation in 
Bosanski Brod next. Plavšić did not persist with her request, and repeatedly praised the 
good job Arkan had done in saving the local Serb population from the threat of the 
Muslims.TPF682FPT When the group returned to the municipality building, Plavšić publicly 
thanked and kissed Arkan. This scene was met by shouts of approval from the local SDS 
members present.TPF683FPT At a dinner with UNPROFOR representative Cedric Thornberry on 20 
April 1992, Plavšić described Bijeljina as a “liberated” town.TPF684FPT Arkan’s men remained in 
Bijeljina until at least May 1992.TPF685FPT  
304. From at least June 1992 until the end of the indictment period, Serbs detained 
Muslims and Croats in the Batković camp in Bijeljina municipality [C2.5]. The detainees 
originated from a large number of different municipalities, including Brčko, Ključ, Lopare, 
Rogatica, Sokolac, Ugljevik, Vlasenica, and Zvornik. Many had been transferred from 
other detention facilities, particularly Sušica camp in Vlasenica and Manjača camp in 
Banja Luka.TPF686FPT In August 1992, the commander at the camp was Velibor Stojanović. At 
 
TP
677
PT Omeragić, T. 11995-7, 12018-19, 12033, 12035; P584 (Article in Slobodna Bosna newspaper, 10 April 
1992), p. 2; P590 (Daily Operative Report, 4 April 1992), pp. 1-2; C7 (Plavšić statement), para. 17. 
TP
678
PT Malešević, T. 16118-20, 16136-41. 
TP
679
PT P511 (Witness 57 statement), p. 6; Plavšić, T. 26934-5; C7 (Plavšić statement), para. 16. 
TP
680
PT Omeragić, T. 11972-3. 
TP
681
PT Omeragić, T. 11968, 11977, 11981-2, 12015, 12010; P590 (Daily Operative Report, 4 April 1992), p. 1; 
C7 (Plavšić statement), paras 13, 18. 
TP
682
PT Omeragić, T. 11978, 12022-3. 
TP
683
PT Kljuić, T. 6176-8; Omeragić, T. 11974-7; P300 (Video clip, no date).  
TP
684
PT P900.A (Thornberry statement), pp. 2-3; C7 (Plavšić statement), para. 42. 
TP
685
PT P764 (Davidović statement), p. 16. 
TP
686
PT Osmanović, T. 5240, 5277; P265 (Osmanović statement), para. 51; P524 (Ferhatović transcript), pp. 488-
9; Kuralić, T. 12568-9; P642 (Kuralić statement), paras 31-3; P710.A (Elvir Pašić transcript), pp. 566, 572; 
P710 (Elvir Pašić transcript), pp. 439, 441, 451; P708 (Agić statement), p. 7; P473 (Witness 43 transcript), 
pp. 53-5, 65; P473.A (Witness 43 transcript), p. 86. P474.A (Witness 212 transcript), pp. 1555, 1565-6, 1573, 
1586-7, 1594-5, 1608; P474 (Witness 212 statement), p. 3; P474 (Witness 212 statement), pp. 4, 7.  
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that time, around 1,280 Muslim men were detained in a single warehouse. There were also 
some women, children, and elderly persons detained in a separate area.TPF687FPT Sanitary 
conditions at Batković were poor and detainees were given little food or water.TPF688FPT The 
detainees were beaten by Serb guards. Three detainees were beaten to death while one 
detainee was shot dead.TPF689FPT Ten detainees were singled out for especially harsh treatment. 
They were beaten three times a day, forced to beat each other, and repeatedly forced to 
engage in degrading sexual acts with each other in the presence of other detainees.TPF690FPT 
Detainees at Batković were forced to perform manual labour daily, including digging 
trenches and carrying munitions at the front line, burying bodies, working in fields and 
factories, and assisting in the construction of an airport near Bijeljina.TPF691FPT In late August or 
September 1992, when representatives of the ICRC visited Batković, the youngest and 
oldest prisoners, together with the most badly beaten detainees, were temporarily removed 
from the camp.TPF692FPT Conditions at Batković improved after the ICRC began to visit the 
facility.TPF693FPT 
305. In addition to the Batković camp, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat and 
Muslim civilians in six detention centres in Bijeljina municipality, namely the Bijeljina 
agricultural school [C2.1], KP Dom Bijeljina [C2.3], the Bijeljina SUP [C2.4], the Bijeljina 
sugar factory [C2.9], a fortified castle [C2.11], and the “4th of July” public utilities 
building [C2.12]. TPF694FPT In addition, in July 1992, five Muslims were detained in a 
slaughterhouse in Bijeljina which Witness Davidović referred to as “Mauzer’s private jail”. 
Ljubiša (Mauzer) Savić was a leading SDS figure in Bijeljina and commander of the Serb 
(National) Guard paramilitary unit. In “Mauzer’s private jail”, the detainees were kept in a 
refrigerated room, one of them hanging from a freezer hook. The five Muslims were 
subsequently freed, after the intervention of Witness Davidović.TPF695FPT  
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PT Kuralić, T. 12568-72; P642 (Kuralić statement), paras 31-3; P880 (Report of the CSCE mission, 29 
September 1992), pp. 32, 40, 42. 
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688
PT Witness 18, T. 726-8; Osmanović, T. 5241-2. 
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689
PT P710.A (Elvir Pašić transcript), pp. 568-9; P710 (Elvir Pašić transcript), p. 449; Witness 18, T. 726-8; 
Osmanović, T. 5244, 5247, 5272-5; P265 (Osmanović statement), paras 54-60; D26 (Osmanović statement), 
p. 1; P524 (Ferhatović transcript), pp. 488-92. 
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PT Kuralić, T. 12569-71, P642 (Kuralić witness statement), p. 8. 
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691
PT Osmanović, T. 5242-3; D26 (Osmanović statement), p. 1; P710.A (Elvir Pašić transcript), p. 570; P710 
(Elvir Pašić transcript), pp. 449, 450; P524 (Ferhatović transcript), pp. 488-92. 
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PT Kuralić, T. 12572-4; P710.A (Elvir Pašić transcript), p. 571; P710 (Elvir Pašić transcript), p. 450. 
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PT P524 (Ferhatović transcript), pp. 491-2. 
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PT Malešević, T. 16118-20, 16136-9, 16140-1.  
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306. In the months following the take-over of Bijeljina, paramilitary groups in the 
municipality, together with members of the local MUP, engaged in criminal activities on a 
massive scale.TPF696FPT Muslim residents of Bijeljina, as well as some Serbs, were terrorized by 
these groups through killings, rapes, house searches, and looting. During the summer of 
1992, two mosques in Bijeljina municipality were damaged or destroyed [D1.1].TPF697FPT Both 
Muslims and Serbs were leaving Bijeljina as a result of this pressure and terrorization.TPF698FPT 
On 15 June 1992, Mauzer stated that the presidency of SAO Semberija-Majevica had 
decided to replace Muslims in managerial positions in Bijeljina, and should “the genocide 
against the Serbian people” in Bosnia-Herzegovina continue, all Muslims would be fired 
from their jobs and expelled from the territory. Mauzer also stated that the 2,500 Muslims 
aged between 18 and 35 who had fled Bijeljina in the aftermath of the Serb take-over 
would lose their jobs, and their apartments would be seized and sealed, and he advised 
them not to return.TPF699FPT  
307. From at least July 1992, Muslims in Bijeljina were targeted by an organized 
campaign of looting and expulsion. The Bijeljina SDS compiled a list of names of wealthy 
Muslims. Aided by Mauzer’s men, Vojkan Đurković of the Bijeljina SDS paid visits to 
those on the list in order to extort property from them. Some of these Muslims initially 
paid to be able to stay in Bijeljina. Others were detained immediately, stripped of their 
valuables, and transferred to “no-man’s land” between the warring factions, where they 
remained, sometimes for days, before being able to cross into Muslim-controlled territory. 
The abandoned Muslim houses were looted, and then allocated by Đurković to Serbs upon 
payment of a fee.TPF700FPT 
308. The Bijeljina SDS was determined to rid the municipality of its remaining Muslims. 
The plan was to kill a Muslim family on each side of town to create an atmosphere of fear. 
This plan was implemented in September 1992 by Duško Malović’s special police unit, at 
the instigation of Drago Vuković, an employee of the local MUP and a member of the 
Bijeljina crisis staff. At the same time, the Serb municipal assembly passed a decision that 
Muslims who refused to be mobilized would be fired, have their electricity, water, and 
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PT P777 (Report on activities of Bosnian-Serb MUP, 29 July 1992); Davidović, T. 15294-6; P764 (Davidović 
statement), pp. 19-20. 
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PT P732 (Riedlmayer report), Appendix 2.1. 
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PT P777 (Report on activities of Bosnian-Serb MUP, 29 July 1992), pp. 2-4; P857 (Tokača report); P732 
(Riedlmayer report), Appendix 2.1. 
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PT P727, tab 11 (TV interview with Ljubiša (Mauzer) Savić, 1 July 1992), p. 3; Davidović, T. 14314-15; 
P764 (Davidović statement), p. 37 
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telephone services cut off, and be required to report for work detail. Prominent Muslims 
were humiliated by being forced to perform menial tasks, and those who refused were 
taken to Batković camp or expelled from the municipality. The SDS operation caused large 
numbers of Muslims to flee Bijeljina.TPF701FPT 
309. The Chamber concludes that at least 52 persons of mainly Muslim ethnicity were 
killed by Serb forces in Bijeljina municipality in April-September 1992. After the take-
over of Bijeljina in early April, paramilitary groups, in particular Arkan’s men, terrorized 
mainly Muslims through killings, rapes, house searches, and looting. During the summer of 
1992, two mosques in Bijeljina town were damaged or destroyed. From at least July 1992, 
Muslims in Bijeljina were targeted by an organized campaign of looting and expulsion. 
Many Muslims were transferred out of the municipality and from there fled to Muslim-
controlled territory. Serbs also detained Muslim and some Croat civilians in nine detention 
centres in the Bijeljina municipality under harsh conditions. In the Batković camp, 
detainees originated from a large number of different municipalities, and were subjected to 
forced labour at the front lines. In September 1992, the Bijeljina SDS implemented a plan 
to expel the remaining Muslim population. The Chamber finds that large numbers of 
Muslims left the municipality out of fear.  
 
4.2.2 Bratunac 
310. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Bratunac municipality was 21,535 (64 per cent) Muslims, 11,475 (34 per cent) Serbs, 40 
Croats, 223 Yugoslavs, and 346 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF702FPT  
311. In early April 1992, Muslim police officers in Bratunac municipality were forced to 
turn over their firearms, and on 9 April Serbs established their own police force displaying 
the insignia of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF703FPT Thereafter, Bratunac Serbs set up barricades 
and checkpoints, and carried out attacks with firearms and explosives. Two coffee bars, 
one owned by a Muslim and the other owned by a Croat were blown up.TPF704FPT On 16 April, 
the TO in Bratunac was mobilized and in the following days, Arkan’s and Šešelj’s 
 
TP
700
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paramilitary units, and a JNA unit under the command of Captain Reljić, arrived in the 
municipality.TPF705FPT While the JNA and TO began disarming Muslim villagers throughout the 
municipality, including the majority-Muslim villages Podčauš and Suha, the paramilitaries 
harassed locals and pillaged abandoned Muslim homes. TPF706FPT Most of the Muslim leadership 
left Bratunac municipality for Srebrenica after receiving threats from these Serb 
paramilitary units. This effectively surrendered Bratunac to Serb control.TPF707FPT 
312. Serb authorities issued a 29 April deadline by which non-Serbs, almost exclusively 
Muslims, had to sign oaths of loyalty to Serb rule in the municipality. Most Muslims had 
left Bratunac municipality by that date. Serb soldiers looted the abandoned Muslim 
properties.TPF708FPT  
313. On 1 May 1992, the Bratunac crisis staff ordered that all paramilitaries and “illegal 
citizens” cease activity and leave the municipality within one week. The paramilitary units, 
however, did not leave. It further declared that only JNA and TO units had the right to deal 
with military issues and perform duties in the state of war that had been declared in the 
territory.TPF709FPT Two days later, the Serb TO surrounded the Muslim village of Hranča and 
torched 43 houses. Over the following week, they attacked and arrested the remaining 
residents of the village. They captured nine villagers, and killed four of them, including a 
six-year-old girl. On 9 May, members of the same TO shot eight Muslim neighbours of 
Witness Ibišević.TP PTOn 11 May, the Serb TO of Bratunac brought approximately 250 of 
Hranča’s inhabitants to the municipal hall of Bratunac. From there, approximately 60 men, 
including Witness Ibišević, were taken to the Vuk Karadžić school [C7.4]. TPF710FPT 
314. On 8 May 1992, during a Muslim attack against Serb paramilitaries in Potočari, 
Goran Zekić, a prominent SDS main board member visiting from Srebrenica, was killed. 
The Bratunac crisis staff met the same day and planned to attack the Muslim village of 
Glogova the next morning, and to forcibly transfer the population to Muslim-controlled 
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Kladanj municipality. On 9 May, JNA forces and Serb TO units surrounded Glogova. 
There was no armed resistance to the Serb advance because the village had already been 
disarmed on 25 April. Approximately 65 inhabitants of Glogova were killed during the 
operation [A4.1]. The remaining Muslims were taken into Serb custody, and most of the 
buildings in the village were then burned.TPF711FPT Also on 9 May, Serb forces set fire to houses 
in the Muslim villages of Cerivac and Polje in Bratunac municipality.TPF712FPT The following 
day, Serb soldiers attacked the Muslim villages of Suha and Mihaljevići, near the town of 
Bratunac. Male villagers were arrested and taken to the Vuk Karadžić school [C7.4], while 
women and children were taken to the Bratunac football stadium [C7.2, C7.5].TPF713FPT 
315. On 10 May 1992, Serb paramilitaries also attacked Krasan Polje, near Vitkovići in 
Bratunac municipality.TPF714FPT On that day, over 500 Muslim men from villages in Bratunac 
were detained in the Vuk Karadžić School. Detainees were severely mistreated and beaten 
repeatedly. Dozens were killed by armed Serb locals and member of paramilitary groups. 
Witness Hasanović, who was detained at the school from 10-13 May, saw how, on one 
occasion, three guards forced all detainees to huddle in a section of the sports hall, 
resulting in seven or eight men suffocating to death. Several men were taken out by the 
guards and killed. On another occasion, the witness was ordered to carry the body of a 
detainee to a hangar, where he saw a large pile of bodies. In total, Witness Hasanović saw 
about 50 detainees beaten or shot to death by the guards in the sports hall [B3.1]. TPF715FPT About 
400 detainees were to be exchanged for Serb prisoners in Pale, among them Witness 
Ibišević who was detained at Vuk Karadžić school from 11 to 14 May.TPF716FPT  
316. Around 5,000 Muslims who had been forcibly removed from their homes were 
detained at the Bratunac football stadium [C7.2, C7.5]. Armed Serbs forced the Muslims to 
surrender their valuables, after which the women and children were separated from the 
men, placed in buses, and transported out of the municipality.TPF717FPT  
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317. On 17 May 1992, police chief Vidoje Radović demanded that all Muslims in the 
village of Vitkovići hand in their weapons. Armed local Serbs dressed in camouflage 
uniform surrounded the village. The next day, soldiers from the Novi Sad Corps entered 
the village and told the Muslims to gather in the streets at noon with their belongings, to be 
taken to Tuzla. Around noon, two buses arrived escorted by armed paramilitary units. 
Witness Džafić and his fellow villagers were taken to the Bratunac football field [C7.2, 
C7.5]. They were later placed on buses and sent to Vlasenica municipality, where they 
were detained under the guard of additional armed Serb paramilitaries, including members 
of Arkan’s men and the White Eagles.TPF718FPT Also on 17 May, Serbs shelled the Muslim 
settlement of Koljević Polje, near Hrnčići, and attacked it on 27 May.  
318. Four Muslim monuments in Bratunac municipality were heavily damaged or 
completely destroyed between April and June 1992, including the mosque in Bratunac 
town and the mosque in Glogova, which was demolished with explosives during the 9 May 
attack [D5.1, D5.2].TPF719FPT  
319. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly 
Muslim civilians in three detention centres in Bratunac municipality in 1992, namely the 
Bratunac town police station [C7.3], the warehouse [C7.6], and the basement of the 
“Express” restaurant [C7.9]. TPF720FPT 
320. The Chamber concludes that Serb forces killed, in total, over 134 Muslims in 
Bratunac municipality in May 1992. During attacks on Muslim villages, including 
Glogova, Serb forces deliberately torched and destroyed Muslim houses and mosques. 
Muslim civilians were detained in five detention centres in the municipality, over 500 in 
the Vuk Karadžić school, and over 5,000 on the Bratunac football field in May 1992. The 
detainees were severely mistreated, and some were killed by local Serbs and members of 
Serb paramilitary units. From mid-May on, detainees held at the Bratunac football field 
were forced on buses and sent to Vlasenica municipality. The Chamber finds that already 
between 10 and 29 April 1992, much of the Muslim population left the municipality due to 
threats by Serb paramilitary forces. 
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4.2.3 Brčko 
321. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Brčko municipality was 38,617 (44 per cent) Muslims, 22,252 (25 per cent) Croats, 18,128 
(20 per cent) Serbs, 5,731 Yugoslavs, and 2,899 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF721FPT 
322. In February 1992, Brčko SDS officials began to call openly for the division of the 
municipality along ethnic lines. Milenko Vojnović (Dr Beli) explained to leading Muslims 
that, on the orders from Radovan Karadžić and other senior SDS officials, local SDS 
members were seeking to establish a Serb autonomous entity in Brčko encompassing 70 
per cent of Brčko town. He warned that the division would be carried out by force if 
necessary.TPF722FPT Maps began to appear in Brčko town showing the division proposed by the 
SDS. TPF723FPT On 17 April, hoping to avoid bloodshed, SDA members of the Brčko municipal 
assembly accepted the SDS proposal for physical division of Brčko town. TPF724FPT 
323. Already in February 1992, the JNA began preparations for military operations in 
Brčko. In February or March, the JNA distributed weapons to Serb villagers and erected 
checkpoints on major roads around Brčko town.TPF725FPT In April, JNA heavy vehicles were seen 
in Brčko town. The JNA dug trenches and set up machine-gun nests.TPF726FPT By the end of 
April, it had moved artillery, weapons and ammunition stores, out of Brčko town and into 
neighbouring Serb villages. During this period, local Serbs were mobilized, with a total of 
3,400 Serbs joining military units. The policy was to place conscripts under the command 
of the Brčko JNA garrison, and to have the garrison lead all war operations in order to 
prevent local Serbs from forming paramilitary groups. The Brčko crisis staff met daily with 
local Serbs and told them that they were under threat from the Muslims. TPF727FPT 
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324. On 30 April 1992, the two bridges crossing the Sava river and linking Brčko town 
to Croatia were blown up.TPF728FPT The Chamber is convinced that they were blown up by Serbs 
because Serbs were warned beforehand about the operation. On the day of the attack, 
Witness Maričić, a Serb, for example, was advised to seek shelter and he thus went to 
Stanovi, six kilometers outside Brčko.TPF729FPT On 1 May, a total of 1,000 Serb forces, which 
included Serb units of the JNA from Bosnia and Serbia, White Eagles, Arkan’s men, and 
others, launched an attack on Brčko town using heavy weapons, tanks and artillery.TPF730FPT 
Areas of the town that were predominantly Muslim were shelled for several days.TPF731FPT Large 
paramilitary groups came from other areas of SAO Semberija-Majevica, of which Brčko 
municipality was a part, to participate in operations in Brčko town. The first group was the 
Serb (National) Guard, established by SAO Semberija-Majevica and comprised of 600 
men under Mauzer’s command.TPF732FPT Another group was the Serbian Radicals under the 
command of Mirko Blagojević.TPF733FPT Blagojević’s group put itself at the disposal of the Brčko 
war presidency and cooperated with local JNA officers, including Pavle Milinković 
(commander of the Brčko garrison), and Captain Šehovac. TPF734FPT Other formations present in 
Brčko at the time of the attack included a TO battalion from Bijeljina sent by the 
presidency of SAO Semberija-Majevica. TPF735FPT  
325. The attack on Brčko was initially met with armed resistance from groups using light 
infantry weapons.TPF736FPT Serb forces, however, quickly took control of the town. TPF737FPT On 2 May 
1992, the TO from neighbouring Bijeljina took control of the Brčko SJB. The war 
presidency appointed Dragan Veselić as chief of police and began re-staffing the SJB with 
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Serb members of the pre-war police force.TPF738FPT On 4 May, a group of soldiers led by Mauzer 
arrived at the Brčko hospital, where 40 to 50 Muslim civilians had sought refuge. Mauzer 
told those present that Brčko town was now under his occupation. He interrogated and beat 
some of the hospital personnel. Later they were brought to Luka camp [C8.7].TPF739FPT 
326. In the days following the occupation of Brčko, a number of civilians, mostly of 
Muslim ethnicity, were killed, beaten, or otherwise abused by Serb forces. On 4 May 1992, 
Muslim firemen who had been detained at the fire station by JNA soldiers [C8.1] were 
beaten by Blagojević and taken to the SUP building where they saw other detainees 
covered in blood. TPF740FPT Another 30 men, mostly Muslim, were taken to the SUP building by 
Serb soldiers,TPF741FPT and approximately 26 men were detained at the Posavina hotel [C8.8]. 
Several detainees at the hotel were beaten by Goran Jelisić, and three were subsequently 
killed, two by Jelisić himself. The bodies of another four recently dead men dressed in 
civilian clothes were seen outside the hotel [A5.1].TPF742FPT The Chamber is not in a position to 
assess circumstances surrounding the deaths of these four men. 
327. On 7 May 1992, there were a number of incidents where police and soldiers 
executed approximately twelve unarmed civilians in Brčko town, in the vicinity of the 
police station [A5.3]. TPF743FPT On the same day, at least six Muslim men who had been hiding in 
Mujkići, a part of Brčko town, were shot dead by Mauzer and soldiers presenting 
themselves as Šešelj’s men. On 7 May, the dead bodies of men, women, and children from 
Mujkići were seen on the ground outside their homes [A5.2].TPF744FPT On 10 May, one of the 
workers detained at the fire station was shot on the orders of JNA Captain Šehovac. 
Detainees were told that anyone not on the Serb side would face the same fate.TPF745FPT On 21 
June, a group of armed men in uniform identifying themselves as police beat and shot dead 
an elderly Muslim woman in her home [A5.5]. Ranko Češić, a local Serb, then sexually 
abused the woman’s granddaughter.TPF746FPT 
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328. From 3 May 1992 onwards, Muslim and Croat men, women, and children were 
systematically detained in various locations in Brčko municipality. Češić told Witness 
Fazlović that his unit was cleansing sections of the town by taking people to the JNA 
barracks or to Luka camp [C8.3] under the alleged reason of protecting them. TPF747FPT Other 
Muslim civilians were temporarily detained by Mauzer’s unit at Brčko hospital [C8.2].TPF748FPT 
329. On 3 May 1992, approximately 200 persons were detained at the Kolobara mosque 
[C8.4] by soldiers in JNA uniform, Arkan’s men, and the White Eagles. Prominent SDA 
members, those suspected of belonging to the SDA, and religious leaders, were specifically 
singled out by the soldiers for beatings. However, interrogations and beatings were not 
limited to Muslims, since Croats, and even Serbs who were not adhering to SDS policy, 
were subject to the same treatment. One of Arkan’s men shot and killed Zikret Suljić, a 
detainee, who tried to escape.TPF749FPT  
330. From 5 to 7 May 1992, a total of 200 Muslim and Croat men, women, and children 
were detained by local Serbs wearing uniforms at the Laser Bus Company in Brčko 
[C8.3].TPF750FPT Goran Jelisić told the detainees on 6 May that he had already killed 80 Muslims 
and was going to kill them, too.TPF751FPT 
331. From 8 May until at least 17 June 1992, Serb forces detained Muslim men, women, 
and children in the village of Brezovo Polje [C8.6]. On 9 June, ten of those detainees were 
taken to the front lines at Begovača and forced to dig trenches.TPF752FPT 
332. From 6 May until at least October 1992, non-Serb men were detained at the Brčko 
army barracks [C8.5]. Early in that period, women and children were also held at the 
barracks.TPF753FPT At least seven detainees were killed, including one detainee shot by Goran 
Jelisić while on work detail on or about 7 May.TPF754FPT  
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333. From 4 May until at least August 1992, many non-Serbs from Brčko municipality 
were taken to Luka camp and detained in a hangar in crowded, unsanitary conditions 
[C8.7]. In early May, a large number of Muslim and Croat women, children, and elderly 
persons were transferred out of Brčko municipality to Čelić, a predominantly Muslim 
village in the neighbouring municipality of Lopare. Military-aged men were placed in 
detention at Luka camp.TPF755FPT Many of the detainees transferred to Luka camp came from 
other temporary detention facilities.TPF756FPT Between 27 May and 7 June, there were 100 to 200 
detainees at Luka camp, consisting of mostly Muslim men aged between 20 and 60.TPF757FPT 
Jelisić was initially in charge of the camp.TPF758FPT Sometime in late May or June, he was 
replaced by Kosta (Kole) Simonović, a local Serb police officer.TPF759FPT Detainees at Luka 
camp were subjected to systematic abuse by Serb guards, particularly by Jelisić and Ranko 
Češić.TPF760FPT Detainees were frequently beatenTPF761FPT and some female detainees were raped.TPF762FPT 
When Witness 224 was raped by Češić, he said that it was a “pleasure to have one more 
balija woman to rape.”TPF763FPT 
334. On numerous occasions, groups of detainees were taken out of the hangar and 
summarily executed, some of whom were shot by Jelisić personally. At least nine detainees 
were killed in this manner. On 9 May 1992, Jelisić brought Stjepo Glavočević, a Muslim, 
into the hangar, while he was holding the man’s cut-off ear. He then struck Glavočević 
with a sabre, killing him [B4.1].TPF764FPT Other detainees were forced to help dispose of the 
 
TP
755
PT P474.A (Witness 212 transcript), pp. 1555-6, 1572-4; P474 (Witness 212 statement), p. 3. 
TP
756
PT P473 (Witness 43 transcript), pp. 53-5, 65; P474.A (Witness 212 transcript), pp. 1555, 1558, 1572-3, 
1605; P474 (Witness 212 statement), pp. 3-6; P476 (Witness 220 transcript), pp. 163-4; Witness 224, T. 562, 
578-9, 616; P514.B (Fadil Redžić transcript), p. 792; Gaši, T. 451, 455, 459.  
TP
757
PT Gaši, T. 451-4, 503; P21 (Map of Brčko, no date); P514.B (Fadil Redžić transcript), pp. 792-3; P514 
(Fadil Redžić statement), p. 8; P476.A (Witness 220 transcript), pp. 210-11, 251. 
TP
758
PT P479 (Witness 214 transcript), pp. 1936-7, 1941, 1945, 1947; P479.A (Witness 214 transcript), pp. 1952, 
2010, 2053-4, 2058; Witness 224, T. 640.  
TP
759
PT P514 (Fadil Redžić statement), p. 8; P514.B (Fadil Redžić transcript), p. 792; P473 (Witness 43 
transcript), pp. 70-1; P473.A (Witness 43 transcript), pp. 124, 130-1; Gaši, T. 470. 
TP
760
PT Witness 224, T. 586-8, 605-6, 608, 611.  
TP
761
PT P473 (Witness 43 transcript), pp. 56, 65-6; Witness 224, T. 614; Gaši, T. 444, 456, 458, 468-9, 487-9, 
527-30; D2 (Gaši statement), p. 5; P476 (Witness 220 transcript), pp. 184-5; P476.A (Witness 220 
transcript), pp. 228-9, 230, 232.  
TP
762
PT Witness 224, T. 596, 609, 613, 618; Fazlović, T. 2310-2; P71 (Jasmin Fazlović statement), paras 24-6.  
TP
763
PT Witness 224, T. 596. 
TP
764
PT P474.A (Witness 212 transcript), pp. 1558, 1561-3, 1565, 1592-3, 1605; P474 (Witness 212 statement), 
pp. 4-6; P476 (Witness 220 transcript), pp. 168-9, 171-3; P476.A (Witness 220 transcript), pp. 211-12, 225; 
P473 (Witness 43 transcript), pp. 65-70; P473.A (Witness 43 transcript), pp. 81, 113; P479.A (Witness 214 
transcript), pp. 1954-6, 1964, 2048; Gaši, T. 461; P857 (Tokača report).  
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 4 
 Municipality crimes 
 
 
127 
bodies, which included dumping them into a canal or the Sava river.TPF765FPT Jelisić, who called 
himself the “Serb Adolf Hitler”, told detainees he had a duty to eradicate Muslims, 
sometimes bragging about the number of people he had killed. While at the camp, one 
detainee saw a document entitled “People to be executed”, which listed approximately 50 
prominent, educated, or wealthy Muslims and Croats.TPF766FPT Some of the bodies of those killed 
in Brčko municipality, including those killed in Luka camp, were buried in pits and 
covered with rubble from demolished mosques.TPF767FPT  
335. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly 
Muslim and Croat civilians in five detention facilities in the municipality in 1992, namely 
the Vestfalija restaurant [C8.11], the football stadium [C8.12], Lončari elementary school 
[C8.13], DTV Partizan [C8.14], and the Pelagićevo farm cooperative shop [C8.15].TPF768FPT 
336. In June or July 1992, the three mosques in the centre of Brčko town were destroyed 
within minutes of each other [D6.1, D6.2, D6.3]. Soldiers seen near one of the mosques 
expressed satisfaction at the mosque’s destruction. TPF769FPT One soldier told firemen not to put 
out the fire in the mosque. TPF770FPT Likewise, firemen were prevented from extinguishing fire in 
Muslim houses, unless they were close to Serb houses.TPF771FPT In the course of 1992, another 
ten Muslim and Catholic monuments in the municipality were either heavily damaged or 
completely destroyed by explosives or shelling.TPF772FPT 
337. The Chamber concludes that over 41 Muslims were killed by Serb forces in Brčko 
municipality in May-June 1992. Serb forces mainly consisting of paramilitary groups 
quickly took control of Brčko town in early May 1992. They specifically targeted Muslim 
parts of the town and destroyed several mosques in the municipality. From 3 May onwards, 
Serbs systematically detained mostly Muslim and Croat civilians in fourteen locations in 
Brčko municipality in harsh conditions. They beat the detainees on a regular basis. Some 
detainees were forced to dig trenches on the front lines. In late May-early June, there were 
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100 to 200 detainees at Luka camp who were systematically abused by Serb guards, in 
particular by Goran Jelisić and Ranko Češić. A large number of Muslim and Croat women, 
children, and elderly persons were transferred out of Brčko municipality to the 
neighbouring municipality of Lopare. 
 
4.2.4 Doboj 
338. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition in 
Doboj municipality was 41,164 (40 per cent) Muslims, 39,820 (39 per cent) Serbs, 13,264 
(13 per cent) Croats, 5,765 Yugoslavs, and 2,536 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF773FPT 
339. In March and April 1992, the JNA set up checkpoints in Doboj town.TPF774FPT In late 
March, at the last session of the Doboj municipal assembly, the president of the Doboj 
SDS Milan Ninković proposed a division of Doboj town into a Serb and a Muslim-Croat 
section. SDA members of the assembly disagreed with the division, and left the session in 
protest. The division was debated again at a meeting attended by Ninković, JNA garrison 
commander Čazim Hadžić (a Muslim), his deputy Major Stanković, and Borislav Paravac, 
president of the SDS and of the Serb crisis staff. According to the proposal, all the main 
municipal facilities and military buildings would be within the Serb-controlled part of the 
town. TPF775FPT 
340. A large unit of the White Eagles had entered the municipality around January or 
February 1992. This paramilitary group consisted of approximately 500 men in olive-drab 
uniforms that often came to the town’s JNA barracks for meals. Just prior to 3 May, this 
paramilitary group took over an area of Ankare, near Doboj town, and forced the residents 
to leave. On 3 May, Serb paramilitaries, the JNA, and the police took over Doboj town. 
The Serb crisis staff took control of the municipality, and all remaining Muslim police 
officers were arrested. Muslims and Croats were ordered to surrender their weapons. The 
Serb authorities issued a curfew allowing Muslims and Croats to be outside their homes for 
only two hours per day, prompting many Muslims and Croats to leave town.TPF776FPT Around 10 
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May, Šešelj’s men intimidated the remaining residents of Doboj town.TPF777FPT As a result of the 
Serb take-over and of rumours of incidents occurring in Bratunac and Bijeljina, thousands 
of Muslims, Croats, and displaced persons left Doboj town for Tešanj, a Muslim-majority 
town south of Doboj in Tešanj municipality. Muslims set up a crisis staff there, and 
established a line of defence to the south of Doboj town to prevent Serbs from taking 
control over the entire municipality of Doboj.TPF778FPT 
341. During May and June 1992, 21 Muslim and Catholic monuments in Doboj 
municipality, including the Trnjak mosque and one other mosque in Doboj town [D9.1, 
D9.2], the mosque in Gornja Grapska [D9.5], and the Catholic Church in Doboj town 
[D9.4], were either heavily damaged or completely destroyed through shelling or 
explosives, or occasionally both.TPF779FPT 
342. On 20 May 1992, Serb forces sealed off the Muslim town of Dragalovći and set up 
checkpoints. On 2 June, Serb police officers called the villagers to gather at the town 
railway station and ordered them to surrender their weapons. Armed Serbs then separated 
out the male villagers at gunpoint, and Serb police took 26 of these men, including Witness 
Garić, to Spreča prison in Doboj town [C11.6]. On 3 June, the witness saw four detainees 
return with severe injuries after being interrogated by Doboj SUP officers at the SUP 
building [C11.9] across the street from the prison. One of them told the witness that he had 
been kicked and struck with chair legs and batons over one hundred times. In the prison, 
detainees were threatened and abused by soldiers wearing red berets and black shirts. 
Around 12 June, Serbs transferred the detainees to hangars in Doboj town [C11.7]. Witness 
Garić was detained in a hangar packed with about 400 Muslims and Croats. The hangar 
was very hot inside and sanitary conditions were poor. The detainees were only allowed 
out to relieve themselves once a day, and were given little food or water. Around 22 June, 
the witness and several other detainees were taken in armoured trucks to a discotheque in 
Usora in Doboj municipality [C11.2]. The Serb guards packed them tightly into the 
building, together with other detainees already present, and beat them. One elderly man 
died due to the harsh conditions. Witness Garić was told by other detainees that they had 
been used as human shields and that some detainees had died [B6.1].TPF780FPT The Chamber 
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considers that it is not in a position to sufficiently assess the fate of the detainees who were 
allegedly used as human shields.  
343. Around 9 July, Witness Garić was transferred again, this time to a camp at Bare in 
Doboj municipality [C11.5]. By then, he had lost twelve kilograms. Serb soldiers forced 
him to herd cattle and pigs for sixteen hours a day. The camp was closed on 15 August 
1992. TPF781FPT 
344. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mainly 
Muslim and Croat civilians in 21 detention centres in Doboj municipality in 1992, namely 
the JNA (Milikovac) 4th of July barracks [C11.1, C11.24], Šešlija camp [C11.3], a 
warehouse in Usora [C11.4, C11.8], the railway station [C11.10], SRC Ozren [C11.11], the 
high school [C11.12], the tyre factory in Bare [C11.13], the Stanari mine [C11.14], Stanari 
elementary school [C11.15], the handball stadium [C11.16], Bosanska [C11.17], the 
Rudanka transmission line factory [C11.18], Kotorko village [C11.19], Majevica hangar 
PD [C11.20], the Putnikovo brdo military premises [C11.21], Seona [C11.22], Grapska 
elementary school [C11.23], Piperi shop [C11.25], the Ševarlije military barracks 
[C11.26], and Podnovlje [C11.27]. TPF782FPT 
345. The Chamber concludes that Doboj town was taken over by Serb forces on 3 May 
1992. In May and June 1992, Serb authorities in Doboj municipality detained Muslim and 
Croat civilians in 33 detention centres under cramped and inhumane conditions. The 
detainees were severely mistreated, and at least one detainee died as a result. Serb 
authorities restricted the freedom of movement of Muslims and Croats, and Serb 
paramilitaries terrorized the population in Doboj town. Muslim and Croat monuments were 
deliberately damaged or destroyed through shelling or explosives. The take-over of Doboj 
town and the threats and intimidation of Muslims in Doboj prompted many thousands to 
leave the town for Tešanj. 
 
 
TP
781
PT P503 (Garić statement), pp. 5-11; Witness 132, T. 12516-17, 12519. 
TP
782
PT Malešević, T. 16123-4, 16136-9, 16140-1; Witness 132, T. 12516-17, 12519; P636 (Witness 132 
statement), para. 25. 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 4 
 Municipality crimes 
 
 
131 
4.2.5 Vlasenica 
346. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Vlasenica municipality was: 18,727 (55 per cent) Muslims, 14,359 (42 per cent) Serbs, 39 
Croats, 340 Yugoslavs, and 477 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF783FPT 
347. From late 1991 and up to May 1992, Muslims working in state-owned companies 
and other public services in Vlasenica municipality were dismissed from their jobs.TPF784FPT 
Muslim shopkeepers feared keeping their businesses open, and Muslim workers of the 
local bauxite company stopped being paid, while their Serb colleagues continued to receive 
salaries.TPF785FPT 
348. A large number of soldiers and reservists were present in the municipality,TPF786FPT and 
during the first days of April 1992, tanks, artillery, and armed vehicles from Milići, Han 
Pijesak, and Šekovići, were deployed there.TPF787FPT Also in the beginning of April 1992, SDS 
and local Muslims negotiated the division of the municipality into Serb and Muslim 
parts.TPF788FPT During the negotiations, Milenko Stanić, the SDS-appointed president of the 
municipal assembly of Vlasenica, consulted with Rajko Dukić, president of the SDS 
executive board. Dukić told Izet Redžić, SDA-appointed president of the executive board 
of Vlasenica municipality, that he was following orders coming from “higher up”. Redžić 
also received threats from Tomislav Savkić, the local SDS president that, if the Muslims 
refused the partition, armed intervention would follow. TPF789FPT  
349. On or about 23 April 1992, JNA soldiers took over the town of Vlasenica with the 
assistance of local armed Serbs, by taking control of the municipality premises, the police 
station, the post office, and the bank.TPF790FPT Immediately after that, the seat of the Serb 
municipality of Vlasenica was moved from Milići to Vlasenica town, and a Serb crisis staff 
was set up. The crisis staff, under Milenko Stanić, issued passes which Muslims were 
required to use in order to move around Vlasenica municipality or to travel to other 
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municipalities.TPF791FPT Checkpoints were erected under the authority of Dragiša Milaković, an 
SDS member. The crisis staff ordered Muslims to surrender their weapons to the Serb 
authorities and introduced work obligations for them.TPF792FPT  
350. At the beginning of May 1992, the Muslims in Zaklopača, a Muslim-majority 
village, were asked to hand over their weapons by a Serb delegation led by Milenko Đurić, 
a manager at the Milići bauxite mines and SDS member. The Muslims did not comply and 
hid their hunting rifles. On 16 May 1992, four or five army vehicles together with a white 
police car arrived in Zaklopača. The men in those vehicles were in army and police 
uniforms and some wore masks. The population tried to flee, but approximately 80 people, 
mostly men, were shot dead by the Serbs. The soldiers killed a witness’ uncle and 
continued to shoot for about fifteen minutes [A17.2]. The dead bodies were left lying 
around the village.TPF793FPT A group of women and children and one elderly man surrendered to 
the Serbs on the following day. The Serbs took them to the municipality building in 
Vlasenica town, where the women had to sign statements giving away their houses and 
properties to, as one witness put it, “the Serbs”. They were then put on a bus and dropped 
off at a point about ten kilometres outside Kladanj. From there, they walked to Kladanj 
town.TPF794FPT 
351. In May and June 1992, a MUP special unit led by Mićo Kraljević, but ultimately 
under the command of the local crisis staff, conducted two operations, one in Sušica, and 
another in Gradina and other Muslim hamlets in the municipality, occasionally 
encountering armed resistance. Their orders were to search for weapons, detain men who 
surrendered for questioning, kill men trying to escape, and send women and children to 
Vlasenica town. Some men were arrested, detained at the municipal court house, and then 
transferred to Sušica camp [C32.6]. During these operations, the unit was explicitly 
ordered to burn all the houses to prevent the owners from returning, and almost all the 
Muslim houses in the area were in fact destroyed.TPF795FPT  
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352. Early in the morning on 2 June 1992, Serb soldiers supported by an APC with a 
machine gun, attacked the predominantly Muslim hamlet of Drum near the town of 
Vlasenica. The soldiers moved from house to house firing automatic weapons, and 
breaking into homes. More than 20 Muslim males were killed in a few minutes. Only three 
of the male residents of Drum survived the attack. The soldiers took the three male 
survivors and 20 Muslim women by bus to Sušica camp [A17.1].TPF796FPT  
353. Sušica camp [C32.6] was established on 31 May 1992 by order of Svetozar 
Andrić, commander of the Birač Brigade, and pursuant to a decision of the Birač SAO 
which regulated the moving out of the Muslim population from the territory of Birač.TPF797FPT 
The guards at the camp, under camp warden Veljko Bašić and deputy Vidosav 
Mlađenović, were members of the MUP and VRS. The local MUP and the municipal crisis 
staff, led by Milenko Stanić, received regular reports on the situation at the camp. The 
crisis staff made decisions concerning the camp and detainees, such as decisions on 
release, visits, and exchanges. Approximately 2,000 to 2,500 Muslims of both genders and 
all ages passed through Sušica camp. The camp remained operational for four months, 
from June to September 1992.TPF798FPT In the first days, over 1,000 persons were detained there. 
Just a few days later, Serb officials allowed the great majority of the women, more than 
800, to leave after they were stripped of their valuables and had signed a declaration that 
they were leaving the municipality voluntarily.TPF799FPT The living conditions in the camp were 
extremely bad. The detainees performed several types of forced labour, including burial of 
the men killed in Drum (see above), digging of trenches, and carrying munitions at front 
lines. They were insufficiently fed, water was very scarce, sanitary conditions were poor, 
and medical care was not provided.TPF800FPT Some time in June 1992, Dragan Nikolić was put in 
charge of Sušica. He told the detainees that he was “God and the law”, and submitted them 
to all kinds of mistreatment, including frequent beatings.TPF801FPT During this period, nine 
detainees in the camp were killed by camp guards or died from mistreatment [B19.3]. 
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These deaths were reported to warden Bašić with no consequences.TPF802FPT On two occasions, 
members of international organizations visited the camp. During both visits, Nikolić 
managed to conceal many detainees and the true state of the conditions of detention.TPF803FPT 
354. Around this time, Muslims were also detained in other locations in the 
municipality. About 150 detainees were held in very poor conditions in five rooms of the 
Vlasenica municipal prison [C32.3], under the control of the police. Detainees were forced 
to perform tasks such as burying bodies, removing property from abandoned Muslim 
houses, and digging trenches at the front lines.TPF804FPT When the commander of the prison 
Sukanović was present, however, the premises were aired and cleaned, and no ill-treatment 
of detainees took place.TPF805FPT 
355. Muslims aged between 18 and 60 and five minors were detained at the police 
station in Vlasenica town [C32.1], where they were repeatedly mistreated and beaten with 
metal pipes, chains, and other objects. No health care was provided, and the conditions of 
detention were poor.TPF806FPT Džemal Ambesković, who had organized a local referendum on the 
independence, was killed while in detention at the police station on or about 22 May 
1992. TPF807FPT On 21 May, the detainees were ordered out of their cell by two police officers and 
placed on buses where soldiers confiscated their personal belongings, including money and 
documents. The bus headed in the direction of Bratunac, accompanied by an armoured 
vehicle and four cars. It stopped on the outskirts of the village of Nova Kasaba, where the 
detainees were ordered off the bus in groups of five. As the detainees got off, they were 
shot by Serb soldiers using automatic rifles and a machine gun mounted on the armoured 
vehicle. Witness Džafić, his brother, two cousins, and another male relative, were in the 
last group to come off the bus. They were fired at and the witness was wounded. The 
soldiers, at least one of whom Džafić knew, searched for survivors and shot them in the 
head. Džafić lay on the ground pretending to be dead until the soldiers left, and then fled to 
Muslim-held territory. Muslim soldiers were sent to retrieve the bodies, but encountered 
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fire from a Serb patrol and were therefore only able to recover the bodies of sixteen out of 
the 29 detainees killed [B19.2].TPF808FPT  
356. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly 
Muslim civilians at eleven detention centres in Vlasenica municipality in 1992, namely the 
SUP [C32.2], Vlasenica town secondary school [C32.4], the sawmill at Milići [C32.8], the 
elementary school [C32.9], the Piskavice cooperative stables [C32.10], the high school 
[C32.11], Panorama hotel [C32.12], the military sports hall [C32.14], the community 
centre at Milići [C32.15], Luka camp [C32.16], and the Šošari chicken farm [C32.17]. TPF809FPT  
357. On the last day of September 1992, a public burial of more than 20 Serb soldiers 
killed in an ambush by the Bosnia-Herzegovina army was held in Vlasenica town. 
Radovan Karadžić was present and held a speech where he called on the audience never to 
forget the victims or to forgive what had happened.TPF810FPT Following the funeral, one of those 
present expressed his concerns to certain senior Serb officials, including the local MUP 
chief that Karadžić’s inflammatory words might lead to violence against Muslim detainees 
at Sušica camp. That same night, three MUP officers arrived at the camp with a bus, 
removed all 140 to 150 inmates in four loads, and killed them. The massacre was reported 
to the Vlasenica crisis staff members, who took no action except to order the dismantling 
of the camp and the concealment of its traces.TPF811FPT  
358. The Chamber concludes that, in total, over 279 Muslims were killed by Serb 
forces in Vlasenica municipality between mid-May and end of September 1992. After the 
take-over of the town of Vlasenica in April 1992, Muslims were dismissed from their jobs 
and subjected to all kinds of discriminatory measures. Serb forces entered many Muslim 
villages and hamlets in the municipality, occasionally encountering armed resistance. They 
destroyed Muslim houses, arrested Muslim civilians, and detained them in seventeen 
facilities where they were often mistreated. Some detainees were forced to leave the 
municipality. On 21 May 1992, 29 detainees in the police station were put on a bus and 
shot by Serb soldiers on the outskirts of the village of Nova Kasaba. On 16 May 1992, 
Serb forces killed approximately 80 people in Zaklopača. A large number of Muslims were 
transferred to and detained at Sušica camp, where about 2,000 to 2,500 Muslims of both 
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genders and all ages passed through during the period of June to September 1992. 
Detainees at Sušica performed forced labour, sometimes at the front lines. Some detainees 
were killed by camp guards or died from mistreatment. A massacre was committed during 
the night of 30 September 1992, when the remaining 140 to 150 detainees at Sušica camp 
were driven out of the camp with buses and executed.  
 
4.2.6 Zvornik 
359. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Zvornik municipality was 48,102 (59 per cent) Muslims, 30,863 (38 per cent) Serbs, 122 
Croats, 1,248 Yugoslavs, and 960 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF812FPT 
360. On 3 April 1992, despite ongoing discussions between representatives of the SDA, 
SDS, and JNA about defence measures to be taken in case of an attack, a long convoy of 
Serbs left Zvornik town.TPF813FPT On 5 April 1992, the Serb TO was mobilized pursuant to an 
order of the Serb crisis staff.TPF814FPT Around this time, paramilitary forces, including the White 
Eagles, the Yellow Wasps and the Red Berets, began to arrive in the municipality. They 
had been invited by Branko Grujić, president of the crisis staff of Zvornik, who later 
became a member of the Zvornik war commission on 17 June 1992 by decision of the 
Bosnian-Serb Presidency.TPF815FPT  
361. On 5 and 6 April 1992, Serb police and paramilitary forces – mainly Arkan’s men 
– erected barricades throughout the municipality, the police was divided along ethnic lines 
pursuant to a dispatch of Momčilo Mandić, and Serb members of the Zvornik SJB 
relocated to Karakaj, where the Serb crisis staff was located. During the night of the 7 
April, the SDA also erected barricades, on the bridge linking Zvornik to Serbia.TPF816FPT  
362. When shooting broke out on 8 April 1992, the barricades were temporarily taken 
down, allowing hundreds of Muslims and Serbs to leave the municipality.TPF817FPT The Serb 
civilians had been informed of a plan to have them killed, and some were forced by Serb 
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paramilitaries to abandon their homes.TPF818FPT That same day, a combination of Serb forces – 
the police, the TO, the JNA, and Arkan’s men – launched an attack against Zvornik 
town,TPF819FPT which originated, at least partially, from inside Serbia.TPF820FPT Many civilians were 
killed during the attack, and Zvornik town was taken over by the Serb forces within a day. 
The Serbian flag was hoisted on top of the main town mosque. On 10 April, Arkan’s men 
looted houses in Zvornik town and piled dozens of dead bodies – including the bodies of 
children, women, and elderly persons – onto trucks. More dead bodies lay in the streets and 
outside houses [A18.1]. As a result of the take-over, many Muslims withdrew to the nearby 
deserted village of Kula Grad, which was also attacked and taken over by paramilitaries 
and local police on 26 April.TPF821FPT  
363. After the attack on Zvornik town, Witness 583, a member of a humanitarian 
organization, saw a group of thousands of Muslims who had sought refuge in a close-by 
valley. Among the group were wounded persons, as well as the bodies of those who had 
died. The witness left the valley in order to organize a convoy of vehicles to take the 
displaced persons to a safer place, however when the transport vehicles returned, the 
Muslims had moved on. Some of the group reached Tuzla a few days later.TPF822FPT 
364. On 10 April 1992, the provisional government of Zvornik instructed all persons 
with tenancy rights in socially owned apartments, as well as all owners of immovable 
property including private houses and businesses, to return and lay claim to those 
properties before 15 May, or face loss of title to the municipality.TPF823FPT On 5 May, the 
provisional government established a “real estate exchange agency” authorized to execute 
exchanges of real estate between residents of Zvornik municipality and other 
municipalities.TPF824FPT 
365. By late April 1992, Serb authorities had taken control of the Muslim village of 
Đulići in Zvornik municipality, and the villagers surrendered their weapons to Serb forces. 
 
TP
817
PT P944 (Witness 674 statement), p. 7; P716 (Hadžiefendić statement), pp. 2-3. 
TP
818
PT Witness 583, T. 6756-7; Witness 680, T. 15193-5. 
TP
819
PT Mehinagić, T. 12617-18, 12702, 12704, 12705; P644 (Mehinagić statement), pp. 13, 16; P653 (Letter, 23 
March 1992); P655 (List of payments); P763.C, tab 77 (Report of Zvornik SJB, January 1993), p. 16; 
P763.C, tab 23 (MUP report, January 1993), p. 5. 
TP
820
PT Witness 583, T. 6759, 6910; Witness 165, T. 15730-1; P944 (Witness 674 statement), p. 7-8; P860 
(Witness 165 statement), p. 3. 
TP
821
PT Witness 682, T. 16864; P718 (Witness 654 statement), pp. 3-4; P716 (Hadžiefendić statement), p. 3; 
P763.C, tab 77 (Report of Zvornik SJB, January 1993), p. 16; P763.C, tab 23 (MUP Report, January 1993), 
p. 5; Witness 583, T. 6758-9, 6896, 6910, 6990-1; P857 (Tokača report); P944 (Witness 674 statement), p. 8. 
TP
822
PT Witness 583, T. 6759-62; P857 (Tokača report). 
TP
823
PT P529, tab 362 (Decision by Zvornik provisional government, 10 April 1992), arts 1-2. 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 4 
 Municipality crimes 
 
 
138 
In order to remain employed, Muslims had to sign a pledge of loyalty to the Serb 
authorities.TPF825FPT Also in late April or early May, Serb forces demanded the surrender of the 
Muslim village of Divič. However, before the deadline for surrender had expired, Divič 
was attacked by Serb forces consisting of Arkan’s men, White Eagles, and reserve police 
officers. About 1,000 Muslims fled towards the nearby village of Jošanica. When some of 
them attempted to return later in May, they were turned away by Serb forces. Around 28 
May, between 400 and 500 Muslims from Divič village, including women, children, and 
elderly persons, were forced onto buses by members of the Yellow Wasps and told that 
they would be taken to Muslim territory. In Crni Vrh, the captives were released and 
allowed to depart on foot. TP F826FPT The same day, Major Svetozar Andrić, commander of the 
VRS 1st Birač Brigade, ordered the Zvornik TO to organise and co-ordinate the moving 
out of the Muslim population with municipalities through which they would pass. Only 
women and children would be moved out, while men fit for military service were to be 
placed in camps for exchange.TPF827FPT In early June, Serbs were seen moving into the villages in 
Zvornik municipality where Muslims had been evicted. Some of them had been ordered to 
do so by the provisional government of the Serb municipality of Zvornik.TPF828FPT 
366. By the end of May 1992, a large number of Muslim villagers gathered in the 
Muslim-majority village of Kozluk fearing paramilitaries and Serb forces who harassed 
them with demands to surrender arms. After the take-over of Zvornik town, paramilitary 
groups and local Serbs had set up barricades in nearby villages and isolated Kozluk. The 
police force in the village was split into Muslim and Serb parts. In the beginning of June, 
Muslim police officers in Kozluk were forced to surrender their uniforms and weapons to a 
Serb police officer. On the night of 20 June, the Serb TO under the command of Marko 
Pavlović attacked Kozluk. On 26 June, a large number of Serb soldiers, TO, and 
paramilitary units entered Kozluk in tanks and other military vehicles. Among the group 
were Branko Grujić, president of the Zvornik SDS and crisis staff, Pavlović, and Jovan 
Mijatović, a member of the Zvornik crisis staff and a deputy to the Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly. They informed the Muslims that they had one hour to leave, or they would be 
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killed. They also told them that they could not take any personal belongings with them, and 
forced them to sign statements surrendering their property. On the same day, a convoy of 
vehicles organized by the Serbs who had attacked and taken over Kozluk transported 
approximately 1,800 persons out of the municipality to Serbia.TPF829FPT  
367. Most of the nineteen Muslim monuments in Zvornik municipality had been 
damaged or completely destroyed through shelling or explosives during the attacks on 
Muslim villages in April and May 1992.TPF830FPT According to the Zvornik SJB’s own reports, 
during the same period the Serb police engaged in house searches and interrogations of 
Muslims on a massive scale, accusing the Muslims of having “prepared the liquidation of 
Serbs”.TPF831FPT Many were detained in various locations in the municipality. For example, the 
Serb police, Arkan’s men, and the White Eagles detained Muslims in the Alhos factory in 
the Karakaj area of Zvornik town, [C34.18] where the Muslims were extensive mistreated. 
On 9 April 1992, Witness 674 was interrogated and beaten by Branko Grujić, and 
approximately eighteen other Muslim detainees were killed by Arkan’s men that same day 
or soon thereafter.TPF832FPT 
368. Around the end of April 1992, several Muslim men were detained at the Standard 
factory [C34.5, C34.19] in Karakaj, guarded by local Serbs. Around 10 May, they were 
moved by the Serb police to the Ekonomija factory, also in Karakaj, where a lot of Muslim 
men were already detained [C34.9]. Some time later, they were moved again, to the Novi 
Izvor factory, guarded by the reserve police [C34.1, C34.2]. This detention centre received 
another 186 Muslim detainees from Divič village on 27 May 1992. Armed groups, 
including members of paramilitaries from Serbia, frequently visited those three detention 
centres and severely mistreated the detainees. One detainee died in the Ekonomija factory 
[B21.1]. TPF833FPT 
369. On 30 May 1992, about 150 Muslim men, women, and children from the village of 
Kostijerevo in Zvornik municipality were arrested by JNA soldiers. They were taken to 
Dom Kulture in Drinjače [C34.23], where they were guarded by the JNA. Muslim 
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detainees from other villages in the municipality were also brought there, although all 
women and children were soon released. The male detainees who remained were beaten by 
the guards and by Arkan’s men. Soon after the arrival of the detainees, a unit of White 
Eagles took them out in groups of ten and shot them dead. In total, 88 people, including 
family members of Witness 654, were killed at Dom Kulture [A18.3]. TPF834FPT 
370. In late May 1992, Muslim representatives met with local Serbs, including a 
member of the Zvornik provisional government, to discuss the removal of Muslims from 
the municipality. A group of approximately 3,000 Muslim men, women, and children left 
in fear for their safety. On 1 June 1992, soon after the group had set off, Serb soldiers 
separated out men fit for military service from the column, and took the women, children, 
and elderly to Muslim-controlled territory.TPF835FPT The men were taken, together with other 
Muslim men captured in the village of Klisa on the same day, to the Karakaj technical 
school [C34.10], where they were detained in a workshop building. The facility was 
guarded by Serb soldiers. Within hours of arriving at the school, approximately 20 
detainees had died from heat stroke and lack of water. Over the course of several days, 
many of the detainees were severely beaten. About 160 detainees were removed in small 
groups and executed by Serb guards. [B21.4]TPF836FPT  
371. On 5 June 1992, a total of 550 detainees from the Karakaj technical school, 
including Witness 571, were taken in a lorry to a cinema hall in Pilića [C34.12]. From 
there Witness 571 together with another 63 men was taken to Gero’s slaughterhouse in 
Karakaj [C34.13]. Guards in JNA uniform forced the men to face the wall and shot them 
dead. The witness, who managed to escape the execution, saw two more buses arrive at the 
slaughterhouse. A total of 190 men were executed [B21.5].TPF837FPT 
372. From late May 1992 onwards, Muslims were detained in the Dom Kulture 
building in Čelopek village [C34.8] and subjected to severe physical and psychological 
abuse. In early June, a paramilitary group from Serbia assaulted the detainees with spiked 
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metal bars and chains. Some detainees were forced to beat each other, and three were 
murdered by the guards. The Yellow Wasps, headed by the Vučković brothers, Repić and 
Žućo, arrived at the Dom Kulture on 11 June and killed at least five detainees. One man 
had his ear cut off, others had their fingers cut off, and at least two men were sexually 
mutilated. Repić’s men forced detainees to eat the severed body parts, killing two detainees 
who could not bring themselves to do so. On 27 June, Repić returned to the Dom Kulture 
alone and shot 20 detainees dead and wounded 22 others [B21.3]. In mid July, the 
remaining detainees were transferred, with the assistance from the Serb municipal 
authorities of Zvornik, to Batković camp in Bijeljina municipality.TPF838FPT 
373. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly 
Muslim civilians at thirteen detention centres in Zvornik municipality in 1992, namely the 
Orahovac CS headquarters [C34.3], a prison near Novi Izvor [C34.4], the Zvornik prison 
[C34.6], the SUP [C34.7], the Zvornik town police station [C34.11], the Kneževići school 
[C34.14], a clay factory in Karakaj [C34.15], an administration building entrance [C34.17], 
the Hladnjača refrigeration plant [C34.20], the youth village [C34.21], the sports hall 
[C34.22], the house of Paša Salihović and elementary school at Liplje [C34.25], and the 
Vidikovac motel [C34.26].TPF839FPT 
374. The Chamber concludes that, in total, approximately 507 Muslim civilians were 
killed by Serb forces in Zvornik municipality from April to June 1992. Dozens were killed 
during the attack on Zvornik town on 8 April 1992 and many left the town in the direction 
of Tuzla. In April and May 1992, Serb forces attacked other villages in Zvornik 
municipality, including Divič. Most of the nineteen Muslim monuments in Zvornik 
municipality were either deliberately damaged or completely destroyed through shelling or 
explosives; Serb paramilitaries looted Muslim houses. The attack on Divič prompted about 
1,000 Muslim villagers to flee. They were not allowed to return to their homes, and 400 to 
500 were forced onto buses by paramilitary units and brought to Crni Vrh. Moreover, Serb 
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soldiers separated a column of approximately 3,000 Muslims who had left in fear of their 
safety, bringing the women, children, and elderly to Muslim-controlled territory, and 
detaining the military-aged men in a hangar in the Karakaj technical school. Serbs detained 
mainly Muslim civilians in 25 detention facilities in Zvornik municipality, where they 
were severely beaten, and large groups executed. A total of 88 detainees were executed by 
Serb paramilitaries in Dom Kulture on 30 May 1992. In the beginning of June 1992, about 
160 detainees in Karakaj school were executed by Serb soldiers, and another 190 detainees 
were transported to Gero’s slaughterhouse and executed there by Serb guards. 
 
4.3 North-western Bosnia-Herzegovina 
4.3.1 Banja Luka 
375. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition in 
Banja Luka municipality was 106,826 (55 per cent) Serbs, 29,026 (15 per cent) Croats, 
28,558 (15 per cent) Muslims, 23,656 Yugoslavs, and 7,626 of other ethnicity.TPF840FPT 
376. The SOS paramilitary group under Nenad Stevandić, a member of the ARK crisis 
staff, operated in Banja Luka municipality in spring and summer of 1992. It included many 
criminals and had links to SJB and CSB officials.TPF841FPT They wore green camouflage 
uniforms with red ribbons marked “SOS”. Although the ARK assembly formally placed 
the SOS under the control of the Banja Luka CSB on or about 29 April 1992, the group 
retained its autonomy after this.TPF842FPT Another paramilitary formation, led by Nikodin Čavić 
from the Serbian Radical Party, was also active in Banja Luka in the summer of 1992. The 
group consisted mostly of volunteers from Serbia.TPF843FPT Witness 458 often observed the SOS 
acting as escorts for SDS leaders such as Radoslav Brđanin. During the republican 
referendum on independence, 29 February and 1 March 1992, the SOS blockaded the 
municipality building in Banja Luka town. On 3 April, the SOS erected checkpoints 
around townTPF844FPT and issued a press statement calling on the president of the municipality to 
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establish a crisis staff in order to pursue several goals of the SOS, including dismissal of 
Banja Luka Corps officers and public utility managers who voted “against Yugoslavia”.  
377. The SOS’s demands were adopted by the SDS. TPF845FPT Upon the establishment of a 
municipal Serb crisis staff in the beginning of April 1992, Predrag Radić, president of the 
crisis staff and a member of the SDS Main Board, announced several measures, including: 
the CSB employees had to pledge loyalty to the Bosnian-Serb Republic or loose their jobs; 
the presidency of the SFRY would be requested to reinforce the JNA’s Banja Luka Corps 
and dismiss or transfer JNA officers who had not voted “for Yugoslavia”; and the directors 
of several public enterprises who pursued “an anti-Serbian policy” would be dismissed. To 
enforce compliance with these orders, mixed patrols of the police, the TO, and the JNA 
were to take over control of the roads from the SOS. TPF846FPT The Banja Luka CSB, pursuant to 
Radić’s demands, set 15 April as the deadline for its staff to pledge loyalty to the Bosnian-
Serb Republic or be suspended. TPF847FPT Witness 144 confirmed that, by early April, all SJBs 
throughout the ARK were cut off from Sarajevo and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, 
and the officers had started wearing the insignia of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF848FPT  
378. From March to October 1992, civilians were killed and frequent attacks carried out 
against businesses and private property owned by Muslims and Croats in Banja Luka 
municipality. Many of these crimes were committed by members of the special police 
detachment of the Banja Luka CSB, VRS soldiers and Serb paramilitaries.TPF849FPT Witness 
Džonlić stated that Serbs in Banja Luka did not need to commit “terrible crimes and 
killings” partly because they were able to gradually and quietly “cleanse” the city.TPF850FPT 
Predrag Radić testified that in 1992 Serbs destroyed mosques in various parts of the ARK 
in order to wipe out traces of the Muslims’ existence.TPF851FPTS S 
379. On 11 May 1992, the ARK crisis staff issued an order confiscating the property of 
able-bodied men aged between 18 and 55 who had left the area and had not immediately 
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returned. This specifically applied to non-Serbs who had fled the territory of the ARK.TPF852FPT 
Before leaving Banja Luka municipality in February 1993, clients of Amir Džonlić, a 
Muslim lawyer, showed him documents stating that they had been dismissed from their 
jobs, sometimes upon direct orders of the ARK crisis staff, because they had failed to 
comply with a mobilization order. Their dismissals meant that they also automatically lost 
their accommodation, as it was common for employers to provide housing for 
employees.TPF853FPT Muslims and Croats in managerial posts were fired by the ARK crisis staff 
irrespective of their responses to the mobilization order.TPF854FPT On 22 June, the ARK crisis 
staff decided that “all executive posts involving a likely flow of information, posts 
involving the protection of public property, that is, all posts important for the functioning 
of economy, may only be held by the personnel of Serbian ethnicity. This refers to all 
socially owned enterprises, joint-stock companies, state institutions, public utilities, 
ministries of interior and the army”.TPF855FPT Employers in Banja Luka were told to evict non-
Serbs from employer-owned apartments in order to make space for families of fallen Serb 
soldiers. Those who attempted to protect non-Serbs in Banja Luka were reprimanded or 
even replaced.TPF856FPT  
380. Between May 1992 and February 1993, many Muslim and Croat civilians were 
leaving Banja Luka each month, out of fear and because they had lost their jobs and 
apartments.TPF857FPT An agency for resettlements, known as “Brđanin’s agency” in reference to 
Radoslav Brđanin, managed all aspects of relocation of the population.TPF858FPT In July and 
August 1992, crowds were seen queuing at the offices of Brđanin’s agency, and busloads 
of people left the municipality for Croatia and other places almost daily.TPF859FPT  
381. During the armed conflict in the ARK between Serb and Muslim-Croat forces from 
April to July 1992, members of the Serb police and the armed forces arrested thousands of 
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Muslims and Croats. According to the information provided by the CSB Banja Luka to the 
Minister of Interior, they were mostly men fit for military service who were divided by the 
police and the Army into three categories: those of security interest to the Bosnian Serbs 
such as participants in the armed conflicts; those who helped to finance arms, supply arms 
or organize armed rebellions against Serbs; and those about whom the Serbs had no 
information and who were to be treated as hostages to be used in exchange for Serb 
citizens.TPF860FPT 
382. From May 1992 onwards, Muslims and Croats civilians in Banja Luka and 
surrounding municipalities were arrested and brought directly or via other detention 
centres in the region, to Manjača camp [C1.4].TPF861FPT When Witness Begić, Witness 565, and 
Witness 633 were transferred with other Muslim detainees from Krings camp in Sanski 
Most municipality to Manjača camp on 7 July, 20 detainees died from injuries or from the 
heat and cramped conditions during this transport [B1.1]. TPF862FPT  
383. The number of detainees at Manjača at any one time between June and December 
1992 varied from several hundred to over 3,000. The majority were Muslims.TPF863FPT The 
detainees lived in cramped and extremely unhygienic conditions and received little food 
and water. Some witnesses suffered extreme weight loss during their detention.TPF864FPT The 
Serb guards, and other individuals allowed into the camp, singled out detainees for beating 
every night.TPF865FPT An UNPROFOR report of 4 July 1992 described the treatment of Muslims 
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in Manjača camp as “atrocious, with regular beatings, deprivation of food and water, [and] 
poor shelter”.TPF866FPT  
384. The Muslim lawyer Amir Džonlić visited Manjača camp with members of a local 
human rights organization in late May or early June 1992. Predrag Radić, General Momir 
Talić, commander of the VRS 1st Krajina Corps, and Lieutenant Colonel Božidar Popović, 
head of Manjača camp, explained to Džonlić that the camp was under the control of the 
VRS 1st Krajina Corps, and that almost all the detainees were prisoners of war. Popović 
admitted that food at the camp was insufficient. Džonlić observed one of the stables in the 
camp, which held 350 to 400 detainees aged between 15 and 70 years, all in civilian 
clothing. He observed that some detainees bore signs of beatings, including blood stains, 
and were moaning. Džonlić was allowed to speak to five or six detainees, who said that the 
detainees at the camp were starving, and that others had been beaten with wooden sticks 
and cables, on some occasions to death, by officers on duty and camp guards. The 
detainees denied having been engaged in combat, although one stated that 300 bona fide 
prisoners of war were indeed being held at the camp. The delegation was able to obtain the 
release of 100 to 120 detainees who were elderly, minor, sick, and clerics, through the 
command of the VRS 1st Krajina Corps.TPF867FPT 
385. Atif Džafić, the Muslim police commander in Ključ municipality, was detained in 
Manjača camp from 7 June to 16 December 1992, and confirmed that, apart from a few 
HVO soldiers confined to the camp’s infirmary, there were no members of the armed 
forces among the detainees.TPF868FPT Witness Asim Egrlić, an SDA member and president of 
Ključ municipality executive board, was arrested on 28 May and taken to the police station 
in Ključ, where he was severely beaten. In mid June, he was sent on to Manjača camp and 
detained for months. He was tortured, beaten, humiliated and deprived of food and 
water.TPF869FPT 
386. Adil Draganović, president of the Sanski Most municipal court, was transferred to 
Manjača camp from a Sanski Most detention centre on 17 June 1992. Upon arrival at 
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Manjača, Draganović and other detainees had to pass through a gauntlet of military police 
officers who beat them with wooden bats and cursed their “balija mothers”. Draganović 
was first held in a stable with many other detainees in very poor conditions, and later sent 
to a cell with seven or eight other detainees. His valuables were stolen by the guards and he 
was forced to lie on the concrete floor. The detainees were regularly beaten by Serb police 
officers who were allowed into the camp at night.TPF870FPT When Draganović was returned to the 
stable, it was cramped and unhygienic, with excrement and urine everywhere. The witness 
lost 26 kilograms during his first month in Manjača. He witnessed some detainees beat to 
death by the Serb guards [B1.2].TPF871FPT On one occasion, Draganović saw eight detainees 
killed outside the camp’s entrance as they were being taken off buses arriving from 
Prijedor.TPF872FPT This incident was also described by Witness 26 and Witness 305, who saw 
police in black uniform kill three of the detainees arriving from Prijedor [B1.4].TPF873FPT The 
commander of the camp, who was not in charge of the police, managed to halt further 
executions of detainees by the police.TPF874FPT Another three detainees, after having been 
transported from Omarska camp in Prijedor to Manjača camp in August 1992, died of 
suffocation when the heat was turned on and the prisoners had to spend the night inside the 
bus [B1.4].TPF875FPT 
387. On 22 June 1992, Witness Osman Selak, a Muslim officer in the JNA and later the 
VRS, was present at a meeting at which General Talić was informed by a representative of 
a Muslim organization that civilians were detained in inadequate conditions at Manjača 
camp and were being ill-treated. To Selak’s knowledge, Talić never had the matter 
investigated.TPF876FPT At the end of June 1992, Manjača camp was, however, inspected by an 
official delegation consisting of SDS representatives, military and police officials, and both 
the “Muslim” Red Cross and the Serbian Red Cross. Omer Filipović, former deputy 
president of Ključ municipality who was being detained at Manjača, told the delegation 
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that none of the detainees had been captured in combat and described the living conditions 
at the camp. No other detainee was allowed to speak afterwards, and the delegation left.TPF877FPT 
388. On 14 July 1992, the ICRC visited Manjača camp. Witness 565, a Muslim resident 
of Sanski Most municipality who had been taken to Manjača camp with 60 other detainees 
on 7 July 1992, showed an ICRC doctor his wounds from beatings. Once the inspection 
staff left, he was called out and beaten by three Serb guards. After the visit, children and 
elderly persons were removed from the camp, and detainees were permitted to write to 
their families and to receive food packets once a week. The ICRC returned to the camp on 
several occasions, and the conditions of detention gradually improved from late August.TPF878FPT  
389. In July and August 1992, Serb authorities appear to have taken a greater interest in 
the camp. For example, a delegation of officials from Banja Luka including Stojan 
Župljanin (head of CSB Banja Luka) visited Manjača camp at the end of July 1992.TPF879FPT On 
two occasions in late July and early August, the VRS 1st Krajina Corps reported to the 
VRS Main Staff that sanitary conditions at Manjača camp were poor and water was not 
available in sufficient quantity.TPF880FPT On 6 August, a colonel of the VRS 1st Krajina Corps 
sent the Prijedor SJB chief a letter advising him that the number of detainees in Manjača 
camp that could not be properly characterized as prisoners of war was “quite large” and 
urged him to organize their release.TPF881FPT At a meeting on 22 August, where the camp 
commander and a major of the 1st Krajina Corps were present, a “list of 92 persons for 
whom there is no evidence that they carried out – participated in combat activities and who 
have serious health problems and attract the attention of journalists and the representatives 
of humanitarian organisations because of their physical appearance” was considered.TPF882FPT On 
22 August, Župljanin ordered that detainees at Manjača camp whose detention “could not 
be confirmed by any material evidence” be released. TPF883FPT 
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390. Manjača camp was not closed until 16 December 1992. Some detainees were 
transferred, under the auspices of ICRC, to Croatia, some were transferred to Batković 
camp in Bijeljina, and some were released.TPF884FPT  
391. In addition to Manjača camp, Serb authorities detained mostly Muslim and Croat 
civilians at seven detention centres in Banja Luka municipality in 1992, namely Banja 
Luka (Tunjice) prison [C1.1], the CSB building [C1.2], Mali Logor (the military 
investigation centre) [C1.3], a sports hall [C1.5], the Kozara barracks [C1.6], Kaštel 
[C1.7], and the old Army Camp [C1.8].TPF885FPT  
392. The Chamber concludes that, in the period March to October 1992, in total, over 31 
Muslims and Croats were killed by Serb forces in Banja Luka municipality. Frequent 
attacks were carried out against businesses and private property owned by Muslims and 
Croats. From April or May 1992 onwards, Serb forces arrested thousands of Muslims and 
Croats in Banja Luka municipality and brought many of them to Manjača camp. Detainees 
at Manjača camp were severely mistreated, and some were beaten to death. The conditions 
in Manjača camp were very harsh and only improved after visits by national and 
international delegations. Eight other detention centres were operating in Banja Luka 
municipality in 1992. The Chamber further finds that, from May 1992 onwards, many 
Muslims and Croats left Banja Luka out of fear and due to unbearable circumstances. An 
agency for resettlement managed all the aspects of relocation. In July and August 1992, 
busloads of people left the municipality for Croatia and other destinations almost daily.  
 
4.3.2 Bosanska Krupa 
393. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Bosanska Krupa municipality was 43,104 (74 per cent) Muslims, 13,841 (24 per cent) 
Serbs, 139 Croats, 708 Yugoslavs, and 528 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF886FPT 
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394. Around March 1992, the SDS created its own police force in the municipality and 
demanded the division of Bosanska Krupa into Serb and Muslim areas. Members of the 
police in the areas claimed by the Serbs were asked to pledge loyalty to the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic.TPF887FPT 
395. On 18 April 1992, at a meeting of the municipal political parties, Miroslav Vještica, 
the local SDS president who was also a member of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, stated that 
he would exert influence on the “top” so that Bosanska Krupa would not be attacked, but 
only if the Muslims agreed to Serb claims to the right bank of the Una river.TPF888FPT The next 
day, the Serbs unilaterally proclaimed Bosanska Krupa a Serb municipality.TPF889FPT On 20 
April, Serb soldiers from Sanski Most, armed with automatic weapons, anti-aircraft 
weapons, mortars, and artillery were seen around Bosanska Krupa town. TPF890FPT Serb 
paramilitaries, similarly armed with JNA weapons, and apparently under the control of 
Gojko Kličković, were seen near the Muslim village of Arapuša on the same day.TPF891FPT On 19 
and 20 April, Serb civilians were seen leaving Bosanska Krupa town.TPF892FPT  
396. On 21 April 1992, the Serbs issued an ultimatum over the radio requiring all 
Muslims to relocate to the left bank of the Una river, thus ordering the division of the 
municipality along ethnic lines. On that day, Serb forces attacked the town.TPF893FPT Serb 
paramilitaries shelled the town with mortars from surrounding hills.TPF894FPT Heavy shelling and 
sniper fire was directed against certain buildings, in particular the police station. Resistance 
was organized by members of the police and the Patriotic League.TPF895FPT Witness 19 saw the 
municipal building shelled by Serb forces, and Serb soldiers burning and looting Muslim 
houses.TPF896FPT Resistance in Bosanska Krupa town lasted four days, during which time most of 
the Muslim residents fled. The witness attended the funerals of twelve civilians killed in 
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the shelling. Their dead bodies had been lying in the streets for fifteen days [A2.1]. TPF897FPT The 
Chamber is not in a position to assess the circumstances of their death. Also on 21 April 
1992, Witness 19 saw Serb paramilitaries attack the Muslim village of Arapuša, after 
initially being held off by Gojko Kličković while negotiations were underway. Some 
villagers were killed and the rest were expelled.TPF898FPT The Chamber is not in a position to 
assess the circumstances surrounding the deaths of these villagers and, in particular, 
whether they were taking active part in the hostilities at the time of their death.  
397. Witness 34, a Muslim civilian, was arrested on 23 April 1992 and detained at 
Jasenica school [C4.1]. The detainees, including the witness, were regularly and severely 
beaten by visiting members of two Serb paramilitary units, the Suha Rebra and Šešelj’s 
men.TPF899FPT In May 1992, the witness was transferred with other detainees to the Petar Kočić 
school [C4.2]. Hygienic conditions at this site were poor. Members of the Serb police, who 
guarded the school, regularly beat and mistreated the detainees, occasionally applying 
electric shocks.TPF900FPT The witness heard the shooting of eleven detainees in a room adjacent to 
where he was detained. A member of the local TO, whom the witness knew, carried out the 
executions.TPF901FPT Another five detainees were killed in this school while the witness was 
detained there [B2.1].TPF902FPT On 21 May 1992, Witness 34 and 20 other detainees were taken 
to Kamenica camp, in Drvar municipality. In the course of his detention, he and his fellow 
Muslim detainees were forced to dig trenches at front lines.TPF903FPT 
398. On 23 April 1992, Witness 19, a Muslim employee of the Bosanska Krupa 
municipal authority, and 35 others, including some Serbs, were arrested by local Serb 
reservists and taken by bus to Jasenica school. A commission separated them into groups 
of soldiers, civilians, and political prisoners. The next day, he was transferred with 76 
civilians to Arapuša village. The detainees were held in the houses of Muslims. They were 
guarded by Serb military units from Donji Petrovac and Gornji Petrovac.TPF904FPT Paramilitary 
forces terrorized the detainees, beating them and looting their property.TPF905FPT During his 
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detention in Arapuša, Witness 19 saw the paramilitaries kill a young pregnant woman on 
27 or 28 April.TPF906FPT On 28 April 1992, Gojko Kličković, who had become president of the 
Bosanska Krupa war presidency, ordered the commanders of three battalions of the 1st 
Podgrmeč Brigade to immediately “evacuate Muslim population” from the territory under 
their control. He wrote that the war presidency was “unable to guarantee safety to the 
Muslim population” and the evacuation of several villages, including Arapuša, was 
considered necessary.TPF907FPT Pursuant to this order, on 1 May 1992 the executive committee of 
Arapuša commune, jointly with the local “refugee committee” and the “battalion 
command”, issued instructions for the evacuation of all Arapuša residents and refugees, 
460 people in total.TPF908FPT On 1 May 1992, the witness was transferred with 460 others to the 
village of Fajtovići in Sanski Most municipality, where 1,200 persons were already 
detained.TPF909FPT 
399. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians at three other detention centres in Bosanska Krupa in 1992, namely 
Suvaj elementary school [C4.4], Gorinja elementary school [C4.5], and Arapuša 
elementary school [C4.6].TPF910FPT 
400. On 22 May 1992, the Bosanska Krupa war presidency issued an ordered to the SJB 
and the military police “To evacuate the remaining Muslim population from the territory” 
of the Serb municipality of Bosanska Krupa.TPF911FPT Three days later, it “proposed” to the 
command of the 1st Podgrmeč Brigade to prepare for a “mop-up” of the left bank of the 
Una river. As part of the mop-up, as many dwellings and other buildings as possible were 
to be destroyed and devastated. The purpose of this proposal was to “undermine enemy 
morale and provoke fear and panic”.TPF912FPT Four Muslim and Catholic monuments in Bosanska 
Krupa were heavily damaged or completely destroyed through fire or explosions during 
1992. This included the Catholic Church [D2.2] in the Bosanska Krupa town, which was 
destroyed by Serb forces in May 1992.TPF913FPT  
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401. A May 1993 MUP report indicates that 43,300 Muslims, 143 Croats, 4,760 Serbs, 
and 256 persons of other ethnicity had moved out of the municipality that was now 
referred to as “Krupa na Uni”. TPF914FPT  
402. The Chamber concludes that seventeen Muslims and Croats were killed by Serb 
forces in Bosanska Krupa municipality in May 1992. Serb forces shelled Bosanska Krupa 
town on 21 April and burned and looted Muslim houses. They also deliberately destroyed 
religious monuments in the municipality. Mainly Muslim and Croat civilians were held in 
five detention centers where they were regularly and severely beaten by members of Serb 
paramilitary units visiting the detention centres. Occasionally, electric shocks were 
applied, and some Muslim detainees were forced to dig trenches at front lines. The 
Chamber finds that by May 1992, most of the Muslims had left the right bank of the Una 
river out of fear and due to unbearable circumstances, and that eventually almost all 
Muslims moved out the municipality. 
 
4.3.3 Bosanski Novi 
403. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Bosanski Novi was: 25,101 (60 per cent) Serbs, 14,040 (34 per cent) Muslims, 403 (1 per 
cent) Croats, 1,557 Yugoslavs, and 564 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF915FPT 
404. In mid April 1992, the newly appointed Serb police chief dismissed all Muslim 
police officers in Bosanski Novi because they refused to sign an oath of loyalty to the Serb 
authorities. The remaining police officers were issued with a new camouflage uniform with 
a Serb flag on the epaulette. Muslims who worked in companies in Bosanski Novi 
municipality also lost their jobs.TPF916FPT 
405. In the Muslim village of Suhača, discussions with SDS representatives from the 
village of Jošova about the handover of Muslim weapons began in late March 1992. The 
Muslims decided to surrender their firearms to the Serbs in late April. Soon after, the 
villagers were instructed to go to a field in Jošova, where they had to wait while Serb 
soldiers searched Suhača for any remaining weapons. Nothing was found. Three days after 
the search, Serb forces attacked Suhača with artillery for an unspecified period of time. 
 
TP
914
PT P892, tab 100 (List of citizens, May 1993), pp. 5-6. 
TP
915
PT P954 (Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991 census, April 1995), pp. 66-9. 
TP
916
PT P467.A (Hamdija Krupić statement), p. 7; P468 (Hasan Alić statement), pp. 2-3. 
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Exits to the village were barricaded, making it impossible to escape. Serb soldiers burnt 
houses in the village and the surrounding hillsTPF917FPT and destroyed two village mosques 
[D3.11, D3.10]. TPF918FPT 
406. Around 9 May 1992, the Bosanski Novi crisis staff under Radomir Pašić issued an 
ultimatum over Bosanski Novi radio for Muslims in the municipality to hand in their 
weapons within 24 hours.TPF919FPT In the following days, Serb forces launched an attack on 
Blagaj Japra using heavy artillery which had been positioned around the village 
beforehand. Shells were fired into the village for two days and JNA soldiers shot and 
wounded civilians.TPF920FPT Several houses and the mosque were damaged in the shelling 
[D3.6]. TPF921FPT Around the same time, there was shooting in the town of Bosanski Novi, and the 
entire Muslim population of the Urije and Prekosanje neighbourhoods were taken by 
soldiers in JNA uniforms to the Đuro Radmanović school and detained there for a few 
days.TPF922FPT The mosques in Urije and Prekosanje were destroyed [D3.2, D3.3]. TPF923FPT From May 
1992 on, SDA members in the town of Bosanski Novi were taken away for interrogation at 
the Bosanski Novi hotel, the police station [C5.11], and the fire department, [C5.7] where 
they were badly beaten.TPF924FPT  
407. During May 1992, other Muslim villages in the Japra valley such as Hozići and 
Agići were attacked and houses were set alight.TPF925FPT Mosques in those villages, including the 
wooden mosque in Blagaj Rijeka [D3.9], were destroyed.TPF926FPT On 24 May, Serb units forced 
the entire Muslim population in the Japra valley, which included villagers from Gornji 
Agići, Hozići, and Suhača, as well as from Donji Agići, Dedići, Dolovljani, Crna Rijeka, 
Ekići, and Maslovare, to move to the village of Blagaj Japra. Serb soldiers told Muslims in 
Suhača that they had to leave as their safety could no longer be ensured. The operation was 
completed in the course of two days. Houses were looted and burnt after villagers started 
 
TP
917
PT Witness 44, T. 2676-7, 2682, 2684, 2711-14, 2718-19, 2720; P97 (Witness 44 statement), paras 1, 12, 15, 
17; Midho Alić, T. 2518; P76 (Midho Alić statement), para. 25; P763.C, tab 49 (Report from Bosanski Novi 
SJB, 15 August 1992), pp. 1, 3. 
TP
918
PT Midho Alić, T. 2491, 2518; Witness 44, T. 2706. 
TP
919
PT Midho Alić, T. 2491, 2508-10, 2590; P468 (Hasan Alić statement), p. 4; D115 (Report Bosanski Novi 
crisis staff), p. 3. 
TP
920
PT Midho Alić, T. 2509, 2512; P468 (Hasan Alić statement), p. 4; P468.B (Hasan Alić statement), p. 2; P97 
(Witness 44 statement), paras 24-5; Witness 44, T. 2725. 
TP
921
PT P468 (Hasan Alić statement), p. 4; P468.B (Hasan Alić statement), p. 2; Midho Alić, T. 2491, 2496, 2514-
17; P79 (Photograph).  
TP
922
PT Purić, T. 26996-8; Delić, T. 26333-8, 26340-2, 26391-2, 26398-9. 
TP
923
PT Witness 44, T. 2704. 
TP
924
PT Purić, T. 26990, 26999-700; Delić, T. 26369, 26393. 
TP
925
PT Midho Alić, T. 2502, 2518, 2521; P78 (Map of Japra valley); P76 (Midho Alić statement), paras 25-6, 29.  
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moving out. A kilometre-long convoy of people driving from the settlements towards 
Bosanski Novi town was stopped in the village of Blagaj by Serb military police in JNA 
uniform.TPF927FPT Serb soldiers directed some of the Muslims to settle in private houses in Blagaj 
Japra which, as one witness who had 29 of the displaced Muslims living in his house 
testified, became like a prison camp. The presence of armed Serb patrols meant that the 
Muslims could not go anywhere [C5.3].TPF928FPT According to Radomir Pašić, the crisis staff 
could not control the situation and stop crimes that were being committed by paramilitary 
groups in the mentioned villages.TPF929FPT Despite this, Pašić took action to remove Muslims out 
of the municipality. 
408. On 26 May 1992, Charles Kirudja, the UN civil coordinator in Sector North, a UN 
protected area in Croatia adjacent to the north-western border of Bosnia-Herzegovina, met 
with the mayor of Dvor, Jugoslav Borojević, in Croatia. Borojević told Kirudja that 
Radomir Pašić, president of the Bosanski Novi crisis staff, had informed him that about 
5,000 Muslims were voluntarily seeking to leave that municipality and travel through 
Sector North to Slovenia and Austria. When asked why the Muslims wanted to leave, 
Borojević told Kirudja that Bosanski Novi was now part of “a new reality”, that is, the new 
reality of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, and that the Muslims did not wish to recognize this 
new Serb authority. The following day, Kirudja received a delegation from Bosanski Novi, 
which included Radomir Pašić, as well as the chief of police, and a member of the 
municipal executive committee. Pašić informed Kirudja that Muslims in Bosanski Novi 
had come under pressure from armed Serb irregulars to leave the area, largely because 
many Muslims had refused to disarm or to pledge loyalty to the new Serb government. 
According to Pašić, the 5,000 persons who wished to leave Bosanski Novi were at that 
time gathered in Blagaj Japra. They had refused to go to other parts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, fearing that they would be mobilized, and the Bosanski Novi police had 
therefore agreed to escort them to the Croatian border. Pašić requested that UNPROFOR 
see to the transit of the group through Sector North. Kirudja did not believe Pašić’s story, 
 
TP
926
PT Midho Alić, T. 2496, 2514-18. 
TP
927
PT P468 (Hasan Alić statement), pp. 5-6; P468.B (Hasan Alić statement), p. 4; P763.C, tab 49 (Report of 
Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), pp. 1-5; P469.B (Witness 572 transcript), pp. 14128-30; P469 
(Witness 572 statement), p. 4; Witness 44, T. 2685, 2723-5; P97 (Witness 44 statement), paras 20, 24, 27; 
Radomir Pašić, T. 19633-4, 19641, 19754-5, 19758, 19575; D115 (Report of Bosanski Novi crisis staff), pp. 
8-9; Purić, T. 27003-4. 
TP
928
PT P468 (Hasan Alić statement), p. 6. 
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PT Radomir Pašić, T. 19629-35, 19637-40; D115 (Report of Bosanski Novi crisis staff), pp. 8-9. 
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and concluded that the Muslims in question were being forced out of the municipality. He 
therefore refused the request.TPF930FPT 
409. On the night of 31 May 1992, shooting resumed in Bosanski Novi town and some 
Muslim houses, as well as the town mosque [D3.1] and the Vidorije mosque [D3.8] were 
set on fire. The day after, Witness Delić and his brother were arrested by Serb soldiers and 
brought to a huntsman’s lodge where they were force to kneel and face a wall. The Serb 
soldiers forced them to sing Serbian songs and opened fire on the wall around them.TPF931FPT 
From there, they were taken by bus to Mlakve stadium [C5.2] where detainees were 
encircled by Serb soldiers and guards. During the subsequent days, more people were 
brought to the stadium. A small number of people walked to the stadium themselves out of 
fear that they would be found at home and, in the words of Witness Delić, “simply 
disappear”. The witness estimated that approximately 1,000 persons were detained at the 
stadium. They were given little food during the first day of detention, and wives and 
mothers of the detainees brought food in thereafter. The detainees slept on the grass, on the 
bleachers, or in the changing rooms. During the detention, the soldiers called out names of 
detained Muslims and brought them to the police station [C5.11], the fire department 
[C5.7] or Hotel Una [C5.6] for interrogation. The detainees, including Witness Delić, were 
released on 5 June 1992. TPF932FPT 
410. In the beginning of June 1992, there were many rounds of negotiations between 
Muslim representatives, the Serb municipal authorities and international representatives. 
The subject of the negotiations was the departure of Croats and Muslims in a convoy from 
Bosanski Novi. The negotiations took place in Radomir Pašić’s office, in Dvor, twice in 
Witness Emin Purić’s house, and twice on the bridge over the Una river. There was no 
discussion regarding the possibility for people to return.TPF933FPT Purić described these 
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930
PT Kirudja, T. 3088-93, 3095-9, 3110-11, 3234, 3236-9; P125 (UNPROFOR memorandum by Kirudja, 26 
May 1992); P120 (Kirudja statement), pp. 16-17; P126 (UNPROFOR memorandum, 29 May 1992), pp. 3-
54; P129 (UNPROFOR memorandum by Kirudja, 8 June 1992), pp. 1-2; P120 (Kirudja statement), pp. 18-
19; Radomir Pašić, T. 19650, 19653, 19655; D115 (Report of Bosanski Novi crisis staff), p. 9. 
TP
931
PT Delić, T. 26338-9, 26340, 26342-4. 
TP
932
PT Delić, T. 26344-7, 26373, 26377, 26396-7; Purić, T. 26995-6; D115 (Report of Bosanski Novi crisis 
staff), pp. 9-10; P529, tab 295 (Report by SJBs in Prijedor, Bosanski Novi and Sanski Most, 18 August 
1992), p. 9; P763.C, tab 49 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), pp. 1-5; P96 (Report of 
Bosanski Novi public security station, 15 August 1992), p. 2; Kirudja, T. 3117-18; P131 (UNPROFOR 
Memorandum by Kirudja, 6 June 1992); P120 (Kirudja statement), p. 21; T. 3104-5; P128 (UNPROFOR 
Memorandum by Thornberry, 6 June 1992); P129 (UNPROFOR memorandum by Kirudja, 8 June 1992), p. 
2. 
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PT Delić, T. 26331-3, 26349-52, 26354, 26356, 26364, 26367, 26393; D116.A (Photograph). 
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“negotiations” as a desperate attempt for help to “leave this hell in Bosanski Novi where 
we were under siege”.TPF934FPT  
411. On 8 June 1992, the Bosanski Novi crisis staff issued an ultimatum to the 4,000 
Muslims who had been forcibly gathered in Blagaj Japra since 24 May. They were told to 
leave the municipality in the direction of Banja Luka with the help of the crisis staff and 
the Red Cross, otherwise the crisis staff would not be able to provide for their security.TPF935FPT 
The next day, the Muslims in Blagaj Japra were driven out of the houses where they were 
staying by Serb soldiers firing weapons. TPF936FPT Some civilians were wounded.TPF937FPT Muslims 
forced to congregate at the Blagaj Japra bridge were stripped of their valuables by the 
military police before being taken to the Japra factory and detained [C5.1]. At one stage, a 
Serb soldier took three men out of the crowd and shot them dead. More such killings 
followed. Some of the people identified from an exhumation of mass graves in the Blagaj 
Japra area which contained 69 bodies were killed on this occasion [A3.1]. TPF938FPT  
412. Also on 9 June 1992, 25 to 30 Muslims were detained by Serb soldiers at an 
elementary school in Blagaj Japra [C5.8] before being ordered to go to the Japra factory.TPF939FPT 
Some of the Muslims detained at the factory were robbed and the men were separated from 
the women and children. TPF940FPT Members of the TO and military police then loaded all of the 
Muslims at the factory into train cars, by this time numbering approximately 4,000, and 
sent them towards Doboj with members of the SJB providing security. The group was, 
however, returned to Bosanski Novi where the Muslims were detained at the Mlakve 
stadium [C5.2].TPF941FPT  
413. A report of the Bosanski Novi SJB noted that none of the approximately 700 
military-aged men subsequently placed in Mlakve stadium by the TO were of security 
interest from the SJB’s point of view, and that the SJB played no role in their detention.TPF942FPT 
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934
PT Purić, T. 26983. 
TP
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PT P529, tab 426 (Announcement by Bosanski Novi crisis staff, 8 June 1992). 
TP
936
PT P468 (Hasan Alić statement), pp. 5-6; P468.B (Hasan Alić statement), p. 4. 
TP
937
PT P97 (Witness 44 statement), paras 24-5; Witness 44, T. 2725. 
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938
PT P97 (Witness 44 statement), paras 25, 27-35; Witness 44, T. 2689-91; P95 (Record of exhumation in 
Bosanski Novi, 28 October 1998), p. 3; P857 (Tokača report). 
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939
PT P76 (Midho Alić statement), paras 28-9; Midho Alić, T. 2497, 2499, 2522, 2524, 2528.  
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940
PT Midho Alić, T. 2497, 2592-7; P468 (Hasan Alić statement), pp. 5-6; P468.B (Hasan Alić statement), p. 4. 
TP
941
PT Midho Alić, T. 2527-8, 2530, 2499; P76 (Midho Alić statement), paras 42-3; P96 (Report of Bosanski 
Novi public security station, 15 August 1992), pp. 2-3; P97 (Witness 44 statement), paras 36-43; P763.C, tab 
49 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), pp. 1-5; Radomir Pašić, T. 19669-74, 19802, 19804-5, 
19817, 19820, 19823-5, 19829; D115 (Report of Bosanski Novi crisis staff), p. 10; Delić, T. 26366, 26377; 
Purić, T. 27004-7; P763.C, tab 49 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), pp. 1-5. 
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The detainees held at Mlakve stadium from 11 June to 27 July 1992 received inadequate 
food and water. Hygienic conditions were poor, with no soap or hot water, and only two 
toilets for the whole group. The detainees slept on tile floors without blankets. For the most 
part, detainees were not harmed by the guards – a mixture of VRS soldiers and military 
police – who protected them from vengeful attacks by other Serbs. One witness suggested 
that this was because the Serbs needed the detainees for exchanges.TPF943FPT On one occasion, 
however, fifteen members of the SDA party were reported to have been separated from the 
rest of the group and taken to the fire station in town [C5.7]. There they were beaten and 
given wooden bats to beat each other. Only six of the men survived the beatings.TPF944FPT 
414. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mainly 
Muslim and Croat civilians in the following detention centres in Bosanski Novi in 1992, 
namely, the police station in Bosanska Kostajnica [C5.4], the Vatrogasno building (fire 
station) [C5.5], the Una hotel [C5.6], a location identified as Suha Međa, [C5.9], and 
private houses [C5.10].TPF945FPT  
415. On 23 June 1992, armed Serbs attacked and entered the Muslim settlement of Alići. 
A group of 27 male villagers were brought to the cemetery and shot dead [A3.2]. TPF946FPT 
416. At the end of June or beginning of July 1992, the Bosanski Novi crisis staff issued 
instructions regulating the conditions for people to be allowed to leave. Persons who did 
not own property had to obtain an official document from the municipal land registry 
office certifying this. Those who owned property were required to draft a contract either 
leaving the property to the Serbs or the Serb state, or simply renouncing it. Persons 
wishing to leave also had to provide a list of all the members of the household, obtain a 
certificate showing that they had no previous convictions, obtain a certificate showing that 
all utility bills were paid; obtain documentation from the municipal secretariat for national 
defence stating that they had completed military service; and obtain a document from the 
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943
PT Witness 44, T. 2693-5; P97 (Witness 44 statement), paras 44-6, 49-50; P96 (Report of Bosanski Novi 
public security station, 15 August 1992), p. 3; Midho Alić, T. 2499, 2533-4; P82 and P83 (Photographs); P76 
(Midho Alić statement), para. 45; P468 (Hasan Alić statement), pp. 8-9; P468.B (Hasan Alić statement), p. 7. 
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PT P468 (Hasan Alić statement), pp. 8-9; P468.B (Hasan Alić statement), p. 7; P857 (Tokača report). 
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PT Malešević, T. 16120-1, 16136-9, 16140-1. 
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PT P469.B (Witness 572 transcript), pp. 14118-19, 14135-40, 14142-7, 14154, 14157; P469.C (Witness 572 
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SJB allowing them to leave. All documents had to state that the action taken was on a 
voluntary basis.TPF947FPT 
417. On 16 July 1992, about 4,000 Muslims lined up in a convoy. Emin Purić led 
negotiations with UNPROFOR, who would not allow the convoy to enter Croatia. After a 
few hours, one of the representatives of the Danish battalion told the convoy that it could 
proceed to Bosanska Dubica where it would be allowed to enter Croatia. The convoy did 
so, headed by Radomir Pašić, but was prevented from entering that municipality and, after 
a few hours, turned towards Bosanska Kostajnica. Once there, the convoy was not allowed 
to cross the bridge over the Una river, so it returned to Bosanski Novi. Once in Bosanski 
Novi, many in the convoy could not return to their homes since Serbs had occupied them 
as soon as the convoy had left, or even before. People therefore stayed in whatever houses 
were available. Sometime between 17 and 23 July 1992, a UNHCR representative arrived 
in Bosanski Novi and informed the Muslims that Croatia had now approved the entry into 
the country. On 23 July 1992, a new convoy of about 9,000 persons lined up, stretching for 
many kilometres, and accompanied by international forces. This convoy included people 
who until then had been detained at Mlakve stadium. A small number of people stayed 
behind, but Witness Delić heard that armed soldiers went door-to-door forcing them to 
leave; in addition, a few buses stayed behind the convoy to bring the remaining people to 
Croatia. Witness Delić stressed that none of the people who left with the convoy did so 
voluntarily, but because of the dreadful situation for Muslims in the municipality. Once 
Muslims left their homes, Serbs started looting or moving into their houses. A couple of 
hundred Muslims still remained in the town of Bosanski Novi after the convoy had left. 
The people in the convoy were taken to the sports hall and the stadium in Karlovac, 
Croatia.TPF948FPT Several weeks later, the Bosanski Novi SJB reported that by 23 July it had 
“deregistered” 5,629 Muslims who had applied to leave the municipality “voluntarily”.TPF949FPT 
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418. Between 12 and 19 August 1992, Charles Kirudja received a further request from 
Radomir Pašić, together with SDS and SDA representatives from Bosanska Kostajnica in 
the north of Bosanski Novi, to “evacuate” 5,000 Muslims from that area. Pašić told Kirudja 
that the Muslims had come to realize that it was impossible for them to live side by side 
with Serbs. The SDA representative explained that Muslims feared reprisals every time 
Serbs were killed at the front line. Despite Pašić’s threat that if the demand to evacuate the 
Muslims were not respected, fatalities might result on both sides, Kirudja refused to 
acquiesce to UNPROFOR’s involvement in a population transfer.TPF950FPT 
419. The Chamber concludes that more than 39 Muslims were killed by Serb forces in 
June 1992. Serb forces attacked a number of Muslim villages in the Japra valley and the 
town of Bosanski Novi, deliberately destroyed houses and mosques, and killed some 
villagers in May 1992. By the end of that month, they forced the Muslim population from 
the villages to gather in the village of Blagaj Japra. In May and June, Muslims were 
arrested and brought to ten detention centres, including Mlakve stadium. Through the 
mentioned acts, as well as pressure exerted on Muslim representatives, the Bosnian-Serb 
municipal authorities sought, and did in fact achieve that large parts of the Muslim 
population left the municipality and the Bosnian-Serb Republic. Convoys carrying of many 
thousands of persons, some of whom had been detained at Mlakve stadium, left the 
municipality and went to Croatia.  
 
4.3.4 Bosanski Petrovac 
420. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Bosanski Petrovac municipality was 11,694 (75 per cent) Serbs, 3,288 (21 per cent) 
Muslims, 48 Croats, 366 Yugoslavs, and 225 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF951FPT 
421. On 24 May 1992, the Bosanski Petrovac crisis staff decided that the SJB, with the 
help of the JNA and the TO, would begin the disarmament of paramilitaries and citizens 
“who illegally possess weapons”.TPF952FPT Muslims were ordered, through the media and from an 
APC driving round the town, to hand in their weapons. TPF953FPT On 27 or 28 May, Muslim 
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houses in town were searched for weapons.TPF954FPT Roadblocks were set up around the 
municipality and the movement of non-Serbs was restricted.TPF955FPT Between April and June, 
the crisis staff dismissed many Muslims in the municipality from their jobs and ordered the 
disconnection of phone lines belonging to Muslim households.TPF956FPT  
422. In the summer of 1992, several dozen unarmed Muslims including women, 
children, and elderly persons were attacked and killed by Serb civilians in the town of 
Bosanski Petrovac without intervention from the civilian police.TPF957FPT A Serb man shot and 
wounded an unarmed Muslim man in the street in Bosanski Petrovac. A military police 
officer handcuffed the Serb man and brought him to the SJB, but the man was set free the 
next day. The military police officer did not file a report on the incident because of what he 
described as the “chaos” at that time and because nobody requested him to do so.TPF958FPT On 
various occasions during the same period, Serb soldiers attacked and burnt Muslim houses 
in the village of Bjelaj, forcing the Muslim villagers to spend the nights in shelters around 
the village.TP F959FPT In the period May through September 1992, four mosques in the 
municipality were blown up [D4.2, D4.3, D4.5].TPF960FPT  
423. On 13 June 1992, the Bosanski Petrovac crisis staff decided to take repressive 
measures against those who illegally armed paramilitaries and civilians.TPF961FPT On 16 June 
1992, the crisis staff decided to detain all individuals who “possess illegal weapons or have 
been registered as Muslim extremists, thus posing a potential threat”. The crisis staff had 
already identified about 40 Muslim “extremists”, most of whom had been found to possess 
illegal weapons.TPF962FPT On 29 June, the crisis staff planned to arrest and bring into custody all 
Muslims fit for military service that were thought to be capable of causing harm to 
Serbs.TPF963FPT  
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424. Around this time, an increasing number of Muslims were detained in Bosanski 
Petrovac.TPF964FPT On 15 June 1992, Serb police arrested Mihdo Družić, a Muslim from 
Bosanski Petrovac, although he had handed in his hunting-rifle, and brought him to the 
SJB [C6.2] where he was detained with about 30 other Muslim men.TPF965FPT On 1 July, the 
group was taken to Kozila camp [C6.1], about 20 kilometers from Bosanski Petrovac. 
There were 80 detainees in the camp, who lived in windowless rooms without hygienic 
facilities. Družić was interrogated and severely mistreated by the commander of the camp 
and the guards until he lost consciousness. Other detainees were subjected to similar 
treatment.TPF966FPT This camp was closed on 21 August, after the ICRC had requested to visit the 
facilities.TPF967FPT Also in June, Mujo Dračić, a Muslim shopkeeper from the village of Bjelaj in 
Bosanski Petrovac municipality, was arrested by four Serb police officers who took him to 
the SJB [C6.2]. He stayed there for three days with approximately 40 other Muslim men in 
very cramped conditions. Most of the detainees were beaten by the police.TPF968FPT 
425. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians at six detention centres in the municipality in 1992, namely the sports 
centre [C6.4], a bus station [C6.5], a hotel [C6.6], Jasikovac [C6.7], Vrtoce [C6.8], and the 
workers’ barracks in Oštrelj [C6.9].TPF969FPT 
426. Serbs in Bosanski Petrovac employed a variety of tactics to instill fear in non-Serbs 
and prompt them to leave.TPF970FPT In July and August 1992, the municipal authorities also asked 
the UNPROFOR, the ICRC, and the UNHCR for assistance in the moving out of Muslims 
from the municipality. These organizations refused, citing ethnic cleansing, and instead 
urged the local authorities to allow people to stay where they wanted.TPF971FPT 
427. On 31 July 1992, the municipal authorities decided to create a commission to 
determine who could leave the municipality. The commission was also to set conditions for 
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those leaving to exchange their property or assign it to the Serb municipality.TPF972FPT On 28 
October, the war presidency of Bosanski Petrovac adopted a decision, stating that “all 
families that have signed contracts on the exchange of flats, houses and other immovable 
property may leave Petrovac Municipality.” Muslim families who had not produced 
exchange contracts were allowed to leave only if they donated all movable and immovable 
property to Bosanski Petrovac.TPF973FPT These decisions left Muslims with no choice but to sign 
over their property to the Serb municipality, receiving nothing in exchange except for a 
written authorization to leave the area.TPF974FPT At least two convoys of Muslims left the 
municipality in September 1992.TPF975FPT 
428. The Chamber finds that in the summer of 1992 several dozen unarmed Muslims 
including women, children, and elderly persons, were killed by Serb civilians in the town 
of Bosanski Petrovac. Between April and June 1992, the crisis staff dismissed many 
Muslims from their jobs and imposed discriminatory measures against them. Mosques 
were deliberately damaged or blown up. In Bosanski Petrovac municipality, many Muslim 
civilians were held in eight detention centers in cramped conditions, where they were often 
subjected to beatings. At least two organized convoys of Muslims left the municipality in 
September 1992. People leaving the municipality had to sign over their property to the 
Serb municipality.  
 
4.3.5 Čelinac 
429. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Čelinac municipality was 16,554 (88 per cent) Serbs, 1,446 (8 per cent) Muslims, 76 
Croats, 377 Yugoslavs, and 260 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF976FPT 
430. Around February 1992, two non-Serb police officers were dismissed from the force. 
Various paramilitary groups arrived at the municipality. The paramilitary groups looted 
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and destroyed houses that belonged to Muslims. Serb soldiers set up barricades close to the 
Muslim part of Čelinac town, restricting the movement of Muslims.TPF977FPT 
431. On 23 July 1992, the war presidency of the municipality adopted a decision 
conferring special status on the non-Serb population in the municipality. According to the 
decision, non-Serbs had the right to live unhindered “within the boundaries of their 
property,” as well as the right to work, health care, pension, and other entitlements 
prescribed by law. They also had the right to leave the municipality, provided their 
departure was conducted in an organized fashion and that the entire household left. They 
were subject to a curfew from 4 p.m. to 6 a.m., and forbidden from selling or exchanging 
their dwellings without permission of the municipal authority, using any communication 
systems apart from the post office telephone, lingering in public places, or travelling to 
other towns without permission from the municipal authority. This decision was to be 
implemented by the Čelinac SJB and was distributed to the command of the local VRS 
brigade, the Čelinac SJB and all households.TPF978FPT By 5 August, municipal authorities had 
received requests from 180 Muslims seeking to move out of Čelinac municipality. At a 
session of the Čelinac municipal assembly on this day, Janko Trivić, a major in the Čelinac 
light infantry battalion, stated: 
there is sporadic fire and destruction of property – Muslim and Croatian weekend homes – 
and increase in crime, car theft, destruction, arson, this is carried out by armed groups, who 
do this in a planned way and are helped out by some politicians. This manifests itself through 
gatherings of extremists and support to such people, which results in anarchy, and ends in 
genocide being carried out… All of this, as well as other perpetrators have contributed to the 
fact that the Muslim population has began to move out of this area.TPF979FPT 
The crimes against non-Serbs were being perpetrated by members of the Čelinac SJB and 
the CSB. Decisions were adopted to introduce an obligation to work, to allocate empty 
homes to refugees, and to set up a commission for the exchange of the population and 
property.TPF980FPT  
432. At least five Muslim civilians, two women and three men, were killed during 
military operations of the 1st Krajina Corps in the village of Bastaši on 16 August 1992, 
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and Muslim houses were set on fire in the village of Šamac. These incidents reportedly 
occurred following the deaths of thirteen VRS soldiers.TPF981FPT  
433. In the course of August and September 1992, Witness 428, a Muslim resident of 
Čelinac municipality, was arrested and then released by the local Serb police on several 
occasions. On these occasions, he was detained at the Čelinac police station [C10.1], and in 
the basement of the SDK bank building [C10.4]. He was given insufficient food and was 
regularly and severely beaten by Serb police officers during his detention. In July and 
December 1992, the local crisis staff forced Witness 428 to perform various labour tasks in 
the municipality.TPF982FPT 
434. In addition to the above-mentioned facilities, Serb authorities also detained mostly 
Croat and Muslim civilians at a school in Čelinac [C10.2] and in Popovac, a village in the 
municipality [C10.3]. TPF983FPT 
435. In 1992, two mosques and the Muslim community centre in the town of Čelinac 
were destroyed [D8.1 and sD8.2].TPF984FPT 
436. The Chamber concludes that, in the municipality of Čelinac which had already been 
a predominantly Serb municipality in 1991, at least five Muslim civilians were killed by 
Serb forces. Serb authorities detained Muslim civilians in six detention facilities under 
inhumane conditions. Restrictive and discriminatory measures were imposed on Muslims, 
Muslim cultural monuments destroyed, and private property looted and destroyed by Serb 
forces and especially by paramilitary forces. Almost all of the Muslim residents moved out 
of Čelinac municipality.  
 
4.3.6 Donji Vakuf 
437. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Donji Vakuf municipality was 13,509 (55 per cent) Muslims, 9,533 (39 per cent) Serbs, 
682 (3 per cent) Croats, 593 Yugoslavs, and 227 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF985FPT 
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438. The local commander of the police station, a Serb, began preparing for a separate 
Serb SJB towards January 1992, and contacted the Banja Luka CSB at the end of February 
1992. The latter offered support and possible financial aid to the leader of this project. 
According to an SJB report, the Muslim leadership in the municipality had agreed to divide 
the police station because they could not prevent it from happening. The Serb SJB of Donji 
Vakuf was set up on 17 April 1992 and took control of the entire town the same day.TPF986FPT 
439. On 6 May 1992, a general Serb mobilization was declared and Muslims were 
requested to lay down their arms. The following day, the Serb flag was hoisted on the 
municipality building. Between May and September 1992, the VRS and Serb police, 
fighting together, took control over the entire territory of Donji Vakuf municipality. There 
were at least seven clashes between the Serb police, sometimes supported by VRS units, 
and Muslims. According to the Serb SJB, most of the Muslims in the municipality fled en 
masse from the municipality starting in May and throughout the summer. TPF987FPT  
440. When Muslims and Croats left Donji Vakuf, their property was stolen by both 
private individuals and uniformed men, including reserve policemen. The SJB submitted 
35 requests to the military police to institute misdemeanour proceedings in relation to such 
crimes.TPF988FPT The SJB stated, however, that it was not able to prevent theft of Muslim and 
Croat property due to its involvement in direct combat operations.  
441. Serbs authorities held mostly Muslim civilians in ten detention centres in Donji 
Vakuf during 1992. These centres were: the Donji Vakuf SJB [C12.2], the TO warehouse 
[C12.3], the Vrbaspromet warehouse [C12.4], the Daljan barracks [C12.5], the Oborci 
elementary school [C12.6], the Semešnica hotel [C12.7], a kindergarten [C12.8], the 
garage in the house of Ivica Stanko [C12.9], the garage in the house of Lončar Goran 
[C12.10], and the Vrbas hotel [C12.11].TPF989FPT  
442. A 1993 MUP report indicates that, in 1992, 12,970 Muslims and 480 Croats moved 
out of the municipality and that 5,450 Serbs moved in.TPF990FPT 
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443. The Chamber concludes that Serb forces detained mostly Muslim civilians in ten 
detention facilities in Donji Vakuf municipality in 1992. The property of Muslims was 
looted after most of the Muslims had left the municipality throughout the summer of 1992 
due to harassment and threats by Serbs. Serb forces exercised control over the entire 
municipality of Donji Vakuf by September 1992.  
 
4.3.7 Ključ 
444. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Ključ municipality was 18,506 (49 per cent) Serbs, 17,696 (47 per cent) Muslims, 330 (1 
per cent) Croats, 579 Yugoslavs, and 280 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF991FPT 
445. By February 1992, Red Berets, White Eagles and a number of JNA units had 
entered the territory of the municipality and a Serb TO had been organized.TPF992FPT On 5 May, 
Jovo Banjac, in his capacity as president of the Council for National Defence, imposed a 
curfew in Ključ municipality pursuant to a decision of the ARK government. TPF993FPT Banjac 
told Witness Egrlić, the SDS-appointed president of Ključ municipality’s executive board 
that Serbs would have to leave some territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Muslims and 
Croats would have to leave others, so that their respective presence as minorities would 
amount to no more than five or six per cent.TPF994FPT In the following days, Serb army units of 
the JNA 6th Partizan brigade took control of the roads leading to the town of Ključ. The 
Serbian flag was hoisted on the municipal building and the local police station.TPF995FPT On 7 
May, active and reserve police officers were asked to pledge loyalty to the ARK and were 
issued uniforms with ARK insignia.TPF996FPT Muslim and Croat police officers were given 
another chance to sign the pledge on 21 and 22 May. Those who refused to sign were 
relieved of their duties.TPF997FPT In the days prior to 7 May, Muslims were dismissed from the 
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SDK and from the local radio.TPF998FPT Muslims, who had failed to sign a pledge of loyalty to the 
new state, as well as one Serb married to a Muslim, were fired from executive posts in 
public bodies and companies. On 21 July, the war presidency of Ključ municipality issued 
a decision stating that all central positions in public institutions and companies were to be 
filled only by Serbs loyal to the Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF999FPT Following this decision, the war 
presidency ordered the dismissal of several non-Serbs from municipal positions, including 
the positions of president and vice-president of the executive board of the municipality.TPF1000FPT 
446. On 25 May 1992, after disarming Muslim police officers, the Serb police 
established a checkpoint between the predominantly Muslim villages of Biljani and Sanica. 
Freedom of movement for Muslims was severely restricted.TPF1001FPT Two days later, armed 
clashes broke out in the village of Krasulje between local Muslims and the Serb police.TPF1002FPT 
The Ključ crisis staff issued an order to surrender “illegally acquired” weapons to the local 
authorities on 28 May. While the order was not enforced against Serbs, non-Serbs were 
required to surrender all the weapons in their possession, including those that were legally 
owned.TPF1003FPT Also, all residents of the municipality, who at the time were members of armed 
units, including White Eagles, were ordered to place themselves under the command of the 
Ključ defence operative force.TPF1004FPT 
447. Following the crisis staff’s order, one Catholic church, 3,500 Muslim-owned 
houses, and at least four Muslim monuments in Ključ municipality, including the Atik 
mosque in the town of Ključ [D15.6], were either completely destroyed or heavily 
damaged by fire and explosives set by Serb forces during 1992.TPF1005FPT 
448. On 28 May 1992, the SDA-appointed president of Ključ municipality’s executive 
board, Asim Egrlić, was arrested at a checkpoint, and taken to the police station in Ključ 
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where he was severely beaten [C19.1]. On the same day, Muhamed Filipović, a Muslim 
member of the Ključ municipal assembly, was arrested by two Serbs in military uniforms 
and taken to the local police station, where he was subjected to beatings by Serb soldiers 
[C19.1]. At the time, at least 22 other Muslims were held at the station. The detainees, 
including Egrlić and Filipović, were later taken from the police station to Stara 
GradiškaTPF1006FPT and subsequently to Manjača camp in Banja Luka [C1.4].TPF1007FPT On 24 June, a 
former Muslim reserve police officer was arrested pursuant to an order of Dragan Stojčić – 
the police commander in Ključ – and taken to the police station in Ključ. There the 
detainee was severely beaten by four reserve police officers and a man in civilian clothes. 
The next day he was transferred to Manjača camp and in December 1992 taken to 
Croatia.TPF1008FPT 
449. Following the crisis staff’s order to surrender weapons, a VRS battalion, together 
with other units, carried out “mopping up” operations from 28 May to around 31 May 
1992.TPF1009FPT Serb forces entered or attacked a number of villages across the municipality, 
including Hadžići and [the hamlet of] Pudin Han. The population of Hadžići was almost 
exclusively Muslim. Houses were looted and destroyed, a village mosque in Pudin Han 
was leveled [D15.4]TP PTand village residents were forced to leave.TPF1010FPT Serb military and White 
Eagles searched Biljani village for weapons on 30 May 1992. No weapons were found 
during the search. Biljani was searched for weapons again on 27 June by JNA soldiers and 
by White Eagles.TPF1011FPT On 25 June, the command of the VRS 17th Light Infantry Brigade 
issued an order pursuant to which the brigade units, jointly with the 6th Infantry Brigade 
and police squads, were to carry out “a complete blockade, search and mopping up of the 
terrain” in the areas of Ramići, Krasulja, Hripavci, Ošljak, and Velagići. The order 
specifically forbade “the torching and destruction of houses except during combat 
operations if necessary”.TPF1012FPT 
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450. Around 1 June 1992, approximately one hundred Serb police officers armed with 
automatic weapons arrived in the Muslim village of Prhovo. TPF1013FPT They assembled about 40 
male villagers and a number of women and children, none of whom were armed. The 
villagers, among the Witness Brković, were ordered to line up facing the wall of a house. 
Several residents were beaten and between five and eight men were killed.TPF1014FPT The 
commander of the Serb unit, Marko Adamović, ordered the soldiers through a megaphone 
to set the village on fire and to kill the women and children.TPF1015FPT When the male residents 
were led out of the villageTPF1016FPT in the direction of Peći, an explosion and gunshots were 
heard coming from the village, as the Serb soldiers opened fire on the civilians who 
remained in the village. A soldier threw a grenade into the group, killing several women 
and further wounding Witness Brković. As a result of the shooting, about 38 people were 
killed, including children, and at least one house was burnt down. TPF1017FPT Later, Serb soldiers 
killed a number of men from the convoy on the way to Peći. Only eleven men survived 
[A9.1]. TPF1018FPT 
451. On 1 June 1992, approximately one hundred male residents of the predominantly 
Muslim villages Hadžići, Velagići, and surrounding villages were gathered by Serb troops 
at the school building in Velagići, where they were first beaten. They were then ordered by 
the soldiers to line up against a wall and soldiers opened fire on them. After all the men 
had fallen to the ground, the soldiers began to kill those who showed signs of life. 
[B10.1]. TPF1019FPT Serb police and military authorities, who arrived at the site after the shooting, 
made arrangements to transfer the bodies to a mass grave site in the woods outside Lanište. 
A total of 77 bodies were exhumed from the mass grave on Mount Grmeč (Lanište II), 
Ključ municipality. All the persons whose bodies were found at the site were male Muslim 
civilians who were identified as residents of Velagići village killed by Serb paramilitary 
forces outside Velagići primary school on 1 June 1992.TPF1020FPT Following the incident, an 
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investigating judge was sent to the school to make a record of the crime. Several VRS 
soldiers were arrested in connection with the killings. The suspects were transferred to 
Mali Logor, in Banja Luka, where they were kept for a short time, before being released to 
their units in Ključ, without being tried for their participation in the killings.TPF1021FPT 
452. Around 30 May 1992, approximately 400 non-Serbs were detained by Serb soldiers 
in JNA uniforms and were guarded at the Sanica school gym by reserve police officers 
[C19.4]. TPF1022FPT The detainees were transferred to a gym in Ključ [C19.6], where 
approximately one hundred persons, including children and elderly, were detained. While 
in detention, Witness Atif Džafić, was interrogated by an inspector from the Banja Luka 
CSB. Džafić was placed in isolation, beaten on several occasions, and was later transferred 
to a detention centre in Sitnica [C19.3], in the east of Ključ municipality.TPF1023FPT Around 2 
June, approximately 300 Muslim men were detained by Serb reserve police in the 
elementary school in Ključ [C19.2].TPF1024FPT On 5 June, Serb reserve police escorted detainees 
from the school to Manjača camp in Banja Luka municipality.TPF1025FPT Around 7 June, some 
400 civilians were taken from a detention centre in Sitnica [C19.3] to Manjača camp.TPF1026FPT 
453. On 10 July 1992, in accordance with an order issued by the commander of the local 
battalion,TPF1027FPT Muslim males, aged 18 to 60, were rounded up by VRS soldiers near Biljani 
primary school. Approximately 60 men were searched and then brought into a classroom 
inside the school building. Groups of five detainees were subsequently called outside the 
classroom and shot.TPF1028FPT More than 20 were killed. Following this, the remaining people 
were taken out, beaten and loaded into a bus. When the bus filled up, those still waiting to 
board were taken aside and shot. As the bus was about to drive away, a soldier took off 
four men, including a relative of Witness 188, and killed them. The bus drove a very short 
distance and stopped. The men were taken off the bus and led away at gunpoint by military 
police. When the witness realized that he too would be killed, he attempted to run away. 
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The guards fired at the escaping detainees, calling out “balijas” after them. The witness fell 
down beside the body of an escapee who had been killed and pretended he was dead 
[A9.3]. TPF1029FPT A total of 27 bodies were recovered from a mass grave and from several 
individual graves in Krasulje village. They were identified as having been male Muslims 
killed by Serbs on 10 July 1992.TPF1030FPT  
454. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mainly Croat 
and Muslim civilians in the following detention centres in Ključ municipality, namely the 
huts in Gornja Sanica [C19.4], and the Gornja Sanica railway station [C19.5].TPF1031FPT In July, 
the Ključ SJB reported to CSB Banja Luka that, by 27 August “no camps, prisons or 
collection centres [remained] in [Ključ] municipality.” All prisoners had been sent to the 
Manjača camp.TPF1032FPT 
455. An agency for the reception and removal of refugees had already been established 
on 27 May 1992 by the crisis staff. Persons who wished to move out of the municipality 
had to obtain a permit issued by the municipal authorities.TPF1033FPT In accordance with the crisis 
staff decision of 30 July, those who wished to leave the municipality had to submit a 
statement saying that they were leaving permanently, and were to exchange their property 
or surrender it to the municipality.TPF1034FPT The SNO and SJB were in charge of issuing the 
relevant documents.TPF1035FPT In accordance with the ARK decision of 4 August, individuals 
leaving the ARK could take with them no more than 300 German marks. TPF1036FPT Out of the 
17,000 or so Muslims who had been living in the Ključ area only around 600 remained by 
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the summer of 1992.TPF1037FPT A report from the VRS 17th Ključ Light Infantry Brigade 
command of the 2nd Krajina Corps, dated 16 February 1993, detailed the numbers of 
people who had left Muslim villages and communes in Ključ municipality between May 
1992 and January 1993: 4,154 of the 4,200 residents of Sanica; 3,429 of the 3,649 residents 
of Velagići (lists indicating the desired destinations for the remaining 220 residents had 
been drafted); 2,655 of the 2,815 residents of Peći; 1,250 of the 1,732 residents of Humići; 
all of the 778 residents of Sokolovo; and all 24 residents of Gornji Ribnik.TPF1038FPT A May 1993 
MUP report indicates that between 14,000 to 15,000 Muslims, 200 Croats, and 1,000 Serbs 
had left the municipality; replaced by 2,000 to 3,000 Serbs.TPF1039FPT 
456. The Chamber concludes that, in total, at least 148 Muslims and Croats were killed 
by Serb forces in Ključ municipality in the period June to mid-July 1992. Serb forces 
entered several villages and deliberately destroyed religious monuments and around 3,500 
houses owned by Muslims. Already in May 1992, Muslims and Croats had been dismissed 
from their posts in public bodies and companies in the municipality. The Serb forces often 
arrested persons or rounded them up and sometimes opened the fire on them, for example 
at the villagers from Hadžići, Velagići, and surrounding villages on 1 June 1992, killing 
approximately 77, and at the Muslim villagers of Prhovo also on 1 June 1992. Several VRS 
soldiers were arrested, but they were never tried for their participation in the killings. In six 
detention centres in the municipality of Ključ, mostly schools, many Muslim and Croat 
civilians were detained in harsh conditions and often severely beaten. Many detainees were 
executed by Serb guards. By end of August, nearly all detainees had been transferred to 
Manjača camp in Banja Luka municipality. The Chamber finds that most of the Muslims 
moved out of the municipality in summer 1992 due to unbearable circumstances and out of 
fear.  
 
4.3.8 Kotor Varoš 
457. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Kotor Varoš municipality was 14,056 (38 per cent) Serbs, 11,090 (30 per cent) Muslims, 
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10,695 (29 per cent) Croats, 745 Yugoslavs, and 267 persons of other or unknown 
ethnicity.TPF1040FPT 
458. During April and May 1992, public institutions in Kotor Varoš such as the social 
and health services and the financial and postal services, began receiving instructions from 
their respective headquarters in Banja Luka.TPF1041FPT The SJB in Kotor Varoš also followed the 
orders of the CSB in Banja Luka. However, in contrast to most SJBs in the ARK, officers 
of the Kotor Varoš SJB continued to wear the insignia of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Government until 11 June 1992.TPF1042FPT 
459. On 11 and 12 June 1992, Serb soldiers in green camouflage uniform attacked the 
town of Kotor Varoš, causing many Muslims and Croats to flee into the woods. After a 
week, the Muslims and Croats surrendered their weapons and returned to the town.TPF1043FPT On 
25 June, there was fighting between Muslim formations and a paramilitary unit under the 
command of Slobodan Dubočanin in the Kotor settlement. The members of this unit took a 
group of Muslims from Kotor outside the town and beat them with rifles, verbally abused 
them, calling them “balijas” and “Ustashas” and stripped them of their valuables. They 
also let a dog loose on one of the Muslims and forced several Muslims to beat their family 
members. Then they alleged that a Serb soldier had been killed and warned that for each 
Serb, five non-Serbs would be killed “in retaliation”. The paramilitaries killed six of the 
group and they mistreated many others. They also forced them to set stores and houses in 
town on fire. Another Muslim was killed near the hospital, in this instance by a police 
officer in the presence of the commander of the police station [A10.1].TPF1044FPT  
460. During the summer of 1992, Serb forces attacked a number of Croat and Muslim 
villages in Kotor Varoš municipality, including the predominantly Muslim villages 
Hrvačani and Vatraći.TPF1045FPT Elvedin Pašić, from the Muslim village of Hrvačani in Kotor 
Varoš municipality, testified that he learned from Elvir Lihović, a villager from Dabovći, 
that sometime prior to July or August 1992, Serb soldiers led the men of Dabovći into a 
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house outside the village and killed almost all of them and that Lihović narrowly survived 
the killing and escaped [A10.2].TPF1046FPT  
461. In June and July 1992, a dozen Croats and Muslims were detained in the police 
station of Kotor Varoš town [C20.4] where they were beaten by special police officers and 
by Serb soldiers wearing red berets. One of them was nearly strangled while being 
interrogated about the activities of other SDA members. Some of them were also sexually 
abused by the police officers.TPF1047FPT  
462. From the end of June 1992 until beyond the indictment period, Muslim and Croat 
men and women were detained in the prison of Kotor Varoš [C20.5.]. The detained men 
were repeatedly beaten and held in cramped conditions and without hygienic facilities and 
sufficient food. At least some of them were not informed of the reasons for their 
detention.TPF1048FPT In July or August, a number of Muslim men, women, and children detained 
at the elementary school in Grabovica [C20.13] were beaten and abused with axes, sticks 
and pitchforks during their detention. TPF1049FPT Some of the more than 100 Muslims and Croats 
detained at the Kotor Varoš elementary school [C20.3], including boys, were beaten and 
tortured by Serb soldiers and special police forces between 8 July and late September 
1992. TPF1050FPT The Kotor Varoš elementary school and the municipal prison were run by the 
Serb special police.TPF1051FPT 
463. In August 1992, approximately 1,000 women, children, and elderly civilians were 
detained at the Pilana sawmill [C20.7] Many women and girls aged 13 and older were 
raped by Serb soldiers prior to being sent to Travnik from where they were released. Along 
the way to Travnik, at Skender Vakuf, Šešelj’s and Arkan’s men boarded the bus in which 
they were travelling and stripped the detainees of their remaining money and jewellery. TPF1052FPT 
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464. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly 
Muslim and Croat civilians in the following detention centres in Kotor Varoš, namely 
Alagić’s or Đevdo’s café in Vrbanjci [C20.1 and C20.15], the Jelsingrad factory [C20.2], 
Maslovare school [C20.6], the high school [C20.8], the old court [C20.9], Šiprage 
[C20.10], Kozara [C20.11], the Dom Zdravlja medical centre [C20.12], and the Vrbanjci 
petrol station [C20.14]. TPF1053FPT 
465. By early October 1992, a small pocket surrounding the predominantly Muslim 
village Večići was the only area of Kotor Varoš municipality not under the control of the 
VRS 1st Krajina Corps. The local Muslim and Croat population had armed and defended 
Večići through the summer months and the area had seen combat actions including the 
ambushing and killing of Serb soldiers. By the autumn, however, the population of Večići 
had been surrounded by Serb forces and negotiations began for the surrender of the 
population. Due to the unwillingness of some of the Muslim and Croat population to 
disarm, there were discussions within the Serb authorities on whether to let the people go 
before they disarmed.TPF1054FPT On 1 November, the 1st Krajina Corps filed a report which 
shows that, following a meeting with General Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, a decision 
was made that the civilian population would be allowed to leave without imposing the 
condition that the armed forces be disarmed.TPF1055FPT On 2 November, during a session of the 
Kotor Varoš war presidency, Colonel Bogojević informed everyone present that he had 
received explicit orders from General Mladić that no one would be allowed to leave Večići 
until unconditional surrender of arms was completed.TPF1056FPT During the night of 2 and 3 
November, armed men from Večići attempted to escape towards Travnik whilst the women 
and children decided to surrender. The Serb military was informed about this and as the 
armed men from Večići fled, they were ambushed and captured by the VRS. Some were 
killed and the others were brought to Grabovica school. The armed men were held 
separately in the school and the women, the elderly, and the children were sent with buses 
provided by the crisis staff to join the rest of the population.TPF1057FPT The war presidency 
decided to organize the departure of a convoy as soon as possible. It also decided that 
Pejić, Župljanin, Balaban and Lieutenant Colonel Novakonić should be responsible for the 
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captured soldiers.TPF1058FPT However, on 4 November, approximately 150 of these men were 
killed [B11.1].TPF1059FPT According to a report of the 1st Krajina Corps Command of 4 
November, “a brutal massacre of the captured members of the Green Berets started 
because of the wounding of four and the killing of one soldier of the Kotor Varoš Light 
Infantry Brigade and the burning of wounded soldiers on Gola Planina (Jajce)”.TPF1060FPT 
Witness D14 also acknowledged that “something happened and serious crimes took place 
there… to members of the Muslim army who had arrived at the school that evening”.TPF1061FPT 
Nedeljko Đekanović, president of Kotor Varoš, went to Grabovica school [C20.13] on 5 
November 1992 to monitor the “clearing up of the terrain and cleaning of the school”.TPF1062FPT 
466. Already in 29 June 1992, the Kotor Varoš crisis staff had decided to establish an 
agency to oversee the resettlement of persons; all buses in the municipality were to be 
made available for that purpose. The crisis staff decided that all those who wanted to move 
out of Kotor Varoš had to submit written requests to the basic court in Kotor Varoš and to 
fill in certain forms declaring their assets and stating that they were “leaving them in 
custody” of the political and social community.TPF1063FPT Witness D14 explained that the term 
“leaving in custody” meant either selling at a lower price or exchanging assets.TPF1064FPT The 
persons moving out of the municipality were to be informed that they were allowed to take 
with them only 300 German Marks. TPF1065FPT Persons who wished to leave were to surrender 
their immovable property to the municipality and declare that they were leaving 
voluntarily.TPF1066FPT On 28 July 1992, the Kotor Varoš war presidency decided that money that 
was confiscated from persons moving out, was not to be returned to those persons but was 
to be used to assist the families of fallen soldiers and to cover municipal expenses.TPF1067FPT In 
July and August, there were incidents where Serb soldiers, as well as Šešelj’s and Arkan’s 
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men, robbed Muslims and Croats who were leaving Kotor Varoš of their valuables.TPF1068FPT 
From some villages like Večići, Sokoline, Viševice, Ravan, and Bilice, the entire Muslim 
population left.TPF1069FPT  
467. A total of fourteen Muslim and Catholic monuments in Kotor Varoš municipality 
were heavily damaged or completely destroyed in 1992, most of them in July and August, 
by fire, explosives, or shelling, or by a combination of the three. The monuments included 
mosques in Hanifići [D16.1], Kotor Varoš town [D16.2], Vrbanjci [D16.3], Hrvačani 
[D16.4], Ravni [D16.5], Vranić [D16.6], Donja Varoš [D16.7], and Večići [D16.8] The 
Nova mosque in Večići suffered minor shelling damage in August 1992 [D16.9.].TPF1070FPT 
468. The Chamber concludes that, in total, over 157 Muslims and Croats were killed by 
Serb forces in the municipality of Kotor Varoš in the period mid-June to the beginning of 
November 1992. During the summer of 1992, Serb forces attacked Kotor Varoš town and a 
number of Croat and Muslim villages in Kotor Varoš municipality and deliberately 
damaged or destroyed Muslim and Croat cultural monuments. They met with resistance of 
Muslim forces, but in many villages they prevailed. When the Muslim population in these 
villages surrendered, Serb forces stripped them of their valuables and killed some of them. 
On 4 November 1992, 150 Muslim men who had been captured near the village Večići 
were massacred. The Chamber further finds that Serb forces detained many Muslim and 
Croat civilians in fourteen detention centers in the municipality. For example, there were 
approximately 1,000 women, children, and elderly civilians at the Pilana sawmill in 
August 1992. They were held under cramped conditions and were beaten on a regular 
basis. Detainees were sent to Travnik, in Skender Vakuf municipality, by bus from where 
they were released. Other Muslims and Croats also left in buses organized by the crisis 
staff and an agency. Persons leaving had to surrender their property to the municipality and 
declare that they were leaving voluntarily. Large parts of the non-Serb population moved 
out of the municipality in 1992 due to unbearable circumstances in the municipality; some 
villages like Večići, Sokoline, Viševice, Ravan, and Bilice, were completely abandoned by 
their Muslim population.  
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4.3.9 Prijedor 
469. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Prijedor municipality was 49,351 (44 per cent) Muslims, 47,581 (42 per cent) Serbs, 6,316 
(6 per cent) Croats, 6,459 Yugoslavs, and 2,836 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1071FPT 
Prijedor municipality was at a strategic location for the VRS and the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic because of its position in the corridor linking Western Bosnia with Serbia.TPF1072FPT 
470. In the early hours of 30 April 1992, JNA forces and the Serb police took control of 
the town of Prijedor by setting up checkpoints and occupying its most important buildings, 
thus taking over municipal administration organs and important companies.TPF1073FPT Police 
officers were obliged to pledge loyalty to the new Serb authorities.TPF1074FPT Police commanders 
of Muslim ethnicity were replaced by these authorities with Serb commanders.TPF1075FPT The 
SDS, through the newly created bodies, removed SDA members from functions in the 
municipal assembly and the municipal administration. Muslim and Croat public officials 
were prohibited from entering the municipal assembly building.TPF1076FPT 
471. With the assistance of soldiers and paramilitaries, the crisis staff, under SDS 
municipal board president Milomir Stakić,TPF1077FPT proceeded to expand restrictive measures 
against Muslims and Croats firing them from their jobs, barring their children from 
attending school, and restricting their movement within and from the municipality. SDS-
controlled radio broadcast accusations and propaganda against Muslims and Croats 
including ethnic insults. Serb authorities prevented Muslims and Croats from travelling 
outside of the municipality. They often searched the houses of Muslims and Croats, cut 
their telephone lines, and partially shut down their electricity supplies.TPF1078FPT 
 
TP
1071
PT P954 (Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991 census, April 1995), pp.198-203. 
TP
1072
PT Adjudicated facts 101-4.  
TP
1073
PT Adjudicated facts 114, 116-21; P564 (Sejmenović transcript), pp. 4479-80, 4556; P564.G (Sejmenović 
transcript), pp. 5387-8; P492 (Atlija transcript), pp. 5553-4; P529, tab 295 (Report by SJBs in Prijedor, 
Bosanski Novi, and Sanski Most, 18 August 1992), p. 6; P529, tab 277 (Report by Prijedor SJB), p. 6; 
P763.C, tab 10 (Report on work of Prijedor SJB, January 1993), p. 2; P803, tab 1 (Information from Simo 
Drljača to Banja Luka CSB, 30 April 1992). 
TP
1074
PT P564 (Sejmenović transcript), p. 4559; P763.C, tab 10 (Report on work of Prijedor SJB, January 1993), 
p. 3. 
TP
1075
PT Adjudicated fact 210.  
TP
1076
PT P901, pp. 2479-81, 2514-21; P490 (Witness 335 transcript), pp. 3914, 3917; P490.A (Witness 335 
transcript), p. 4016; P564 (Sejmenović transcript), p. 4561; P803, tab 2 (Minutes of SDS municipal board, 9 
May 1992). 
TP
1077
PT Adjudicated fact 212; P803, tab 2 (Minutes of SDS Prijedor municipal board, 9 May 1992); P803, tab 3 
(Instructions on establishment, composition and tasks of Prijedor crisis staffs in, June 1992); P803, tab 6 
(Article in Kozarski Vjesnik newspaper, 25 September 1992). 
TP
1078
PT Adjudicated facts 154-7, 164-5; P492 (Atlija transcript), pp. 5553-4; P492.A (Atlija transcript), p. 5659. 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 4 
 Municipality crimes 
 
 
180 
472. In early May 1992, shortly after the take-over of the town of Prijedor, Serb soldiers 
and reserve police officers proceeded to attack Prijedor’s old town area, a predominantly 
Muslim neighbourhood. They forced the unarmed men, women, and children out of their 
homes, looted local businesses, and destroyed the local mosque and some houses. Heavy 
machinery was used to level the area of the old town.TPF1079FPT 
473. From May to December 1992, mosques and other religious institutions throughout 
Prijedor municipality were targeted for destruction and the property of Muslims and Croats 
went missing. TPF1080FPT The mosque in the old town of Prijedor and a Catholic church [D18.5] 
were destroyed. TPF1081FPT Property of Muslims and Croats who had left the area was confiscated 
and assigned to Serbs. Soldiers and MUP special units took part in organized looting of 
villages, from which Muslims, Croats, and other non-Serbs, had been driven out.TPF1082FPT 
474. In late May 1992, following clashes between Serbs and Muslims at a checkpoint in 
the Muslim village of Hambarine on 22 May, areas to the south-west of the town of 
Prijedor were attacked by Bosnian-Serb forces, including the police and VRS forces.TPF1083FPT 
The 1st Krajina Corps and the local MUP cooperated in mopping-up operations in Prijedor, 
in the villages of Kozarac, Kozaruša, Trnopolje, and elsewhere in Prijedor 
municipality.TPF1084FPT Several paramilitary groups, including those headed by Dragan (Zolja) 
Slijepčević and Momčilo (Cigo) Radanović, fought alongside the VRS in these 
operations.TPF1085FPT Slobodan Kuruzović, member of the SDS municipal board, commander of 
the local Serb TO and in charge of the Trnopolje camp, stated to prisoners in Trnopolje 
that the Serb plan was to reduce the number of Muslims in Prijedor to 10 per cent or less, 
and later to reduce this to 2 per cent or less.TPF1086FPT 
475. The day after the incident at the Hambarine checkpoint on 22 May 1992, during 
which a Serb was shot, Serb forces attacked the area around that village. Because the 
Hambarine authorities had not complied with the ultimatum of the Prijedor crisis staff to 
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surrender all weapons, and also turn over the men staffing the checkpoint, the crisis staff 
ordered artillery shelling, which lasted several hours. Around 1,000 Serb soldiers then 
entered the area, supported by tanks and other weaponry. After a brief period of 
intermittent fighting local Muslim leaders collected and surrendered most of the weapons 
held by their side. By this time, many of the inhabitants of Hambarine, including women, 
children, and elderly persons, had fled north to other villages or south to a forested area, 
which was also shelled. A number of the displaced residents later returned to Serb-
controlled Hambarine, although only temporarily. On 20 July, the last major cleansing in 
the municipality occurred with the removal of thousands of non-Serbs from Hambarine and 
nearby Ljubija.TPF1087FPT More than 40 villagers were killed in the attacks on Hambarine and in 
the attack on Ljubija.TPF1088FPT The Chamber is not in a position to assess the circumstances 
surrounding their death, in particular whether those killed were taking active part in the 
hostilities.  
476. During late April and May 1992 tension developed between the new Serb 
authorities in Prijedor and the local authorities in Kozarac, a town to the east of Prijedor 
town, which had a large concentration of Muslims: of the 4,000 inhabitants of Kozarac 
town, 90 per cent were Muslim. Serbs and Muslims erected checkpoints in Kozarac and the 
surrounding area. Serbs on the police radio made continuous references to destroying 
mosques and everything that belonged to the Muslims, as well as Muslims themselves. 
JNA officers and SDS officials threatened to raze Kozarac to the ground if the population 
did not surrender its weapons.TPF1089FPT  
477. On 22 May 1992 Kozarac was blockaded, rendering movement in and out of the 
town extremely difficult, and telephone lines were disconnected. The Prijedor crisis staff 
addressed an ultimatum to the Kozarac TO and the police to surrender all weapons and to 
pledge loyalty and declare subordination to the new authorities of the Serb municipality. 
On 24 May, after the expiration of the ultimatum, Kozarac was attacked. The attack, 
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carried out by VRS 1st Krajina Corps, MUP and paramilitary forces, began with heavy 
shelling, followed by the advance of tanks and infantry. About 50 armed local men 
opposed the Serb forces. The Serb infantry entered Kozarac, set houses on fire, and 
rounded up, assaulted, and killed local residents not taking part in the hostilities [A13.1]. 
About half of Kozarac was destroyed, with damage continuing through the period of June 
and August 1992. The local mosque, unlike the Orthodox church, was destroyed during the 
attack [D18.4]. In the attack care was taken to avoid damage to Serb property. The men 
from Kozarac were taken to the Keraterm [C25.5] and Omarska detention camps [C25.4], 
while the women and elderly persons to the Trnopolje detention camp [C25.6].TPF1090FPT  
478. On 26 May 1992 a special unit from Prijedor, composed of approximately 30 men 
and commanded by Slobodan Kuruzović, along with a detachment of the military police, 
arrived at Trnopolje. The unit surrounded the village, while the military police placed the 
remaining local residents in the elementary school [C25.41] after having separated Muslim 
TO members, reserve police officers, SDA activists, and senior officials, who were 
detained in the community centre.TPF1091FPT 
479. The two Muslim villages of Jaskići and Sivci were attacked by armed Serbs on 14 
June 1992. Women and children were separated from the men who were taken to Keraterm 
camp [C25.5]. During this operation four men were brutally beaten and five were shot and 
killed by Bosnian-Serb forces [A13.5]. TPF1092FPT 
480. Similar operations took place in Prijedor municipality at other times during the 
summer of 1992. Near the Muslim village of Bišćani, a Serb joint military and civilian 
police operation resulted in the death of two Muslim civilians who were not taking active 
part in the hostilities [A13.6]. In the Muslim village Čarakovo, 30 to 50 Muslim civilians 
were killed, during an exchange of fire between an armed Muslim group and Serb military 
and police.TPF1093FPT The Chamber considers that the great number of killings of civilians 
indicate that they were not collateral damage in a firing exchange between warring parties. 
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481. Around 20 July 1992, Serb soldiers with an APC and at least two trucks conducted 
an operation in the predominantly Muslim villages on the Prijedor-Tukovi-Volar road, 
including Hegići, Mrkalji, Ravine, Duratovići Polje, and Čemernica. During the operation, 
300 to 400 civilians were killed, including at least two women. Many of the victims had 
bullet wounds in their backs. In the following days, Serb soldiers forced Muslims from the 
village of Čemernica to remove dead bodies from the other villages and bury them.TPF1094FPT  
482. On 24 July 1992, Serb forces attacked the predominantly Croat village of Briševo, 
after the local population had complied with the instruction to surrender weapons. Sixty-
eight villagers were killed during the attack, including fourteen women, two boys, and four 
invalids, even though there was no armed resistance [A13.7]. Thirty-six men from the 
village were brought to the detention centre Krings Hall in Sanski Most [C28.3]. During 
the following weeks the soldiers looted the area and destroyed houses, as well as a Catholic 
church [D18.1].TPF1095FPT 
483. Serb authorities detained mostly Croat and Muslim civilians in 58 detention and 
collection centres in Prijedor municipality in 1992. Five of them were considered long-
term detention centres: Keraterm [C25.5], Trnopolje [C25.6], Omarska [C25.4], the police 
station in Prijedor town [C25.2], and the command post at Miška Glava [C25.3]. The other 
53 locations mentioned in Schedule C of the indictment were places of short-term 
detention.TPF1096FPT Most of the Muslims and Croats in Prijedor were detained for some period of 
time at one of these detention or collection centres in 1992.TPF1097FPT 
484. According to a police officer, detainees in Prijedor were investigated by Serb 
military or regular police and placed into three categories: group A detainees consisted of 
persons who were “not guilty of anything”; group B consisted of persons who had 
supported the SDA or an alleged Muslim “attack” on Prijedor; and group C consisted of 
those persons who belonged to the SDA, or who had taken part in or financed the alleged 
“attack” on Prijedor. Police commanders provided officers with lists of prominent Muslims 
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from Prijedor who were to be arrested and investigated.TPF1098FPT In the days immediately 
following the take-over of Prijedor town several local non-Serb leaders were arrested, 
including the president of the municipal assembly, an SDA member, the president of the 
municipal court, the public prosecutor, the director of a local mine, the secretary for town 
planning, and the director of the municipality income administration.TPF1099FPT 
485. On or about 26 May 1992, Serb police and JNA officers used the military prison in 
Prijedor barracks to detain briefly (up to 2 days) about 30 civilians, including Witness 30, 
who were beaten regularly by soldiers [C25.1].TPF1100FPT  
486. In the beginning of July 1992, Serb soldiers rounded up Muslims and Croats in 
Gomjenica, near Tukovi, and took them to Zeger bridge. At the bridge many of them were 
killed, while others were loaded on buses.TPF1101FPT On or about 20 July 1992 about 100 armed 
Muslim men from Hambarine surrendered to Bosnian-Serb forces. The Serb soldiers 
interrogated and beat them over a period of four or five days in a small café in Miška 
Glava. Around 25 July the detainees were transferred to a stadium in Ljubija [C25.10], 
where Serb soldiers and police beat them, killing three [A13.9].TPF1102FPT That night about 90 
detainees were taken by bus to Kipe, an iron-ore mine, where Serb soldiers ordered them 
off the bus in groups of three and shot them, sparing only five [A13.8]. TPF1103FPT 
487. As stated earlier, three large detention centres were established in the municipality: 
men of military age were brought mostly to Keraterm [C25.5] and Omarska [C25.4], while 
women, children, elderly persons, and other men to Trnopolje [C25.6]. Teams representing 
both military and civilian authorities screened detainees in Keraterm and Trnopolje in 
order to determine their role in the conflict. As armed conflict spread throughout the 
municipality in the following days, the need to process large numbers of captured persons 
led the municipal crisis staff to transform Keraterm into a transit centre and to establish 
another camp at Omarska.TPF1104FPT These three camps were guarded by soldiers, police forces, 
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TO units, or combination thereof. Detainees were executed and subjected to severe 
mistreatment, which included psychological abuse, beatings, sexual assaults, and torture. 
Detainees were forced to spit on the Muslim flag, sing Serbian nationalist songs or give the 
Serbian three-fingered salute. Members of paramilitary organizations and local Serbs were 
routinely allowed to enter the camps to abuse, beat, and kill prisoners.TPF1105FPT In the period 
before 21 August 1992 when Omarska and Keraterm were dismantled, 187 police 
employees in total were involved in guard duty at the camps. The Trnopolje collection 
centre remained in place until November 1992. Altogether, more than 5,500 persons were 
held and interviewed at the three camps.TPF1106FPT  
488. Keraterm detention camp was located on the eastern outskirts of Prijedor town 
[C25.5]. It opened on 25 May and held up to 1,500 prisoners, Muslims and Croats, 
crowded in large rooms. Conditions of detention were very poor: there was inadequate 
ventilation, insufficient hygienic facilities, and very little food. Due to the environmental 
conditions, the detainees suffered from lice and dysentery.TPF1107FPT Detainees at Keraterm were 
beaten, or ordered to beat each other, and some died as a result.TPF1108FPT Around 24 to 26 July 
Serb guards shot Muslim and Croat detainees in one of the rooms of the camp using 
machine guns, killing 150 to 200 and injuring others [B15.3].TPF1109FPT 
489. Already on 27 May 1992 the Prijedor crisis staff ordered detainees in Keraterm to 
be transferred to Omarska. According to a Prijedor SJB report of August 1992 addressed to 
the CSB in Banja Luka, the great majority of the transferred men were between the ages of 
18 and 60. In the following days, Muslim men arrested in Kozarac were also transferred to 
Omarska.TPF1110FPT It was only on 31 May, however, that Simo Drljača, commander of the 
Prijedor SJB, issued an official order, pursuant to a decision of the crisis staff, to establish 
Omarska camp. The camp was to be set up at Ljubija’s defunct iron-ore mine, two 
kilometres south of the village of Omarska. [C25.4] The order was implemented by Drljača 
in cooperation with the Banja Luka CSB. The Omarska camp, under Željko Meakić, 
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functioned until late August 1992, when the detainees were transferred to Trnopolje and 
other camps.TPF1111FPT Meakić was required to submit daily reports to Drljača.TPF1112FPT Members of 
the MUP ran the camp and carried out interrogations, together with military investigators, 
while the military was in charge of access to Omarska.TPF1113FPT The crisis staff permitted only 
Drljača to release detainees.TPF1114FPT 
490. Detainees in Omarska, who numbered up to 3,000 at one time, were mostly 
Muslims, Croats, and a dozen Serbs deemed to be on the side of Muslims. Overall, less 
than 40 women were detained in Omarska during the period of its operation. One of these 
women was repeatedly raped and beaten.TPF1115FPT When detainees arrived at Omarska, they 
were searched, stripped of their belongings, and often beaten. Some of the detainees were 
kept indoors, mostly in rooms in a hangar, but also in lavatories, in small garages, or in a 
building called “the white house” in very crowded conditions. Up to 600 others were kept 
in an open concrete area, in all weather conditions.TPF1116FPT Hygiene at the camp was very poor 
and detainees suffered from skin diseases and other illnesses. Food and water were scarce, 
and some detainees, especially those heavily beaten, could not reach the place where food 
was distributed. Some detainees were beaten to death [B15.1].TPF1117FPT One of the groups 
abusing prisoners at Omarska was a special MUP detachment placed under the command 
of the Banja Luka CSB. TPF1118FPT The most serious beatings took place in “the white house”, as 
well as in another building, “the red house” where detainees were taken and mistreated.TPF1119FPT 
Beatings also took place during night visits by civilians and soldiers who were allowed into 
the camp.TPF1120FPT 
491. Around 17 July 1992 head of the Banja Luka CSB Stojan Župljanin, a member of 
the ARK crisis staff Radislav Vukić, the ARK crisis staff president Radoslav Brđanin, and 
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member of the SDS Main Board and of the ARK crisis staff at the time Predrag Radić, 
visited Omarska. They saw non-Serb civilians detained in inhumane conditions and 
subjected to verbal abuse and humiliation. Radić expressed his disapproval to Župljanin 
and the Red Cross office in Banja Luka.TPF1121FPT During a second visit by ARK officials, 
president of the ARK Vojo Kuprešanin, ordered the immediate release of Mevludin 
Sejmenović, a prominent Muslim, and discussed on the phone with Radovan Karadžić how 
to improve the appearance of Omarska for foreign reporters.TPF1122FPT Around the beginning of 
August 1992 Serbian and foreign journalists were allowed into Omarska camp. Detainees 
were warned not to complain about the conditions of detention.TPF1123FPT 
492. Of the total number of persons processed at Omarska by mid-August 1992, 1,773 
were transferred to facilities in Trnopolje and 1,331 to Manjača camp, in Banja Luka.TPF1124FPT 
On 24 and 25 May 1992 Prijedor radio inadequately described Trnopolje as an “open 
camp” established for the safety of the civilian population [C25.6]. Thousands of people 
were detained there over the following months between May and November 1992 by 
armed soldiers, under Slobodan Kuruzović, in cramped conditions.TPF1125FPT A VRS 1st Krajina 
Corps report from January 1993 states that at the Trnopolje “open reception centre” , in 
addition to women and children, there was a large concentration of Muslim men fit for 
military service including persons who had spent some time in Omarska and Keraterm 
because of their direct or indirect involvement in armed rebellion.TPF1126FPT At first Serb soldiers 
informed the detainees in Trnopolje that they were being held for their own protection 
against Muslim extremists. The camp later became a point where Serb soldiers would 
gather civilians, including men, women, and children, for deportation to other parts of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere.TPF1127FPT Although in certain periods, people in Trnopolje 
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were theoretically allowed to leave the camp, security conditions outside the camp 
rendered it, in effect, a place of detention.TPF1128FPT 
493. Camp authorities in Trnopolje did not distribute food and, on occasion, Serb 
soldiers beat and killed Muslim and Croat detainees. In one such incident Serb soldiers 
took eleven detainees to a maize field and shot them dead [B15.2].TPF1129FPT Sanitary conditions 
were very poor, and the majority of detainees developed dysentery and scabies while at the 
camp.TPF1130FPT Moreover, soldiers coming from outside the camp and Slobodan Kuruzović, the 
camp commander, raped the female detainees.TPF1131FPT 
494. On 21 August 1992, 154 Muslims from the camps of Trnopolje and Tukovi 
[C25.32], designated as category “C” detainees (members of the SDA or Muslims who 
were believed to have taken part in, or to have financed, the Muslim “attack” on Prijedor) 
were put on buses and taken to Korićanske Stijene, in Skender Vakuf municipality. There 
they were taken off the buses and executed by a Serb police unit from Prijedor and by 
soldiers in military uniform [B15.5].TPF1132FPT On the same day a local VRS infantry unit 
reported the incident to the 1st Krajina Corps command, stating that Prijedor and Sanski 
Most police had committed “genocide” against 154 Muslim civilians and requesting an 
investigation.TPF1133FPT On 22 August the VRS 1st Krajina Corps command reported the event to 
the VRS Main Staff twice, putting civilian casualties at about 100.TPF1134FPT On 23 or 24 August 
a police unit from Prijedor, accompanied by Drljača and Župljanin, returned to Korićanske 
Stijene and removed the bodies.TPF1135FPT This incident was mentioned again in a report of the 
1st Krajina Corps, dated 3 September 1992, to the VRS Main Staff. It claimed that Drljača 
was responsible, adding: “This action caused indignation not only among citizens but also 
among 1st Krajina Corps soldiers. This dark stain which was created did not have support, 
but it is very fortunate that the international community did not find out about it in more 
detail.”TPF1136FPT On 14 September Drljača, responding to a request by Mićo Stanišić, the MUP 
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Minister, to start an investigation into the matter, wrote that an investigation could not be 
carried out because the officers who had participated in the convoy were currently 
deployed in the battlefield. TPF1137FPT 
495. On 22 August 1992 an unsigned report stamped “Command of Doboj Operative 
Group 2” addressed to the Prijedor Operations Group command stated: 
all are now washing their hands regarding camps and reception centres, attempting to pass 
responsibility for issuing orders for mass execution of civilians in the camps and centres onto 
someone else. This has become particularly noticeable since the visit of foreign reporters to 
Prijedor, more precisely to Omarska and Trnopolje. Forged (antedated) documents about this 
are even appearing ... One thing is certain: we are already starting to feel the cost of the 
needless spilling [of] Muslim blood.TPF1138FPT 
496. On 28 August 1992 Simo Drljača, in response to a request from the Ministry of 
Health, informed the CSB that there were no camps, prisons, or collection centres in 
Prijedor and that 1,335 “prisoners of war” had been moved to Manjača.TPF1139FPT On or about 24 
September 1992 Milomir Stakić, local SDS president, answered complaints by local Serbs 
on the release of detainees from Keraterm, Omarska, and Trnopolje, stating that the 
Government in Pale had decided to release them for two reasons: “pressure from 
international public opinion and official policy and the steep cost of maintaining the 
prisons.”TPF1140FPT 
497. According to the Prijedor SJB’s own reporting, about 33,180 residents had moved 
out of the municipality in the period from the beginning of the conflict to August, or had 
filed successful requests to this effect with the local authorities. They comprised 13,180 
Muslims who had complied with the required formalities, as well as about 20,000 (mainly, 
but not exclusively, Muslims and Croats) who had left without following the procedures. 
Two hundred and eighty families of Serbian refugees had already settled in Trnopolje by 
18 August 1992, while arrangements were under way to find accommodation to 400 others 
there, as well.TPF1141FPT A 1993 MUP report indicates that 42,000 Muslims and 2,000 Croats 
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moved out of Prijedor municipality in 1992, replaced by about 14,000 Serbs who moved 
in.TPF1142FPT 
498. The Chamber concludes that, in total, over 508 Muslims and Croats were killed by 
Serb forces in Prijedor municipality between May and August 1992. Serb forces attacked 
Prijedor town and after the take-over proceeded to attack the old town area, a 
predominantly Muslim neighbourhood. They looted local businesses and deliberately 
destroyed houses with the assistance of paramilitary units. The crisis staff implemented 
restrictive measures against Muslims and Croats. Serb forces also attacked numerous 
predominantly Muslim or Croat villages in Prijedor municipality. Large numbers of 
Muslim and Croat civilians were killed during the attacks and many others were executed 
afterwards. On 20 July, the last major population displacement in the municipality 
occurred with the removal of thousands of non-Serbs from Hambarine and nearby Ljubija. 
From May to December 1992, mosques and other religious institutions throughout Prijedor 
municipality were targeted for destruction. Property of Muslims and Croats who had left 
the area was confiscated and assigned to Serbs.  
499. The Chamber further concludes that most of the Muslims and Croats in Prijedor 
municipality were detained for some period of time at one of 58 detention centres in 
Prijedor municipality, five of which were long-term detention camps. Particularly in the 
long-term detention centres at Keraterm, Trnopolje, and Omarska, detainees were 
subjected to severe mistreatment, which included psychological abuse, beatings, sexual 
assaults, rapes, and torture, often leading to death. Altogether, more than 5,500 persons 
were held and interviewed at the three camps. On several occasions detainees were 
executed. Around 24 to 26 July, in one of the rooms of the Keraterm camp, 150 to 200 
Muslim and Croat detainees were fired at with machine guns and killed. On 25 July, 85 
detainees were killed by Serb soldiers at an iron-ore mine. On 21 August, 154 Muslim 
detainees were executed at Korićanske Stijene, in Skender Vakuf municipality. The 
Chamber concludes that over 30,000 of the Muslim and Croat population of Prijedor 
moved out of the municipality in the period from the beginning of the conflict in April 
through August 1992 out of fear or due to unbearable circumstances. 
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4.3.10 Prnjavor 
500. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Prnjavor municipality was 33,508 (71 per cent) Serbs, 7,143 (15 per cent) Muslims, 1,721 
(4 per cent) Croats, 1,757 Yugoslavs, and 2,926 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1143FPT 
501. During the first half of 1992, the Serb crisis staff and local Serbs discriminatorily 
targeted Muslims in the municipality, dismissing them from the police and the judiciary, 
restricting their movements, and harassing and attacking them. Business premises and 
other property as well as the mosque [D19.1] and the Catholic Church in Prnjavor town 
were destroyed.TPF1144FPT The terrorization of Muslims in Prnjavor municipality was also carried 
out by the Wolves of Vučjak, a paramilitary group which worked closely with the local 
police and was headed by a local criminal called Veljko Milanković.TPF1145FPT 
502. Around March 1992, a group consisting of police, Serb soldiers from Laktaši, and 
Veljko Milanković ordered the inhabitants of the Muslim village of Lišnja to leave their 
homes. Most of the villagers were taken and brought to a sawmill in Vijaka, where JNA 
soldiers and police officers were present.TPF1146FPT Some of the persons detained at the sawmill 
in Vijaka were released a day later, while about 250 to 300 Muslim men were put on buses 
and taken to the Sloga shoe factory in the town of Prnjavor. There they were guarded and 
interrogated by Serb police officers. They were subjected to beating by guards, local Serb 
reserve police officers and soldiers who were passing through the municipality. The 
detainees were not provided with food other than that brought by friends and relatives. 
They were forced to labour at various tasks. Some detainees were taken to the SJB in 
Prnjavor town where they were interrogated and beaten.TPF1147FPT 
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503. In June 1992, the SJB, under orders from CSB Banja Luka, a TO unit, the Wolves 
of Vučjak and some military units launched an attack on Lišnja and another Muslim 
village, Purači, with heavy artillery.TPF1148FPT During the attack, Dragan Đurić, a deputy to the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bosnian-Serb Assemblies, said on a radio broadcast that 100 
Muslims would be killed for every Serb killed.TPF1149FPT Fifty-four houses and a mosque [D19.2] 
in that village were destroyed during the attack. TPF1150FPT The mosque in Purači was also 
destroyed [D19.3]. TPF1151FPT Witness Odobašić heard Nedeljko Davidović, a Serb captain, boast 
on the radio that he had defeated the “balijas” by shelling Lišnja and Purači, and that the 
Wolves had looted and burned houses there.TPF1152FPT 
504. From the first half of 1992 and onwards, Muslims and Croats started to leave the 
municipality because of pressure and threats from the Serbs. Buses with Muslims were 
seen leaving the municipality in the direction of the Hungarian border. Persons were 
charged money for the permission to leave. They also had to sign statements authorizing a 
local lawyer to sell their immovable property within six months, failing which ownership 
of the property was transferred to the Bosnian-Serb Republic. TPF1153FPT 
505. On 19 June 1992, the Serb crisis staff in Prnjavor decided that all “refugees” living 
in the municipality who were “disloyal” to the authorities of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, as 
well as “refugees” whose relatives were members of enemy formations, were obliged to 
leave the municipality. It ordered the SJB to implement the decision.TPF1154FPT On 23 June 1992, 
the crisis staff decided that persons who had left the municipality and who owned property 
were to report to the municipal authority by 10 July or face being treated “in accordance 
with the Decision of the [ARK] Crisis Staff”, meaning that their property would be 
declared property of the state and put at the disposal of the municipality.TPF1155FPT  
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506. A May 1993 MUP report indicates that 2,053 Muslims, 923 Croats, and 308 of 
other non-Serbian ethnicity had left the municipality while 2,500 Serbs had moved in.TPF1156FPT  
507. The Chamber concludes that, during the first half of 1992, Muslims in Prnjavor 
municipality were subjected to discriminatory measures and dismissed from the police and 
the judiciary. In particular, the paramilitary group Wolves of Vučjak harassed and attacked 
Muslims. Business premises and other private property as well as the mosque and the 
Catholic Church in Prnjavor town were destroyed. From the first half of 1992 and onwards, 
the threats and pressure made Muslim and Croats leave the municipality. Some left on 
buses for the Hungarian border.  
 
4.3.11 Sanski Most 
508. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Sanski Most municipality was 28,136 (47 per cent) Muslims, 25,363 (42 per cent) Serbs, 
4,322 (7 per cent) Croats, 1,247 Yugoslavs, and 1,239 persons of other or unknown 
ethnicity.TPF1157FPT 
509. In March 1992, local SDS officials acting on the orders of regional SDS officials in 
Banja Luka repeatedly requested the municipal assembly to discuss the issue of Sanski 
Most becoming part of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. When the assembly refused, the local 
SDS authorities called for a division of the municipality along ethnic lines.TPF1158FPT On 25 
March, by proclamation signed by the president of the local SDS Vlado Vrkeš, and the 
president of the Sanski Most municipal assembly Nedjeljko Rašula, all Serb territories in 
the municipality were declared part of the Bosnian-Serb Republic as the unified Serb 
municipality of Sanski Most.TPF1159FPT On 3 April, the Serb assembly of Sanski Most decided 
that the municipality would become part of the ARK.TPF1160FPT The Serb crisis staff in Sanski 
Most issued a statement that, as of 20 April, only the Constitution and laws of the Bosnian-
Serb Republic shall be in effect in the territory of Serb Sanski Most.TPF1161FPT On the same day, 
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the crisis staff declared the former municipal assembly illegal.TPF1162FPT The crisis staff 
dismissed many Muslims and Croats from their jobs, including judges and directors of 
public companies, the local radio, and the health centre; others were put off from going to 
work by the treatment they received there, and were replaced with Serbs.TPF1163FPT Serb 
managers who had allowed Croats and Muslims to work in their companies were also 
dismissed. TPF1164FPT SDS president Vrkeš, accompanied by SOS members and the Serb police, 
forced out the Croat director of the municipal SDK, appointing a Serb in her place.TPF1165FPT 
510. On 11 April 1992, Witness Adil Draganović, the Muslim president of the Sanski 
Most municipal court, received a threatening letter signed by members of the White Eagles 
stating that he and the municipal deputy prosecutor, Enver Cerić, also a Muslim, were to 
leave Sanski Most by 15 May 1992 or their families would be harmed.TPF1166FPT On 15 May 
1992, the Muslim employees of the court were informed by the Serb police that they had to 
take mandatory leave.TPF1167FPT Draganović was dismissed from his post and the judiciary 
authority was transferred to the Serbs, upon an order of the crisis staff.TPF1168FPT 
511. On 17 April 1992, Stojan Župljanin, head of CSB Banja Luka, ordered the division 
of the police along ethnic lines. Police officers were ordered to demonstrate their loyalty to 
the Serb municipality by wearing the insignia of the Bosnian-Serb Republic and signing a 
declaration that they would respect its laws and regulations. Only persons of Serb ethnicity 
signed the declaration.TPF1169FPT Some non-Serb police officers and SDA leaders took refuge in 
the municipality building, where negotiations between the political parties continued. On 
19 April, the crisis staff addressed an ultimatum to those inside. The building was 
surrounded by soldiers of the JNA 6th Krajina Brigade. Those inside the building managed 
to flee to surrounding villages. Nedjeljko Rašula, as head of the crisis staff, dismissed 
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Muslim and Croat officers from the police force.TPF1170FPT On the same day, Serb forces attacked 
the municipality building in the town. Around that time, members of the SOS who were 
supported by the SDS, armed with automatic weapons and dressed in camouflage, 
destroyed 28 shops and restaurants belonging to Muslims and Croats in the Sanski Most 
area.TPF1171FPT As a result of these attacks and other acts of intimidation during March and April 
1992, many Muslim and Croat inhabitants left the municipality. TPF1172FPT 
512. In March and April 1992, Serb forces, including soldiers of the JNA 6th Krajina 
Brigade, and Serb police, erected checkpoints in the town of Sanski Most and around non-
Serb villages, and the crisis staff established a curfew prohibiting movement at night.TPF1173FPT 
At the checkpoints, armed Serb forces checked the Muslims that went through. TPF1174FPT 
513. During May 1992, various armed groups were seen in the municipality, including 
the SOS, the White Eagles, and local SUP and JNA units.TPF1175FPT On 5 August, the Sanski 
Most SJB reported that in the previous two months, there had been a great deal of activity 
by certain paramilitary groups that had ‘broken free’ from the command of the army and 
conducted their own operations, such as planting explosives, torching houses, killings, 
looting and other types of crime against the Muslim and Croatian population, all aimed at 
acquiring material profit and putting pressure on them to move out. It further referred to 45 
explosions that had been set off at Muslim houses and business premises, and two mosques 
destroyed. It reported that it had registered four such groups, among them the SOS group, a 
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former paramilitary group with a strength of around 30 men, which had formally been 
placed under the command of the local military unit.TPF1176FPT 
514. On 25 May 1992, calls upon Muslims to surrender their weapons to the Serb 
authorities were broadcast over Sanski Most radio. Serb patrols collected the weapons.TPF1177FPT 
The broadcasts also called on several named individuals – wealthy Muslims and Muslim 
intellectuals – to surrender.TPF1178FPT That same evening, Sanski Most town was shelled by Serb 
forces.TPF1179FPT Serb forces also shelled the hamlet of Okreč, which was predominantly 
Muslim.TPF1180FPT On or around 25 May, the JNA 6th Krajina Brigade and the TO also launched 
an artillery attack on the Muslim settlements of Mahala, Muhići, and Otoka. Serb soldiers 
forced Mahala residents to gather at a training ground and then shelled the village and 
partially destroyed houses and the local mosque.TPF1181FPT The attack on Mahala is confirmed by 
a report of the SJB of Sanski Most.TPF1182FPT 
515. On 27 May 1992, between 50 to 100 Serb soldiers surrounded the majority-Muslim 
village of Lukavica and ordered the village be evacuated for the purpose of searching the 
houses for weapons.TPF1183FPT On 1 August, a group of soldiers in olive-coloured uniform with a 
red stripe pinned to their epaulettes came to Lukavica and broke into several houses. They 
led away fourteen civilian men aged 22 to 60 years. The following day, the villagers found 
the bodies of thirteen of the men, marked with bullet holes and severe wounds. Only one of 
the men survived [A14.4].TPF1184FPT 
516. Also on 27 May, Serb forces shelled the village of Hrustovo, an almost exclusively 
Muslim village. On 30 May, the Muslims of the village decided to hand in their weapons, 
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but the shelling continued.TPF1185FPT The next day, as people from 21 households were forced to 
leave Jelečevići, a Muslim hamlet in the area of Hrustovo, about 30 women and children 
and one man took refuge inside a garage. Eight to ten Serb soldiers in camouflage uniform 
came to the garage and ordered the Muslims out. A man who tried to mediate was shot and 
the soldiers killed sixteen women and children when they tried to run away [A14.1]. 
Between 50 and 100 Serb soldiers escorted the survivors with around 200 inhabitants of 
neighbouring villages to the hamlet of Kljevci, where their valuables were confiscated. 
Serb soldiers detained the villagers at various locations before transporting them by bus 
and train to Doboj, where they were ordered to find their way to Muslim-held territory.TPF1186FPT 
517. On or around 28 May 1992, the Muslim village of Vrhpolje was shelled by Serb 
forces. Shortly thereafter, the inhabitants were summoned to hand in their weapons. They 
were told that that was a condition for them to be allowed to leave their village.TPF1187FPT 
518. On 28 May 1992, the Sanski Most crisis staff decided that the location for the burial 
of people killed in the municipality would be the Muslim cemetery and that the dead were 
to be buried in a common grave “without the usual rituals (in the absence of family 
etc.)”.TPF1188FPT 
519. On 31 May or 1 June 1992, Serb soldiers led by Jadranko Palja escorted nineteen 
Muslim men from the hamlet of Donji Begići to Vrhpolje bridge. Four of the men were 
killed by the soldiers along the way. The others arriving on the bridge were surrounded by 
50 Serb soldiers, forced to surrender their belongings, beaten, and ordered to jump off the 
bridge. From the bridge the soldiers shot at the men in the water and killed almost all of 
them [A14.2]. TPF1189FPT 
520. On or around 27 June 1992, local Serb reservists in olive-grey uniform arrived in 
the Muslim hamlet of Kenjari. In a nearby house, 20 Muslim men were arrested, 
interrogated and taken before Vlado Vrkeš, president of the Sanski Most SDS, who assured 
them they had nothing to fear. They were led by Serb soldiers to a house in the hamlet of 
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Blaževići. The soldiers threw explosives into the house, and then opened fire with rifles 
against those trying to escape. The bodies of the dead were taken back into the house and 
the house was set on fire. Witness 481 identified eighteen persons killed in this incident 
[A14.3]. TPF1190FPT 
521. During 1992, at least nineteen Muslim and Catholic monuments in Sanski Most 
municipality were heavily damaged or completely destroyed. The monuments included 
mosques in Donji Kamengrad [D22.1], in Kukavice Hrustovo [D22.3], the mosque in 
Keranovići Hrustovo [D22.4], the mosque in Stari Mlađan [D22.5], the mosque in 
Pobriježje [D22.6], the mosque in Ehovci [D22.9], and Hamza Bey mosque in Sanski Most 
town [D22.7]. In late May 1992, the Hasanbegova mosque in Sanski Most was destroyed 
by members of the 6th Krajina Brigade. A parking lot was laid out on top of its 
cemetery. TPF1191FPT In mid 1992, the SDS ordered the destruction of the Donji Kamengrad 
mosque. Mladen Majkić, a military engineer, was ordered by a member of the SDS to set 
explosives in the mosque.TPF1192FPT 
522. The Betonirka prison camp [C28.1] and Krings Hall [C28.3] as well as the 
detention centre at the Hasan Kikić sports hall [C28.2] were set up by the crisis staff of 
Sanki Most municipality in the beginning of May 1992. The detainees were delivered to 
these centres by the army and the SJB, on direct orders from the crisis staff. The SJB was 
made responsible for the security at these detention centres. According to information from 
the Bosnian-Serb authorities, of the 1,655 detainees at the three centres, the majority were 
men from 18 to 65 years; 1,538 were Muslims and the rest Croats. About 900 detainees 
were sent to Manjača camp in Banja Luka upon an order of the crisis staff, and another 600 
were set free. TPF1193FPT 
523. In late May 1992, Serb forces began to arrest Croat and Muslim leaders.TPF1194FPT Some, 
including the secretary of the SDA municipal board, a Muslim judge, and the municipal 
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chief of police, were killed.TPF1195FPT Adil Draganović, president of the municipal court, was 
detained at the local police station [C28.5] from 25 May to 17 June 1992, when he was 
transferred to Manjača camp in Banja Luka municipality.TPF1196FPT The conditions at the police 
station were bad, with little food, insufficient space to lie down, no toilet, and no 
shower. TPF1197FPT Police officers, soldiers and ordinary citizens severely beat the detainees on a 
regular basis. The detainees were not given any medical treatment.TPF1198FPT 
524. Mirzet Karabeg, president of the executive board of the municipal assembly, was 
detained at the Sanski Most police station [C28.5] and in the Betonirka prison camp 
[C28.1] from 25 May to 28 August 1992. In the police station, he was held together with 
fourteen prominent Muslim and Croat civilians, and in Betonirka together with 75 
persons.TPF1199FPT Approximately 30 men were detained in Betonirka prison camp by June 1992 
[C28.1]. At four by five meters, the building where the detainees were kept was so 
crowded that the detainees were forced to sleep sitting up. The detainees were provided 
with insufficient food and water. Serb police officers and outsiders who were allowed into 
the camp beat and mistreated the detainees.TPF1200FPT On 22 June, around 20 detainees from 
Betonirka prison camp were taken to nearby Kriva Cesta, where they were ordered at 
gunpoint by soldiers in olive-grey uniforms to dig their own graves. A group of ten 
persons, among them Nedjeljko Rašula, sat at a picnic table nearby, watching the digging. 
When the detainees had finished, a soldier slit the throats of all but three detainees, who 
were taken back to the camp [B17.1].TPF1201FPT 
525. Faik Biščević, a member of the local SDA’s main board, was arrested on 27 May 
1992 and detained in a house in Magarice village for two days, without food or water. 
Around 29 May, he was transferred to Sanski Most prison [C28.7], where he was held in 
cramped conditions with inadequate food and hygiene facilities. He lost 32 kilograms 
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whilst in prison. Prison guards and soldiers, who were allowed to enter the prison, 
regularly beat the detainees. A Muslim religious leader from Vrhpolje, Emir Seferović, 
was mistreated more frequently than other detainees and was forced by prison guards to eat 
pork. Nedjeljko Rašula was seen on several occasions eating in the prison kitchen.TPF1202FPT 
526. On 1 June 1992, Adem Seferović, a Muslim from the village of Hrustovo, 
surrendered to Serb soldiers and was taken to Betonirka prison camp [C28.1].TPF1203FPT In early 
July 1992, all Muslims from Hrustovo, Trnopolje, and Kamićak who had sought refuge in 
Tomina elementary school [C28.22] were taken to the Krings Hall in Sanski Most [C28.3], 
where they were detained with 600 others. The hygiene conditions at this detention centre 
were extremely poor. Serb police officers beat the detainees with batons and rifles, and 
Witness 481 saw one man beaten to death in July 1992. TPF1204FPT 
527. On 4 June 1992, the Sanski Most crisis staff tasked Mirko Vrućinić, Nedjeljko 
Rašula, and Colonel Aničić with specifying categories of detained persons in the 
municipality for transfer to Manjača camp. The categories comprised “politicians”, 
“nationalist extremists”, and people “unwelcome” in Sanski Most municipality. Witnesses 
628 and 633 explained that the first two categories referred to members of the SDA and the 
HDZ and to those who had voted for the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF1205FPT 
528. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians in twelve detention centres in Sanski Most municipality in 1992, 
namely a military garage [C28.4], the Krkojevci sports hall [C28.6], the SUP building at 
Lušci Palanka [C28.8], the prison at Sana [C28.9], the Narodni Front elementary school 
[C28.10], Kamengrad [C28.11], the Gornja Mahala elementary school [C28.12], the house 
of Simo Miljuš [C28.13], Keramika [C28.14], Lufani [C28.15], Podvidača [C28.17], and 
Kozica school [C28.21].TPF1206FPT 
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529. On 30 May 1992, the crisis staff of Sanski Most discussed “the problem of 
refugees” from the Mahala area, as well as that of Muslims and Croats who were disloyal 
to the Bosnian-Serb Republic and its laws. The crisis staff decided that all persons who had 
not taken up arms and who wished to leave the municipality would be allowed to do so. It 
also decided to contact the ARK leadership regarding population resettlement.TPF1207FPT In May 
or June, Bosnian-Serb police were seen forcing people out of their homes in a Muslim area 
of Sanski Most. Vlado Vrkeš, president of the Sanski Most SDS, told Witness 633 that the 
opinion in the SDS was that this type of action was taken as a countermove to Muslim 
actions elsewhere and that Muslims had to be resettled so that Sanski Most could become a 
purely Serb town. TPF1208FPT 
530. In June 1992, Besim Islamčević, a Muslim from Podbriježje, organized a meeting 
attended by Vlado Vrkeš during which a procedure for the departure of the Muslims was 
discussed. Muslims wishing to stay had to sign an oath of loyalty to the Serb authorities in 
the municipality. After additional pressure on the Muslim community during June-July, 
Muslim representatives considered that it would be safer for the Muslims to leave Sanski 
Most. It was suggested that Islamčević and Vrkeš should discuss with UNPROFOR 
representatives the possibility of organizing the departure of Muslims. UNPROFOR’s 
representative told the delegation that the UN would not assist with a population transfer 
through Croatia. Despite this, convoys of thousands of Muslims, under the escort of 
civilian and military police, left the municipality during September 1992.TPF1209FPT 
531. On 22 June 1992, the Sanski Most crisis staff was informed about the ARK crisis 
staff’s decision that every municipality in the region was to appoint a person responsible 
for matters relating to the removal and exchange of populations and prisoners, and that this 
person was to report to Vojo Kuprešanin of the ARK. The crisis staff of Sanski Most 
appointed Vrkeš for this purpose and established a five-member committee for population 
migration.TPF1210FPT The crisis staff also decided on 2 July 1992 that departure from the 
municipality would be granted to persons who had given a statement to the municipal 
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authority that they were permanently leaving the municipality and who had exchanged 
their immovable property or surrendered it to the municipality. TPF1211FPT 
532. Around 3,000 persons left Sanski Most municipality between May and August 
1992, and as of 16 August 1992 the SJB had approved the applications of 12,000 persons, 
mostly Muslims, who wished to leave the municipality but had not been able to do so.TPF1212FPT 
A May 1993 MUP report indicates that 24,000 Muslims and 3,000 Croats had left the 
municipality and that 5,000 Serbs moved in.TPF1213FPT 
533. The Chamber concludes that, in total, more than 88 Muslim civilians were killed by 
Serb forces in the municipality of Sanski Most in the period end of May to August 1992. 
Serb forces attacked many majority-Muslim villages and settlements in the municipality 
and deliberately destroyed mosques and Muslim houses and business premises. As a result 
of these attacks and other acts of intimidation, many Muslims and Croats left the 
municipality. Serb forces also detained more than 1.500 mainly Muslim and Croat civilians 
in eighteen detention facilities in the municipality. The detainees were mistreated on a 
regular basis. During September 1992, convoys of thousands of Muslims left the 
municipality under the escort of civilian and military police. They were forced to surrender 
their property to the municipality. Almost all Muslims had left the municipality of Sanski 
Most in 1992. 
 
4.3.12 Teslić 
534. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Teslić municipality was 32,962 (55 per cent) Serbs, 12,802 (21 per cent) Muslims, 9,525 
(16 per cent) Croats, 3,465 Yugoslavs, and 1,100 persons of other or unknown 
ethnicity.TPF1214FPT 
535. In April 1992, Teslić town was barricaded and road signs appeared in Cyrillic.TPF1215FPT 
The Teslić SJB, which had been part of the Doboj CSB under the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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MUP, became part of the Banja Luka CSB.TPF1216FPT The SDS-appointed president of the 
municipality fired all non-Serb police officers.TPF1217FPT 
536. Around May 1992, many paramilitary groups, such as Arkan’s Men, the White 
Eagles, and the Red Berets arrived in the town of Teslić.TPF1218FPT They beat and killed people 
around the town and destroyed or damaged Muslim and Croat properties, including five or 
six mosques in Teslić town and surrounding villages [D25.2, D25.3], as well as Catholic 
churches [D25.1].TPF1219FPT The Teslić public prosecutor and the investigating judge initiated 
proceedings against persons who allegedly committed serious crimes against people and 
property in Teslić municipality.TPF1220FPT The accused were subsequently arrested and remanded 
in custody, but due to pressure and threats from the command of the Doboj operational 
group, a paramilitary formation also called Mića’s, were soon after released from the Banja 
Luka prison.TPF1221FPT  
537. Witness 484, a Muslim resident of the suburbs of Teslić, was arrested on 3 June 
1992 by soldiers in green camouflage uniforms and red berets and Serb police officers in 
blue camouflage uniform.TPF1222FPT He was detained at the Teslić Police station [C31.3, C31.6] 
in a cell measuring 12 square metres with around 50 other persons, including seven 
persons known to him – six Muslims and a Croat. The detainees were beaten and 
humiliated.TPF1223FPT Vlado Petrović, a Croat, saw Red Berets beating a Muslim detainee in the 
police station upon orders of the police commander.TPF1224FPT Several days later, one detainee 
was transferred to a detention centre in the TO building [C31.1, C31.8] and another to the 
hangar near the TO building [C31.2]. TPF1225FPT Between 200 and 300 detainees, including some 
local politicians and other prominent figures from Teslić municipality, were being held in 
each of these facilities.TPF1226FPT Serb reserve police officers and soldiers in green camouflage 
uniform and Red Berets stationed in the TO hangar were under the command of Predrag 
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Markočević and Marinko Đukić.TPF1227FPT In the TO building, prisoners were severely 
beaten.TPF1228FPT Witness 484 who was detained in the TO hangar saw four detainees beaten to 
death and the president of the Teslić SDA, Fadil Isić, shot by Red Berets as he lay on a bed 
in a medical centre [B18.1].TPF1229FPT Another witness saw the Red Berets beat up a Muslim 
detainee.TPF1230FPT Witness 484 paid the Red Berets a large sum of money to be released, only to 
be arrested again by the Red Berets, who took him to the Pribinić post office, which was 
under the control of the military police [C31.9]. He was detained there with six other 
Muslim men and beaten by Dragan Babić, a local Serb waering olive-grey military reserve 
uniform. Witness 484 was finally released on 23 July 1992.TPF1231FPT 
538. Detainees that were released from the TO building, in August 1992, were obliged to 
report for work duties, such as cleaning streets, cutting wood, and digging trenches.TPF1232FPT In 
October 1992, one former detainee was issued a document by the local Serb TO which 
stated that he was not allowed to enter his home, nor remove any items because they now 
belonged to the municipality of Teslić.TPF1233FPT 
539. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians at five detention centres in the municipality in 1992, namely the 
detention centre in Pribinić [C31.4], Mladost school [C31.5], Teslić prison [C31.7], the 
Proleter football club stadium [C31.10], and the Banja Vrućica health resort [C31.11].TPF1234FPT 
540. The Chamber concludes that, in total, more than five persons of Muslim or Croat 
ethnicity were killed by Serb forces in Teslić municipality in summer 1992. Serb 
paramilitaries beat and killed people in the town of Teslić and destroyed or damaged 
Muslim and Croat property, including mosques and Catholic churches. Serbs also detained 
Muslim and Croats in several detention centres under cramped conditions. Detainees were 
severely beaten and some died as a result. Former detainees were obliged to work and dig 
trenches. 
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4.4 Sarajevo municipalities 
4.4.1 Hadžići 
541. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Hadžići municipality was 15,392 (64 per cent) Muslims, 6,362 (26 per cent) Serbs, 746 (3 
per cent) Croats, 841 Yugoslavs, and 859 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1235FPT 
542. From mid April 1992, SDS leaders and JNA barracks commanders in Hadžići 
cooperated openly in bringing in JNA reserve units from Serbia and Montenegro. These 
units occupied strategically important buildings and positions in the town of Hadžići in the 
course of the second half of April 1992. In early May 1992, the SDS held a session to 
establish a Serb municipality of Hadžići and to define its boundaries. On 7 May 1992, 
armed Serb reservists and Serb policemen entered the Hadžići municipal building, evicting 
the employees. The same day, the SDS issued an ultimatum demanding that the Muslim 
police, TO officers, and members of other municipal bodies leave Hadžići municipality by 
the following day. On 8 May 1992, an artillery attack against the police station of Hadžići 
was launched.TPF1236FPT 
543. During the next few days, Serbs took control over parts of the municipality and 
started to arrest people and expel and evict large parts of the non-Serb population. Two to 
three thousand Muslim and Croat men, women and children left Hadžići town, many left 
on foot and withdrew through the woods. Serb women and children were evacuated from 
Hadžići on buses. Only two to three hundred members of the original Muslim and Croat 
population remained in Hadžići town. Serb reservists set up checkpoints and positions in 
the town centre, restricting movement.TPF1237FPT  
544. Between 15 and 20 May 1992, the Serbs also shelled the settlement of Musići, part 
of the village of Ušivak. On 20 May 1992, armed Serbs in JNA uniform or dressed in 
olive-green camouflage uniforms entered Musići, gathered fourteen Muslim men and took 
them to the garage in the Hadžići municipal assembly building [C15.4]. Another 46 men 
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were held in the same garage.TPF1238FPT The Serb forces ill-treated the detainees and did not give 
them sufficient food and water.TPF1239FPT 
545. On 25 May 1992, Serb forces transferred some of the detainees from the garage of 
the municipal building to the Hadžići sports centre [C15.3, C15.5] where at that time 60 
men and one woman were detained.TPF1240FPT Vidomir Banduka, a member of the crisis staff of 
Hadžići municipality, confirmed that it was a decision of the crisis staff to keep the 
Muslims there.TPF1241FPT While in detention in the Hadžići sports centre, the detainees were often 
beaten and sexually abused by members of the paramilitary units.TPF1242FPT 
546. Around 22 June 1992, the detainees were transferred from the Hadžići sports centre 
to the Slaviša Vajner Čiča barracks in Lukavica, Novo Sarajevo municipality, in order to 
be exchanged.TPF1243FPT When the exchange attempts had failed, on 8 September 1992, Witness 
Musić was returned to Hadžići town and detained at the Hadžići sports centre along with 
500 others. The majority of the detainees were women and children.TPF1244FPT 
547. On 20 June 1992, Serb military police detained Witness 141 and her sister at the 
Hadžići civil defence headquarters [C15.1], where they were beaten and raped by the Serb 
guards. In the headquarters, military policemen intimidated Witness 141 by pretending to 
order her execution and by handing her an active grenade. Around 25 June 1992, they were 
moved to the garage of the municipal building [C15.4] where the witness’s sister was 
sexually abused by a Serb paramilitary soldier. In mid July 1992, Ratko Radić, the SDS 
municipal president transferred the two women to the premises of a factory outside Hadžići 
[C15.2] where they were detained together with other Muslims from Hadžići and were 
forced to work. At the factory, Radić raped the witness’s sister regularly. Other 
commanders and guards stationed at the factory raped both women on many occasions. 
Around 11 December 1992, the factory commander moved some detainees to the Vranica 
Dormitory Huts in Hadžići [C15.6] where another 30 Muslims and Croats, among them 
 
TP
1238
PT Musić T. 8452, 8461; P407.A (Musić statement), paras 1, 3; P407.C (Musić statement), paras 23-9, 33-5; 
P407.D (Musić statement), paras 2-5. 
TP
1239
PT P407.C (Musić statement), paras 36, 38; P499.B (Witness 141 statement), p. 3; P499 (Witness 141 
statement), p. 4. 
TP
1240
PT P407.A (Musić statement), para. 3; P407.C (Musić statement), paras 40, 52, 55; P407.D (Musić 
statement), para. 5; P501.A (Balić statement), pp. 1-2; Banduka, T. 18882, 18890.T 
P
1241
P Banduka, T. 18808, 18814-16, 18629-30, 18665-8. 
P
1242
P P407.A (Musić statement), para. 5; P407.C (Musić statement), paras 45-50; P501.A (Balić statement), pp. 
1-2; Banduka, T. 18809, 18882. 
P
1243
P P407.A (Musić statement), para. 6; P407.B (Musić statement), para. 2; P407.C (Musić statement), paras 
55-9; P501.A (Balić statement), p. 2; Banduka, T. 18820, 18883-4. 
P
1244
P P407.A (Musić statement), paras 8-10. 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 4 
 Municipality crimes 
 
 
207 
women, were held. Serb soldiers passing by repeatedly beat and threatened the 
detainees.TPF1245FPT  
548. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians at eight detention centres in the municipality in 1992, namely the 
professional trades school, the Garaže (car garages), the Zgrada TO building, the basement 
of a hotel, Tarčin prison, the Žunovnica military barracks, the building of Social Affairs, 
and the Blažuj military barracks.TPF1246FPT 
549. In late 1992, the Serb assembly of the municipality of Hadžići decided to rescind 
citizenship rights in the Bosnian-Serb Republic to all former residents of Hadžići who had 
not returned to the territory of the municipality or had not provided an explanation for their 
inability to return before 20 July 1992. The decision also terminated their tenancy rights 
and employment rights and stated that their property was to be used temporarily for the 
requirements of the defence of the municipality.TPF1247FPT  
550. The Chamber concludes that Serb forces took over Hadžići town and parts of 
Hadžići municipality with the assistance of JNA forces and expelled most of the non-Serb 
population in May 1992. They detained mainly Muslim and Croat civilians in thirteen 
detention facilities under inhumane conditions, mistreated and sexually abused them. 
 
4.4.2 Ilidža 
551. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Ilidža municipality was 29,337 (43 per cent) Muslims, 25,029 (37 per cent) Serbs, 6,934 
(10 per cent) Croats, 5,181 Yugoslavs, and 1,456 persons of other or unknown 
ethnicity.TPF1248FPT 
552. In the beginning of March 1992, a Serb SJB was created after the Muslim police 
officers were dismissed from their positions.TPF1249FPT In April and May 1992, various 
paramilitary formations arrived in the municipality, including Brne Gavrolović’s group, 
Bokan’s group, “Chetniks” from Zvornik, and Arkan’s men, with some of whom the Ilidža 
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crisis staff cooperated.TPF1250FPT After the establishment of the VRS, some paramilitaries 
remained in Ilidža and assisted the VRS and MUP forces. TPF1251FPT 
553. By the end of April 1992, under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Tadija 
Manojlović, JNA heavy artillery, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns, and tanks, fired every 
evening on targets in Sarajevo, including the neighbourhoods of Butmir and Hrasnica in 
Ilidža municipality.TPF1252FPT The Serb SJB also took part in the attacks.TPF1253FPT By early May 1992, 
Serb forces controlled Ilidža.TPF1254FPT 
554. In 1992, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat and Muslim civilians in ten 
detention centres in Ilidža municipality, namely the former ambulance building [C16.2], 
the Lužani trailer park [C16.3], the cultural and sports complex, the storage building of 
Energoinvest, Kasindol hospital, the “July 27” elementary school [C16.5], the graphic 
school, the kindergarten, the Ilidža SJB [C16.1], and the Blažuj military barracks. On 23 
July 1992, Witness Musić was arrested by “Chetnik” police and detained in a small cell 
without windows at the Ilidža SJB [C16.1]. During Musić’s detention in Ilidža, “Chetnik” 
police officers forced him to help them loot Muslim houses in the town. All detained 
Muslims were interrogated in order for Serb authorities to obtain information regarding 
their intentions.TPF1255FPT 
555. Due to repressive measures undertaken against them, many Muslims fled and 
moved out of the municipality. Tomislav Kovač, the wartime chief of the Ilidža SJB, said 
on one occasion that the civilian authorities had declared a general policy of expelling 
Muslims from Ilidža.TPF1256FPT On 25 June 1992, Nedjeljko Prstojević, president of the Ilidža 
crisis staff, spoke with Rade Ristić, a local official from Ilidža, about the situation in the 
Kasindol area. Upon hearing that the Serbs were holding their ground, Prstojević told 
Ristić: “All right. But have them hold on to it tightly and have them all killed there please 
... Kill all the Muslims, like Alija ... I don’t want to see one military aged Muslim alive 
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there”. He went on to authorize Ristić to give Muslim apartments in the area to Serbs 
involved in the fighting, saying that he had printed the requisite forms for the transfer of 
property, and that on that same day authorities in Ilidža had already filled out 30 such 
forms for apartments in the Nedžarići area, east of Ilidža town.TPF1257FPT 
556. The Chamber concludes that, after Serb forces took control over Ilidža municipality 
in May 1992, they detained mainly Muslim and Croat civilians in twelve detention 
facilities in the municipality. Many Muslims left the territory of Ilidža municipality out of 
fear and due to repressive measures undertaken against them. 
 
4.4.3 Ilijaš 
557. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Ilijaš municipality was 11,325 (45 per cent) Serbs, 10,585 (42 per cent) Muslims, 1,736 (7 
per cent) Croats, 1,167 Yugoslavs, and 371 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1258FPT 
558. In March 1992, Serb flags were hoisted on the Ilijaš municipal building and on the 
police station and SDA and HDZ representatives stopped attending the municipal assembly 
meetings. Around the same time, the SJB split along ethnic lines.TPF1259FPT The Serb part called 
itself the “Serb police” of SAO Romanija and came under the control of the Serb crisis 
staff.TPF1260FPT Muslim and Croat police officers, as well as Muslims and Croats employed at 
schools, banks, and hospitals, were dismissed. TPF1261FPT Muslims proceeded to establish their 
own crisis staff and police station in a village close to the town of Ilijaš.TPF1262FPT 
559. The Serb crisis staff took over all the major military and civilian institutions and 
facilities in the municipality, including the SDK, banks, a JNA fuel warehouse, and the 
media.TPF1263FPT The local SDS was assisted by a paramilitary formation.TPF1264FPT Still later, on 14 
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June 1992, the Serb crisis staff of the municipality invited Arkan’s men to come to its 
assistance with at least one platoon.TPF1265FPT  
560. Preparations to take over the majority-Muslim village of Lješevo began in March 
1992 when Serbs erected checkpoints, distributed arms to the locals, and placed heavy 
artillery on the surrounding hills. In April 1992, the Muslims in the village organized 
village guards and in May they formed a crisis staff, charged with organizing life and work 
in the village. Also in May, the Serb police ordered the Muslims to surrender their 
weapons. Most of the Muslims complied and 60 to 80 per cent of the Muslims left the 
village in fear of an attack. On 4 June, Lješevo was hit with gunfire and shells. The shells 
hit several houses in the Muslim part of the village where no military target was present. 
On the following day, Serb soldiers entered the village and killed approximately 20 
Muslim villagers, after capturing them and burning their personal documents [A8.1]. The 
Serb soldiers forced other villagers from their homes and assembled them at the railway 
station. From there, the Serb police transported the village residents by bus to a building in 
the Podlugovi area of Ilijaš [C17.5], where they were detained for two months.TPF1266FPT  
561. On two occasions, in April and again on 4 June, Serb forces shelled the hamlet of 
Mlini. By early July, the attacks caused the majority of the village population to move to 
Breza municipality, to the north of Sarajevo.TPF1267FPT 
562. Around May 1992, the Muslims in the predominantly Muslim village of Gornja 
Bioča organized guard shifts, armed with military and hunting rifles. On 29 May, Serb 
forces shelled the village. Serb soldiers killed two relatives of Witness Selimović outside 
their house. Soon thereafter local Serb soldiers detained the Muslim village residents, 
including women and children, and held them for five days in the village primary school 
[C17.1, C17.3]. Soldiers then moved 80 men to another school, in Podlugovi [C17.5].TPF1268FPT 
The detainees in Podlugovi [C17.5] were guarded by Serbs. They slept on the floor and 
received very little food, on some days nothing at all. Sometime in August 1992, a 
representative of the Ministry of Justice of the Bosnian-Serb Republic visited the detainees 
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and informed them that, because of the poor conditions in detention, they would be moved 
elsewhere. Around 17 August, the detainees were indeed transferred, to another detention 
centre in Semizovac, Vogošća municipality.TPF1269FPT 
563. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians at nine detention centres in the municipality in 1992, namely the 
industrial school, the former railway station, the INA gasoline storage plant, the old homes 
in Jamjanovići, the old pit in Podlugovi, the town police station and prison [C17.7], the 
Nišići winter services maintenance, the MIK factory hall in Podlugovi, and a concrete 
bunker by the Stavanja river in Podlugovi.TPF1270FPT  
564. During 1992, Serb forces destroyed a large number of historical and religious sites 
in Ilijaš, including the Catholic cathedral in Taračin Do and 21 Muslim religious 
monuments, including the mosque in Stari Ilijaš [D13.1, D13.2], the mosque in Misoča 
[D13.3], the mekhtab in Bioča [D13.4], and a mosque in Srednje.TPF1271FPT 
565. The Chamber concludes that, in total, at least 22 Muslims were killed by Serb 
forces in the municipality of Ilijaš in May and June 1992. Serb forces attacked several 
Muslim-majority villages and destroyed a large number of historical and religious 
monuments. The attacks on the hamlet Mlini caused the majority of the population to move 
to Breza municipality, to the north of Sarajevo. In other villages, Serbs forced villagers out 
of their houses and detained many of them in twelve detention centres in the municipality 
in poor conditions.  
  
4.4.4 Novi Grad 
566. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Novi Grad municipality was 69,430 (51 per cent) Muslims, 37,591 (28 per cent) Serbs, 
8,889 (7 per cent) Croats, 15,580 Yugoslavs, and 5,126 persons of other or unknown 
ethnicity.TPF1272FPT 
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567. On or about 22 February 1992, a Serb municipality was established in Rajlovac, 
comprised of mixed population villages including the predominantly Muslim village 
Ahatovići.TPF1273FPT In March, at the talks between local SDA and SDS representatives in the 
village, the Serbs threatened to attack the Muslims if they did not leave the village. The 
Muslims refused to comply with the demand and established a local crisis staff, set up 
barricades, organized village guards and armed themselves with infantry weapons. In 
April, Serbs set up barricades in other places in the municipality. One barricade was set up 
at the bridge across the Bosna River in the Reljevo settlement where only Serbs could pass 
through. When Witness Mujkić tried to pass, he was told that no “balijas” could pass.TPF1274FPT 
In early May, Arkan’s men and the White Eagles arrived at the village. On 24 or 25 May, 
women, children, and the elderly attempted to leave Ahatovići for the nearby municipality 
of Visoko, but were prevented from doing so by Serb soldiers who fired at them. 
Following this incident, about 120 men from Ahatovići, armed with light infantry 
weapons, organized resistance in the village. On or about 27 May, Serb tanks and 
armoured vehicles took up positions in the hills around Ahatovići. Using megaphones, the 
Serbs urged the villagers to surrender. They threatened: “Balijas, surrender, or we kill your 
children.” When they refused, Serb infantry launched an attack but they were repelled by 
the Muslims. The Serb forces proceeded to shell the village from the hills. Serb former 
JNA soldiers and White Eagles then entered the village with APCs and tanks whereupon 
the Muslim villagers surrendered. During the attack, a number of Muslim villagers were 
killed and about fifteen wounded and captured Muslims were executed by Serb soldiers 
[A12.1]. The Chamber finds that, with the exception of the fifteen wounded Muslims who 
were killed upon capture, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the Muslims 
killed in Ahatovići were not taking active part in the hostilities. Almost all 130 houses in 
Ahatovići were damaged or destroyed during the attack.TPF1275FPT A few days after the attack, the 
village mosque was blown up. All the surviving Muslims in the village were either arrested 
or expelled, together with some Serbs and Croats who were married to Muslims. TPF1276FPT 
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568. On 2 June 1992, after the attack on Ahatovići, Witness 122, Elvir Jahić and other 
Muslims from the village were taken to the Rajlovac army barracks [C22.1] where other 
Muslims were already being detained. On the way to the barracks, the Serbs cursed Alija 
Izetbegović and “balija mothers”. The commander of the detention centre at the barracks 
was Mile Stojanović. The detainees received no food and little water during their 
detention. Members of a special unit, under the command of Nikola Stanišić, severely beat 
the detainees and unleashed dogs on them. At least two men died as a result of the beatings 
[B13.1]. On 10 June, a Serb man called Žuti launched a hand bomb with poisonous gas 
into the reservoir where the detainees were being held and said “breathe in, balijas”. One 
of the guards allowed the detainees out soon thereafter.TPF1277FPT  
569. On 14 June 1992, Žuti and some other guards took Witness 122, Elvir Jahić and 
about 50 other detainees by bus to Sokolina, near Srednje, in Ilijaš municipality. There the 
guards and the driver got off the bus and attacked it with grenades and automatic weapons. 
A total of 47 detainees were killed during this incident. Witness 122 escaped and Jahić 
survived the massacre [B13.2]. TPF1278FPT  
570. Witness Ramiz Mujkić was also detained at the Rajlovac army barracks in the 
period from 6 to 9 August 1992. On the first night, an officer in olive-green army uniform 
hit him with a grenade, breaking his jaw.TPF1279FPT Witness Ferid Čutura, a Muslim from 
Vogošća, was detained at the military airport barracks in Novi Grad during the first two 
weeks of May 1992. He and other detainees were severely beaten on a regular basis by the 
Serb guards. The detainees were also forced by the guards to beat other detainees. On 13 
May, the witness was transferred to a detention centre in Vogošća municipality.TPF1280FPT 
571. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians at three other detention centres in Novi Grad municipality, all in the 
commune of Rajlovac, in 1992, namely the Energopetrol gasoline storage plant, a 
distribution centre, and the Kisikana oxygen storage plant.TPF1281FPT  
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572. A May 1993 MUP report indicates that 13,000 Muslims and 40 Croats had left the 
municipality while 3,400 Serbs had arrived.TPF1282FPT  
573. The Chamber concludes that Serb forces killed 64 Muslims in total in Novi Grad 
municipality in May-June 1992. In Ahatovići, Serb forces killed fifteen wounded persons 
by the end of May 1992. On 14 June 1992, 47 detainees were killed in Sokolina, near 
Srednje, in Ilijaš municipality. Serbs detained mostly Muslim and Croat civilians in four 
detention centres around the municipality. The detainees were severely beaten and 
mistreated by Serb guards. Numerous houses and one mosque were destroyed during the 
attack of one village, and about 13,000 Muslims and some Croats were subsequently 
expelled by force.  
 
4.4.5 Novo Sarajevo 
574. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Novo Sarajevo municipality was 33,902 (36 per cent) Muslims, 32,899 (35 per cent) Serbs, 
8,798 (9 per cent) Croats, 15,099 Yugoslavs, and 4,391 persons of other or unknown 
ethnicity.TPF1283FPT 
575. On 1 March 1992, Serbs, including Serb employees of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
MUP such as the then assistant Minister of Interior, Momčilo Mandić, and the head of the 
Novo Sarajevo SJB, Milenko Jovanović, and SDS officials such as Rajko Dukić, Jovan 
Tintor, and Ratko Adžić, began to organize barricades at strategic points in Sarajevo and 
surrounding municipalities.TPF1284FPT The following day, Muslims set up barricades.TPF1285FPT During 
the following months, Serb police and Serb soldiers in JNA uniforms continued to restrict 
the movement of non-Serbs.TPF1286FPT 
576. At the end of April 1992, JNA forces shelled Sarajevo and its neighbourhoods, such 
as Bijelo Polje and Novo Sarajevo. TPF1287FPT From June 1992 onwards, soldiers, assigned to 
sniper duty, took position at the upper floors of four multi-storey buildings in the commune 
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of Grbavica. A VRS soldier reported that he had heard sounds of gunfire coming from the 
upper floors and was told by the snipers that they had shot people.TPF1288FPT Members of the Serb 
army, the Serb police, and Šešelj’s men, searched Muslim and Croat houses in the 
commune of Grbavica for weapons.TP F1289FPT Three women, two Muslim and one of mixed 
ethnicity, were raped during these house searches from June to September 1992, by an 
armed man, named Batko, who had come to their apartments.TP F1290FPT Batko also committed 
several other crimes, including looting and plundering, in Grbavica in June-July 1992.TPF1291FPT 
577. From the outbreak of conflict until October 1992, KP Dom Butmir or Kula [C23.2] 
in Novo Sarajevo accommodated 10,000 Muslim civilians of all ages, for periods ranging 
from a few days to several months.TP F1292FPT Between 12 May 1992 and 20 May 1992, 118 
unarmed persons, including 31 from Dobrinja, were detained by TO forces on various 
grounds at Kula.TPF1293FPT Kula was under the Serb MUP jurisdiction until the beginning of 
August 1992, when it was taken over by the Ministry of Justice.TPF1294FPT The inadequacy of 
accommodation, food, and hygiene, and the poor health of the detainees were addressed by 
the SJBs in Ilidža and Novi Grad who asked the MUP and the Ministry of Justice on 20 
May 1992 to solve the situation.TPF1295FPT 
578. Another detention centre in Novo Sarajevo where non-Serbs were detained was 
under army jurisdiction and located at Lukavica, Novo Sarajevo [C23.6]. TPF1296FPT In both Kula 
and Lukavica detainees were regularly beaten.TPF1297FPT In Kula, two detainees were beaten to 
death by the guards on or about 7 April 1992. TPF1298FPT In several cases, detainees were 
transferred to Kula prison within a month after their arrival at the Lukavica barracks.TPF1299FPT In 
both the detention centres, detainees were forced to perform manual labour such as digging 
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trenches and graves.TPF1300FPT In Kula, detainees were obliged to participate in a work platoon. 
Some of them were ordered to dig trenches at front lines, and as a result, at least four 
detainees were killed by snipers or shells and others were injured. TPF1301FPT 
579. On 16 June 1992, Witness 329, a Croat woman from Novo Sarajevo, was detained 
in the “Šoping” building in Grbavica [C23.1] where she was questioned and beaten by 
Serb soldiers. According to the witness, Biljana Plavšić entered the room and told the 
soldiers to take away the witness and two other detainees – who showed signs of beatings – 
because she was trying to have breakfast in the room next door.TPF1302FPT The Chamber accepts 
the testimony of the witness, but is not in a position to make a finding on whether Biljana 
Plavšić realized that the witness was detained. The witness was transferred to the Lukavica 
barracks in Novo Sarajevo where she was kept in poor conditions with 26 other 
persons.TPF1303FPT On one occasion she saw the Accused, Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, and 
Nikola Koljević arrive together by helicopter.TPF1304FPT 
580. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians at the following detention centres in the municipality in 1992: the 
garages and basements in Grbavica [C23.3], the Digitron Buje shop [C23.4], the rooms of 
Vrace MZ (local community) [C23.5], the Bane Šurbat students’ dormitory, and the Vraca 
police station.TPF1305FPT 
581. In early June 1992, many non-Serbs, in order to escape harassment or arrest, paid 
large sums of money to the Serb authorities to allow them to leave the municipality.TPF1306FPT 
Serb forces expelled Muslims on a large scale from the commune of Grbavica.TPF1307FPT On 30 
September 1992, UN representatives saw 25 families crossing the frontline from Grbavica 
into the city of Sarajevo, and the ICRC also informed UN representatives that they had 
received 150 families who had been forcibly driven from the area.TPF1308FPT 
582. The Chamber concludes that, in total, at least six Muslims were killed by Serb 
forces in Novo Sarajevo municipality in summer 1992. Serb forces detained many non-
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Serbs in six detention centers. The largest detention centre KP Dom Butmir or Kula 
accommodated as many as 10,000 Muslim civilians of all ages in Novo Sarajevo in the 
period from end of April until October 1992. Detainees were regularly beaten, some to 
death. They were forced to work in a work platoon and some of them had to dig trenches at 
front lines, and were injured or killed as a result. Since early June 1992, many non-Serbs 
left the municipality. Serb forces expelled Muslims on a large scale from the commune of 
Grbavica on 30 September 1992. 
 
4.4.6 Pale 
583. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Pale municipality was 11,284 (69 per cent) Serbs, 4,364 (27 per cent) Muslims, 129 (1 per 
cent) Croats, 396 Yugoslavs, and 182 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1309FPT  
584. In early March, Muslims were dismissed from the police in Pale.TPF1310FPT During the 
same month, the Serbs started a campaign to convince Muslims to leave the municipality. 
In some parts of the municipality, Serb police officers and paramilitary commanders 
attempted, on a daily basis and for many weeks in a row, to convince Muslims to leave in 
peace and thereby avoid trouble later. In the second half of March, a Muslim delegation 
from the municipality met with Nikola Koljević and the Pale chief of police, Koroman. 
Koljević told the delegation that local Serbs did not want Muslims living in Pale. Koroman 
informed the delegation that he could no longer guarantee the Muslims’ safety as he could 
not control the Red Berets who had arrived in the municipality.TPF1311FPT Around the same time, 
in March and April 1992, Serbs paramilitaries, local police and reserve soldiers set up 
checkpoints in Pale which severely restricted the movements of Muslims.TPF1312FPT In connection 
with this, many local Serbs were armed and assisted at the barricades.TPF1313FPT In May and June 
1992, there was an increasing concentration of regular and paramilitary personnel in the 
municipality.TPF1314FPT On 22 May, Serb forces attacked and shelled the predominantly Muslim 
village of Donja Vinča, setting houses on fire and forcing the villagers to leave. TPF1315FPT 
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585. Witness Mirsad Smajš and other detainees from the Sarajevo area were transferred 
from the Kula prison in Novo Sarajevo to the sport complex in Pale on 10 May 1992. They 
were detained at the sport complex [C24.2] for three days before they were exchanged. At 
this time, the sport complex held between 400 and 600 detainees. The sport complex was 
close to the police station, and about three kilometres from the Kikinda and Panorama 
hotels which functioned as the seat of the Bosnian-Serb institutions (Assembly, 
Presidency, Government) until June 1992. In mid-May, Witness Rešid Hasanović and 
others who had been arrested and detained in Bratunac were also brought to the sports 
complex. When, on 4 June 1992, Witness Azem Omerović and three other men were taken 
to the sport complex by Serbs in camouflage uniforms using police cars, there were about 
50 detainees held there. The conditions at the detention centre were harsh: the detainees 
slept on the floor without blankets and were provided with food only every other day. 
Many of the detainees were humiliated and beaten by guards and Serb men who were 
allowed into the facility. On one occasion three detainees were beaten to death [B14.1]. 
However, there was no beating of detainees when Ratomir Kojić, who was in charge of the 
detention centre, was present. In early August, the detainees were told that they were going 
to be taken for exchange but were instead transferred back to Kula in Novo Sarajevo. TPF1316FPT 
586. In addition to the sport complex, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat and Muslim 
civilians at three other detention centres in the municipality in 1992, namely the movie 
theatre [C24.4], the cultural centre, and the military barracks in Hrenovica. TPF1317FPT 
587. In late June and early July, the transfer of Muslims from the municipality was 
organized, with announcements and schedules indicating which streets would be affected 
each day. This was carried out with the support of the SDS crisis staff. The Muslims were 
transported to the Muslim part of Sarajevo in around 20 busloads and were allowed to take 
with them only the items they could carry.TPF1318FPT 
588. The Chamber concludes that, in total, at least three Muslims were killed by Serb 
forces in the municipality in summer 1992. Serb forces shelled the predominantly Muslim 
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village of Donja Vinča on 22 May forcing the villagers to leave. In Pale, Muslims were 
detained in five detention facilities. For example, between 400 and 600 detainees, mainly 
of Muslim ethnicity, were detained in harsh conditions in the sport complex where they 
were severely beaten, occasionally to death. In late June and July 1992, buses organized by 
the crisis staff transported a huge number of Muslims from Pale to the Muslim part of 
Sarajevo.  
 
4.4.7 Trnovo 
589. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Trnovo municipality was 4,790 (69 per cent) Muslims, 2,059 (29 per cent) Serbs, sixteen 
Croats, 72 Yugoslavs, and 54 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1319FPT 
590. In March and April 1992, Serbs and Muslims both erected checkpoints in and 
around Trnovo.TPF1320FPT Also, around March or early April 1992, Serb police officers formed 
their own police force, based at the local culture centre, and hoisted a Serb flag on the 
building.TPF1321FPT At the session of the SDS municipal board on 26 April 1992, Drašković, a 
member of the board, called for a division of the municipal administration along ethnic 
lines.TPF1322FPT 
591. Soldiers wearing Serb insignia and tanks appeared in Trnovo and dug trenches in 
town around 25 May 1992. TPF1323FPT Around 29 or 30 May 1992, Serb residents started leaving 
Trnovo expecting an imminent attack. TPF1324FPT The following day, Serb forces under the 
command of Ratko Bundalo shelled Trnovo for several hours. Houses owned by Muslims 
were the main target of the shelling.TPF1325FPT In addition, a Serb unit set Muslim houses in town 
on fire and destroyed the town mosque. TPF1326FPT At least five Muslim residents of Trnovo were 
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killed in the shelling and fourteen Muslims were captured by the Serbs.TPF1327FPT The Chamber is 
not in a position to assess the circumstances of the death of the five Muslim residents. 
592. About 2,500 Muslims left Trnovo as a result of this attack.TPF1328FPT Those who remained 
– mainly women, children, and the elderly – were taken for questioning before the crisis 
staff.TPF1329FPT On 11 June 1992, Colonel Ratko Bundalo of the VRS declared the Kalinovik and 
Trnovo municipalities to be war zones. The movement of the Muslim population was 
further restricted.TPF1330FPT Muslims were detained in two week-end cottagesTPF1331FPT and, in early 
July 1992, exchanged or released to Muslim-held territories.TPF1332FPT 
593. The Chamber concludes that Serb forces attacked Trnovo town and deliberately 
destroyed houses owned by Muslims and the town mosque at the end of May 1992. More 
than half of the Muslim population left Trnovo municipality as a result of the attack and 
other restrictions imposed on them. Some Muslims left the municipality after having being 
detained. 
 
4.4.8 Vogošća 
594. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Vogošća municipality was 12,499 (51 per cent) Muslims, 8,813 (36 per cent) Serbs, 1,071 
(4 per cent) Croats, 1,730 Yugoslavs, and 534 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1333FPT 
595. In early March 1992, the SDS delegates withdrew from the Vogošća municipal 
assembly and established their own assembly. TPF1334FPT Jovan Tintor, member of SDS Main 
Board and president of Vogošća crisis staff, Rajko Koprivica, president of the local SDS, 
and other local SDS leaders wanted the municipality of Vogošća to be divided along ethnic 
lines. The division, as envisaged by them, would leave the Serbs with the town centre, the 
important communication links, and all local industry.TPF1335FPT In March, the JNA set up 
roadblocks around important factories in Sarajevo, including the Pretis artillery and rocket 
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manufacturing plant in Vogošća,TPF1336FPT which was one of the largest in Europe.TPF1337FPT In late 
March, the police were divided along ethnic lines.TPF1338FPT 
596. A large part of Vogošća was brought under Serb control by military force between 4 
and 17 April 1992 by Serb army units and the police organized by the Vogošća crisis 
staff.TPF1339FPT SDS and crisis staff control did not extend to the Serb paramilitaries which 
appeared in the municipality in the period April until August 1992. Paramilitaries acted in 
collusion with some members of Vogošća’s military command, police force, and municipal 
authorities.TPF1340FPT On 30 July 1992, the Vogošća war commission decided to remunerate the 
volunteers under Major Jovo Ostojić, referred to as the “Šoša detachment”.TPF1341FPT 
597. On the basis of instructions received from the MUP and the local military 
command, all Serb police forces in Vogošća municipality were sent to the front lines as 
early as mid-April 1992. Rather than maintaining law and order, police officers engaged in 
combat activities. Many police officers participated in criminal activities, such as looting 
of Muslim houses. They also robbed the TAS factory in Vogošća, which manufactured 
“Golf” vehicles, of around 2,000 cars by June 1992. A special platoon from Sokolac, led 
by Duško Malović and assigned to Mićo Stanišić, was involved in the large scale theft of 
cars from the TAS factory in Vogošća, while the reserve police looted Muslim houses. TPF1342FPT 
598. On 1 May 1992, a Muslim police officer in Sarajevo and his colleague were 
arrested by the Serb TO while driving to his home in Vogošća. They were taken to the 
police station in Vogošća town [C33.8], where they were interrogated and beaten by Jovan 
Tintor.TPF1343FPT  
599. On 2 May 1992, Serbs surrounded and shelled the villages of Svrake and 
Semizovac, in Vogošća municipality. Military aeroplanes bombed the villages, following 
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which residents surrendered their weapons.TPF1344FPT After the take-over of Svrake and 
Semizovac in early May 1992, the Serbs took 470 Muslim men, women, and children to 
the barracks in Semizovac [C33.3.]. The women, children, and the elderly were later 
released, but the men were kept.TPF1345FPT They were supposed to be exchanged for nine Serbs 
who had been taken prisoner by Muslim forces.TPF1346FPT 
600. On 29 May 1992, Gornja Bioča was shelled by Serb forces. Some Muslim men who 
had been guarding Gornja Bioča with hunting and military rifles fled into the woods.TPF1347FPT 
They were arrested and detained in Planjo’s house in Semizovac on 31 May 1992. Since 
the beginning of June 1992, Serb police also detained men from the village of Lješevo, in 
Ilijaš municipality, in Planjo’s house.TPF1348FPT On 8 July, the municipal secretariat for town 
planning, property rights, housing policy, and land register decided, upon request of the 
Ministry of Justice, to temporarily turn over Planjo’s house to the Ministry, for use as a 
prison.TPF1349FPT On 17 August, a group of more than 80 Muslim men who had been in detention 
in a school Podlugovi, in Ilijaš municipality, were transferred by police officers in 
camouflage uniform to Planjo’s house. [C33.1.] There were a total of 113 men detained at 
Planjo’s house, most of whom were Muslims, but also some Croats and one Serb. Women 
and children were held in separate quarters upstairs. They were guarded by Serb soldiers 
and police officers in camouflage uniform, who would often severely beat them.TPF1350FPT In 
October, 172 people were detained here.TPF1351FPT In the period between August and November 
1992, Serbs would come from Serbia on the weekends to beat the detainees and force them 
to perform sexually humiliating acts.TPF1352FPT  
601. At the end of August 1992, Serb military personnel began to take Muslim detainees 
from Planjo’s house to perform labour at the front lines in Ravne and Žuč. This included 
digging trenches, carrying ammunition, and removing the bodies of Serb soldiers killed in 
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battle.TPF1353FPT Sometimes groups of detainees from Planjo’s house were used as human 
shields.TPF1354FPT During the month of September 1992, at least fifteen Muslim detainees were 
killed while performing labour at the front lines or being used as human shields [B20.2]. 
Several detainees were also wounded.TPF1355FPT 
602. In May 1992, some detainees from a detention facility called “bunker” [C33.2] 
where 35 male villagers from a Muslim majority village Svrake were detained were taken 
out by a man called Boro Radić and also sent to dig trenches in Žuć. TPF1356FPT According to one 
witness, some detainees never returned. The Chamber is not in a position to further assess 
the fate of these detainees. 
603. Another detention centre in Vogošća was located in the Sonja café-restaurant. 
Brano Vlačo was the warden. The conditions at the detention centre were inadequate, as 
there was overcrowding and insufficient food.TPF1357FPT 
604. In addition to the facilities mentioned above Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians at the following detention centres in the municipality in 1992, namely 
the Sonje bunker beside the Kon Tiki boarding house, a sports complex, the Krivoglavci 
tunnel, the Kisikana Company Building [C33.4], the UPI Distribution centre [C33.5], 
Nake’s garage [C33.7], the Park hotel [C33.9], and the UNIS factories.TPF1358FPT 
605. The mosque in Svrake and the mosque at Kobilja Glava were destroyed [D28.1, 
D28.2]. TPF1359FPT Also, the following places of worship were destroyed during the war in 
Vogošća: the mosque in Ugorsko, the masjid (mosque without minaret) in Karaula-Donja 
Vogošća, the masjid in Tihovići, the masjid in Gora, the masjid in Krč, the mosque under 
construction in the Park Hotel vicinity, and the Catholic church in Semizovac.TPF1360FPT 
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606. The Chamber concludes that at least fifteen Muslim and Croat detainees were killed 
by Serb forces in Vogošća municipality in September 1992. A large part of Vogošća was 
brought under Serb control by military force already between 4 and 17 April, but Serb 
forces shelled other villages in the municipalities and damaged or destroyed several 
mosques in the following months. Many police officers participated in criminal activities, 
such as looting of Muslim houses and robbing the TAS factory in Vogošća. After the take-
over of villages, Serb forces arrested Muslims and Croats and detained them in ten 
detention centers in the municipality under harsh conditions. Some of the prisoners were 
used as human shields and were killed. Until November 1992, Serbs regularly came from 
Serbia to beat the detainees and force them to perform sexually humiliating acts. 
 
4.5 South-eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina 
4.5.1 Bileća 
607. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Bileća municipality was 10,628 (80 per cent) Serbs, 1,947 (15 per cent) Muslims, 39 
Croats, 222 Yugoslavs, and 448 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1361FPT 
608. After the 1990 elections, Serbs occupied all positions of power in municipal offices 
in Bileća, including the head of police.TPF1362FPT In January 1992, all police officers were 
required to wear insignia showing their loyalty to the Bosnian-Serb Republic and the 
Muslim officers, who all refused to comply, were dismissed from their jobs.TPF1363FPT During 
1992, many more Muslims were dismissed from their jobs.TPF1364FPT Leading up to April 1992 
and onwards, Muslims in Bileća were intimidated by Serbs who increasingly carried 
weapons in public. Checkpoints were erected in the municipality and restrictions on the 
movement of Muslim residents were imposed.TPF1365FPT 
609. On 10 June 1992, Serb paramilitary groups entered Bileća from Gacko. They 
included Arkan’s Men, Yellow Wasps, and White Eagles.TPF1366FPT Serb regular and reserve 
police officers selectively arrested Muslim civilians and confiscated all firearms held by 
Muslims. A total of 41 arrested persons were accommodated in the Bileća barracks, which 
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were only intended to hold approximately fifteen persons, for 48 hours [C3.1]. During and 
after this operation, Muslim property was looted throughout the entire municipality, and 
Serbs from other municipalities moved into the abandoned Muslim homes.TPF1367FPT 
610. On 10 June 1992, Witness 10 was taken to the Bileća police station, [C3.2] beaten 
by Serb paramilitaries and then taken to the Bileća barracks, also known as the JNA 
compound Moše Pijade, [C3.1] where he was detained for fifteen days. Around this time, 
the Bileća barracks accommodated 244 detainees, including several women and children. 
Witness 10 was soon returned to the police station, and detained in a cell with 20 to 25 
other men in a building behind the station [C3.4]. In the following months, the detainees 
were beaten regularly by the police and paramilitaries, resulting in at least two 
fatalities.TPF1368FPT During this period, Serb authorities, among them the Bileća police chief and 
Milorad Vučerević, president of SAO Herzegovina, visited the detainees. Following a visit 
by the UNHCR in December 1992, the witness and a number of other detainees were 
released and transported, together with their families, in buses out of the municipality to 
Montenegro.TPF1369FPT  
611. Witness Murguz, a former police officer, was arrested by Serb police on 4 July 
1992 while attempting to flee the municipality and taken to the student dormitory Đački 
Dom [C3.5] with around 70 other Muslim men. He and many other Muslim men were 
subjected to severe mistreatment, including heavy electric shocks and tear gas, while in the 
custody of the Serb police who were guarding the facility. On one occasion, the guards 
took Murguz out of his cell, attached cables to his fingers, and subjected him to electric 
shocks which left him unconscious.TPF1370FPT On 2 September 1992, a CSCE delegation 
inspected 74 detainees in poor condition at the student dormitory Đački Dom [C3.5] in 
Bileća. The delegation noticed that detainees had been mistreated. The facility where the 
detainees were held was inadequate and food provided was insufficient.TPF1371FPT Witness 
Murguz was released in October 1992 after being compelled to sign a declaration 
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indicating that he was leaving the municipality voluntary. He and other detainees, as well 
as their families, were taken in buses directly from the Đački Dom to Montenegro.TPF1372FPT 
612. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians at the Bileća prison [C3.3] in 1992.TPF1373FPT The detention centres in 
Bileća also received Muslims who had been arrested during 1992 in the neighbouring 
municipality of Gacko.TPF1374FPT 
613. Serbs destroyed three mosques in Bileća, using explosives and further demolished 
them with heavy machinery.TPF1375FPT The Chamber is, however, not in a position to clarify 
whether the mosques have been destroyed in 1992.  
614. The Chamber concludes that two detained Muslims were killed by Serb forces in 
the municipality of Bileća in summer 1992. Serb forces looted Muslim property throughout 
the entire municipality. From June 1992 on, Muslim civilians were arrested and detained in 
five detention centers where they were regularly beaten by police and paramilitaries. In one 
detention centre, they were subjected to heavy electric shocks and tear gas. Some of the 
detainees were released after international delegations had visited the detention centres. 
 
4.5.2 Čajniče 
615. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Čajniče municipality was 4,709 (53 per cent) Serbs, 4,024 (45 per cent) Muslims, five 
Croats, 77 Yugoslavs, and 141 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1376FPT 
616. In March 1992, the local SDS leader and municipal president, Duško Kornjača, 
gained control of local armed forces, assumed the presidency of the Čajniče crisis staff, 
and became SAO Herzegovina defence minister.TPF1377FPT That month, local Serbs also formed a 
paramilitary brigade in the municipality and Serbs began to carry weapons openly. In 
April, local Serb authorities dismissed Muslim police officers and many other Muslims 
from positions of public authority. Serb authorities erected barricades on the roads out of 
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Čajniče with the effect of controlling the movement of the Muslims in the municipality. 
Muslims were required to have documents, signed by Kornjača, in order to leave Čajniče. 
As a result of these events, many Muslims began to leave the municipality for Goražde and 
Montenegro.TPF1378FPT 
617. In April 1992, the crisis staff in Čajniče ordered the disarming of local Muslims and 
the arrest of well-known Muslims. TPF1379FPT Serb authorities detained mostly Croat and Muslim 
civilians at three detention centres in the municipality in 1992, namely the Mostina lodge 
[C9.1], the Čajniče town police station [C9.2], and the school [C9.3].TPF1380FPT 
618. In mid-April 1992, several Muslim civilians were arrested and detained in a storage 
container adjacent to a hunting lodge at Mostina [C9.1], a Serb checkpoint along the road 
from Čajniče to Pljevlja in Montenegro. Duško Kornjača’s brother, Milun Kornjača, was in 
charge at the checkpoint, which was operated by the paramilitary group the Blue Eagles. 
The paramilitaries occasionally took detainees out of the container and beat them. The ill-
treatment got more and more severe. On 18 May 1992, members of the Blue Eagles 
massacred around 30 detainees in the container [B5.1], reportedly in retaliation for the 
death of a Serb soldier elsewhere.TPF1381FPT  
619. Following this incident, the majority of the Muslims were removed from Čajniče. 
The local SDS organized buses to facilitate their immediate departure from the 
municipality while others left by their own means. The evacuation was later justified by 
Kornjača as being in the best interests of the Muslims.TPF1382FPT In the meantime, in early May 
1992, Serb forces, some in JNA uniform, some in police uniform, worked in conjunction 
with paramilitary forces, including the Blue Eagles, as they occupied by force Muslim 
towns in the area. Muslim homes were looted and burned in multiple areas across western 
and central Čajniče.TPF1383FPT 
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620. In June 1992, Serb authorities destroyed the mosques in the town of Čajniče [D7.1, 
D7.2] using artillery and explosives. The SDS crisis staff president Kornjača was reported 
to be publicly enthusiastic about this action. Later in 1992, he ordered the destruction of all 
other Muslim religious sites in order to eradicate traces of the Muslim presence in 
Čajniče.TPF1384FPT On 17 September 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Presidency appointed Kornjača a 
member of the war commission of Čajniče municipality.TPF1385FPT 
621. The Chamber concludes that, in total, around 30 Muslim detainees were killed in 
the municipality in May 1992. After the imposition of many restrictive measures upon 
Muslims and the dismissal of Muslim police officers and other Muslims from positions of 
public authority in April, many Muslims began to leave the municipality for Goražde and 
Montenegro. In early May 1992, Serb forces occupied Muslim towns in the municipality 
by force. Muslim homes were looted and burned, the mosques in the town of Čajniče were 
destroyed. The Chamber finds that in Čajniče municipality, Muslim and Croat detainees 
were kept in three detention centres. On 18-19 May 1992, members of the Blue Eagles 
killed around 30 detainees held in a hunting lodge. After that, the majority of the Muslims 
were removed from or left Čajniče. The local SDS organized buses for the departure from 
the municipality. 
 
4.5.3 Foča 
622. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Foča municipality was 20,790 (51 per cent) Muslims, 18,315 (45 per cent) Serbs, 94 
Croats, 463 Yugoslavs, and 851 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1386FPT 
623. From April 1992, Muslims in Foča municipality were dismissed from their jobs or 
were, with the support of the Serb crisis staff, prevented or discouraged from reporting to 
work. TPF1387FPT Restrictions were placed on the movement of Muslims.TPF1388FPT At the same time, the 
Serb population could move around freely, with the exception of a night curfew from 8 
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p.m. to 6 a.m. affecting all inhabitants.TPF1389FPT The SDS political propaganda grew more 
aggressive, and there were outbursts of violence and house-burning.TPF1390FPT  
624. Immediately prior to the outbreak of the conflict on 8 April 1992, Serbs began 
evacuating their families and children from Foča, generally to Serbia or to Montenegro.TPF1391FPT 
Some Muslims, alerted by the movements of their Serb neighbours coupled with general 
tension in the town, also fled or managed to evacuate their families before the outbreak of 
the conflict.TPF1392FPT Others, both Serbs and Muslims, relocated to areas of Foča town where 
people of their own ethnicity were in majority.TPF1393FPT  
625. On 7 April 1992, following pressure from the SDS leadership, the SJB was divided 
along ethnic lines.TPF1394FPT By then, there was already a Serb military presence in the streets and 
many Serbs were mobilized on that day and issued with weapons. On the night between 7 
and 8 April, Serbs took over the Foča radio station, the warehouse of the regional medical 
centre, and the TO warehouse where weapons were stored.TPF1395FPT 
626. The Serbs deployed heavy artillery on elevated sites around Foča, controlling not 
only heavy weapons which belonged to the JNA, but also the weaponry of the TO. TPF1396FPT  
627. On 8 April 1992, an armed conflict between the Serb and Muslim forces broke out 
in Foča. On that day, roadblocks were set up throughout the town. TPF1397FPT Sometime between 
8.30 and 10 a.m., a Serb attack on Foča town began, with a combination of infantry fire 
and shelling from artillery weapons. Serb forces included local soldiers as well as soldiers 
from Montenegro and Serbia, and in particular the White Eagles.TPF1398FPT Most of the shooting 
and shelling was directed at predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods, in particular Donje 
Polje, but the Serbs also attacked neighbourhoods with both Serb and Muslim inhabitants, 
such as Čohodar Mahala.TPF1399FPT Muslim resistance consisted mostly of infantry concentrated 
in Donje Polje and Šukovac. Serb forces proceeded to take over Foča town area by area, 
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including the hospital and the KP Dom prison facility.TPF1400FPT During the conflict, many 
civilians hid or left Foča altogether.TPF1401FPT Many of the Muslims in hiding gave up their 
personal weapons so that they could not be accused of participating in the conflict. It took 
about a week for the Serb forces to secure Foča town and about ten days more for them to 
be in complete control of Foča municipality.TPF1402FPT The military attack resulted in large 
numbers of wounded civilians, most of them Muslims, and many Muslims leaving the 
town.TPF1403FPT Muslim neighbourhoods were destroyed systematically by Serb soldiers during 
the battle for control of the town, as well as after the town had been secured. Also Serb 
houses were set on fire during the fighting in town.TPF1404FPT 
628. After the Serb take-over of Foča, there was a noticeable presence of Serb soldiers 
and Serb paramilitary units and the attack against the Muslim civilian population 
continued. Around 14 or 15 April 1992, Muslims and some Serbs were arrested in the 
centre of Foča town. While the Serbs were allowed to return home after a few hours, the 
Muslims had to stay in detention.TPF1405FPT Between 14 and 17 April, local paramilitaries 
arrested and detained Muslim civilians from other areas of Foča town, including several 
doctors and medical staff from the Foča hospital, at the TO military warehouses at Livade 
[C13.11]. TPF1406FPT During the arrests, Serb soldiers and military police severely beat and injured 
several of the detainees.TPF1407FPT On 17 April, all male Muslim civilians detained at Livade 
were transferred to the KP Dom [C13.8]. TPF1408FPT 
629. In April and May 1992, Muslims stayed in residences in Foča under virtual house 
arrest, either because they were hiding or at the order of Serb soldiers.TPF1409FPT Houses such as 
“Planika’s” and “Šandal’s” were used as interim detention centres by the Serb military.TPF1410FPT 
Military checkpoints were established, controlling access in and out of Foča and its 
surrounding villages.TPF1411FPT The crisis staff ordered the Muslims to surrender their weapons 
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while Serbs were allowed to keep theirs.TPF1412FPT Serb military police and soldiers searched 
Muslim households for weapons, money and other items. TPF1413FPT Serb houses were not 
searched, or at most were searched superficially.TPF1414FPT Muslim businesses were looted or 
burned, or had equipment confiscated.TPF1415FPT 
630. Outside the town of Foča, Serb forces took over or destroyed Muslim villages in 
Foča municipality.TPF1416FPT The attacks continued until early June 1992.TPF1417FPT The Serb forces 
consisted of military, police, paramilitaries, and, sometimes, Serb villagers. During attacks, 
Muslim houses and apartments were systematically ransacked or burnt down, Muslim 
villagers were rounded up or captured, and sometimes beaten or killed in the process.TPF1418FPT 
The local Foča Tactical Group, including a reconnaissance group under the command of 
Dragoljub Kunarac together with Dragomir “Gaga” Vuković and about fourteen others 
(including Montenegrin soldiers) took part in the armed activities in the municipality. TPF1419FPT  
631. In the period April to June 1992, 25 Muslim monuments in Foča municipality, 
including the Alažda mosque (or the Coloured Mosque of Hasan Nazir) in the town of 
Foča [D11.1] and the mosque in Jeleč [D11.2], were either heavily damaged or completely 
destroyed by fire and explosives. The Alažda mosque was blown up by Serbs in April and 
the ruins were razed by bulldozer in August of the same year. TPF1420FPT 
632. In one attack, Serb troops followed fleeing Muslims in the direction of Goražde, 
and captured the JNA fuel depot warehouse at Filipovići where many Muslim civilians had 
been seeking shelter. At the warehouse, Muslim men were separated from women and 
children.TPF1421FPT The Serb forces separated nine men from the rest and shot them. One of these 
men survived the shooting and another one managed to escape [A6.2].TPF1422FPT 
633. The village of Brod, four kilometres from Foča town, was attacked on 20 April 
1992, after the village authorities had not responded to a Serb crisis staff demand that the 
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villagers should surrender.TPF1423FPT Serb forces in Miljevina set the surrounding Muslim 
villages on fire, and arrested male Muslim civilians.TPF1424FPT On 25 or 26 April, the villages of 
Filipovići and Paunci were attacked and Muslim houses were burned to the ground. 
Civilians from Filipovići were killed.TPF1425FPT 
634. Around 28 April 1992, Serb troops attacked Ustikolina where some Muslims had 
tried to form a resistance.TPF1426FPT After taking the village, Serb forces set fire to Muslim 
houses. From there, Serb forces continued attacking and destroying Muslim villages along 
the left bank of the Drina, downstream from Ošanica, while the population was fleeing. 
Some people were killed. TPF1427FPT 
635. On 4 and 5 May 1992, Serb forces shelled and took over the Muslim village of 
Jeleč.TPF1428FPT When the forces set the village on fire, the population fled to a nearby forest. 
Muslims who stayed in their homes or who tried to escape were killed [A6.3]. TPF1429FPT Other 
male Muslim villagers were captured and detained in facilities in the municipalities of 
Kalinovik and Bileća and later transferred to the Foča KP Dom [C13.8]. TPF1430FPT  
636. In mid-June 1992, about 27 Muslim civilians, mostly women and children, were 
killed in the Čohodor Mahala neighbourhood in the town of Foča.TPF1431FPT  
637. On 22 June 1992, all fifteen adult men from the village of Trnovača, including 
Witness 558’s husband, were taken from the village to a bridge over the Drina river in the 
area of Foča called Brod, where fourteen were killed [A6.6].TPF1432FPT On 24 June, local Serbs 
took a number of women from the same village to Bukovica motel [C13.9], where one 
woman was raped. Two days later the remaining women were taken to the “Srednja Škola” 
[C13.1, C13.2] where some local Serbs, including Miroslav Stanić and Mitar Sipčić from 
the Serb crisis staff, told them that they were trying to ensure a safe route for them out of 
the municipality. During that night one soldier attempted to enter the school but Mitar 
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Sipčić prevented him. The next day, on 27 June, the women were transported to 
Montenegro.TPF1433FPT 
638. In early July 1992, local Serb soldiers, including Gojko Janković and Radomir 
Kovač, attacked the Muslim village of Mješaja/Trošanj.TPF1434FPT At the time of the attack, some 
Muslim villagers were in the woods where they spent the nights in fear of attacks.TPF1435FPT 
Three villagers, including the mother of Witness 295, were killed during the attack. The 
rest of the villagers, consisting of a group of about 50 Muslims, were violently forced 
towards a meadow and another two male villagers were severely mistreated. Serb soldiers 
hit the villagers with rifle butts and tree branches, kicking them, and calling them Ustashas. 
One of the Muslims lost an eye as a result of the brutal beating. At the meadow, the Serb 
soldiers separated the men from the women and the women were chased down a hill 
towards the village of Trošanj. The seven detained men, including the brother of Witness 
295, were killed [A6.7].TPF1436FPT Some of the women were brought to one of the attacking 
soldier’s apartment and were raped repeatedly by many soldiers; they were later sold.TPF1437FPT 
Some other women from the village of Mješaja/Trošanj were taken by Serb soldiers to a 
detention centre at the construction site Buk Bijela [C13.6], where Gojko Janković was in 
charge. At this detention centre, Witness 295 was raped by around ten Serb soldiers until 
she lost consciousness. The witness’s uncle was killed there on 3 July 1992.TPF1438FPT Witness 
295 was later transferred to the Srednja Škola [C13.1, C13.2], where women and children 
were being held in a classroom. Mitar Sipčić was in charge of the guards at the school. 
Witness 295 and nine other women were raped almost every night by local Serb soldiers 
either in one of the classrooms or at a location outside the school.TPF1439FPT  
639. Between 10 April and the beginning of June 1992, large-scale arrests of Muslim 
civilian men and women were carried out throughout Foča and its environs. They were 
arrested, rounded up, separated and imprisoned or detained at several detention centres in 
the municipality. Some of them were killed, raped or severely beaten.TPF1440FPT Some men spent 
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as much as two and a half years in detention.TPF1441FPT The sole reason for this treatment of the 
civilians was their Muslim ethnicity.TPF1442FPT  
640. There were Muslim civilians held at Foča high school [C13.20] and Partizan Hall 
[C13.4] in intolerably unhygienic conditions, without medical care, and with insufficient 
food.TPF1443FPT All this was done in full view, with complete knowledge and sometimes with the 
direct involvement of the local authorities, particularly the police forces.TPF1444FPT The Partizan 
hall was in fact guarded by police officers. Serb soldiers or policemen, including the chief 
of Foča’s police, Dragan Gagović, would come to these detention centres, select one or 
more women, take them out and rape them.TPF1445FPT On one occasion, when women who were 
being transferred from Buk Bijela to Foča high school tried to seek the protection of the 
police in Foča, their complaints were ignored. On another occasion, a woman who tried to 
seek refuge at the SJB was hit by a policeman with the butt of his rifle.TPF1446FPT Some of the 
women were also taken out of these two detention centres by Serb soldiers, including 
Dragoljub Kunarac, to privately owned apartments and houses where they had to cook, 
clean and serve the residents. They were also subjected to sexual assaults. During one rape, 
Kunarac expressed with verbal and physical aggression his view that rapes against Muslim 
women were one of the many ways in which the Serbs could assert their superiority and 
victory over the Muslims. After months of captivity, many women were transferred from 
the municipality or exchanged.TPF1447FPT 
641. Some of the women from Partizan Hall were at some point moved to different 
houses and apartments where they continued to be raped and mistreated. In particular, at 
“Karaman’s house” in Miljevina [C13.3, C13.15], soldiers had easy access to women and 
girls whom they raped.TPF1448FPT Radovan Stanković was in charge at the house.TPF1449FPT Two female 
detainees, including a twelve-year-old girl, spent about 20 days in another apartment in the 
so-called Lepa Brena block in Foča during which they were constantly raped by the two 
occupants of the apartment and by other men who visited. In mid-November 1992, the two 
female detainees were taken to a house near the Hotel Zelengora. They stayed in this house 
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for approximately 20 days during which they were continually raped by a group of 
soldiers. This group of soldiers subsequently took them to yet another apartment where 
they continued to rape them for approximately two weeks.TPF1450FPT 
642. Detainees at the KP Dom [C13.8] numbered between 350 and 500 with peaks at 
over 500 in the summer of 1992.TPF1451FPT They were held there for periods lasting from four 
months to more than two and a half years.TPF1452FPT In addition to the mainly civilian population 
at the KP Dom, there were some Muslim soldiers kept in isolation cells, separately from 
the civilian Muslim detainees.TPF1453FPT The detainees ranged in age from 15 to almost 80 
years.TPF1454FPT While some Serbs were also held in the KP Dom, they were held legally, having 
been convicted by courts prior to the outbreak of the conflict or having been detained for 
military offences during the conflict. By contrast, the Muslims were not detained on any 
legal ground, nor was their continued confinement subject to review.TPF1455FPT Apart from a short 
period at the beginning of their detention at the KP Dom, Muslim detainees were denied 
any contact with the outside world or with their families, and (for a long time) with the 
ICRC. TPF1456FPT None of the detainees was ever charged, tried or convicted for any crime before 
being detained or while in detention at the KP Dom.TPF1457FPT  
643. During the first weeks after the start of the conflict, the KP Dom was guarded by 
the Užice Corps of the JNA. TPF1458FPT Muslims were rounded up, arrested and taken to the KP 
Dom by paramilitary units.TPF1459FPT From about 18 or 19 April 1992 onwards, former Serb 
guards from the KP Dom returned to carry out their work assignments under the authority 
of the warden, Milorad Krnojelac.TPF1460FPT 
644. As warden, formally appointed by the Ministry of Justice on 17 July 1992, 
Krnojelac was responsible to the Ministry of Justice and to a certain extent to the Military 
Command. TPF1461FPT Krnojelac could inform the Foča Tactical Group of convicted Serbs who 
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wished to be released from the KP Dom to allow them to join fighting units and make 
recommendations as to who should be released for this purpose. Foča Tactical group 
included a reconnaissance group under the command of Dragoljub Kunarac, and about 
fourteen others (including Dragomir “Gaga” Vuković and Montenegrin soldiers).TPF1462FPT 
Otherwise the Military Command and the Ministry of Justice had the power over the 
continued detention of convicted Serb detainees.TPF1463FPT It was the Military Command and not 
the Ministry of Justice, who had power to make decisions concerning which Muslim 
detainees would be detained in and released from the KP Dom.TPF1464FPT In this respect, 
Krnojelac was obliged to forward requests for release of these detainees to the Serb crisis 
staff or the Foča Tactical Group, which could decide on these matters.TPF1465FPT The Military 
Command could also make decisions about which persons would be permitted to enter the 
KP Dom, and it had some power over the appointment of persons to work assignments at 
the KP Dom and the type of work to be completed by persons assigned to such work. TPF1466FPT 
645. There were certain groups who entered the KP Dom over whom Krnojelac could 
exercise only limited control. These included investigators and paramilitaries.TPF1467FPT Members 
of the military would enter the KP Dom, although they needed prior permission by the 
military authorities.TPF1468FPT Krnojelac was able to ensure that such persons did not remove 
detainees from the KP Dom without the approval by the Military Command.TPF1469FPT 
646. The detainees had to endure brutal living conditions at KP Dom where they were 
kept in cramped conditions without heating and without adequate food and hygiene 
facilities. Medical care was insufficient.TPF1470FPT Muslim detainees, unlike the Serb detainees, 
were fed starvation rations so that many suffered from severe weight loss and other health 
problems. They were not allowed to receive visits after April 1992 and therefore could not 
supplement their meagre food rations and hygienic supplies.TPF1471FPT 
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647. Interrogations of detainees at KP Dom were conducted sometimes within a few 
days or weeks of arrival, sometimes only after months and, in some cases, not at all.TPF1472FPT 
Both in the course of interrogations and as part of the daily life at KP Dom, many detainees 
were insulted, threatened, and brutally mistreated by guards and people from outside the 
camp. Some were beaten so severely that they were unable to walk for days. Acts which 
resulted in beatings or periods spent in the isolation cells included efforts to get additional 
food, or access to warm water, and attempts to communicate with each other, the guards, 
or the outside world.TPF1473FPT The screams and moans of those being beaten could be heard by 
other detainees, instilling fear among all detainees.TPF1474FPT Since they could not identify any 
criteria for the selection, many Muslim detainees lived under the constant fear that they 
would be taken away next for similar treatment.TPF1475FPT Some of the detainees at the KP Dom 
were taken out for forced labour.TPF1476FPT Between 28 June and 5 July 1992, Serb guards 
murdered 36 Muslims from the Foča area at the KP Dom [B7.1].TPF1477FPT Another 62 bodies 
were found and exhumed from a mass grave on Maluša mountain, Foča municipality. The 
bodies were male, were clad in civilian clothes and a number of them were identified as 
having been Muslims. The limbs of almost every body had been tied and the discovery of a 
large amount of spent infantry ammunition in the vicinity of the grave showed that the 
persons were killed at that location [B7.1].TPF1478FPT The Chamber finds that these men had been 
Muslim civilians who had been detained at the time of their killing. Around 17 or 18 
September 1992, at least another 35 detainees were taken away from the KP Dom and 
killed.TPF1479FPT  
648. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians at twelve detention centres in the municipality in 1992, namely Foča 
hospital [C13.7], Miljevina police station [C13.10], Brioni [C13.12], the house of 
Slobodan Matović [C13.13], the Velečevo reformatory [C13.14], Brod na Drini elementary 
school [C13.17], the Čohodar Mahala military warehouse [C13.18], a Muslim house in 
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Trnovača [C13.19], the house of Munib Hodžić [C13.21], Presjeka Ustikolina [C13.22], 
the apartment of Asima Džanko in Donde Polje [C13.23], and houses in the village of 
Điđevo [C13.24]. TPF1480FPT 
649. Initially there was a military order preventing citizens from leaving Foča. However, 
most of the Muslim civilian population was eventually forced to leave the municipality.TPF1481FPT 
In May 1992 buses were organized to take civilians out of town, and around 13 August 
some Muslims in Foča, mostly women and children, were taken to Rožaje, 
Montenegro.TPF1482FPT On 23 October, a group of women and children from the municipality, 
having been detained for a month at Partizan Hall [C13.4], were transported by bus to 
Goražde.TPF1483FPT Many Muslims left the municipality out of fear for their safety. In order to 
leave they had to arrange for certificates from the local police and sign a form transferring 
whatever property they had to the Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF1484FPT  
650. Groups of detainees were transferred from the KP Dom to other camps in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.TPF1485FPT Detainees were also taken out of the KP Dom on exchanges.TPF1486FPT Around 
30 August 1992, a group of approximately 55 men were taken for exchange in 
Montenegro, but the bus on which they were being transported was intercepted by a 
Serbian soldier in Nikšić, Montenegro, and sent back to the KP Dom.TPF1487FPT The group was 
then divided in two with approximately 20 younger men being taken away, possibly to 
Goražde, and never seen again. The remaining group of 35 men was taken to be exchanged 
in Rožaj in Montenegro.TPF1488FPT  
651. As a result of the events described above, all traces of Muslim presence and culture 
were wiped out of Foča.TPF1489FPT In January 1994, the Serb authorities crowned their complete 
victory - their “gaining supremacy” over the Muslims - by renaming Foča “Srbinje”, 
literally “the town of the Serbs”.TPF1490FPT In the autumn of 1994, the Accused addressed a 
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gathering of people in Foča town, thanking them for creating a “true Serbian town” and for 
preventing it from becoming “another Mecca.TPF1491FPT 
652. The Chamber concludes that over 192 persons, mainly of Muslim ethnicity, were 
killed by Serb forces in the municipality of Foča in the period April to July 1992. By end 
of April 1992, Serb forces had taken control of Foča town and of Foča municipality. Serb 
forces proceeded to attack many Muslim villages, systematically rounded up and 
imprisoned Muslim civilians, they burned and destroyed mostly Muslim, properties and 
demolished several mosques in the Foča town and municipality. Many Muslim civilians 
were killed.TPF1492FPT Muslim and Croat civilians were detained in nineteen detention centres 
under harsh conditions. Muslim women were raped or sexually abused on a regular basis 
and detained in private houses. Detainees in KP Dom numbered between 350 and 500 with 
peaks at over 500 in the summer of 1992. They were brutally mistreated by guards and 
people from outside the camp. Some of the detainees in KP Dom were taken out for forced 
labour. The Chamber finds that, in total, 133 detainees were killed in KP Dom. 
653. The Chamber further concludes that many Muslims left the municipality out of fear 
for their safety. Since May 1992, buses were organized to take civilians out of town. In 
order to leave, they had to transfer their property to the Bosnian-Serb Republic. Around 
13 August, some Muslims in Foča, mostly women and children, were taken to Rožaje, 
Montenegro. Others were transported to Muslim territory, for example some detainees, 
were transported by bus to Goražde on 23 October 1992. 
 
4.5.4 Gacko 
654. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Gacko municipality was 6,661 (62 per cent) Serbs, 3,858 (36 per cent) Muslims, 29 Croats, 
84 Yugoslavs, and 156 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1493FPT 
655. In early 1992 Serb reservists, the police (by then exclusively Serb), and Serb 
members of the TO put up barricades in the town of Gacko.TPF1494FPT In March, violence against 
non-Serbs began when members of a local Serb paramilitary unit arrested and later killed 
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two Muslim men.TPF1495FPT Units of the White Eagles, under the command of Ljubo Jorgić, 
equipped with artillery and infantry weapons and cooperating with the local JNA, patrolled 
the town. They beat Muslims and looted their property with no response from the 
authorities. Serbs burned Muslim houses and businesses.TPF1496FPT Around May or early June 
1992, all Muslim police officers were dismissed, as were Muslim directors of local 
businesses and factories, all replaced by Serbs. The Muslim police commander was 
replaced by the Serb deputy commander, Vitomir Popić.TPF1497FPT At a meeting held on 2 June 
1992, a JNA Herzegovina Corps officer and a Colonel from a JNA unit based in Niš 
threatened to use force against the Muslims of Gacko if they did not comply with an SDS 
order to surrender all weapons. Members of the White Eagles were also present at this 
meetingTP PT.TPF1498FPT In early June, the Yellow Wasps and Arkan’s men were in Gacko, from 
where they then moved on to Bileća.TPF1499FPT 
656. From as early as April 1992, Bosnian Serbs, including paramilitary groups active in 
the municipality, detained mostly Muslim and Croats in Gacko in at least six locations, 
namely Avtovac post office [C14.1], the Gacko SJB [C14.2], the Avtovac barracks 
[C14.3], Fazlagića Kula [C14.4], the power plant [C14.5], and the Samački hotel 
[C14.6]. TPF1500FPT In late May or early June 1992, the local police, under commander Popić, 
together with the local leader of the White Eagles began arresting Muslims and taking 
them to a detention camp in Bileća municipality.TPF1501FPT In early June, there were around 120 
Muslim detainees at the Gacko police station [C14.2]. Some of the detainees were 
beaten.TPF1502FPT These detainees were later moved to the Dom Kulture in Avtovac (three 
kilometres outside Gacko).TPF1503FPT Witness 3 was arrested on 10 June 1992 and brought to the 
police station [C14.2] where he was held with six other Muslim men.TP PT he conditions of 
detention were harsh; the witness and the other inmates were beaten on several occasions. 
On 3 July 1992, the witness saw the execution of five of these Muslim men by seven local 
Serb men led by police commander Popić [B8.1]. The two remaining detainees, the witness 
and another detainee, were forced to load the bodies on a truck and ordered to clean the 
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blood of the walls and the floor. On 4 July 1992, in the same police station, the witness 
was forced by Popić to watch the rape of his own wife by a Serb man from the Munja unit 
of the Red Berets assisted by two other armed Red Berets. On 5 July Witness 3 was taken 
under military escort to various detention centres in Montenegro and Serbia.TPF1504FPT 
657. In the meantime, a large part of the Muslim population of Gacko town had 
withdrawn to the locations Fazlagića Kula and Borać in the municipality, where they were 
trying to organize their evacuation from the municipality. On 17 June 1992, Serb forces 
attacked Fazlagića Kula and killed 130 women, children, and elderly who had not fled 
prior to the attack [A7.1]. Muslims had tried to defend themselves, but the Serb forces used 
artillery, mortars, and tanks.PF1505FP A convoy of Muslims managed to leave from Borać in the 
direction of Kalinovik but was attacked by Serb forces on 4 July 1992. While the men in 
the convoy managed to continue, the women and children were left behind and one witness 
heard that they were captured and brought to Kalinovik and Foča.TPF1506FPT 
658. On 31 July 1992, the Gacko war presidency directed the Muslim residents of 
Bjelašnica, a village in the municipality, to surrender their weapons and gather at a 
collection area, where they were to be put on buses. Men were all to be considered 
prisoners of war and detained in Bileća, with the possibility of being exchanged.TPF1507FPT 
Women, children and the elderly were to be transferred to nearby municipalities or to 
Macedonia. The military police of the Bileća Corps and, according to the proclamation of 
the war presidency, the ICRC, would guarantee transport safety.TPF1508FPT Some people from the 
town of Gacko had stayed behind when others withdrew to Fazlagića Kula and Borać and 
these people were later moved to Macedonia.TPF1509FPT 
659. The Chamber finds that, throughout the summer of 1992, Serb forces and local Serb 
men killed, in total, 137 Muslims, most of whom were women, children, and elderly 
persons. The Chamber finds that in Gacko municipality, Muslims and Croats were detained 
in six detention facilities where they were kept in cramped conditions and beaten on a 
regular basis. In March 1992, Serb paramilitary units beat Muslim men and looted Muslim 
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houses in Gacko town. The Chamber finds that in June-July 1992, large numbers of 
Muslims and Croats left the municipality. Women, children and elderly persons were 
transferred to nearby municipalities or to Macedonia. 
 
4.5.5 Kalinovik 
660. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Kalinovik municipality was 2,826 (61 per cent) Serbs, 1,716 (37 per cent) Muslims, 
seventeen Croats, 46 Yugoslavs, and 62 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1510FPT 
661. Starting already in 1991, Muslims in Kalinovik municipality were subjected to 
harassment and physical intimidation by Serbs.TPF1511FPT On 20 April 1992, Muslim police 
officers, including the chief of police, were dismissed from their jobs following an order 
from Momčilo Mandić.TPF1512FPT In May 1992, Grujo Lalović, president of the municipal 
assembly and president of the SDS municipal crisis staff, issued a request for Muslim 
residents to surrender their weapons.TPF1513FPT In addition, Serbs went to every village in the 
municipality, demanding that the Muslims hand over their weapons.TPF1514FPT Muslim residents 
complied.TPF1515FPT  
662. On 17 May 1992, the SDS crisis staff issued an order calling upon all military-aged 
Muslim men to report to the municipal secretariat for national defence, and to the police 
twice a week.TPF1516FPT Also in May 1992, Muslims in the municipality were required to carry a 
permit issued by the crisis staff in order to move around.TPF1517FPT When Kalinovik municipality 
was declared a war zone by the Serb armed forces on 11 June 1992, the movement of the 
Muslim population was further restricted.TPF1518FPT 
663. On 25 June 1992, Muslim men were summoned by order of Nedžo Banjanin, 
secretary of the municipal secretariat for national defence, to the municipal assembly 
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building to be given work assignments at the Zelengora wood-processing plant.TPF1519FPT Around 
60 Muslim men responded, were arrested, and taken to the Kalinovik elementary school 
[C18.2]. Those men who had failed to respond to the summons were later arrested and also 
brought to the school.TPF1520FPT On 6 July 1992, the detainees were transferred to an ammunition 
warehouse in Jelašačko Polje [C18.4] where, by the beginning of August 1992, some 85 
Muslim men were held and where many detainees were severely beaten.TPF1521FPT There were no 
sanitary facilities in the warehouse, the detainees had to sleep on the concrete floor and 
received little food and water.TPF1522FPT On 5 August 1992, around 25 Muslim detainees were 
called out by Serb soldiers and transported under police escort to the village of Ratine near 
Jeleč, in Foča municipality. The detainees were severely mistreated, their hands tied with 
wire, and their valuables taken away. At a stable in Ratine, the convoy stopped and about 
20 Muslims were shot. Four men were spared and ordered to place the dead bodies in the 
stable. Later on, they were shot, as well. The soldiers poured petrol over the bodies, set the 
stable on fire and left. There was only one survivor [B9.1].TPF1523FPT  
664. At the end of July and beginning of August 1992, villages such as Ljuta, Jelašca, 
Jezero, Mjehovina, and Daganj were shelled, burnt, and taken by the VRS. Many villagers, 
including elderly and women, were killed during these attacks.TP F1524FPT The mosques of 
Kalinovik, namely in Ulog [D14.1], Hotovlje [D14.2], Kutina and Jesalica were destroyed 
during the war.TPF1525FPT  
665. Between 1 and 5 August 1992, Serbs arrested, rounded up, separated and 
imprisoned, or detained almost all remaining Muslims men and women from Kalinovik, 
and also approximately 190 women, children, and elderly persons from Gacko. All 
detainees where subsequently taken to Kalinovik elementary school [C18.2].TPF1526FPT During 
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detention, some detainees were beaten and killed, and women were raped.TPF1527FPT The sole 
reason for this treatment of the civilians was their Muslim ethnicity.TPF1528FPT 
666. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat 
and Muslim civilians at four detention centres in the municipality in 1992, namely the 
Kalinovik town SJB [C18.3], Miladin Radojević elementary school [C18.5], a gunpowder 
warehouse [C18.6], and the Pavlovac farm [C18.7].TPF1529FPT 
667. The Chamber concludes that over 24 Muslims were killed in Kalinovik 
municipality in August 1992. On 5 August 1992, 24 detained Muslim men were shot by 
Serb soldiers. In late July and early August 1992, several villages in Kalinovik were 
shelled, burnt, and taken by Serb forces; the mosques in Kalinovik were destroyed. In the 
beginning of August 1992, Serbs arrested, rounded up, separated, and detained almost all 
remaining Muslim men and women from Kalinovik and also approximately 190 women, 
children, and elderly persons from Gacko. The detainees were held in several facilities in 
harsh conditions. During detention, some detainees were beaten and killed, and women 
were raped.  
 
4.5.6 Nevesinje 
668. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Nevesinje municipality was 10,711 (74 per cent) Serbs, 3,313 (23 per cent) Muslims, 210 
(1 per cent) Croats, 123 Yugoslavs, and 91 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1530FPT 
669. On 16 June 1992, soldiers in camouflage uniform led by Krsto Savić, the 
commissioner for SAO Eastern Herzegovina, entered the house of Witness Trebović, a 
Muslim resident of Nevesinje municipality. They claimed to be looking for weapons and 
radio equipment. During this operation, Savić shot the witness’ husband, Redžep Trebović, 
in the leg. The Serb soldiers held the witness back from helping her husband. When the 
witness and the family were allowed to bring the husband to the hospital four hours later, 
Redžep Trebović had died from his injury. The witness’ house was burnt down 
[A11.1]. TPF1531FPT  
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670. On 22 June 1992, Serb forces shelled Presjeka village in Nevesinje municipality.TPF1532FPT 
Witness 270, a Muslim, her family, and a group of about 150 to 200 other Muslim civilians 
from Presjeka and Kljuna fled to the Velež mountains. Sixteen elderly persons who could 
not keep pace, were left behind, and were later killed by a local Serb.TPF1533FPT The group 
wandered the mountains for three to four days before an artillery attack split the group in 
two. Near Mostar, the witness and 75 others were detained by Serbs in JNA uniform or 
mixed civilian-military clothing.TPF1534FPT They were taken to Dnopolje, in Mostar municipality. 
In front of a school, 29 men were separated from the women and 20 children in the group. 
The men, among them Witness 270’s husband, were later killed at Dubravica.TP PTA total of 27 
bodies of men from this group were exhumed at Teleća Lastva, to where they had been 
moved [B12.1].TPF1535FPT On the order of Major Zdravko Kandić of the 5th JNA battalion, the 
women and children, including babies, were taken to the basement of a heating plant in 
Kilavci, in Nevesinje municipality [C21.1]. The basement of the heating plant was bare 
and had no lavatory. No food or water was given to the group, not even for the babies, and 
Witness 270 and the other mothers had to give urine to them to avoid dehydration.TPF1536FPT 
After four days, Witness 270 and four other detained women were separated from their 
children and taken to Boračko Jezero lake resort, in Konjic municipality [C21.2]. The 
remaining women and children in the basement of the heating plant in Kilavci were killed 
and placed in a pit at Lipovača by the Serb military. During an official exhumation in 
1999, the bodily remains of adult persons and seven children were found at Lipovača 
[B12.1]. TPF1537FPT  
671. In addition to the basement of the heating plant in Kilavci, Serb authorities detained 
mostly Muslim civilians at two detention centres in Nevesinje in 1992, namely Gornje 
Rakitno [C21.3], and the tool factory and workshop, which was one detention facility 
[C21.4, C21.5]. TPF1538FPT Also, in June 1992, Muslim men were detained and beaten at the 
Nevesinje police station and on 16 June, one witness observed a dead body of a Muslim 
man lying in front of the station [A11.2].TPF1539FPT The Chamber is not in a position to assess the 
circumstances of his death. 
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672. During the spring and summer of 1992, nine Muslim and Catholic monuments in 
Nevesinje municipality, including three mosques in the town of Nevesinje and the mosque 
in Kljuna were either heavily damaged or destroyed through fire and explosives [D17.1, 
D17.2, D17.3, D17.4]. Already in September 1991, the Old Mosque at Odzak had been 
almost completely destroyed through shelling and explosions.TPF1540FPT 
673. The Chamber concludes that, in total, over 53 Muslims were killed by Serb forces 
in June 1992. Serb forces shelled villages in the municipality of Nevesinje and deliberately 
damaged or destroyed religious monuments. Mostly Muslim civilians were detained in four 
detention centres. Most of the women and children who had been detained in the basement 
of a heating plant in Kilavci in June were killed by Serb soldiers.  
 
4.5.7 Rogatica 
674. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Rogatica municipality was 13,209 (60 per cent) Muslims, 8,391 (38 per cent) Serbs, 
nineteen Croats, 186 Yugoslavs, and 173 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1541FPT 
675. By the beginning of 1992, Rajko Kušić, a prominent SDS leader in Rogatica and a 
member of the SDS Main Board, had formed a paramilitary unit composed of 45-50 Serbs, 
among them SDS supporters from Rogatica municipality.TPF1542FPT Kušić and Sveto Veselinović, 
the municipal SDS president, sought the partition of the municipality as well as the 
division of the police and the TO in Rogatica. In March 1992, Muslim negotiators agreed 
to the partition in order to avoid war. The Serbs then implemented the division of the 
police station, keeping the weapons they had been issued, a part of the police building, and 
two-thirds of the vehicles.TPF1543FPT Around the same time, the SDS established a Serb crisis 
staff, of which Kušić and Veselinović were members. The crisis staff ordered that Muslims 
be fired from their jobs and be restricted in their movement, although it is unclear whether 
the restrictions were applied throughout the municipality. Serbs also declared the 
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establishment of the Serb municipality of Rogatica.TPF1544FPT Kušić and the SDS ordered all 
Muslims in Rogatica municipality to surrender their weapons under threat of arrest and 
expulsion.TPF1545FPT 
676. On 5 or 6 March 1992, about 50 people in camouflage armed with automatic 
weapons, including six members of the reserve police force, gathered in the majority-Serb 
village Borika, declared themselves to be “Serbian police”, and proceeded to tour other 
majority-Serb villages in the municipality, firing weapons into the air threatening the 
Muslim population.TPF1546FPT From March onwards, armed Serb locals and JNA soldiers, 
including the Užice Corps of the JNA and Rajko Kušić’s paramilitary unit, robbed, 
harassed and mistreated Muslims in the Rogatica area. Witness Dobrača was among the 
victims.TPF1547FPT 
677. At the end of March 1992, most of the Serb population left Rogatica town.TPF1548FPT 
Following their departure, there commenced provocative shooting at the town, from rifles 
and anti-aircraft machinegun fire installed in the villages of Plješevica and Krnčići.TPF1549FPT At 
the beginning of May 1992, representatives of the local SDS, including the SDS board 
member Tomo Batinić, and by that time president of the crisis staff Milorad Sokolović 
demanded control of the whole municipality of Rogatica from Muslim representatives with 
whom they were negotiating. The Muslim authorities objected.TPF1550FPT 
678. On the night of 12 to 13 May 1992, the area of Živaljevina in Rogatica municipality 
was shelled by mortar and anti-aircraft weapons, airplanes, and cannons from the villages 
of Plješevica and Seljani.TPF1551FPT Beginning on 22 May and for approximately seven days, Serb 
forces – including the VRS, Kušić’s men, and volunteer forces – shelled and, finally, took 
control of Rogatica town and the surrounding villages. They met resistance from only 
about 50 Muslims armed with light weapons.TPF1552FPT After the shelling, the Serbs ordered the 
Muslims to gather in the town’s central square. Soldiers in JNA uniform, including a 
reserve JNA captain, demanded that the Muslim population sign a loyalty oath to surrender 
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and move to the Veljko Vlahović secondary school, under the threat of being killed if they 
did not comply [C26.1, C26.6].TPF1553FPT A total of 2,500-3,000 Muslims assembled in the town 
square.TPF1554FPT Serb police and others in olive-green camouflage uniform removed from their 
homes those who did not comply with the orders to go to the secondary school, proceeding 
to separate the men from the women and then beating the men.TPF1555FPT 
679. Witness 382 and his family were among those who went to the secondary 
school.TPF1556FPT Later on, local Serbs under the authority of Rajko Kušić detained up to 1,100 
Muslims of Rogatica in the secondary school.TPF1557FPT Guards and machine-gun nests were 
posted around the secondary school and the detainees were informed that the surrounding 
area had been set with landmines.TPF1558FPT Serb soldiers, police officers, special unit members, 
and paramilitaries interrogated Muslims detained in the secondary school for periods of up 
to three and a half months. The guards beat, raped, and tortured the Muslim detainees. On 
some occasions between June and September 1992, male detainees were taken out and 
killed.TPF1559FPT 
680. On 21 June 1992, “Chetniks” in olive drab uniform captured Witness Agić, who 
had been involved in organizing the defence in Rogatica before the shelling. They beat him 
and took him to the Sladara malt-house in Rogatica [C26.5] where they detained him for 
two or three days. He was then moved to a local nursery in the municipality and after 
another two days, to the Rogatica SUP [C26.7] where he was interrogated and beaten by 
the guards.TPF1560FPT 
681. A total of 28 Muslims who had surrendered to the Serbs after the May shelling of 
Rogatica town were taken to the area of Duljevac village, in Rogatica municipality, where 
24 of them died being used as human shields by Kušić’s paramilitary unit. A total of 24 
Muslims from the area of Rogatica, some of them from Seljani village, who had 
surrendered to the Serbian authorities were buried in a mass grave in Duljević. Two 
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doctors, several directors or managers of companies in Rogatica and some minors and 
elderly villagers were among them.TPF1561FPT 
682. A group of 1,500-2,000 Muslims left Rogatica town due to the intensified shelling 
in May 1992. When the group arrived at the village of Vragolovi in Rogatica municipality, 
there were approximately 5,000-6,000 displaced Muslims and refugees. In July, 1,500 of 
these Muslims escaped to Goradže when Serb forces shelled Vragolovi. In August, all but 
ten of the remaining refugees left the village for Goradže after having received a warning 
about another Serb attack.TPF1562FPT 
683. In addition to the facilities mentioned above Serb authorities detained mostly 
Muslim civilians in four detention centres in the municipality in 1992, namely Rogatica 
farm [C26.2], Rogatica school [C26.3], the stud farm in Borika [C26.8], and Crkveni dom 
(church premises) [C26.10]. TPF1563FPT 
684. By the end of 1992, more than ten mosques in the municipality were destroyed by 
mines. They included the Rogatica town mosque [D20.2], the Arnaudija mosque [D20.1] 
and three mosques in the Vragolovi area, west of Rogatica town, including the mosque in 
Vragalovi [D20.5]. TPF1564FPT 
685. The Chamber concludes that Serb forces, in total, killed over 24 Muslim civilians in 
Rogatica municipality, most of whom were used as human shields. Serb forces shelled and 
took control of Rogatica town and the surrounding villages in May 1992 and deliberately 
destroyed many mosques. Serb forces detained mostly Muslim civilians in seven detention 
facilities, among them up to 1,100 at the secondary school in Rogatica where they were 
mistreated, beaten and raped in the period June to August 1992. Many thousand Muslims 
were expelled by constant shelling of their villages. 
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4.5.8 Sokolac 
686. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Sokolac municipality was 10,195 (69 per cent) Serbs, 4,493 (30 per cent) Muslims, 
nineteen Croats, 83 Yugoslavs, and 93 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1565FPT 
687. In March 1992, barricades were set up and some local Serbs began appearing in 
JNA and camouflage uniforms and carrying automatic weapons.TPF1566FPT Some time in March 
or April, Zoran Cvijetić, chief of the Sokolac SJB, dismissed all Muslim police officers 
from their jobs.TPF1567FPT During April, several paramilitary units based themselves in Sokolac 
town and its surrounding villages. These units included Arkan’s men, the White Eagles, 
and some local groups.TPF1568FPT 
688. In May 1992, Milan Tupajić, president of the Sokolac crisis staff, held several 
official and unofficial meetings with Muslim families on the dangers of remaining in 
Sokolac municipality, explaining that he would not be able to protect them. At the time, 
columns of Muslim refugees from the Drina valley were passing through Sokolac, 
according to Tupajić, fleeing mass killings and other crimes. Others were transported 
through the municipality in bus convoys, escorted by the police of the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic.TPF1569FPT During the second half of May 1992 and throughout the following months, 
the Muslim population started leaving the town of Sokolac and the village of Knežina 
because they felt frightened by the situation in the municipality. Muslims from the 
surrounding villages stayed.TPF1570FPT 
689. In the period from the end of July to the end of September 1992, the VRS 2nd 
Romanija Brigade attacked and destroyed several Muslim villages in Sokolac municipality, 
including Pihlice, Kaljina, Sahbegovići, Mangurići, and Meljine. Attacks began with 
artillery fire, followed by infantry incursions and lastly, the villages were burnt. All five 
mosques in Sokolac municipality, namely in Knežina, Kruševci [D24.1], Kaljina, 
Novoseoci, and Košutica, were blown up or destroyed during these attacks.TPF1571FPT During the 
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attack on Meljine, four women were killed, one through the shelling and three by having 
their throats cut [A15.2].TPF1572FPT 
690. Around 20 July 1992, four Serbs from Sokolac and Knežina dressed in military 
police uniforms, driving an APC with an anti-aircraft machine placed on it, arrested 
Witness Gagula, a Muslim teacher from Knežina in Sokolac municipality. They brought 
him to a barrack situated in the former KTK factory in Knežina [C30.7], where he was 
interrogated and beaten by one of the officers. He was then transported to the elementary 
school “Slaviša Vajner Čiča” in Sokolac [C30.2] by local Serb soldiers where he was 
detained with thirteen other detainees until 3 October 1992. On his arrival at the school, the 
witness was again interrogated and beaten by members of Serb soldiers. On 3 October, the 
witness, along with other detainees, was transferred to the former elementary school in 
Čavarine [C30.1]. The witness identified the commander and some of the guards there as 
former teachers from Sokolac and Knežina. The conditions in the detention centre were 
harsh with insufficient food and hygiene facilities. Detainees were beaten by Serb 
paramilitaries coming from Ilijaš. Gagula was detained in Čavarine until 15 March 1993, 
when he was transferred to the Batković camp in Bijeljina [C2.5].TPF1573FPT 
691. On 22 September 1992, members of the VRS 2nd Romanija Brigade surrounded the 
village of Novoseoci and, despite there being no armed resistance, killed 40 to 45 Muslim 
men [A15.4] and put the women and children on buses and transported them to 
Sarajevo.TPF1574FPT General Krstić informed the VRS Main Staff on the same date that “During 
the day, the village of Novoseoci was cleansed”.TPF1575FPT 
692. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly 
Muslim detainees in eight detention centres in Sokolac municipality in 1992, namely the 
Podromanija cattle farm [C30.3], Knežina post office [C30.4], elementary school 
gymnasium [C30.5], the winter road maintenance point [C30.6], KTK Knežina plant 
[C30.7], Šipad Romanija [C30.8], houses in Čavarina [C30.9], and the slaughter house in 
Sokolac [C30.10].TPF1576FPT 
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693. The Chamber concludes that, in total, more than 44 Muslims were killed by Serb 
forces. On 22 September 1992, over 40 Muslim male civilians were killed by Serb soldiers 
in the village of Novoseoci. In the period July through September 1992, Serb forces 
attacked and destroyed several Muslim villages and deliberately destroyed the five 
mosques in the municipality of Sokolac. From at least July on, Muslim civilians were 
detained in ten detention centres throughout the municipality. The threat of violence felt by 
the Muslim population in the town of Sokolac and the village of Knežina, and the lack of 
protection from the municipal authorities, forced them to leave their homes from May 1992 
and onwards. Some women and children from the villages Novoseoci were transported to 
Sarajevo on buses. 
 
4.5.9 Višegrad 
694. According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of 
Višegrad municipality was 13,471 (64 per cent) Muslims, 6,743 (32 per cent) Serbs, 32 
Croats, 319 Yugoslavs, and 634 persons of other or unknown ethnicity.TPF1577FPT 
695. From early 1992, Muslims in Višegrad were disarmed or requested to surrender 
their weapons.TPF1578FPT From 4 April 1992, Serb politicians repeatedly requested the division of 
the police in the municipality along ethnic lines.TPF1579FPT Soon thereafter, both of the opposing 
groups raised barricades around the town of Višegrad, and this was followed by random 
acts of violence, including shooting and shelling. In the course of one such incident, 
mortars were fired at Muslim neighbourhoods.TPF1580FPT As a result, many civilians fearing for 
their lives fled from their villages.TPF1581FPT When the JNA Užice Corps entered Višegrad around 
14 April 1992, the situation calmed down for a while. After securing the town, JNA 
officers and Muslim leaders jointly led a media campaign to encourage people to return to 
their homes. Many actually did so in late April 1992. The JNA also set up negotiations 
between the two sides to try to defuse ethnic tension.TPF1582FPT 
696. On 19 May 1992, the JNA withdrew from Višegrad. Paramilitary groups stayed 
behind, and other paramilitaries arrived as soon as the army had left the town. Some local 
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Serbs joined them.TPF1583FPT Those Muslims who remained in the area of Višegrad or those who 
had returned to their homes found themselves trapped, disarmed, and at the mercy of 
paramilitaries. Others were subjected to mistreatment and humiliation, to rapes or beatings. 
The paramilitary groups operated at least with the acquiescence of local Serb authorities, in 
particular from, by this time, exclusively Serb police force.TPF1584FPT Many were deprived of 
their valuables by, among others, Milan Lukić and his men.TPF1585FPT Muslim houses were looted 
and often burnt down.TPF1586FPT In addition, six Muslim monuments in the municipality, 
including the two mosques in the town of Višegrad [D26.1], were completely destroyed by 
fire and explosives during 1992.TPF1587FPT 
697. In May 1992, convoys were organized, emptying many villages of their Muslim 
population.TPF1588FPT On one occasion thousands of Muslims from villages on both sides of the 
Drina river from the area around the town of Višegrad were taken to the local football 
stadium.TPF1589FPT There, a JNA commander told them that people living on the left side of the 
Drina river could return to their villages, which had been cleansed of “reactionary forces”, 
whereas people from the right side were not allowed to go back.TPF1590FPT As a consequence, 
many people from the right side of the river stayed in the town of Višegrad, went into 
hiding, or fled.TPF1591FPT 
698. In June 1992 and the following months approximately 200 non-Serb civilians, 
mostly Muslims, women, children, and elderly persons among them, were killed. Some of 
them were shot on a bridge over the Drina river and their bodies then pushed over the side. 
The bodies were exhumed from a number of graves in 2000 and 2001. During these 
exhumations it was concluded that the victims’ clothing was civilian and that there was no 
evidence of firearms. Ligatures were found on or near some of the bodies. The majority of 
the victims died of gunshot wounds, predominantly a single shot. Relatively few wounds 
were on the lower half of the body, which would suggest closeness of the perpetrator to the 
victim. Some of the bodies showed signs of blunt force trauma, which indicated injuries 
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caused prior to death by blows from weapons, or, less likely, by kicking or falling 
[A16.1]. TPF1592FPT 
699. On 14 June 1992, a large group of Muslim civilians of all ages fleeing from 
Koritnik and Sase were locked up in a Muslim house in Pionirska Street, Višegrad, by 
local Serb paramilitaries led by Milan Lukić.TPF1593FPT The house was then set on fire and those 
who tried to escape through the windows were shot at.TPF1594FPT Approximately 66 people died 
as a result of the fire [A16.2].TPF1595FPT 
700. Many Muslim civilians who had not yet fled of their own accord were 
systematically expelled, sometimes with police escorts.TPF1596FPT In the process of their transfer 
identification documents and valuables were often taken away.TPF1597FPT Within a few weeks, the 
municipality of Višegrad was almost completely cleansed of its Muslim citizens.TPF1598FPT 
701. The Chamber finds that, in total, more than 266 persons, mostly Muslims, were 
killed by Serb forces in the municipality of Višegrad in June 1992 and the following 
months. On 14 June 1992, approximately 66 Muslims were locked up by Serb 
paramilitaries and burnt alive in a Muslim house in Višegrad town. The Chamber finds that 
many civilians fled from their villages in Višegrad municipality out of fear for their lives. 
Those who remained or returned to their homes were humiliated, mistreated, beaten or 
raped. Serb paramilitaries looted and often burnt down Muslim houses. It is the Chamber’s 
finding that many Muslim civilians who had not fled of their own accord were 
systematically expelled, sometimes with police escorts. During 1992, six Muslim 
monuments in the municipality were deliberately destroyed. 
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5. Legal findings on crimes 
 
5.1 Crimes against humanity: general elements and jurisdictional requirements 
5.1.1 Applicable law 
702. The indictment charges the Accused with five counts of crimes against humanity 
under Article 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal. He is charged with extermination (count 4) 
or, in the alternative, murder (count 5), pursuant to Articles 5(b) and 5(a) of the Statute, 
respectively. The crimes of deportation (count 7) and “other inhumane acts (forced 
transfer)” (count 8) are charged separately and cumulatively pursuant to Articles 5(d) and 
5(i) of the Statute, respectively. The Accused is also charged with persecution on political, 
racial, or religious grounds (count 3) pursuant to Article 5(h) of the Statute.  
703. Article 5 of the Statute states: “The International Tribunal shall have the power to 
prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, 
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population.” 
A list of crimes follows. The quoted paragraph incorporates the general requirements of 
crimes against humanity. The Chamber will proceed to consider the judicial interpretation 
of these requirements. 
704. Committed in armed conflict. This is a jurisdictional limitation on the Tribunal 
which is not part of the customary-law definition of crimes against humanity.TPF1599FPT It 
requires only that there existed an armed conflict at the relevant time and place.TPF1600FPT An 
armed conflict is defined as a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a state.TPF1601FPT An armed conflict is understood to continue beyond the cessation 
of hostilities, until a general conclusion of peace is reached, or, in the case of internal 
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. The geographical scope of an armed conflict is 
understood to cover the whole of the territories of the warring states, or, in the case of 
internal conflicts, the whole of the territories under the control of the parties to the conflict, 
whether or not actual combat takes place there.TPF1602FPT 
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705. Widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population. For the 
acts of the perpetrator to amount to a crime against humanity they must be part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. The following 
elements under this general requirement may be distinguished:  
(i) there must be an attack;  
(ii) the attack must be widespread or systematic;  
(iii) the attack must be directed against a civilian population;  
(iv) the acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack; 
(v) the perpetrator must know that there is a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population and that his or her acts are part of that attack.TPF1603FPT 
706. The Chamber also makes the following observations on the law: 
 (a) Attack. The notion of “attack” is different from that of “armed conflict”, even 
though the attack and the armed conflict might be related or even indistinguishable.TPF1604FPT An 
attack is formed of conduct causing physical or mental injury, as well as acts preparatory to 
such conduct.TPF1605FPT 
 (b) Widespread or systematic. “Widespread” refers to the large-scale nature of the 
attack.TPF1606FPT “Systematic” refers to the organized nature of the attack.TPF1607FPT Proof of the 
existence of a plan or policy behind the attack is relevant to proof of this element, but the 
existence of a plan or policy is not a distinct legal element of the crime.TPF1608FPT  
 (c) Directed against any civilian population. In determining the scope of the 
“civilian” population, the Appeals Chamber has regarded Article 50 of Additional Protocol 
I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions as relevant,TPF1609FPT even though the Conventions are 
primarily sources of international humanitarian law. The Protocol defines a “civilian” as an 
individual who is not a member of the armed forces or otherwise a combatant.TPF1610FPT A 
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civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians in this sense. Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions is also a source of guidance on the meaning of “civilian 
population” for the purposes of crimes against humanity. This provision reflects 
“elementary considerations of humanity” applicable under customary international law to 
any armed conflict.TPF1611FPT It sets out a minimum level of protection for “persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities”. In conformity with the case law on this point, the Chamber 
understands that “civilian population”, for the purposes of crimes against humanity, 
includes not only civilians narrowly defined, but also persons who are not taking active 
part in the hostilities.TPF1612FPT 
 The phrase “directed against” indicates that it is the civilian population that must be 
the primary object of the attack.TPF1613FPT There is no requirement that the attack should be 
directed against the civilian population of the entire area under consideration.TPF1614FPT  
 (d) The acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack. This element aims at 
excluding isolated acts.TPF1615FPT An act would be regarded as isolated when it is so far removed 
from the attack that, having considered the context and circumstances in which it was 
committed, it cannot reasonably be said to have been part of the attack.TPF1616FPT  
 (e) Perpetrator’s knowledge. The perpetrator must know that there is a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against a civilian population and that his or her acts are part of 
that attack.TPF1617FPT The perpetrator need not have detailed knowledge of the attack.TPF1618FPT The 
motives of the perpetrator for taking part in the attack are not relevant. The perpetrator 
need not share the purpose of the attack, and may commit a crime against humanity for 
purely personal reasons.TPF1619FPT 
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5.1.2 Legal findings 
707. As the Chamber stated above, an armed conflict is considered to cover the whole of 
the territories of the parties to the conflict, or under the control of the parties to the conflict, 
regardless of whether any actual combat has taken place in a specific area under 
consideration. Temporally, an armed conflict continues until a general conclusion of peace 
is reached, or a peaceful settlement is achieved. The Chamber finds that at least from June 
1991, and extending beyond the indictment period, one or more armed conflicts existed, in 
the required sense, in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At first, when Bosnia-
Herzegovina was still part of the SFRY, the armed conflict centered on Slovenia and 
Croatia, both of which declared independence on 25 June 1991.TPF1620FPT During the conflict in 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a vital base for JNA operations, and Bosnian Serbs were 
an important source of manpower for both the JNA and the TO.TPF1621FPT The conflict between 
Serbia and Croatia also served greatly to exacerbate the tension between Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s three ethnic groups.TPF1622FPT Later the conflict became focused on the territory of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and armed clashes erupted at latest during April 1992 in connection 
with the declarations of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic, and continued beyond the indictment period.  
708. On the basis of the evidence discussed in part 4 of this judgement, the Chamber 
finds that, from 18 March 1992 until the end of the indictment period (30 December 1992) 
there was an attack directed against the Bosnian-Muslim and Bosnian-Croat civilian 
population residing in the indictment municipalities. The Chamber notes that, as described 
above in part 2, there might have been various factors or actions attributed to members of 
these groups which may have influenced the timing and motivation of the attack. However, 
these factors are not to be misunderstood as a justification for conducting a widespread and 
systematic attack on a civilian population. The attack included a wide range of 
discriminatory measures taken against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, such as the 
imposition of curfews; the setting-up of barricades and checkpoints where members of 
these ethnic groups were regularly stopped and searched; regular searches of the houses of 
Muslims and Croats; and dismissals of Muslims and Croats from employment in the armed 
forces, the police, municipal organs, and private and publicly owned companies. Beginning 
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in April 1992, Serb forces attacked Muslims and Croats living in towns, villages, and 
smaller settlements, most of which were undefended and contained no military targets, in 
order to take control of the municipality. Muslims and Croats were mistreated and killed. 
Men were often arrested and taken to detention centres, while women and children were 
forced to leave their homes and often the municipality. Serb forces then looted and 
destroyed the houses, rendering it impossible for the villagers to return. Religious 
monuments and sacred sites of importance to Muslims and Croats were also destroyed. The 
Muslim and Croat men and women kept in detention were often beaten or raped by 
members of Serb forces, some of whom were employed as guards for the facility and 
others who were allowed access to the detention centres. The conditions in many of the 
detention centres were intolerable, with insufficient food, water, medical care, and hygiene 
facilities. As a result of the treatment of the detainees, and the conditions of detention, 
many detainees suffered injuries and health problems, sometimes fatal. In addition, many 
detainees were executed at the detention centres. Beginning towards the end of 1992, 
detainees were either directly transferred out of the municipalities, or released and forced 
to leave their municipality by their own means, after being compelled to sign over their 
property to the municipality or to local Serbs. From the summer 1992 onwards, forcible 
transfer out of the municipality was also the fate of many Muslims and Croats who, until 
then, had managed to remain in their homes.  
709. This illustrates the nature of the attack on the Muslim and Croat civilian population 
during the indictment period. The various acts comprising the attack will be further dealt 
with below in parts 5.2.2, 5.3.2, and 5.4.2. Although the Chamber finds that this was the 
general pattern followed in the municipalities, it recognizes that there were differences, 
mostly depending on the ethnic composition of the municipality in question. In 
municipalities where Muslims were a majority and had control over local institutions, such 
as Bratunac, Rogatica, Vlasenica, and Zvornik, local Serb civilians were evacuated, 
whereupon Serbian paramilitary forces launched attacks, expelling the Muslims and Croats 
and repopulating the areas with displaced Serbs. In municipalities where Serbs were a 
majority and had control over the local institutions, such as Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and 
Bosanski Novi, Serb authorities and armed forces exercised relentless and methodical 
pressure on Muslims and Croats, which included threats, arrests, and killings, as well as 
destruction of their religious and cultural institutions, in order to compel them to leave.  
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710. The Chamber finds that in the present case the attack aimed at forcibly displacing 
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats in order to change the ethnic composition of a 
municipality or smaller area within a municipality. The attack was undertaken throughout 
the indictment municipalities, and required the involvement of the Bosnian-Serb 
authorities, on central, regional, and municipal levels. The Chamber therefore finds that the 
attack was both widespread and systematic. The evidence heard and referred to in part 4, 
shows that the actions taken, with few exceptions, targeted Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats who were not taking an active part in the hostilities. The Chamber therefore finds 
that the attack itself was clearly directed against the Bosnian-Muslim and Bosnian-Croat 
civilian population. 
711. The Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators knew about the 
attack and that their acts were part thereof.  
712. Having determined the existence of both an armed conflict and a widespread and 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population at the relevant time and place, the 
Chamber will now examine the individual acts charged as crimes against humanity.  
713. In its discussion on the crimes, in parts 5.2.2, 5.3.2, and 5.4.2, below, the Chamber 
has made references to incidents, detention centres, and destroyed cultural monuments and 
sacred sites, listed in schedules A, B, C and D of the indictment. In instances where the 
Chamber has received no, or insufficient, evidence on a certain item in the schedules, no 
such reference has been made. 
 
5.2 Murder or extermination as crimes against humanity 
5.2.1 Applicable law 
714. The indictment charges the Accused with extermination or murder, in the 
alternative, for killings, including those during and after the attacks on towns and villages 
listed in Schedule A, and those related to detention facilities listed in Schedule B.TPF1623FPT The 
Chamber will set out the legal requirements for the crimes of murder (count 5) and 
extermination (count 4). The general requirements of these crimes, when charged as crimes 
against humanity, have been discussed in part 5.1, above. 
715. Murder. The crime of murder consists of the following elements: 
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(a) the victim died; 
(b) an act or omission of the perpetrator caused the victim’s death; and 
(c) the act or omission was committed with intent to kill or in the reasonable knowledge 
that it might lead to death.TPF1624FPT 
716. Extermination. The crime of extermination subsumes the elements of murder under 
Article 5 of the Statute. Extermination additionally requires that the killings occur on a 
mass scale and that the perpetrator intended by his acts this result.TPF1625FPT Although “mass 
scale” refers primarily to the number of killings, it does not suggest a numerical 
minimum.TPF1626FPT The killings constituting the extermination must form part of the same 
incident, taking into account such factors as the time and place of the killings, the selection 
of the victims, and the manner in which they were targeted.TPF1627FPT 
 
5.2.2 Legal findings 
717. Based on the evidence received, the Chamber finds that approximately 3,000 
Muslims and Croats were killed in 30 municipalities during the indictment period. To 
avoid any misunderstanding, the Chamber notes that this is not a historical finding, but a 
legal one. The Chamber is bound to make its findings exclusively on the basis of the 
evidence received. This finding does not therefore exclude for the possibility that more 
Muslims and Croats were killed in these municipalities during the relevant time period. For 
purposes of this judgement, however, the Chamber may only take into account those 
specific killings which were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Chamber further notes 
that the number of killings mentioned in this paragraph does not include killings in such 
incidents where, on the basis of the evidence, the Chamber was unable to assess the 
definite number of victims. 
718. Murder. The following incidents of killings have been proven:   
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Banja Luka (NW): Twenty Muslim detainees died during transport from Krings 
camp to Manjača camp on 7 July 1992 [B1.1]; an unknown number of non-Serb male 
detainees at Manjača camp beaten to death by Serb guards between June and September 
1992 [B1.2]; eight detainees transported from Prijedor killed at the entrance to Manjača 
camp [B1.4]; and three detainees suffocated to death on a bus while being transported from 
Omarska camp in Prijedor to Manjača on 6 August 1992 [B1.4]. 
 Bijeljina (NE): Forty-eight mainly Muslim men, women, and children, killed by 
Serb paramilitaries during the take over of the town of Bijeljina on or about 2 April 1992 
[A1.1]; three detainees beaten to death and one shot dead by Serb guards in Batković 
Camp sometime between July and September 1992.  
Bileća (SE): Two Muslim detainees at the Bileća police station beaten to death by 
police and paramilitaries during the summer of 1992. 
Bosanska Krupa (NW): Eleven detainees at Petar Kočić school shot dead by a 
member of the TO in May 1992 [B2.1]; five detainees killed by Serb police while being 
held at the Petar Kočić school in May 1992 [B2.1]; and a young pregnant woman killed by 
paramilitaries in Arapuša village in Bosanska Krupa municipality on 27 or 28 April 1992. 
Bosanski Novi (NW): At least three Muslim men killed by Serb soldiers while being 
forcibly expelled from Blagaj Japra on 9 June 1992 [A3.1]; and nine Muslim detainees 
taken from the Mlakve stadium and beaten to death by guards at the fire station sometime 
between 11 June and 27 July 1992.  
Bosanski Petrovac (NW): Several dozen unarmed Muslim civilians, including 
women, children, and elderly persons, killed by Serb civilians in the town of Bosanski 
Petrovac during the summer of 1992. 
 Bratunac (NE): Twelve Muslim villagers, four of whom had been captured which 
included one six-year-old girl, killed by Serb forces during the attack on Hranča from 3 to 
9 May 1992; approximately 65 civilians killed by Serb TO and JNA forces on 9 May 1992 
during the attack on the Muslim village of Glogova, which met no armed resistance [A4.1]; 
at least 50 Muslim detainees at the Vuk Karadžić school beaten or shot to death by Serb 
guards and paramilitaries from 10 to 13 May 1992 [B3.1]; and seven Muslim male 
detainees suffocated to death at the Vuk Karadžić school when forced by Serb guards to 
huddle together in May 1992.  
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Brčko (NE): Three Muslim male detainees killed in Posavina hotel by Goran Jelisić 
on 4 May 1992 [A5.1]; approximately 12 civilians executed in Brčko town by police 
officers and soldiers on 7 May 1992 [A5.3]; at least seven Muslim men, women and 
children in Mujkići shot dead by Mauzer and soldiers presenting themselves as Šešelj’s 
men on 7 May 1992 [A5.2]; one Muslim fireman shot dead by a JNA soldier at the Brčko 
fire station upon an order by Captain Šehovac on 10 May 1992; an elderly Muslim woman 
beaten and shot dead in her home by uniformed men on 21 June 1992 [A5.5]; Zikret Suljić 
shot dead by one of Arkan’s men while trying to escape detention in a mosque in May 
1992; seven Muslim and Croat male detainees killed while being held at the Brčko army 
barracks on or about 7 May 1992; and at least nine detainees at Luka camp executed by 
Goran Jelisić and others on various dates, including Stjepo Glavočević, killed by Jelisić on 
9 May 1992 [B4.1].  
Čelinac (NW): Five Muslim men and women, who were not taking part in the 
hostilities, killed during Serb military operations in the village of Bastaši on or about 16 
August 1992. 
 Doboj (NE): One elderly male detainee beaten to death while being held in a 
discotheque in Usora on or about 22 June 1992. 
Foča (SE): Seven Muslim male civilians shot dead by Serb soldiers at the JNA fuel 
depot warehouse in Filipovići [A6.2]; an unknown number of Muslim civilians killed by 
Serb forces during an attack on Filipovići on 25 or 26 April 1992; an unknown number of 
Muslim civilians killed by Serb forces while they were fleeing attacks on Muslim villages 
along the left bank of the Drina river downstream from Ošanica on or about 28 April 1992; 
an unknown number of Muslim civilians killed by Serb forces during the attack on the 
village of Jeleč on 4 and 5 May 1992 [A6.3]; twenty-seven Muslim civilians, 
predominantly women and children, killed by Serb forces in the Čohodor Mahala 
neighbourhood in mid-June 1992; ten civilians, including at least one female, killed by 
Serb soldiers during and after the attack on the Muslim village of Mješaja/Trošanj in early 
July 1992 [A6.7]; one Muslim male detainee from the village of Mješaja/Trošanj killed by 
Serb forces at the construction site Buk Bijela on 3 July 1992; fourteen Muslim men from 
the village of Trnovača taken to a bridge over the Drina river in Brod and killed by Serb 
forces on 22 June 1992 [A6.6]; sixty-two detained civilians killed on Maluša mountain; 
and 35 non-Serb detainees from KP Dom killed on or about 17 September 1992. 
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Gacko (SE): Two Muslim men arrested and killed by a Serb paramilitary unit in 
Gacko town in March 1992; and five Muslim male detainees held at the Gacko police 
station executed by local Serb men led by police commander Popić on 3 July 1992 [B8.1]. 
Ilijaš (Sarajevo): Two villagers killed outside their house by Serb soldiers during 
the attack on the Muslim village of Gornja Bioča on 29 May 1992; approximately 20 
Muslim villagers captured and killed by Serb soldiers during the attack on Lješevo on 5 
June 1992 [A8.1]. 
Kalinovik (SE): An unknown number of villagers, including women and elderly 
persons, killed during the VRS attacks on Ljuta, Jelašca, Jezero, Mjehovina, and Daganj at 
the end of July and beginning of August 1992; and an unknown number of Muslim 
civilians from Gacko and Kalinovik killed while detained at Kalinovik elementary school. 
Kotor Varoš (NW): Six Muslims killed by Serb paramilitaries and one Muslim 
killed by a police officer in Kotor settlement on 25 June 1992 [A10.1]; and an unknown 
number of male villagers from Dabovci killed by Serb soldiers in the summer of 1992 
[A10.2]. 
Nevesinje (SE): Redžep Trebović shot dead by Serb soldiers in his home in the 
town of Nevesinje on 16 June 1992 [A11.1]; sixteen elderly Muslims killed by a local Serb 
in Presjeka village while fleeing the attack on the village by Serb forces on 22 June 1992; 
twenty-nine Muslim male villagers from Presjeka and Kljuna killed by Serb soldiers at 
Dubravica on or about 25 June 1992 [B12.1]; and at least seven children and several 
Muslim women detained in the basement of the heating plant in Kilavci killed by Serb 
military and placed in a pit at Lipovača [A11.4 and B12.1]. 
Novi Grad (Sarajevo): Fifteen wounded and captured Muslims executed by Serb 
soldiers during the attack on Ahatovići on or about 27 May 1992 [A12.1]; and two Muslim 
male detainees at the Rajlovac army barracks beaten to death by a Serb special unit in June 
1992 [B13.1].  
Novo Sarajevo (Sarajevo): Two Muslim detainees at Kula detention facility beaten 
to death by guards on or about 7 April 1992; and at least four detainees from Kula killed by 
snipers or shells while performing forced labor at front lines. 
Pale (Sarajevo): Three male detainees at the sport complex beaten to death by 
guards and Serb men in June or July 1992 [B14.1]. 
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Prijedor (NW): An unknown number of Muslim villagers killed by Serb forces, 
during the attack on Kozarac on 24 May 1992 [A13.1]; five Muslim men killed by Serb 
forces during the attack on Jaskići and Sivci villages on 14 June 1992 [A13.5]; two Muslim 
civilians killed near the Muslim village of Bišćani during the summer of 1992 during a 
Serb joint military and civilian police operation [A13.6]; thirty Muslim civilians killed 
during an exchange of fire between an armed Muslim group and Serb military and police 
in the village of Čarakovo during the summer of 1992 [A13.6]; three Muslim men from 
Hambarine who had surrendered to Serb forces beaten to death in the Ljubija stadium on or 
about 25 July 1992 [A13.9]; an unknown number of detainees in Omarska beaten to death 
by Serb guards, police, soldiers, and civilians allowed into the camp [B15.1]; and eleven 
Muslim male detainees from Trnopolje taken to a maize field and executed by Serb 
soldiers [B15.2].  
Rogatica (SE): An unknown number of Muslim male detainees killed by Serb 
guards at the Veljko Vlahović secondary school between June and September 1992; and 24 
Muslims, some from Seljani village, killed while being used as human shields by Kušić’s 
paramilitary unit after the shelling of Rogatica town in May 1992. 
Sanski Most (NW): Sixteen Muslim women and children and one Muslim man from 
Jelečevići killed by Serb soldiers on 31 May 1992 [A14.1]; the secretary of the SDA 
municipal board, a Muslim judge, and the municipal chief of police killed when Serb 
forces arrested Muslim and Croat leaders in late May 1992; one Muslim male detainee at 
Krings Hall beaten to death by Serb police in July 1992; and 13 male civilians shot dead by 
Serb soldiers in the Muslim village of Lukavica on 1 August 1992 [A14.4]. 
Sokolac (SE): Four women killed, one from shelling and three by having their 
throats cut, during the attack by the VRS on the Muslim village of Meljine in the summer 
of 1992 [A15.2]. 
Teslić (NW): An unknown number of civilians killed in the town of Teslić by 
Arkan’s men, the White Eagles, and the Red Berets in May 1992; four detainees at the TO 
hangar beaten to death by Serb police and soldiers [B18.1]; and Fadil Isić, president of the 
Teslić SDA, shot dead by Red Berets as he lay on a bed in a medical centre. 
Višegrad (SE): Approximately 200 non-Serb civilians, mostly Muslim, including 
women, children, and elderly persons, killed in Višegrad during the summer of 1992 
[A16.1].  
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Vlasenica (NE): Nine Muslim detainees killed at Sušica camp by guards between 
June and September 1992 [B19.3]; and Džemal Ambesković killed while in detention at 
the Vlasenica police station on or about 22 May 1992.  
Vogošća (Sarajevo): Fifteen Muslim male detainees from Planjo’s house killed 
while being used by Serb military to perform forced labour and act as human shields in 
September 1992 [B20.2]. 
Zvornik (NE): Dozens of men, women, and children killed during the attack on 
Zvornik town by Serb forces and Arkan’s men on 8 April 1992 [A18.1]; approximately 18 
Muslim detainees at the Alhos Factory in the Karakaj area of Zvornik town killed by 
Arkan’s men on or about 9 April 1992; one Muslim detainee killed at Ekonomija farm in 
Karakaj sometime after 10 May 1992 [B21.1]; approximately 20 Muslim male detainees at 
Karakaj Technical School died from heat stroke and lack of water on 1 June 1992; three 
Muslim detainees at the Dom Kulture in Čelopek killed by guards in early June 1992; 
seven Muslim detainees at the Dom Kulture in Čelopek killed by the Yellow Wasps on 11 
June 1992; and 20 Muslim detainees at the Dom Kulture in Čelopek shot dead by Dušan 
Repić on 27 June 1992 [B21.3]. 
719. The Chamber finds that all the victims in the incidents above died as a result of acts 
of the perpetrators, who intended to kill them. The Chamber further finds that the victims 
were captured or detained at the time of their killing, or otherwise not taking active part in 
the hostilities. The Chamber finds that the killings were part of the widespread and 
systematic attack against the Muslim and Croat civilian population. The Chamber therefore 
finds that all the above incidents constitute murder as a crime against humanity. 
720. Extermination. The Chamber finds that for the following incidents of killings, the 
element of mass scale is fulfilled, considering the number of deaths in each incident and 
the circumstances surrounding the deaths, including the selection of the victims, the time 
and place of the killings, and the manner in which the killings were carried out. Incidents 
where large numbers of persons were killed under circumstances that were not sufficiently 
clear to the Chamber have not been included. The following killings on a mass scale have 
been proven: 
Bosanski Novi (NW): Twenty-seven male villagers brought to a cemetery and killed 
by armed Serbs during an attack on the Muslim settlement of Alići on 23 June 1992 
[A3.2]. 
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Čajniče (SE): Approximately 30 Muslim detainees being held in a storage 
container near a hunting lodge in Mostina killed by members of Blue Eagles paramilitary 
on or about 18 May 1992 [B5.1]. 
Foča (SE): Thirty-six Muslim detainees from the Foča area killed at KP Dom by 
Serb guards between 28 June and 5 July 1992 [B7.1]; 
 Gacko (SE): Approximately 130 Muslim women, children, and elderly persons 
waiting to be evacuated from the municipality killed by Serb forces during the attack on 
Fazlagića Kula on 17 June 1992 [A7.1].  
 Kalinovik (SE): Twenty-four Muslim male detainees from an ammunition 
warehouse in Jelašačko Polje executed by Serb soldiers and the police in a stable in Ratine 
on 5 August 1992, after having been severely mistreated, bound, and stripped of their 
valuables. Twenty were killed first and the remaining four ordered to place the dead bodies 
in the stable after which they were killed as well. The soldiers poured petrol over the 
bodies, set the stable on fire and left [B9.1]. 
 Ključ (NW): Forty-four men, women, and children in the Muslim village of Prhovo 
rounded up, forced to face a wall and killed by Serb forces on 1 June 1992 [A9.1]; twenty-
seven Muslim males executed by Serb VRS soldiers and police officers at Biljani primary 
school on 10 July 1992 [A9.3]; and seventy-seven Muslim men from Hadžići, Velagići, 
and surrounding villages lined up against a wall and shot dead by Serb forces at the 
Velagići school on 1 June 1992. After all men had fallen to the ground, the soldiers killed 
those who showed signs of life [B10.1]. 
 Kotor Varoš (NW): Approximately 150 Muslim men from Večići killed by Serb 
military after being captured and detained at the Grabovica school on 4 November 1992 
[B11.1]. 
Novi Grad (Sarajevo): Forty-seven detainees from the Rajlovac army barracks 
taken by bus to Sokolina and killed by Serb guards using grenades and automatic weapons 
on 14 June 1992 [B13.2]. 
Prijedor (NW): Sixty-eight men, women, and children killed by Serb forces during 
an attack on the predominantly Croat village of Briševo on 24 July 1992 [A13.7]; eighty-
five Muslim male detainees from Ljubija stadium brought by bus to the Kipe iron-ore mine 
and executed by Serb soliders on or about 25 July 1992 [A13.8]; between 150 and 200 
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Muslim and Croat detainees in Keraterm shot dead in one room by Serb guards between 24 
and 26 July [B15.3]; and 154 Muslim detainees from the camps of Trnopolje and Tukovi 
bussed to Korićanske Stijene in Skender Vakuf municipality and executed by Serb police 
and Serb soldiers on 21 August 1992 [B15.5].  
Sanski Most (NW): Nineteen Muslim men from Donji Begići brought to Vrhpolje 
bridge by 50 Serb soldiers, beaten, ordered to jump off the bridge and shot dead in the 
water on or about 31 May 1992 [A14.2]; eighteen Muslim men interrogated by Serb 
soldiers on or about 27 June 1992 and then taken to a house in Blaževići whereupon the 
soldiers threw explosives into the house and opened fire on those trying to escape [A14.3]; 
and approximately 17 Muslim and Croat detainees from Betonirka camp killed in Kriva 
Cesta by Serb soldiers on 22 June 1992 after being forced at gunpoint to dig their own 
graves [B17.1]. 
Sokolac (SE): Between 40 and 45 Muslim male civilians in the village of 
Novoseoci killed by VRS soldiers on 22 September 1992, after which General Krstić 
informed the VRS Main Staff that “the village of Novoseoci was cleansed” [A15.4]. 
 Višegrad (SE): Sixty-six Muslim civilians from Koritnik and Sase burnt alive by 
local Serb paramilitaries led by Milan Lukić in a house on Pionirska Street in Višegrad on 
14 June 1992 [A16.2].  
 Vlasenica (NE): Twenty Muslim men, all but three in the village of Drum, killed in 
a few minutes by Serb soldiers moving house to house during the attack on 2 June 1992 
[A17.1]; approximately 80 men, women, and children killed by Serb soldiers and police, 
while attempting to flee the attack on the village of Zaklopača on 16 May 1992 [A17.2]; 
the 140-150 remaining Muslim detainees from Sušica camp removed in four bus loads on 
30 September 1992 and executed by three MUP officers; and twenty-nine Muslim 
detainees from the Vlasenica police station taken by bus to the outskirts of the village of 
Nova Kasaba and shot dead by Serb soldiers on 21 May 1992, after which the soldiers 
searched for survivors and shot them in the head [B19.2].  
Zvornik (NE): Eighty-eight Muslim male detainees at Dom Kulture in Drinjača 
taken out in groups of ten and executed by the White Eagles on 30 May 1992 [A18.3]; 
approximately 160 Muslim male detainees at Karakaj Technical School removed in small 
groups and executed by Serb guards on or about 1 June 1992 [B21.4]; and 190 male 
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detainees brought to Gero’s slaughterhouse in busloads and executed by guards in JNA 
uniforms on 5 May 1992 [B21.5]. 
721. The Chamber finds that all the victims in the above incidents died as a result of acts 
of the perpetrators who intended to kill on a mass scale. The Chamber further finds that the 
victims referred to above were either captured or detained at the time of their killing, or 
otherwise not taking active part in the hostilities. The Chamber finds that the killings were 
part of the widespread and systematic attack against the Muslim and Croat civilian 
population. The Chamber therefore finds that all the above incidents constitute 
extermination as a crime against humanity.  
 
5.3 Deportation and other inhumane acts (forced transfer) as crimes against humanity 
5.3.1 Applicable law 
722. The indictment charges the Accused with deportation and forced transfer as crimes 
against humanity committed in the indictment municipalities. The crime of deportation 
(count 7) is listed in Article 5(d) of the Statute, whereas forced transfer (count 8) is a 
charge under “other inhumane acts” in Article 5(i). The general requirements of these 
crimes, when charged as crimes against humanity, have been discussed in part 5.1, above. 
723. Actus reus. Deportation and forcible transfer both entail the forcible displacement of 
persons from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under 
international law. The crime of deportation requires that the victims be displaced across a 
de jure state border, or, in certain circumstances, a de facto border.TPF1628FPT Forcible transfer 
involves displacement of persons within national boundaries.TPF1629FPT The Chamber will not 
consider the transfer of detainees from one detention centre to another as forcible transfer. 
724. Forcible displacement means that people are moved against their will or without a 
genuine choice.TPF1630FPT Fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression, and other 
such circumstances may create an environment where there is no choice but to leave, thus 
amounting to the forcible displacement of people.TPF1631FPT Displacement of persons carried out 
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pursuant to an agreement among political or military leaders, or under the auspices of the 
ICRC or another neutral organization, does not necessarily make it voluntary.TPF1632FPT 
725. International humanitarian law recognizes limited circumstances under which the 
displacement of civilians during armed conflict is allowed, namely if it is carried out for 
the security of the persons involved, or for imperative military reasons.TPF1633FPT In such cases 
the displacement is temporary and must be carried out in such a manner as to ensure that 
displaced persons are returned to their homes as soon as the situation allows.TPF1634FPT 
726. Mens rea. The perpetrator of deportation or forcible transfer must intend to forcibly 
displace the persons, however, the intent need not be to displace on a permanent basis. TPF1635FPT  
 
5.3.2 Legal findings 
727. The Chamber finds that a large number of Muslims in Bijeljina, Bosanska Krupa, 
Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Bratunac, Čajniče, Čelinac, Donji Vakuf, Foča, Gacko, 
Hadžići, Ilidža, Ilijaš, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Prijedor, 
Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, Trnovo, Višegrad, and Zvornik, were displaced from their 
homes to other places in the same municipality or to other municipalities within the 
territory under Bosnian-Serb control. The Chamber also finds, based on the evidence 
presented, that Croats were displaced in the same manner from a few of these 
municipalities, namely Bosanska Krupa, Hadžići, Novi Grad, Prijedor, and Sanski Most, 
although in lower numbers.  
728. The Chamber further finds that a large number of Muslims in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, 
Bileća, Bosanski Novi, Bratunac, Brčko, Čajniče, Doboj, Foča, Gacko, Nevesinje, Pale, 
Prnjavor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Vlasenica, and Zvornik, were displaced to Croatia, 
Macedonia, or other places outside the territory under Bosnian-Serb control. The Chamber 
also finds, based on the evidence presented, that Croats were displaced in the same manner 
from a few of these municipalities, namely Banja Luka, Doboj, and Prnjavor, although in 
lower numbers.  
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729. The displacement of Muslims and Croats occurred in a similar way in all the above 
mentioned municipalities. Serb municipal authorities and Serb forces created severe living 
conditions for Muslims and Croats which aimed, and succeeded, in making it practically 
impossible for most of them to remain. The measures undertaken increased in severity by 
time, starting with dismissals from employment, house searches, and the cutting off of 
water, electricity, and telephone services. Once Serb forces had taken over towns and 
villages, many Muslims and Croats were arrested and interrogated, during which they were 
often tortured and beaten by their captors. The terrorization of the Muslim and Croat 
population very often included individual killings and massacres, as described in part 5.2.2, 
above. News of such massacres served to further instil fear among the Muslim and Croat 
population. All this caused many Muslims and Croats in municipalities like Banja Luka, 
Bijeljina, Čelinac, Ilidža, and Sanski Most, to abandon their homes in fear for their own 
safety. In other municipalities, such as Bosanska Krupa, Foča, Gacko, Hadžići, Ilijaš, 
Prijedor, Rogatica, Trnovo, and Zvornik, it was an armed attack by Bosnian-Serb forces on 
the particular town or village that lead many Muslims and Croats to flee their homes, in 
order to avoid the killings, detention, and destruction that might follow. 
730. Some Muslims and Croats decided, or simply had no other choice than, to remain in 
their homes despite the killings, arrests and widespread discrimination occurring. In these 
cases, Serb authorities and Serb forces often proceeded to physically drive these groups 
out. This occurred in many municipalities, including Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bosanska 
Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Bratunac, Brčko, Čajniče, Foča, Gacko. 
Hadžići, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, Trnovo, Vlasenica, and 
Zvornik. In some cases, this was done through large-scale operations where transportation 
and escorts were provided by the Serb authorities, who additionally attempted, sometimes 
successfully, to involve international organizations in the movement of the population.  
731. One such example is the forcible displacement of the Muslim population of 
Bosanski Novi. During May 1992, Serb forces drove Muslims from their homes in nine 
villages in the Japra valley to the village of Blagaj Japra. At the same time, Muslims in the 
town of Bosanski Novi were being arrested. At that point, Serb authorities began 
“negotiations” with persons informally representing the Muslims community and UN 
officials, with the aim of transferring the Muslims out of the municipality. One of the 
Muslim representatives described these “negotiations” as a desperate attempt to receive 
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some help to “leave this hell in Bosanski Novi where we were under siege”.TPF1636FPT Serb 
municipal authorities put forth the stance that the departure of Muslims from the 
municipality was on a voluntary basis. However, the Chamber excludes the possibility that 
the municipal authorities actually believed that this was the case. Rather, in this respect, 
the Serb authorities were, in the Chamber’s opinion, deliberately cynical. As another of the 
Muslim representatives testified, “in view of all that had happened to me before, from the 
arrest, the camp, the killing of my uncle, the torchings, the chaos, how can one say that we 
left of our own will?”TPF1637FPT This involuntary character was also clear to UN officials, who 
hesitated to comply with requests for assistance in the movement of the Muslim population 
from Serb authorities. In July, a large convoy of approximately 9,000 persons, including 
the displaced persons from Blagaj Japra who were at that time being detained at Mlakve 
stadium, set out for Croatia.  
732. The Chamber finds that all the Muslims and Croats referred to above were 
displaced against their will, and that they were not taking active part in the hostilities at the 
time the forcible displacement was committed. The Chamber further finds that the 
displacement was part of the widespread and systematic attack against the Muslim and 
Croat civilian population. The Chamber therefore finds that the displacement of Muslims 
and Croats from Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bileća, Bosanski Novi, Bratunac, Brčko, Čajniče, 
Doboj, Foča, Gacko, Nevesinje, Pale, Prnjavor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Vlasenica, 
Zvornik, referred to above, constitutes deportation. The Chamber also finds that the 
displacement of Muslims from Bijeljina, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski 
Petrovac, Bratunac, Čajniče, Čelinac, Donji Vakuf, Foča, Gacko, Hadžići, Ilidža, Ilijaš, 
Ključ, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, Trnovo, 
Višegrad, and Zvornik, referred to above, constitutes forcible transfer. As seen, there were 
in some municipalities, namely Bijeljina, Bosanski Novi, Bratunac, Čajniče, Foča, Gacko, 
Pale, Rogatica, Sanski Most, and Zvornik, instances of both deportation and forcible 
transfer. 
 
 
P
1636
P Purić, T. 26983. 
P
1637
P Delić, T. 26362. 
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5.4 Persecution as a crime against humanity 
5.4.1 Applicable law 
Common elements of persecution as a crime against humanity 
733. The indictment charges the Accused, pursuant to Article 5(h) of the Statute, with 
persecution as a crime against humanity committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats in the indictment municipalities.TPF1638FPT The general requirements of crimes against 
humanity have been discussed in part 5.1, above. 
734. The crime of persecution consists of an act or omission which: 
(a) discriminates in fact and denies a fundamental human right laid down in 
international law; and 
(b) is carried out with the intention to discriminate on one of the listed grounds, 
namely politics, race, or religion.TPF1639FPT 
735. Acts listed under the other sub-headings of Article 5 of the Statute or provided for 
elsewhere in the Statute, as well as acts not explicitly mentioned in the Statute, may qualify 
as underlying acts of persecution.TPF1640FPT The underlying act itself need not constitute a crime 
in international law.TPF1641FPT In practice, not every denial of a fundamental human right will be 
serious enough to constitute a crime against humanity.TPF1642FPT The underlying act committed 
on discriminatory grounds, considered in isolation or in conjunction with other acts, must 
be of the same gravity as other crimes listed under Article 5 of the Statute.TPF1643FPT 
 
Underlying acts of persecution 
(a) Imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures involving 
denial of fundamental rights 
736. Paragraph 19(a) of the indictment charges the Accused with persecution through 
“the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures including: (i) 
 
P
1638
P Indictment, paras 18-23. In accordance with an agreement between the parties, accepted by the Chamber, 
the words “or other non-Serb populations” in the indictment are “meaningless for the purpose of this case”: 
T. 17076, 17085, 17132, 17139-40. 
P
1639
P Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 185.  
P
1640
P Tadić Trial Judgement, paras 700, 702-3; Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, paras 605, 614. 
P
1641
P Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 323. 
P
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P Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, para. 621; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 434. 
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the denial of freedom of movement; (ii) the denial of employment through the removal 
from positions of authority in local government institutions and the police and the general 
dismissal from employment; (iii) the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of 
homes; (iv) the denial of the right to judicial process; and (v) the denial of equal access to 
public services.” 
737. The Prosecution has pleaded the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and 
discriminatory measures by using the open-ended term “including”. The indictment alleges 
that five specific rights were denied on a discriminatory basis. As the Accused is entitled to 
be clearly informed of the charges against him, the Chamber will confine its analysis to the 
specific allegations. 
738. The Nuremberg Tribunal entered convictions on crimes against humanity and war 
crimes for various acts committed against Jews, ranging from economic discrimination to 
extermination. These acts included three of the acts set out in paragraph 19(a) of the 
indictment, namely the denial of freedom of movement, the denial of employment, and the 
denial of the right to judicial process.TPF1644FPT These types of acts, as well as the denial of equal 
access to public services and the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes, 
were addressed in the context of crimes against humanity by tribunals applying the Allies’ 
Control Council Law No. 10.TPF1645FPT In the Justice case, in which numerous representatives of 
the judiciary in Germany were tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity, the 
United States Military Tribunal convicted the defendants for the exclusion of Jews from 
public service and from educational institutions, and for discriminatory treatment of Jews 
and Poles in the judicial system. The Tribunal argued that: 
The record contains innumerable acts of persecution of individual Poles and Jews, but to 
consider these cases as isolated and unrelated instances of perversion of justice would be to 
overlook the very essence of the offence charged in the indictment ... lesser forms of racial 
 
P
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P Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 135. 
P
1644
P United States et al. v. Hermann Göring et al. (Nuremberg Judgement), International Military Tribunal (1 
October 1946), in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, Nuremberg 1947, pp. 171, 247-9, 254, 298, 300, 304-5, 329, 335, 339-
40. 
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P Trial of Hans Albin Rauter, Netherlands Special Court, The Hague (4 May 1948), in 14 Law Reports of 
Trials of War Criminals, selected and prepared by the United Nations War Crime Commission, London 
1947-1949 (LRTWC), pp. 89, 92-3. The conviction of Rauter was confirmed by the Netherlands Special 
Court of Cassation on 12 January 1949 (14 LRTWC 89, 107-11); Trial of Dr. Joseph Buhler, Supreme 
National Tribunal of Poland (10 July 1948), in 14 LRTWC 23, 29; Trial of Artur Greiser, Supreme National 
Tribunal of Poland (7 July 1946), in 13 LRTWC 70, 94, 105. 
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persecution [than the extermination of Jews and Poles] were universally practiced by 
governmental authority and constituted an integral part in the general policy of the Reich.TPF1646FPT 
739. The Justice case and the other cases cited dealt with acts of the same kind as those 
included in paragraph 19(a) of the indictment. These acts, carried out on discriminatory 
grounds, were considered both in conjunction with each other and in conjunction with 
other acts, some of which were considered crimes under international law in their own 
right. No conviction was entered for the equivalent of a paragraph 19(a) act in isolation. 
740. Some of the acts referred to in paragraph 19(a) of the indictment have also been 
considered in the case law of this tribunal. The Brđanin Trial Chamber considered the 
denial of freedom of movement, the denial of employment, the denial of the right to 
judicial process, and the denial of equal access to public services, and concluded that these 
acts constitute persecution only when taken in conjunction with each other since, taken in 
isolation, each act is not of the same gravity as the other crimes listed in Article 5 of the 
Statute.TPF1647FPT 
741. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that the various acts mentioned in paragraph 
19(a) of the indictment, carried out on discriminatory grounds (henceforth to be understood 
as discriminatory in fact and carried out with discriminatory intent), and for which the 
general elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitute the crime of 
persecution when considered in conjunction with other acts. 
 
(b) Killings (murder) 
742. Paragraphs 19(b) and (f) of the indictment charge the Accused with persecution 
through “killings during and after attacks on towns and villages in the Municipalities, 
including those listed in Schedule A” and “killings related to detention facilities, including 
those listed in Schedule B”. These acts are also charged elsewhere in the indictment as 
genocide and/or complicity in genocide under Article 4(3)(a) and (e) of the Statute, murder 
or extermination as a crime against humanity under Article 5(a) and (b) of the Statute, and 
murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war under Article 3 of the Statute. 
 
P
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P United States v. Josef Altstötter et al. (Justice case), American Military Tribunal (4 December 1947), in 3 
Trials for War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, 
Nuremberg, October 1946 – April 1949 (TWC), pp. 954, 1063-4.  
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743. The Chamber interprets the charge of “killings” in paragraphs 19(b) and (f) of the 
indictment as relating to the crime of murder. The elements of the crime of murder have 
been discussed in part 5.2.1, above. 
744. An act of murder, carried out on discriminatory grounds, and for which the general 
elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitutes the crime of persecution.TPF1648FPT 
 
(c) Cruel or inhumane treatment 
745. Paragraphs 19(c) and (g) of the indictment charge the Accused with persecution 
through “cruel or inhumane treatment during and after the attacks on towns and villages in 
the Municipalities including torture, physical and psychological abuse, sexual violence and 
forced existence under inhumane living conditions”, as well as “cruel or inhumane 
treatment in detention facilities including torture, physical and psychological abuse and 
sexual violence”. 
746. The crime of cruel or inhumane treatment requires proof of an act or omission 
which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack 
on human dignity.TPF1649FPT It must be shown that the perpetrator had the intention to inflict 
serious mental or physical suffering or injury, or to commit a serious attack on the human 
dignity of the victim, or that he or she knew that the act or omission was likely to cause 
serious mental or physical suffering or injury, or a serious attack on human dignity, and 
was reckless as to that result.TPF1650FPT  
747. An act of cruel or inhumane treatment, carried out on discriminatory grounds, and 
for which the general elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitutes the 
crime of persecution.TPF1651FPT  
 
(d) Forced transfer or deportation 
748. Paragraph 19(d) of the indictment charges the Accused with persecution through 
“forced transfer or deportation”. The crimes of forced transfer and deportation are also 
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charged elsewhere in the indictment as crimes against humanity punishable under Article 
5(d) and (i) of the Statute. 
749. The Chamber has dealt with the crimes of forcible transfer and deportation in part 
5.3.1, above. An act of forcible transfer or deportation, carried out on discriminatory 
grounds, and for which the general elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, 
constitutes the crime of persecution.TPF1652FPT 
 
(e) Unlawful detention (imprisonment) 
750. Paragraph 19(e) of the indictment charges the Accused with persecution through 
“unlawful detention in detention facilities, including those listed in Schedule C” to the 
indictment. 
751. Unlawful detention is not listed, as such, as a crime in the Statute, although Article 
5(e) provides for the act of imprisonment as a crime against humanity. The Chamber 
interprets the charge in paragraph 19(e) of the indictment as relating to this act.  
752. The term imprisonment in Article 5(e) is understood as “arbitrary imprisonment, 
that is to say, the deprivation of liberty of the individual without due process of law”.TPF1653FPT 
The crime of imprisonment consists of the following elements:  
(1) an individual is deprived of his or her liberty;  
(2) the deprivation of liberty is carried out arbitrarily, that is, there is no legal basis 
for it; and  
(3) the perpetrator acted with the intent to deprive the individual arbitrarily of his or 
her liberty.TPF1654FPT 
753. If there is a legal basis for the deprivation of liberty, it must apply throughout the 
period of imprisonment, for the deprivation of liberty will become arbitrary as soon as the 
legal basis ceases to exist. When a national law is relied upon to justify a deprivation of 
liberty, this law must not violate international law.TPF1655FPT 
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754. Unlawful detention, carried out on discriminatory grounds, and for which the 
general elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitutes the crime of 
persecution.TPF1656FPT 
 
(f) Establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions 
755. Paragraph 19(h) of the indictment charges the Accused with persecution through 
“the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in detention facilities 
including those listed in Schedule C”. It alleges that “these conditions included the failure 
to provide adequate: accommodation or shelter; food or water; medical care; or hygienic 
sanitation facilities”. 
756. The concept of “inhuman living conditions” is considered a subcategory of cruel or 
inhumane treatment,TPF1657FPT which has been discussed under (c) above. 
 
(g) Forced labour 
757. Paragraph 19(i) of the indictment charges the Accused with persecution through 
“forced labour including digging graves and trenches and other forms of forced labour at 
front lines”. 
758. When determining whether the labour was forced, a Chamber may consider whether 
the objective circumstances surrounding the performance of work were so coercive as to 
negate any possibility of consent.TPF1658FPT 
759. Under international humanitarian law not all forms of labour are prohibited, 
provided that the labour is performed under certain protective conditions.TPF1659FPT Considering 
that the indictment is limited to digging graves and trenches and other forced labour 
performed at front lines, the Chamber finds that the acts charged cannot fall within any 
lawful exceptions to the prohibition of forced labour. 
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760. The Appeals Chamber has held that forced labour, considered in conjunction with 
“a series of acts comprising unlawful detention and beatings” constitute persecution.TPF1660FPT 
The Appeals Chamber has also held that “the use of persons taking no active part in 
hostilities to prepare military fortifications for use in operations and against the forces with 
whom those persons identify or sympathise is a serious attack on human dignity and causes 
serious mental (and depending on the circumstances physical) suffering or injury” and 
thereby constitutes cruel or inhumane treatment.TPF1661FPT As established under (c) above, cruel 
or inhumane treatment carried out on discriminatory grounds, and for which the general 
elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitutes a crime of persecution. 
761. An act of forced labour at front lines, carried out on discriminatory grounds, and for 
which the general elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitutes the crime 
of persecution.TPF1662FPT 
 
(h) Human shields 
762. Paragraph 19(i) of the indictment charges the Accused with persecution through 
“the use of Bosnian Muslim [and] Bosnian Croat […] populations as human shields”. 
763. The Chamber understands human shields to mean the placement or detention of 
persons in areas where they may be exposed to combat operations, for the purpose of 
rendering certain areas or activities immune from military operations or armed attack.TPF1663FPT 
764. The use of persons as human shields, carried out on discriminatory grounds, and for 
which the general elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitutes the crime 
of persecution.TPF1664FPT 
 
(i) Appropriation or plunder of property 
765. Paragraph 19(j) of the indictment charges the Accused with persecution through the 
“appropriation or plunder of property during and after attacks, in detention facilities and in 
the course of deportations or forcible transfers”. The indictment exemplifies the charge 
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with “the practice of forcing Bosnian Muslims [and] Bosnian Croats … to sign documents 
turning over their property to Bosnian Serb governmental authorities in order to be allowed 
to leave the Municipalities”. 
766. Plunder of public and private property was explicitly included in the Nuremberg 
Charter and Control Council Law No. 10 as a war crime. Acts of plunder were charged 
both as a war crime and as a crime against humanity in many of the trials based on these 
instruments, including the trial of the major war criminals in Nuremberg.TPF1665FPT The 
Nuremberg Tribunal dealt with plunder as a crime against humanity and considered, for 
example, “looting of Jewish businesses” as part of the persecution of the Jews.TPF1666FPT In 
relation to one defendant, Hermann Göring, the Tribunal stated: 
Göring persecuted the Jews … not only in Germany where he raised the billion-mark fine ... 
but in the conquered territories as well. His own utterances then and his testimony now 
shows this interest was primarily economic – how to get their property and how to force 
them out of the economic life of Europe.TPF1667FPT 
767. The Nuremberg Tribunal entered convictions on plunder only for appropriations on 
a nation-wide scale.TPF1668FPT This was also true of many of the cases under Control Council 
Law No. 10. TPF1669FPT In the Flick case, however, the American Military Tribunal held that the 
scale of the appropriation was not the critical issue when the act is considered as a crime 
against humanity. Rather, it was the impact of the appropriation on the victim. Under one 
of the counts, Friedrich Flick, an industrialist, was charged with crimes against humanity 
for acquiring industrial property formerly owned or controlled by Jews. The Tribunal 
stated that: 
A distinction could be made between industrial property and the dwellings, household 
furnishings, and food supplies of a persecuted people. In this case, however, we are only 
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concerned with industrial property ... The ‘atrocities and offenses’ listed [in Article 6(c) of 
the Charter] ‘murder, extermination,’ etc., are all offenses against the person. Property is not 
mentioned. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis the catch-all words ‘other persecutions’ 
must be deemed to include only such as affect the life and liberty of the oppressed 
peoples. TPF1670FPT 
768. The Chamber considers that appropriation or plunder as an underlying act of 
persecution is to be understood as any intentional appropriation of public or private 
property that has a severe impact on the owner or user of the property. 
769. Some appropriation of property cannot be regarded as unlawful. For example, under 
international humanitarian law there is a general exception to the prohibition of 
appropriation of property as a grave breach under the Geneva Conventions when the 
appropriation is justified by military necessity.TPF1671FPT  
770. The Appeals Chamber has found that destruction of property, depending on the 
nature and extent of the destruction, may constitute persecution. In addition, it confirmed 
that plunder, in conjunction with “killings, beatings, unlawful attacks on civilians and 
civilian objects, the unlawful imprisonment of civilians, [and] destruction of civilian 
objects”, constitutes persecution.TPF1672FPT 
771. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that an act of appropriation or plunder that 
has a severe impact on the victim, carried out on discriminatory grounds, and for which the 
general elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitutes the crime of 
persecution. 
772. An act of appropriation or plunder which in itself does not have a severe impact on 
the victim, may still, when carried out on discriminatory grounds, and when the general 
elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitute the crime of persecution, when 
considered in conjunction with other acts. 
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(j) Destruction of private property 
773. Paragraph 19(k) of the indictment charges the Accused with persecution through the 
“intentional or wanton destruction of private property including homes and business 
premises”. 
774. The Appeals Chamber has clarified that acts of destruction of property, “depending 
on the nature and extent of the destruction”, may constitute persecution.TPF1673FPT As with 
appropriation of property, it is the impact on the victims that is the determining factor.TPF1674FPT 
The Appeals Chamber has held that there are “certain types of property whose destruction 
may not have a severe enough impact on the victim as to constitute a crime against 
humanity, even if such a destruction is perpetrated on discriminatory grounds: an example 
is the burning of someone’s car (unless the car constitutes an indispensable and vital asset 
to the owner)”.TPF1675FPT 
775. The Chamber considers that destruction of private property as an underlying act of 
persecution is to be understood as any intentional destruction of private property that has a 
severe impact on the victim. 
776. Some destruction of property cannot be regarded as unlawful. For example, under 
international humanitarian law there is a general exception to the prohibition of destruction 
of property as a grave breach under the Geneva Conventions when the destruction is 
justified by military necessity.TPF1676FPT 
777. The Appeals Chamber has confirmed that “destruction of civilian objects”, in 
conjunction with “killings, beatings, unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian objects, the 
unlawful imprisonment of civilians, ... and looting”, constitutes persecution.TPF1677FPT 
778. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that an act of destruction of property that 
has a severe impact on the victim, carried out on discriminatory grounds, and for which the 
general elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitutes the crime of 
persecution.TPF1678FPT 
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779. An act of destruction of property which in itself does not have a severe impact on 
the victim, may still, when carried out on discriminatory grounds, and when the general 
elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitute the crime of persecution, when 
considered in conjunction with other acts. 
 
(k) Destruction of cultural monuments and sacred sites 
780. Paragraph 19(k) of the indictment charges the Accused with persecution through 
“intentional or wanton destruction of ... public property, including cultural monuments and 
sacred sites listed in Schedule D”. 
781. The destruction of cultural property may have a severe impact on persons who 
value that property. The Kordić and Čerkez Trial Chamber held that the destruction of 
religious property, “when perpetrated with the requisite discriminatory intent, amounts to 
an attack on the very religious identity of a people. As such, it manifests a nearly pure 
expression of the notion of ‘crimes against humanity’”.TPF1679FPT 
782. The Chamber considers that the destruction of cultural property as an underlying act 
of persecution is to be understood as destruction or damage of an institution dedicated to 
religion, charity, education, or the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art 
and science, when the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy or damage that property 
or in the reckless disregard of the substantial likelihood of the destruction or damage.TPF1680FPT  
783. An act of destruction of cultural monuments and sacred sites carried out on 
discriminatory grounds, and for which the general elements of crimes against humanity are 
fulfilled, constitutes the crime of persecution.TPF1681FPT 
 
 
P
1679
P Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 207. 
P
1680
P Ibid., paras 206, 362; Stakić Trial Judgement, paras 765-7; Brđanin Trial Judgement, paras 596-9, 1021, 
1023; Strugar Trial Judgement, paras 308-11. 
P
1681
P Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 207; Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 768; Brđanin Trial 
Judgement, paras 1023-4.  
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5.4.2 Legal findings 
(a) Imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures involving 
denial of fundamental rights 
784. On the basis of the evidence presented and described above in part 4, the Chamber 
finds that Serb authorities and Serb forces restricted the freedom of movement of mainly 
Muslims, but also some Croats, through the institution of curfews, checkpoints, 
compulsory reporting to local police, or mandatory travel permits in the following 
municipalities: Bileća, Čajniče, Čelinac, Doboj, Foča, Kalinovik, Ključ, Novo Sarajevo, 
Pale, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, and Trnovo. The Chamber further finds 
that Serb authorities and Serb forces violated the right to privacy of mainly Muslims, but 
also some Croats, through arbitrary house searches, often under the pretext of searching for 
weapons, in the following municipalities: Bijeljina, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, 
Foča, Hadžići, Nevesinje, Novo Sarajevo, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Zvornik. 
785. The Chamber finds that Serb authorities dismissed mainly Muslim, but also some 
Croat, police officers, judges, public servants, members of the armed forces, and other 
employees in the following municipalities: Banja Luka, Bileća, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski 
Petrovac, Čajniče, Čelinac, Foča, Gacko, Hadžići, Kalinovik, Ključ, Pale, Prijedor, 
Prnjavor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, Teslić, and Vlasenica.  
786. The Chamber also finds that Serb authorities denied Muslims and Croats equal 
access to public services in the municipalities of Bijeljina, Bosanski Petrovac, Čelinac, and 
Prijedor, by discontinuing the supply of electricity, water, or telephone services to their 
homes, and in addition, by barring children of Muslims and Croats from attending public 
school in Prijedor municipality. 
787. The Chamber finds that the measures clearly targeted Muslims and Croats and that 
they were therefore discriminatory in fact. The measures were applied specifically to 
Muslims and Croats on the basis of their ethnicity. By way of example, the Čelinac war 
presidency adopted a decision conferring special status on the non-Serb population in the 
municipality. According to the decision, non-Serbs had the right to live unhindered “within 
the boundaries of their property,” and the right to leave the municipality, provided their 
departure was conducted in an organized fashion and that the entire household left. They 
were subject to a curfew from 4 p.m. to 6 a.m., forbidden from selling or exchanging their 
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dwellings without permission of the municipal authority, using any communication 
systems apart from the post office telephone, “lingering” in public places, or travelling to 
other towns without permission from the municipal authority. The population of Čelinac 
consisted overwhelmingly of Serbs, with a small minority of Muslims and only a few 
Croats and the war presidency’s decision was clearly directed at members of these 
minorities for no other reason than their ethnicity. In Foča, restrictions were placed on the 
movement of Muslims while the Serb population could move around freely, and Muslim 
households were searched by Serb military police and soldiers for weapons, money and 
other items while Serb houses were not searched, or at most were searched superficially.  
788. The Chamber also finds that the discriminatory measures were applied in the 
context of a wider discriminatory attack against Muslims and Croats in the indictment 
municipalities, as described in part 5.1.2, above. In conclusion, the Chamber finds that the 
measures were carried out on discriminatory grounds.  
789. The restrictive measures described above were undertaken during a period when 
Muslims and Croats were increasingly targeted for killings, arbitrary arrests, detention, 
looting, and destruction of property. For example, the Muslims villagers of Jošova in 
Bosanski Novi were instructed by Serb soldiers to leave their homes and gather in a field 
while the soldiers searched their homes for weapons. No weapons were found, and three 
days later Serb forces attacked the village, burning down houses and destroying two 
mosques. In Novo Sarajevo, in the process of searching Muslim and Croat homes for 
weapons, Serb police and paramilitaries also committed rape and plunder. The Chamber 
finds that when the restrictive measures are considered in conjunction with crimes against 
Muslims and Croats, such as the ones mentioned, they constitute persecution. 
790. The Chamber finds that the restrictive and discriminatory measures, namely the 
denial of employment, restriction on freedom of movement, violation of right to privacy 
and denial of equal access to public services, were part of the widespread and systematic 
attack against the Muslim and Croat civilian population. The Chamber therefore finds that 
all above acts imposing restrictive and discriminatory measures against Muslims and 
Croats constitute persecution as a crime against humanity. 
791. The Chamber has heard ample evidence on a fifth discriminatory measure referred 
to in the indictment, namely the denial of the right to judicial process, but will deal with 
this in parts 5.4.2 (e) and (h) below.  
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(b) Killings (murder) 
792. The Chamber has found that approximately 3,000 Muslims and Croats were killed 
in 30 municipalities during the indictment period and that this was part of a widespread 
and systematic attack against the Muslim and Croat civilian population (see part 5.2.2, 
above). The Chamber finds that these killings were discriminatory in fact.  
793. The Chamber further finds that the perpetrators of the killings chose their victims 
on the basis of their Muslim and Croat identity. The fact that Muslims were specifically 
targeted for murder and extermination is demonstrated by the deliberate targeting of 
predominantly Muslim villages for attack, such as Hozići and Agići in Bosanski Novi, 
Prhovo in Ključ, Donja Vinča in Pale, and Jaskići and Sivci in Prijedor, to name but a few. 
In some cases, such as in Suhača in Bosanski Novi and Lješevo in Ilijaš, the Muslim 
villagers were disarmed just prior to the attack, ensuring that no defence would be possible. 
Serb forces then used such weapons to attack the town which would ensure a high number 
of casualties, including heavy artillery. In addition to the discriminatory intent which can 
be inferred from the attacks on Muslim villages, examples of expressed intent are also 
found. During the attack on the Muslim village of Ahatovići in Novi Grad, Serb forces 
called out to Muslim villagers hiding in the forest, “Balijas, surrender yourselves or we’ll 
kill your women and children.” Balija is a derogatory term for Muslims. During this attack, 
15 of the Muslim villagers were captured and killed. In Luka camp in Brčko, one night the 
Serb guards sang songs which included lines such as “balija, you’ve had it. There’s a little 
left for you. We will exterminate you.” On that night, at least two detainees were executed, 
after which Goran Jelisić stated “another balija less!” Also in Foča, Muslim civilians were 
rounded up and killed for the sole reason of their Muslim ethnicity. 
794. The Chamber also finds that the killings were committed in the context of a wider 
discriminatory attack against Muslims and Croats in the indictment municipalities, as 
described in part 5.1.2, above. In conclusion, the Chamber finds that the killings were 
carried out on discriminatory grounds. The Chamber therefore finds that they constitute 
persecution as a crime against humanity. 
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(c) Cruel or inhumane treatment, including establishment and perpetuation of inhumane 
living conditions 
795. The Chamber finds that, through acts and omissions, the Serb authorities 
established and perpetuated inhumane living conditions in many of the detention centres 
where Muslims and Croats were held (see section (e), below). Detainees were not provided 
with sufficient food, water, or medical care, and were kept in extremely cramped and 
unhygienic conditions. 
796. For example, detainees in KP Dom [C13.8] in Foča were given starvation rations 
and suffered extreme weight loss. In addition, they were not allowed to receive visits and 
could therefore not supplement their meagre food rations. In Zvornik, 20 detainees died 
from heat stroke and lack of water within hours of arriving at the Karakaj technical school 
[C34.10]. In Omarska camp [C25.4] in Prijedor, up to 600 detainees were kept in an open 
concrete area in all weather conditions, while in Betonirka prison [C28.1] in Sanski Most, 
conditions were so cramped that detainees were forced to sleep sitting up. Some detention 
centres, such as Omarska camp, functioned as long-term detention facilities, where 
detainees were subjected to inhumane living conditions for several months. 
797. In addition to the detention centres mentioned above, the Chamber finds that 
inhumane living conditions were established and maintained in Manjača camp [C1.4] in 
Banja Luka; Đački Dom [C3.5] in Bileća; Mlakve stadium [C5.2] in Bosanski Novi; 
Kozila camp [C6.1] in Bosanski Petrovac; Luka camp [C8.7] in Brčko; Foča high school 
[C13.20] and the Partizan Hall [C13.4] in Foča; Podlugovi detention centre [C17.5] in 
Ilijaš; the ammunition warehouse Jelašačko Polje [C18.4] in Kalinovik; the Kotor Varoš 
prison [C20.5]; the basement of a heating plant [C21.1] in Nevesinje; the Rajlovac army 
barracks [C22.1] in Novi Grad; Kula prison [C23.2] in Novo Sarajevo; the sports hall 
[C24.2] in Pale; the Keraterm [C25.5] and Trnopolje camps [C25.6] in Prijedor; the Sanski 
Most prison [C28.7]; and Sušica camp [C32.6] in Vlasenica. 
798. The Chamber also finds that Muslim and Croat detainees in numerous detention 
centres were physically and psychologically ill-treated by members of Serb forces, some of 
whom were employed as guards for the facility, and others who were allowed access to the 
detention centres. Detainees were beaten on a regular basis in many detention centres. In 
Batković camp [C2.5] in Bijeljina, for example, some detainees were beaten three times a 
day and were forced to beat each other. Extremely serious beatings took place in KP Dom 
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[C13.8] in Foča, where detainees were sometimes beaten so severely that they could not 
walk for days. In the Petar Kočić school [C4.2] in Bosanska Krupa and in Đački Dom 
[C3.5] in Bileća, detainees were subjected to electric shocks. Many detainees sustained 
severe injuries as a result of these beatings. On many occasions, detainees were in fact 
beaten to death. The Chamber has dealt with such incidents in part 5.2.2, above.  
799. In addition to the detention centres mentioned above, detainees were also physically 
or psychologically ill-treated in the following detention centres: Manjača camp [C1.4] in 
Banja Luka; the Bileća police station [C3.2]; the police station [C5.11], the fire station 
[C5.7], Mlakve stadium [C5.2] and Hotel Una [C5.6] in Bosanski Novi; the police station 
[C6.2] and Kozila camp [C6.1] in Bosanski Petrovac; Vuk Karadžić School [C7.4] in 
Bratunac; the fire station [C8.1], Posavina hotel [C8.8], Kolobara mosque [C8.4], and Luka 
camp [C8.7] in Brčko; the police station [C10.1] and the SDK building [C10.4] in Čelinac; 
Spreča prison [C11.6] and the municipal prison [C32.3] in Doboj; the military warehouse 
at Livade [C13.11] in Foča; Gacko police station [C14.2]; the civil defence headquarters 
[C15.1], the municipal assembly building [C15.4], the sports centre [C15.3=C15.5] and 
Vranica Dormitory huts [C15.6] in Hadžići; the ammunition warehouse Jelašačko Polje 
[C18.4] and the elementary school [C18.2] in Kalinovik; the police station [C19.1] and the 
sports hall [C19.6] in Ključ; Kotor Varoš elementary school [C20.3], the police station 
[C20.4], the prison [C20.5] and the Grabovica elementary school [20.13] in Kotor Varoš; 
the basement of a heating plant [C21.1] in Nevesinje; the Rajlovac barracks [C22.1] in 
Novi Grad; Lukavica [C23.6], Kula prison [C23.2], and the Šoping building in Grbavica 
[C23.1] in Novo Sarajevo; the Pale sports hall [C24.2]; the Ljubija [C25.10], Trnopolje 
[C25.6], Omarska [C25.4] and Keraterm [C25.5] camps in Prijedor; the police station 
[C28.5], Betonirka prison camp [C28.1] and Krings Hall [C28.3] in Sanski Most; Teslić 
police station [C31.3=C31.6]; the municipal prison and Sušica camp [C32.6] in Vlasenica; 
the police station [C33.8] and Planjo’s house [C33.1] in Vogošća; Karakaj technical school 
[C34.10], Alhos factory [C34.18], the Standard factory [C34.5=C34.19], Ekonomija 
[C34.9], Novi Izvor [C34.1=34.2], the Dom Kulture Drinjače [C34.23], and the Dom 
Kulture Čelopek [C34.8] in Zvornik.  
800. The Chamber finds that in a number of detention centres, Muslim and Croat 
detainees were raped or sexually abused. For example, in Batković camp [C2.5] in 
Bijeljina, male detainees were forced to engage in degrading sexual acts with each other in 
the presence of other detainees. In several detention centres in Foča, women and young 
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girls were raped on a regular basis, namely in Bukovica motel [C13.19], the workers huts 
at Buk Bijela [C13.6], Srednja Škola [C13.1], and Karaman’s house in Miljevina 
[C13.3=13.15]. Sexual abuse also occurred in Luka camp [C8.7] in Brčko; the civil 
defence headquarters [C15.1], a factory outside the town of Hadžići [C15.2], and the sports 
centre [C15.3=15.5] in Hadžići; Kalinovik elementary school [C18.2]; the police station 
[C20.4] and Pilana sawmill [C20.7] in Kotor Varoš; the police station [C33.8] in Vogošća; 
and the Dom Kulture Čelopek [C34.8] in Zvornik.  
801. The Chamber finds that also during armed attacks on towns and villages, Serb 
forces beat and otherwise ill-treated Muslim and Croat civilians, causing them serious 
mental and physical harm, in the following municipalities: Bosanski Novi, Kotor Varoš, 
Prijedor, Novo Sarajevo, Teslić, Foča, Gacko, Rogatica, and Višegrad. 
802. For example, during the attack on Bosanski Novi town, one witness was arrested 
together with his brother by Serb soldiers, and forced to kneel and face a wall. The Serb 
soldiers then forced them to sing Serbian songs and opened fire on the wall around them. 
In Kotor Varoš, members of a Serb paramilitary unit severely mistreated a group of 
Muslims from Kotor settlement. The Serbs beat them with rifles and verbally abused the 
Muslims, calling them “balijas” and “Ustashas”. The Serbs also let a dog loose on one of 
the Muslims, and forced several Muslims to beat their family members. In Foča, after the 
attack on the Muslim village of Mješaja/Trošanj, Serb soldiers beat the Muslim villagers 
with rifle butts and tree branches, kicked them, and called them “Ustashas”. One of the 
victims lost an eye as a result of the brutal beating. 
803. The Chamber finds that the inhumane living conditions at the detention centres, and 
the ill-treatment of Muslims and Croats during the attacks on towns and villages, and in 
detention centres, resulted in serious injuries and serious mental and physical suffering of 
the victims. Regarding the creation and maintenance of inhumane living conditions in 
detention centres, the Chamber finds that the perpetrators either had the intention to inflict 
serious mental and physical harm on the detainees, or that they knew that their acts or 
omissions was likely to cause serious mental or physical suffering or injury, or a serious 
attack on human dignity, and was reckless as to that result. Regarding the ill-treatment of 
Muslims and Croats during attacks on towns and villages and in the detention centres, the 
Chamber finds that the perpetrators intended to inflict such serious injuries and serious 
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mental and physical harm. The Chamber therefore finds that all these acts and omissions 
constitute cruel or inhumane treatment.  
804. The victims of the cruel and inhumane treatment were exclusively Muslims and 
Croats, and the Chamber therefore finds that these killings were discriminatory in fact. In 
addition, the victims were selected on the basis of their ethnicity. Many Muslim detainees 
were called “balija”, or were otherwise insulted. Some Muslim detainees were forced to 
spit on the Muslim flag or to sing Serb nationalistic songs. While raping a woman in a 
Foča detention centre, Dragoljub Kunarac expressed with verbal and physical aggression 
his view that rapes against Muslim women were one of the many ways in which the Serbs 
could assert their superiority and victory over the Muslims. In this respect, the Chamber 
also considers the fact that Muslims and Croats were detained on discriminatory grounds 
(see section (e), below). 
805. The Chamber also finds that the cruel or inhumane treatment was committed in the 
context of a wider discriminatory attack against Muslims and Croats in the indictment 
municipalities, as described in part 5.1.2, above. In conclusion, the Chamber finds that the 
cruel or inhumane treatment was carried out on discriminatory grounds.  
806. The Chamber further finds that the victims referred to above were either captured or 
detained, or otherwise not taking active part in the hostilities, at the time of the cruel or 
inhumane treatment. The Chamber finds that the cruel or inhumane treatment was part of 
the widespread and systematic attack against the Muslim and Croat civilian population. 
The Chamber therefore finds that all above incidents of cruel and inhumane treatment 
constitute persecution as a crime against humanity. 
 
(d) Forced transfer or deportation 
807. The Chamber has found that Muslims and Croats were forcibly displaced from 32 
municipalities, and that this was part of a widespread and systematic attack against the 
Muslim and Croat civilian population (see part 5.3.2). The Chamber finds that the forcible 
displacement was discriminatory in fact.  
808. The Chamber further finds that Muslims and Croats were forced to leave or were 
expelled from the municipalities on the basis of their ethnicity. As was described in part 
5.3.2, above, many Muslims and Croats were forced to leave their homes due to the 
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discriminatory measures instituted by Serb authorities and the violence directed 
specifically at them. Their expulsion was often accompanied by the destruction of religious 
sites and property of significance to these groups. In a number of municipalities, Muslims 
and Croats were forced to sign over their property to Serb authorities, as a precondition for 
their departure. Orthodox churches were never destroyed and Serb property was not looted 
or confiscated.  
809. The Chamber finds that the forcible displacement of Muslims and Croats was the 
very aim of the discriminatory attack against these groups in all the indictment 
municipalities, as described in part 5.1.2, above. For this reason, the Chamber finds that the 
forcible displacement was clearly carried out on discriminatory grounds.  
 
 (e) Unlawful detention (imprisonment) 
810. The Chamber finds that Serb authorities detained mainly Muslim, but also Croat 
civilians in more than 350 detention facilities, the majority of which are referred to in 
schedule C of the indictment, located in 33 municipalities, namely Banja Luka, Bijeljina, 
Bileća, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Bratunac, Brčko, Čajniče, 
Čelinac, Doboj, Donji Vakuf, Foča, Gacko, Hadžići, Ilidža, Ilijaš, Kalinovik, Ključ, Kotor 
Varoš, Nevesinje, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, 
Sokolac, Teslić, Trnovo, Vlasenica, Vogošća, and Zvornik.TPF1682FPT With regard to 36 of the 
facilities listed in the indictment schedule, the Chamber either did not receive sufficient 
evidence to conclude that they functioned as detention centres where Muslim and Croat 
 
P
1682
P As for the detention centres set out in schedule C of the indictment, the Chamber refers to part 4 of this 
judgement where all centres which the Chamber considers proven are indicated by name and code. In 
addition, part 4 discusses the following detention centres which were not explicitly set out in the indictment 
but which the Chamber considers proven: Bijeljina: Mauzer’s private jail or slaughterhouse; Hadžići: the 
professional trades school, the Garaže (garages), the Zgrada TO building, the basement of a hotel, Tarčin 
prison, the Žunovnica military barracks, the building of Social Affairs, and the Blažuj military barracks; 
Ilidža: the cultural and sports complex, the storage building of Energoinvest, Kasindol hospital, the graphic 
school, the kindergarten, and the Blažuj military barracks; Ilijaš: the industrial school, the former railway 
station, the INA gasoline storage plant, the old homes in Jamjanovića, the old pit in Podlugovi, the Nišići 
winter services maintenance, the MIK factory hall in Podlugovi, and a concrete bunker by the Stavanja river 
in Podlugovi; Novi Grad: the Energopetrol gasoline storage plant, a distribution centre, and the Kisikana 
oxygen storage plant; Pale: the cultural centre and the miliatrey barracks in Hrenovica; Trnovo: weekend 
cottages; Vlasenica: the municipal court house; Vogošća: the Sonje bunker beside the Kon Tiki 
boardinghouse, a sports complex, the Krivoglavci tunnel and the UNIS factorie. 
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civilians were unlawfully held, or has not found that they operated within the indictment 
period or within one of the indictment municipalities.TPF1683FPT  
811. Various facilities, such as prisons, police stations, schools, municipal buildings, 
industrial premises, hotels, and sports facilities, within the municipalities were all used as 
detention centres. Serb forces often arrested and detained Muslims and Croats after having 
attacked their villages and towns. Sometimes persons were put in temporary detention 
facilities before being transferred to other long-term detention facilities. For example, in 
Vlasenica municipality, following attacks on Sušica and several other villages, a MUP 
special unit detained men in the municipal court house before they were transferred to 
Sušica camp.  
812. Serb forces arrested many thousands of Muslims and Croats and detained them in 
the detention centres referred to above. Detainees were sometimes divided into different 
categories, for example, detainees who were of security interest to the Serbs; detainees 
who helped to finance or supply arms; and detainees about whom the Serbs had no 
information and who were to be treated as hostages to be used in exchange for Serb 
citizens. According to another categorization in Prijedor municipality, group A detainees 
consisted of persons who were “not guilty of anything”; group B and group C consisted of 
persons who had supported the SDA or belonged to the SDA, or who had taken part in or 
financed attacks on Prijedor. The Chamber finds that these categories reveal that the arrest 
and detention of Muslims and Croats was widespread and not limited to lawful detention. 
This is also consistent with numerous witness testimonies received by the Chamber. The 
Chamber also notes that while the detainees in many cases consisted exclusively, or almost 
exclusively, of Muslims and Croats, the guards were always of Serb ethnicity. The 
Chamber finds that Serb forces detained Muslims and Croats on the basis of their ethnicity, 
and that the arrest and detention therefore was unlawful, discriminatory in fact, and carried 
out on discriminatory grounds.  
813. As for the discriminatory ground, the Chamber also takes into consideration the fact 
that the unlawful detention was committed in the context of a wider discriminatory attack 
against Muslims and Croats in the indictment municipalities, as described in part 5.1.2, 
 
P
1683
P Bijeljina: C2.6, C2.7, C2.10, C2.13-C2.15; Bosanska Krupa: C4.3; Bosanski Petrovac: C6.3; Bratunac: 
C7.1, C7.7, C7.8; Brčko: C8.10, C8.16; Doboj: C11.28, C11.29, C11.30; Donji Vakuf: C12.1, C12.12; Foča: 
C13.5, C13.16; Ilidža: C16.4; Ilijaš: C17.4, C17.6; Kalinovik: C18.1; Ključ: C19.7; Nevesinje: C21.2; Pale: 
C24.1, C24.3; Rogatica: C26.4, C24.9; Sanski Most: C28.16, C28.18-C28.20; Vlasenica: C.32.7; Vogošća: 
C33.6.  
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above. In conclusion, the Chamber finds that the unlawful detention was carried out on 
discriminatory grounds. 
814. The Chamber finds that the unlawful detention was part of the widespread and 
systematic attack against the Muslim and Croat civilian population. The Chamber therefore 
finds that the unlawful detention constitutes persecution as a crime against humanity. 
 
(f) Forced labour 
815. The Chamber finds that Serb forces used Muslims and Croats for labour at front 
lines, including digging trenches and carrying munitions, in seven municipalities, namely 
Bijeljina, Bosanska Krupa, Brčko, Novo Sarajevo, Teslić, Vlasenica, and Vogošća. All the 
victims in the mentioned instances were held at various detention centres when they were 
taken for forced labour. For example, detainees at Batković camp in Bijeljina and Sušica 
camp in Vlasenica were regularly forced to perform manual labour, including digging 
trenches. Considering the findings on illegal detention and the conditions at detention 
centres (sections (c) and (e), above), the Chamber finds that there was no real possibility 
for the detainees to consent to be used for work and that the labour was therefore forced.  
816. As the victims were Muslims and Croats, the Chamber finds that the acts of forced 
labour were discriminatory in fact. As the Chamber has already found that Muslims and 
Croats were held on discriminatory grounds in the detention centres at which forced labour 
was practiced, it can be inferred that they were chosen for forced labour on the same 
grounds.  
817. The Chamber also finds that the acts of forced labour were committed in the context 
of a wider discriminatory attack against Muslims and Croats in the indictment 
municipalities, as described in part 5.1.2, above. In conclusion, the Chamber finds that the 
acts of forced labour were carried out on discriminatory grounds. 
818. The Chamber finds that the forced labour was part of the widespread and systematic 
attack against the Muslim and Croat civilian population. The Chamber therefore finds that 
the acts of forced labour constitute persecution as a crime against humanity. 
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(g) Human shields 
819. The Chamber finds that Muslim and Croat detainees and villagers were used by 
Serb soldiers as human shields in Rogatica and Vogošća. The Chamber has found that 
during these incidents, 39 Muslims were killed. The Chamber has addressed these killings 
in part 5.2.2 above and will therefore not consider them further here. 
 
(h) Appropriation or plunder of property 
820. The Chamber finds that acts of appropriation and plunder of property of Muslims 
and Croats were committed in 27 municipalities, namely Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bileća, 
Bratunac, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Čajniče, Čelinac, Donji 
Vakuf, Foča, Gacko, Hadžići, Ilidža, Kalinovik, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Novo Sarajevo, 
Prijedor, Prnjavor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Teslić, Višegrad, Vlasenica, Vogošća, and 
Zvornik.  
821. In many municipalities, Serb authorities implemented decisions forcing Muslims to 
surrender all their property to the municipality in order to be allowed to leave. As 
discussed above in part 5.3.2, the departure was prompted by violence and discriminatory 
measures against Muslims and Croats. Muslims were given no option but to sign over their 
property to the Serb municipality, receiving nothing in exchange except for written 
authorization to leave the area.  
822. For example, in Bosanski Petrovac, the war presidency adopted a decision that “all 
families that have signed contracts on the exchange of flats, houses and other immovable 
property may leave Petrovac Municipality.” Muslim families who had not produced 
exchange contracts were allowed to leave only if they donated all movable and immovable 
property to the municipality. Similar procedures were adopted in Bosanski Novi, Foča, 
Ključ, Prnjavor, Vlasenica and Zvornik. In some municipalities, Muslims who owned 
property and had already left the area were instructed to report to the municipal authorities 
on very short notice or risk forfeiting their property to the municipality. In other cases, 
Serbs simply took over houses and flats from which Muslims and Croats had been forced. 
823. The acts of appropriation and plunder also included the looting of Muslim- and 
Croat-owned private houses and businesses by armed Serb forces. The looting took place 
during and after attacks on towns and villages, and in the course of deportation or forcible 
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transfer. In addition, detained Muslims and Croats were forced to surrender their 
belongings, jewellery, money, and documents to Serb soldiers or guards at detention 
centres while being detained.  
824. Regarding the confiscation of private houses, the Chamber has considered both the 
economic and emotional value of the property, as well as the purpose of the confiscation, 
that is to force Muslims and Croats to leave the municipality and not return. The Chamber 
is convinced that this type of appropriation had a severe impact on the victims. The 
Chamber had insufficient information to assess the impact on the victims the instances of 
plunder of private houses and business premises, and the other forms of plunder described 
above.  
825. As the victims of the appropriation and plunder described were Muslims and 
Croats, the Chamber finds that it was discriminatory in fact. The Chamber considers that 
the appropriation and plunder in the present case often took place in connection with illegal 
detention and forcible displacement. For example, in Vlasenica, Muslims detained at the 
police station in Vlasenica [C32.1] were ordered out of their cells on 21 May 1992 and 
placed in buses. Serb soldiers proceeded to confiscate their personal belongings, including 
money and documents, before these detainees were taken to their execution. This incident 
has been described in greater detail in part 4. A number of women, children, and elderly 
civilians detained at the Pilana sawmill [C20.7] in Kotor Varoš were being released, put on 
buses and forcibly removed from the municipality in August 1992. Along the way 
paramilitaries boarded the buses in which they were travelling and stripped the detainees of 
their remaining money and jewellery. The Chamber further considers that the decisions 
and instruction issued by municipal authorities on property, as referred to above, was an 
integral part of the forcible transfer of Muslims and Croats from the municipality. The 
Chamber has found that the illegal detention and the forcible displacement was carried out 
on discriminatory grounds (see sections (d) and (e), above) 
826. The Chamber also finds that the appropriation and plunder was committed in the 
context of a wider discriminatory attack against Muslims and Croats in the indictment 
municipalities, as described in part 5.1.2, above. In conclusion, the Chamber finds that the 
appropriation and plunder was carried out on discriminatory grounds. 
827. The Chamber finds that the confiscation of private houses constitutes persecution. 
The Chamber further finds that, although the other instances of appropriation or plunder 
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might not in and of itself constitute persecution, these acts must be considered in 
conjunction with the killings, deportation, and unlawful detention of Muslims and Croats 
that took place in connection with these acts. The Chamber therefore finds that all above 
incidents constitute persecution. 
828. The Chamber finds that the appropriation and plunder of property of Muslims and 
Croats was part of the widespread and systematic attack against the Muslim and Croat 
civilian population. The Chamber therefore finds that the appropriation and plunder of 
property constitutes persecution as a crime against humanity. 
 
(i) Destruction of private property 
829. The Chamber finds that acts of destruction of private property belonging to 
Muslims and Croats, including homes and business premises, were committed in 19 
municipalities, namely Banja Luka, Bratunac, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski 
Petrovac, Brčko, Čajniče, Čelinac, Foča, Ilijaš, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Novi Grad, Pale, 
Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, Trnovo, and Vlasenica.  
830. The destruction of private houses belonging to Muslims and Croats took place 
during attacks and take-overs of towns and villages by Serb forces in all the mentioned 
municipalities. Houses were destroyed by shelling, through explosives, or burnt down. For 
example, when Serb forces shelled the Muslim village Ahatovići in Novi Grad, almost all 
130 houses in the village were destroyed. In Bratunac, during the attack on Glogova on 9 
May 1992 after 65 villagers had been killed and the remaining ones had been detained, 
Serb forces burnt most of the houses in the village. In Vlasenica, Serb forces conducted 
military operations in a number of Muslim villages and hamlets in May and June 1992, 
during which they were under explicit order to burn all the houses to prevent the owners 
from returning. Almost all the Muslim houses in the area were in fact destroyed. 
Destruction of business premises were carried out in Banja Luka, Kotor Varoš, Prnjavor, 
and Sanski Most. For example, in Sanski Most, members of the paramilitary group SOS 
destroyed 28 shops and restaurants belonging to Muslims and Croats.  
831. The Chamber finds that the acts of destruction of private houses had a severe impact 
on the victims, for the same reasons described in section (h), above. The Chamber had 
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insufficient information to assess the impact on the victims of destruction of their business 
premises. 
832. As the victims of the destruction of private property were Muslims and Croats, the 
Chamber finds that the destruction was discriminatory in fact. The Chamber considers that 
the destruction was done in connection with attacks on Muslim and Croat towns, villages 
and hamlets and that the private property of these groups therefore was targeted, while 
Serb property was spared. In Brčko, for example, Serb soldiers prevented firemen from 
putting out fires in Muslim houses unless they were close to Serb houses.  
833. The Chamber also finds that the destruction of private property was committed in 
the context of a wider discriminatory attack against Muslims and Croats in the indictment 
municipalities, as described in part 5.1.2, above. In conclusion, the Chamber finds that the 
appropriation and plunder was carried out on discriminatory grounds. 
834. The Chamber finds that the destruction of private houses constitutes persecution. 
The Chamber further finds that, although the instances of destruction of business property 
might not in and of itself constitute persecution, these acts must be considered in 
conjunction with the killings, deportation, and unlawful detention of Muslims and Croats 
that took place in connection with these acts. The Chamber therefore finds that all above 
incidents constitute persecution. 
835. The Chamber finds that the destruction of private property was part of the 
widespread and systematic attack against the Muslim and Croat civilian population. The 
Chamber therefore finds that the destruction of private property constitutes persecution as a 
crime against humanity. 
 
(j) Destruction of cultural monuments and sacred sites 
836. The Chamber finds that more than 200 cultural or religious sites, mainly mosques, 
but also Catholic churches, the majority of which are referred to in schedule D of the 
indictment, were heavily damaged or destroyed by Serb forces in 26 municipalities, 
namely Bijeljina, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Bratunac, Brčko, 
Čajniče, Čelinac, Doboj, Foča, Ilijaš, Kalinovik, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Nevesinje, Novi 
Grad, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, Teslić, Trnovo, Višegrad, 
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Vogošća, and Zvornik.TPF1684FPT The Chamber did not receive sufficient evidence to conclude 
that several of the mosques listed in schedule D of the indictment were destroyed by Serb 
forces, during the period of the indictment, or within an indictment municipality.TPF1685FPT 
837. The Chamber finds that Serb forces intentionally and wantonly destroyed the 
mosques, churches, and other religious monuments referred to above. Mosques were often 
destroyed using explosives and then further demolished with heavy machinery.  
838. As the monuments and sites were Muslim and, in some instances Croat, the 
Chamber finds that destruction was discriminatory in fact. The Chamber finds that the 
Muslim and Croat monuments and sites were targeted specifically as religious symbols for 
the respective ethnic groups. For example, the Hasanbegova mosque in Sanski Most was 
destroyed by members of the 6th Krajina Brigade, and afterwards a parking lot was laid on 
top of the cemetery. When a mosque in the centre of Brčko town was burning, soldiers 
expressed satisfaction at the mosque’s destruction and told firemen not to put out the fire. 
The Chamber finds that Serb forces destroyed mosques in order to wipe out traces of the 
Muslim culture and religion. 
839. The Chamber also finds that the destruction of the cultural monuments and sacred 
sites was committed in the context of a wider discriminatory attack against Muslims and 
Croats in the indictment municipalities, as described in part 5.1.2, above. In conclusion, the 
Chamber finds that the destruction was carried out on discriminatory grounds. 
840. The Chamber finds that the destruction of cultural monuments and sacred sites was 
part of the widespread and systematic attack against the Muslim and Croat civilian 
 
P
1684
P As for the monuments and sites set out in schedule C of the indictment, the Chamber refers to part 4 of 
this judgement where all the monuments and sites which the Chamber considers proven are indicated by 
name and code. In addition, part 4 discusses the following monuments and sites which were not explicitly set 
out in the indictment, but which the Chamber considers proven: Bijeljina: one mosque; Bosanska Krupa: 
three Muslim and Catholic monuments; Bosanski Petrovac: one mosque; Bratunac: two mosques; Doboj: 
seventeen mosques; Foča: twenty-three mosques; Ilijaš: eighteen mosques; Kalinovik: Kutina and Jesalica; 
Ključ: four Muslim monuments; Kotor Varoš: five mosques; Nevesinje: one Catholic church; Novi Grad: one 
mosque; Prijedor: one mosque; Prnjavor: one mosque; Rogatica: seven mosques; Sanski Most: eleven 
mosques; Sokolac: four mosques; Teslić: four mosques; Trnovo: one mosque; Višegrad: five mosques; 
Vogošća: the mosque in Ugorsko, the masjid (mosque without minaret) in Karaula-Donja Vogošća, the 
masjid in Tihovići, the masjid in Gora, the masjid in Krč, the mosque under construction in the Park Hotel 
vicinity, and the Catholic church in Semizovac; Zvornik: nineteen Muslim monuments. 
P
1685
P Bosanska Krupa: D2.1; Bosanski Novi: D3.4, D3.5, D3.7; Bosanski Petrovac: D4.1, D4.4; Čajniče: D7.3; 
Doboj: D9.3; Donji Vakuf: D10.1-D10.5; Foča: D11.4, D11.4; Hadžići: D12.1, D12.2; Ključ: D15.1-D15.3, 
D15.5, D15.7; Nevesinje: D17.5; Prijedor: D18.2, D18.3, D18.6-D18.11; Rogatica: D20.3, D20.4; Rudo: 
D21.1-D21.4; Sanski Most: D22.2, D22.8, D22.9; Šipovo: D23.1-D23.3; Vlasenica: D27.1; Vogošća: D28.2; 
Zvornik: D29.1-D29.4. 
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population. The Chamber therefore finds that the destruction of cultural monuments and 
sacred sites constitutes persecution as a crime against humanity. 
 
5.5 Murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war 
5.5.1 Applicable law 
841. The Accused is charged with murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war 
(count 6) pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute. This crime is charged in the alternative to 
murder as a crime against humanity which, in turn, is charged in the alternative to 
extermination as a crime against humanity (counts 4 and 5, respectively).  
842. Article 3 of the Statute is a “residual clause” which gives the Tribunal jurisdiction 
over any serious violation of international humanitarian law not covered by Articles 2, 4, 
or 5 of the Statute.TPF1686FPT To fall within this residual jurisdiction, the offence charged must 
meet four conditions: (i) it must constitute an infringement of a rule of international 
humanitarian law; (ii) the rule infringed upon must be customary in nature or, if it belongs 
to treaty law, the treaty provisions were unquestionably binding on the parties at the time 
of the alleged offence and do not derogate from peremptory norms of international law; 
(iii) the violation must be serious, that is to say, it must involve a breach of a rule 
protecting important values and the breach must have grave consequences for the victim; 
and (iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the 
individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.TPF1687FPT 
843. In the present case, the charge of murder as a violation of the laws or customs of 
war is based on Article 3(1)(a) common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. It is well 
established in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal that violations of Common Article 3 fall 
within the ambit of Article 3 of the Statute.TPF1688FPT With respect to a charge of murder under 
Common Article 3(1)(a), the four jurisdictional requirements set out above are clearly met. 
Common Article 3 is part of customary international law applicable in both internal and 
international armed conflicts.TPF1689FPT The crime of murder prohibited by Common Article 3 
 
P
1686
P Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 
October 1995, paras 89-93; Čelebići Appeal Judgement paras 125, 131, 133. 
P
1687
P Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 
October 1995, paras 94, 143.  
P
1688
P Ibid., para. 89; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 125, 133-6; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 68.  
P
1689
P Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 
October 1995, paras 89, 98; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 138-9, 147.  
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undoubtedly breaches a rule protecting important values and involves grave consequences 
for the victim. It also entails individual criminal responsibility.TPF1690FPT The Chamber therefore 
has jurisdiction. 
844. Once jurisdiction is established, there are two general conditions that must be met 
for the applicability of Article 3 of the Statute: first, there must be an armed conflict; and 
second, there must be a nexus between the alleged offence and the armed conflict.TPF1691FPT 
845. Armed conflict. The Chamber has already found that an armed conflict existed at the 
relevant time and place (see part 5.1.2, above). As indicated above, the nature of the 
conflict (internal or international) is immaterial for the purposes of Common Article 3. 
846. Nexus. The alleged crime need not have occurred at a time and place in which there 
was actual combat, so long as the acts of the perpetrator were “closely related” to 
hostilities occurring in territories controlled by parties to the conflict.TPF1692FPT The existence of 
this close relationship between the crime and the armed conflict will be established where 
it can be shown that the conflict played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to 
commit the crime, his or her decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed, 
or the purpose for which it was committed. TPF1693FPT 
847. The final requirement for the application of an Article 3 charge based on Common 
Article 3 is that the victim was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time the offence 
was committed. This covers, among other persons, members of armed forces who have laid 
down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any 
other cause.TPF1694FPT The perpetrator must know or should have known the status of the victims 
as persons taking no active part in the hostilities.TPF1695FPT 
848. The elements of the crime of murder have been discussed in part 5.2.1, above. 
 
 
P
1690
P Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 
October 1995, para. 134; confirmed in Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 173-4; Strugar Trial Judgement, 
para. 219.  
P
1691
P Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 
October 1995, para. 70; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 55; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 342. 
P
1692
P Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 57; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 342. 
P
1693
P Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 58. 
P
1694
P Common Article 3(1); Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 420.  
P
1695
P Halilović Trial Judgement, para. 36. 
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5.5.2 Legal findings 
849. All incidents of killings have been found to constitute either murder or 
extermination as crimes against humanity (see part 5.2.2, above). As murder as a violation 
of the laws or customs of war was charged in the alternative to these crimes, the Chamber 
will not make any legal findings on the former. The Chamber has classified all proven 
killings under Article 5 of the Statute, so the allegation regarding Article 3 of the Statute 
(violations of the laws or customs of war), which was charged in the alternative to murder 
as a crime against humanity, is rendered moot. 
 
5.6 Genocide and/or complicity in genocide 
5.6.1 Applicable law 
850. The indictment charges genocide and complicity in genocide (count 1 and count 2) 
cumulatively or in the alternative (“and/or”).TPF1696FPT 
851. Mens rea. The hallmark of the crime of genocide is the intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such.TPF1697FPT The constituent 
elements of the mens rea of genocide will be discussed for the most part briefly, as the 
applicable law is by now generally settled. 
852. Paragraph 15 of the indictment alleges participation in an enterprise to bring about 
the partial destruction of the Bosnian-Muslim and Bosnian-Croat groups in territories 
within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Any ambiguity as to whether this allegation denotes the intent 
of the participants, or the actual extent of the crime, is resolved in paragraph 16, where 
destruction of the groups in part is said to have been the intent. 
853. Thus the indictment alleges intent to achieve destruction “in part”. This can be 
proven only if the intent to destroy a substantial part of the protected group is proven. TPF1698FPT 
To determine whether the targeted part of the group is substantial, the numerical relation of 
the part to the overall size of the group should be considered, as well as its prominence 
 
P
1696
P The cumulative possibility is relevant only where different acts are concerned. In relation to one and the 
same act, either genocide or complicity in genocide may be established against a person, but not both, since 
at stake are two alternative modes of personal liability for a crime, not two different substantive crimes. This 
point will be revisited in the section below on complicity in genocide. 
P
1697
P As indicated in paragraph 16 of the indictment, genocide may be considered an extreme form of 
persecution, although it should be noted, too, that the actus reus of genocide is significantly narrower than 
that of persecution. 
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within the group as a whole.TPF1699FPT In Krstić, the proven intent to destroy approximately 
40,000 Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica was said by the Appeals Chamber to meet the 
substantiality requirement.TPF1700FPT 
854. “Destruction”, as a component of the mens rea of genocide, is not limited to 
physical or biological destruction of the group’s members, since the group (or a part of it) 
can be destroyed in other ways, such as by transferring children out of the group (or the 
part) or by severing the bonds among its members.TPF1701FPT Thus it has been said that one may 
rely, for example, on evidence of deliberate forcible transfer as evidence of the mens rea of 
genocide.TPF1702FPT 
855. As with “destruction”, the group as either national, ethnic, racial, or religious is a 
notion that occurs both in the mens rea of genocide and in the actus reus. In the context of 
the present case it is the least problematic notion. There is no dispute that the Bosnian 
Muslims and Bosnian Croats were national or ethnic groups in the sense of the Genocide 
Convention.  
856. The words “as such” which conclude the statement of intent have been interpreted 
by the Appeals Chamber to mean that one of the proscribed acts was committed against a 
victim because of his or her membership of the protected group, but not necessarily solely 
because of that membership.TPF1703FPT  
857. A peculiarity of the present case, which involves multiple levels of actors, is that a 
crime committed by a person of low political or military rank without genocidal intent may 
nevertheless be characterized as an act of genocide if it was procured by a person of higher 
authority acting with that intent. The Chamber will therefore make findings on the intent of 
genocide in two separate places in this judgement: in the present part, in relation to lower-
level perpetrators, and in part 6, in relation to the Accused. 
858. Lastly, on intent, genocide requires proof of intent to commit the underlying act, or 
actus reus, in addition to proof of the specific intent of genocide.  
 
P
1698
P Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras 8-12. 
P
1699
P Ibid., para. 14. 
P
1700
P Ibid., paras 15-16. 
P
1701
P It is not accurate to speak of “the group” as being amenable to physical or biological destruction. Its 
members are, of course, physical or biological beings, but the bonds among its members, as well as such 
aspects of the group as its members’ culture and beliefs, are neither physical nor biological. Hence the 
Genocide Convention’s “intent to destroy” the group cannot sensibly be regarded as reducible to an intent to 
destroy the group physically or biologically, as has occasionally been said. 
P
1702
P Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 33. 
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859. Actus reus. Of the five types of actus reus listed in Article 4 of the Statute, the 
indictment charges the first three: 
(i) Killing members of the Bosnian-Muslim or Bosnian-Croat groups. This is to be 
understood as murder of members of those groups,TPF1704FPT murder having been defined already 
in part 5.2.1, above. 
(ii) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the same groups, by cruel 
or inhuman treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, sexual violence, 
and beatings. 
(iii) Inflicting on the groups conditions of life calculated to bring about their 
physical destruction. The conditions are alleged to have been: cruel or inhuman treatment, 
including torture, physical and psychological abuse, and sexual violence; inhumane living 
conditions, namely failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, 
medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities; and forced labour. 
860. The actus reus of genocide, as charged in the indictment, is further narrowed in the 
case of (i), to killings committed in connection with attacks on towns and villages or in 
connection with detention centres, as specified in schedules A and B of the indictment; and 
in the cases of (ii) and (iii), to acts committed in detention centres, as shown in schedule C. 
861. The meanings of the terms used in the indictment to particularize the acts falling 
under (ii) and (iii) – cruel or inhuman treatment, inhumane living conditions, and forced 
labour – have been explained above in part 5.4. However, in the context of genocide the 
act must contribute, or tend to contribute, to the destruction of the protected group or part 
thereof. Murder has that effect, as do the two types of actus reus not charged in the 
indictment, namely measures to prevent births in the group and transfer of children out of 
the group. The actus reus in (iii) – “inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction” – by its own terms must have, or tend to have, a 
destructive effect on the group or the part. 
862. Thus, only (ii) – “causing serious bodily or mental harm” – remains somewhat open 
to interpretation, but a fair and consistent construction of this clause alongside the four 
other types of actus reus is that, in order to pass as the actus reus of genocide under (ii), the 
act must inflict such “harm” as to contribute, or tend to contribute, to the destruction of the 
 
P
1703
P Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 53. 
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group or part thereof. Harm amounting to “a grave and long-term disadvantage to a 
person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life” has been said to be sufficient for 
this purpose.TPF1705FPT 
863. At the same time, it follows that “failure to provide adequate accommodation, 
shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities” will not amount to the 
actus reus of genocide if the deprivation is not so severe as to contribute to the destruction 
of the group, or tend to do so. Living conditions, which may be inadequate by any number 
of standards, may nevertheless be adequate for the survival of the group. 
864. Complicity in genocide. Where acts of genocide are found to have been committed, 
it becomes possible to find that a person associated himself or herself with those acts to 
such an extent that he or she may be found guilty of complicity.  
865. The term “complicity” comes from the Genocide Convention, not from Article 7(1) 
of the Tribunal’s Statute, and as it has been suggested that there is a difference between 
complicity, on the one hand, and the cognate “aiding and abetting” found in Article 7(1), 
on the other, the Chamber will pause briefly to consider this difference. The Appeals 
Chamber has said that complicity, as it occurs in the Genocide Convention, may 
encompass conduct “broader” than aiding and abetting.TPF1706FPT For complicity that is 
“broader”, the Prosecution must prove that the accomplice not only knew of the principal’s 
specific intent to destroy the protected group in whole or in part, but also shared that intent 
himself or herself. TPF1707FPT  
866. In sum, genocide will be proven if one or more of the acts specified in (i) (ii), or 
(iii), above, was committed with the intent to destroy, in part, the Bosnian-Muslim or 
Bosnian-Croat ethnic group, as such. The acts must destroy, or tend to destroy, a 
substantial part of the group, and the intent must be that that part of the group exists no 
more.  
 
 
P
1704
P Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 151. 
P
1705
P Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 513. 
P
1706
P Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 139. In the Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, the 
Appeals Chamber said that “the prohibited act of complicity in genocide, which is included in the Genocide 
Convention and in Article 2 of the [ICTR] Statute, encompasses aiding and abetting” (para. 371, emphasis 
added). 
P
1707
P Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 142; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, paras 500-1. 
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5.6.2 Legal findings 
867. The Chamber finds that some of the crimes described earlier in part 5 meet the 
requirements of the actus reus for genocide. This is the case with regard to all of the crimes 
of murder and extermination, described above in part 5.2.2, as well as some instances of 
cruel or inhumane treatment, discussed above in part 5.4.2. The Chamber does not find, 
however, that any of these acts were committed with the intent to destroy, in part, the 
Bosnian-Muslim or Bosnian-Croat ethnic group, as such. 
868. In the instances of extermination, the Chamber has considered whether a genocidal 
intent of the perpetrator could be inferred directly from the large number of killings. In this 
context, the Chamber has also considered the number of victims relative to the number of 
Muslims and Croats present in the village or detention centre where the killings took place, 
and the selection of the victims. The Chamber finds that in no instance are the killings 
themselves sufficient to make a conclusive finding on whether the perpetrator had a 
genocidal intent. 
869. In addition to the acts themselves, the Chamber has considered the surrounding 
circumstances, including words uttered by the perpetrators and other persons at the scene 
of the crime and official reports on the crimes, in order to establish the mens rea. 
Considering the evidence as a whole, the Chamber can make no conclusive finding that 
any acts were committed with the intent to destroy, in part, the Bosnian-Muslim or 
Bosnian-Croat ethnic group, as such. 
 306 
6. The Accused’s responsibility 
 
6.1 Overview 
870. In this part the Chamber sets out the law applicable to joint criminal enterprise 
liability (JCE). Facts relevant to the Accused’s criminal liability are discussed in the 
subsequent sections, after which these facts are interpreted in light of the applicable law. 
Having determined the Accused’s criminal liability, the Chamber concludes this part by 
making findings on the charges in the indictment and on the permissibility of multiple 
convictions for the same acts. 
 
6.2 Law of joint criminal enterprise 
6.2.1 Arguments of the parties 
871. The Defence submitted that JCE as pleaded by the Prosecution is not an appropriate 
mode of liability in this case.TPF1708FPT According to the Defence, the case law relied upon by the 
Tadić Appeals Chamber to prove the doctrine’s existence in customary international law 
consists mainly of “low-level, small scale criminal activity, usually the unlawful killings of 
small groups of POWs, committed by small groups of German soldiers, or civilians.”TPF1709FPT 
The political leaders held criminally responsible following the Second World War were 
convicted under theories of conspiracy and organizational liability, not JCE, according to 
the Defence.TPF1710FPT Thus, in the Defence view, customary international law does not support 
the application of JCE to the present case. 
872. The Defence relied on the Brđanin Trial Judgement, where it is held that “JCE is 
not an appropriate mode of liability to describe the individual criminal responsibility of the 
Accused, given the extraordinarily broad nature of this case, where the Prosecution seeks 
to include within a JCE a person as structurally remote from the commission of the crimes 
charged in the Indictment as the Accused.”TPF1711FPT The Defence submitted that the reasoning in 
Brđanin should be applied here, and JCE rejected.TPF1712FPT  
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873. Closely related to this argument was the Defence’s next assertion, also based on the 
reasoning in Brđanin,TPF1713FPT that liability under JCE requires proof that the Accused had 
entered into an agreement with the individuals who were the principal perpetrators of the 
underlying crimesTPF1714FPT and that the Accused carried out acts which substantially assisted or 
significantly effected the furtherance of the JCE’s objective.TPF1715FPT 
874. The Prosecution replied that, according to the Appeals Chamber, JCE liability can 
apply to a massive criminal campaign, and that there is no geographic limitation on 
JCE. TPF1716FPT The Prosecution also cited an Appeals Chamber decision which states that 
“liability for participation in a criminal plan is as wide as the plan itself, even if the plan 
amounts to a nation-wide government-organized system of cruelty and injustice.”TPF1717FPT 
875. The Prosecution further submitted that the principal perpetrators of the crimes do 
not have to be members of the JCE, and no agreement between the Accused and the 
principal perpetrators is required for JCE liability.TPF1718FPT According to the Prosecution, the 
Stakić Appeal Judgement implicitly confirms that a JCE may be comprised of participants 
at the leadership level who use the principal perpetrators of the crimes as their 
“instruments”.TPF1719FPT As for the agreement requirement, the Prosecution argued that the only 
support for this conclusion of the Brđanin Trial Chamber is an interlocutory decision in the 
same case, which itself cites no authority.TPF1720FPT 
 
6.2.2 Discussion 
876. The Prosecution’s case is that the Accused is responsible pursuant to Article 7(1) of 
the Statute for the crimes charged in the indictment, and in particular that he is responsible 
as a co-perpetrator in a joint criminal enterprise. The Defence’s assertion that JCE is not an 
appropriate mode of liability in this case, due to the size of the case, its scope, and the fact 
that the Accused was structurally remote from the commission of the crimes charged in the 
indictment, is incorrect, as the Appeals Chamber has never suggested that JCE liability can 
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arise only from participation in enterprises of small size or scope.TPF1721FPT Far from being 
inappropriate, JCE is well suited to cases such as the present one, in which numerous 
persons are all said to be concerned with the commission of a large number of crimes. 
877. On the facts of this case, as discussed later in this section, the Chamber finds JCE to 
be the most appropriate mode of liability. Therefore, other forms of liability charged in the 
indictment will not be further considered in this judgement. 
878. In the context of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence the JCE doctrine received its first 
detailed treatment in the Tadić Appeal Judgement.TPF1722FPT The Tadić Appeals Chamber found 
in broad terms that a person who in execution of a common criminal purpose or JCE 
contributes to the commission of crimes by a group of persons may be held criminally 
liable subject to certain conditions.TPF1723FPT The Appeals Chamber’s analysis of customary 
international law resulted in the identification and definition of three forms of JCE liability. 
879. In the first JCE form: 
all co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common design, possess the same criminal intention; 
for instance, the formulation of a plan among the co-perpetrators to kill, where, in effecting 
this common design (and even if each co-perpetrator carries out a different role within it), 
they ... all possess the intent to kill. 
The objective and subjective prerequisites for imputing criminal responsibility to a 
participant who did not, or cannot be proven to have effected the killing are as follows: 
(i) the accused must voluntarily participate in one aspect of the common design (for instance, 
by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the victim, or by providing material assistance to or 
facilitating the activities of his co-perpetrators); and 
(ii) the accused, even if not personally effecting the killing, must nevertheless intend this 
result. TPF1724FPT 
880. The second form of JCE, which is described as a special case of the first form, was 
found to have served cases where the offences charged were alleged to have been 
committed by members of military or administrative units, such as those running 
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concentration camps and comparable “systems”.TPF1725FPT The Prosecution’s attempt to revive 
this notion in its final trial brief and closing arguments,TPF1726FPT when the notion had been left 
behind already at the Rule 98 bis stage,TPF1727FPT does not warrant consideration here. 
881. The third form of JCE is characterized by a common criminal design to pursue a 
course of conduct where one or more of the co-perpetrators commits an act which, while 
outside the common design, is a natural and foreseeable consequence of the 
implementation of that design.TPF1728FPT 
882. There are two requirements in this context, one objective and the other 
subjective.TPF1729FPT The objective element does not depend upon the accused’s state of mind. 
This is the requirement that the resulting crime was a natural and foreseeable consequence 
of the JCE’s execution. It is to be distinguished from the subjective state of mind, namely 
that the accused was aware that the resulting crime was a possible consequence of the 
execution of the JCE, and participated with that awareness.TPF1730FPT 
883. To summarize the elements of the first and third forms of JCE: 
 (i) Plurality of persons. A joint criminal enterprise exists when a plurality of 
persons participate in the realization of a common criminal objective.TPF1731FPT The persons 
participating in the criminal enterprise need not be organized in a military, political, or 
administrative structure.TPF1732FPT 
 (ii) A common objective which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime 
provided for in the Statute. The first form of the JCE exists where the common objective 
amounts to, or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute. The mens 
rea required for the first form is that the JCE participants, including the accused, had a 
common state of mind, namely the state of mind that the statutory crime(s) forming part of 
the objective should be carried out.TPF1733FPT The third form of the JCE depends on whether it is 
natural and foreseeable that the execution of the JCE in its first form will lead to the 
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commission of one or more other statutory crimes. In addition to the intent of the first 
form, it is required that the accused took the risk that another statutory crime – not forming 
part of the common criminal objective but nevertheless being a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of the JCE – would be committed. TPF1734FPT 
 According to the Appeals Chamber, the common objective need not have been 
previously arranged or formulated. TPF1735FPT This means that the second JCE element does not 
presume preparatory planning or explicit agreement among JCE participants.TPF1736FPT 
Moreover, a JCE may exist even if none or only some of the principal perpetrators are part 
of it, because, for example, they are not aware of the JCE or its objective and are procured 
by members of the JCE to commit crimes which further that objective.TPF1737FPT 
 (iii) Participation of the accused in the objective’s implementation. This is achieved 
by the accused’s commission of a crime forming part of the common objective (and 
provided for in the Statute). Alternatively, instead of committing the intended crime as a 
principal perpetrator, the accused’s conduct may satisfy this element if it involved 
procuring or giving assistance to the execution of a crime forming part of the common 
objective.TPF1738FPT A contribution of the accused to the JCE need not have been, as a matter of 
law, either substantialTPF1739FPT or necessary to the achievement of the JCE’s objective.TPF1740FPT 
884. In relation to the first two elements of JCE liability, it is the common objective that 
begins to transform a plurality of persons into a group or enterprise, as this plurality has in 
common the particular objective. It is evident, however, that a common objective alone is 
not always sufficient to determine a group, as different and independent groups may 
happen to share identical objectives. Rather, it is the interaction or cooperation among 
persons – their joint action – in addition to their common objective, that makes those 
persons a group. The persons in a criminal enterprise must be shown to act together,TPF1741FPT or 
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in concert with each other,TPF1742FPT in the implementation of a common objective, if they are to 
share responsibility for the crimes committed through the JCE. A concern expressed by the 
Trial Chamber in BrđaninTPF1743FPT about the issue of alleged JCE participants acting 
independently of each other, is sufficiently addressed by the requirement that joint action 
among members of a criminal enterprise is proven. 
885. The Tadić Appeals Chamber concluded by noting the differences between 
responsibility arising from membership of a JCE and responsibility for aiding and abetting 
crimes, these being distinct forms of individual criminal liability under Article 7(1) of the 
Statute. The differences are twofold: 
 Actus reus: The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, 
encourage, or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, 
etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of that crime. By 
contrast, in the case of action pursuant to a common criminal objective, it is sufficient for 
the participant to perform acts which in some way are directed to the furtherance of the 
common objective through the commission of crimes.TPF1744FPT 
 Mens rea: In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is 
knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a 
specific crime by the principal. By contrast, in the case of co-perpetration as part of a JCE, 
intent to achieve the criminal objective is required.TPF1745FPT 
886. As stated by the Appeals Chamber in the Kvočka case, there is no form of 
responsibility provided for in the Statute or in customary law which could be described as 
“aiding and abetting a JCE.” TPF1746FPT Gradations of fault within the JCE doctrine are possible, 
and may be reflected in the sentences given. However, a person’s conduct either meets the 
conditions of JCE membership, as set out above, in which case he or she is characterized as 
a co-perpetrator, or the conduct fails the threshold, in which case there is no JCE 
responsibility. The last sentence of paragraph 4 of the indictment in the present case 
(“Alternatively, he participated as an aider or abettor”) thus is an inaccurate plea of 
criminal responsibility, and will be disregarded. 
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6.3 Observations preliminary to discussion of facts 
887. The Chamber wishes to make three preliminary observations that are especially 
relevant to this part of the judgement. 
888. The Accused expressed several times his wish to prove his innocence. TPF1747FPT The 
Accused of course enjoys a presumption of innocence. In evaluating the evidence given by 
the Accused as a witness, the Chamber found that in many matters the Accused’s evidence 
did not cast doubt on incriminating evidence which the Chamber received from other 
sources, such as documents and other witnesses. Although the Accused’s testimony 
assisted the Chamber to better understand some issues, the Chamber found the Accused, 
especially upon cross-examination, to be of very low credibility. On key points, therefore, 
little or no weight has been given to his evidence. A conclusion on the credibility of a 
witness cannot always be fully explained, nor is a Trial Chamber required to give such an 
explanation. Nevertheless, in what follows, the Chamber will highlight certain aspects of 
the Accused’s testimony, and explain why it did not consider these aspects of his testimony 
credible. 
889. Second, the Chamber cannot possibly discuss here all the evidence relevant to the 
Accused’s responsibility which it received in the course of two-and-a-half years of trial 
and subsequently analysed. Having carefully deliberated on this vast amount of evidence, 
what the Chamber can (and must) do is to illustrate the types of fact that underlie its 
conclusions, so that these conclusions are sufficiently explained. 
890. Third, vast though the amount of evidence in this case is, some findings must be 
made through secure inferences from other proven evidence. The Accused’s knowledge of 
events, acceptance of new circumstances, and general intentionality during the indictment 
period, are one area where inferences must be made. The information the Accused received 
during this period is an important element for the determination of his responsibility, 
because knowledge combined with continuing participation can be conclusive as to a 
person’s intent. When testifying, the Accused denied that he had knowledge of many facts 
surrounding crimes committed by Bosnian-Serb authorities in 1992. 
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891. The Chamber has before it a large body of evidence directly proving the Accused’s 
intent, as well as his knowledge of many facts. For example, the Accused’s intent and state 
of knowledge are directly proven by witnesses who testified that they had presented the 
Accused with information about crimes that were being committed against Muslims and 
Croats. The evidence sometimes includes the Accused’s response to such information. 
Minutes of meetings which the Accused attended or presided over (including Assembly 
and Presidency sessions) contain much evidence of this kind. Recordings of telephone calls 
made by the Accused are also directly probative. At other times the evidence is less direct, 
such as the evidence of constant interaction between the Accused and knowledgeable 
persons – Assembly deputies, army officers, local SDS leaders, etc. This evidence, 
combined with information about the Accused’s positions, powers, and interests, can be 
conclusive as to the kind of information that was made known to the Accused. 
892. Documents produced by the Bosnian-Serb administration – copious in number – 
and by international organizations are usually clearly addressed, but normally the flow of 
such information does not come to a halt at the addressee. For example, information in 
important documents addressed to the Accused as Assembly President, or to Radovan 
Karadžić as President of the Republic, or simply addressed to the Bosnian-Serb 
Presidency, or to the VRS Main Staff, or to Prime Minister Đerić, who was also a member 
of the Presidency, can be assumed in the context of the times to have been shared among 
those persons who, as shown by the evidence on the structure and functioning of the 
Bosnian-Serb authorities, worked together very closely and were cleared to receive the 
most sensitive information, in particular the Accused and Karadžić. The Chamber found no 
evidence suggesting that any matters were kept from the Accused (as a member of the 
Presidency he partook of information-sharing on topics too sensitive to record, as indicated 
in the minutes of some Presidency sessions) or that he was uninformed about any issue of 
substance to the present case, except when we find the Accused actively seeking 
information following up on events. 
893. According to this reasoning, the Chamber has made findings, detailed later in this 
part, that the Accused became aware of information – if not always its specifics, then at 
least in outline – on such matters reported to the Bosnian-Serb leadership, if not to him in 
particular, as the civilian detention, deportation or forced transfer, cruel or inhumane 
treatment, murder and extermination, and destruction of personal and cultural property of 
Muslims and Croats by Bosnian-Serb forces. Such inferences are made secure by the 
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Chamber’s finding that the Accused was no passive repository of information, but was 
eager to obtain information, indeed detailed information, about the unfolding events. He 
cultivated daily contact with expertly informed persons and was a focus of consultation for 
the administrators of the Bosnian-Serb provinces. The Chamber has no doubt that he and 
his closest associate, Radovan Karadžić, shared between themselves all important 
information about Bosnian-Serb affairs. 
 
6.4 Retrospective 
894. In August 1995, before the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, Radovan Karadžić praised the 
achievements of the struggle which began in 1992: “We absolutely cannot let ourselves get 
any ideas about them taking our traditional territories from us. To tell the truth, there are 
towns that we’ve grabbed for ourselves, and there were only 30% of us. I can name as 
many of those as you want, but we cannot give up the towns where we made up 70%.” He 
continued: “Don’t let this get around, but remember how many of us there were in 
Bratunac, how many in Srebrenica, how many in Višegrad, how many in Rogatica, how 
many in Vlasenica, in Zvornik, etc. Due to strategic importance they had to become ours, 
and no one is practically questioning it any more.” TPF1748FPT 
895. The Serb component of pre-conflict population of Bratunac municipality had been 
34 per cent; Višegrad’s 32 per cent; Rogatica’s 38 per cent; Vlasenica’s 42 per cent; and 
Zvornik’s 38 per cent.TPF1749FPT These territories were “grabbed” by the Bosnian Serbs in the 
manner explained in part 4 of this judgement, and the departure of Muslims and Croats, 
and the influx of Serbs from other regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had turned the 
peacetime demographic on its head.TPF1750FPT 
896. In the period following 1992, the aim of the Accused and other leaders of the 
Bosnian-Serb secession was to maintain control of the territories they had grabbed and 
ethnically recomposed through force. On 21 August 1994 the Accused expressed 
admiration for fellow speakers on a Banja Luka television show, whose chauvinistic and 
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self-congratulatory addresses aimed at cementing the status quo.TPF1751FPT Rajko Kasagić had 
said on that occasion that “the Muslims and Croats ... turned us into Turks and converted 
us to their religion, they impaled us, they plucked out our eyes.”TPF1752FPT Vojo Kuprešanin had 
sermonized about ethnic purity: “There can be no Muslim state on land that has been 
forever Serbian. There is no Muslim people and the entire world knows this. There are 
only Serbian people in these parts.”TPF1753FPT Radoslav Brđanin had portrayed Muslims as filth, 
some of which still clung to the Serbian boot: “it is the obligation of the Serbs over the 
next hundred years to wipe their feet from the foul non-Christians who have befouled this 
soil of ours.”TPF1754FPT The rhetorical frenzy was thrown into high gear by the next speaker, 
Milenko Gligorić: “Dear brothers and sisters, the Serbian volcano has been ignited, and 
nothing can stop it.”TPF1755FPT Biljana Plavšić, whose turn came next, dwelt on the “terrible 
genocide” of the Second World War, in which 1,200,000 Serbs (as she told the story) had 
perished, and which lay at the root of latter-day Bosnian-Serb separatism.TPF1756FPT 
897. The Accused, as the last speaker on the show, having expressed his “great 
satisfaction” for “these wonderful words by my predecessors”, wrapped up the lesson for 
the television audience: “We simply want to separate because we cannot live together. ... It 
would take a great war to force us to live together again. We don’t need war to separate us 
– we are already separate. The war would be necessary for someone to assemble us 
together in the same state.”TPF1757FPT “Separation” can be understood in a number of ways, but 
the events of 1992 help to narrow the alternatives. Karadžić’s speech of July 1994 to the 
Bosnian-Serb Assembly, that the aim of the Bosnian Serbs had been to “get rid of the 
enemy in our house, meaning the Croats and Muslims and not to be together in one state 
anymore”,TPF1758FPT is the meaning of separation that the Accused was celebrating in public one 
month after this speech. 
898. As the Accused had indicated on the occasion of his television appearance, the war 
of separation and expulsion was already history by that time. Only a few Serb aspirations 
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remained unfulfilled. Sarajevo, which the Bosnian-Serb administration had had to abandon 
in April 1992 when it moved to Pale, was unfinished business for the Accused. It was his 
home town and he wanted it back on his own terms. In an Oslobođenje article published in 
November 1994, he set out his vision of an ethnically cleansed Sarajevo: “The significance 
of Sarajevo for our struggle is huge. ... We are talking about two towns, two countries here. 
That is the first phase. I will tell you now publicly what I think, for the first time to the 
‘Oslobođenje’. The perspective for Sarajevo is such that in the future it will be a unified 
town but a Serb one completely. The Muslims will have to look for a capital outside of 
Sarajevo, somewhere else. That is the natural course of things. This town will belong to the 
Republika Srpska in its totality. ... It is our goal to achieve all this without war but I doubt 
that the Muslims want the same. I am afraid that for this reason the deciding battle of this 
war will take place exactly here, in Sarajevo.”TPF1759FPT 
899. In 2006, when the Accused was testifying as a witness in this case, he resiled from 
the above words, remarking that they were “inappropriate and really, it’s almost as if it 
wasn’t me who said them.” TPF1760FPT However, by the end of 1992, the Bosnian Serbs had, for 
the most part, restored “the natural course of things” – Serb dominance over historical Serb 
lands – in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
900. In another Oslobođenje article, dated November 1995, the Accused is quoted as 
saying: “I will remind you of something. At the beginning of the war, we adopted six 
strategic goals. The first was to separate ourselves from Muslims and Croats”.TPF1761FPT This was 
the Accused’s most important goal, and as President of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly and a 
member of the Bosnian-Serb Presidency he pursued it ceaselessly. Expressions of ethnic 
hatred and scaremongering in the Bosnian-Serb Assembly were a staple under his 
chairmanship throughout, and beyond, the indictment period. At an Assembly meeting on 
8 January 1993, the Accused praised an incendiary speech by Vlado Kovačević, which 
included the following imagery: “[The] two-headed dragon has opened his jaws over the 
Serb people in order to swallow it, to destroy it, to wipe it off the face of the earth. Both 
heads, the Islamic one as well as the Vatican one are equally dangerous for us. All those 
democracies ... of Europe ... want ... to have us imprisoned in the dark realm of Islam.”TPF1762FPT 
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The Accused commended the speaker: “I have to conclude that you are the best when we 
have opponents”, he said while thanking him.TPF1763FPT 
901. The rhetoric of fear was interspersed with belittlement of the adversary aimed at 
dehumanization of the Muslim identity. At the 8 January 1993 session of the Assembly, the 
Accused questioned the very existence of a Muslim identity. For him, “Muslims” were 
pseudo-Turks, pseudo-Muslims, a fake people, at most a transient sect: “We should really 
take a stand concerning whether the Muslims are a nation. ... Let us [call them] ‘a religious 
group of Turkish orientation’. That would be very important to say, because they are not 
from any Muslim world, but the Muslims of Turkish orientation, which is different from 
the real Muslims.” He then placed a resolution before the Assembly and invited a vote: 
“All right gentlemen, let us conclude. The Assembly is at the position that the Muslims are 
a communist creation and that they are a religious group of Turkish orientation. ... We do 
not accept this artificial nation. We believe that the Muslims are a sect ... Who is for? Is 
there anyone against? Abstaining? Gentlemen, thank you, we adopted the conclusions 
unanimously.” TPF1764FPT 
902. As mentioned earlier, the Accused’s credibility as a witness was very low, but the 
Accused did tell the Chamber in a rare moment of relative frankness that his 
characterization of Muslim identity as a fiction was “nonsense ... I have to say I never 
thought like this. If I could distance myself from this Momčilo Krajišnik, I would.”TPF1765FPT By 
that parliamentary act of 8 January 1993, the Accused fashioned a theoretical underpinning 
for the removal of Muslims from Serb lands the year before: the Muslims were not a 
nation, and therefore had no right to the territory they had been deprived of. 
 
6.5 Consolidation of Bosnian-Serb central authority 
903. Calls to take over territories and create a Serb-dominated state in Bosnia-
Herzegovina became strong and distinct in the Bosnian-Serb Assembly beginning in 
January 1992. At the Assembly session of 26 January 1992, a member of the Ministerial 
Council, Jovan Čizmović, addressed the Accused as Assembly President: “Taking the 
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constitutional and legal status of the peoples as a starting point, it is both politically and 
legally correct to allow all peoples to create their own sovereign and independent states on 
the basis of the right of each people to self-determination and an absolute respect of the 
will of all other peoples, and not on the basis of a unilateral act and by the use of force. To 
solve this problem, I propose that we begin with an urgent operationalization and a 
declaration on the establishment and promulgation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Tasks set out in the instructions of 19 December 1991 should be carried 
out.”TPF1766FPT 
904. This undoubtedly was a reference to an eight-page document entitled “Instructions 
for the Organisation and Activity of the Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances”, TPF1767FPT whose contents and dissemination at an 
SDS Main Board session on 19 or 20 December 1991 were discussed in part 2 of this 
judgement. The Instructions were on their face a kind of crisis-management manual for 
municipalities. Their significance lies not, as the Prosecution alleges, in their having served 
as a blueprint for municipal action in 1992 (which is not to say that some municipal organs 
did not purport to act pursuant to them, or that general similarities cannot be found 
between the arrangements outlined in that document and actual events) but in the fact that 
the Instructions were endorsed by the Bosnian-Serb leadership and had been received by 
many Bosnian-Serb municipal authorities. In early 1992, the foremost priority of the 
Accused and his associates was to concoct an idea of central authority and to promote the 
idea throughout the Bosnian-Serb territories. To this end, the Instructions served to shape 
calls for joint and coordinated action (as illustrated by Čizmović in this instance). The 
document represented a trapping of central authority, and such authority was an essential 
prerequisite for the success of Bosnian-Serb secessionism. 
905. Even as late as the end of February 1992 there were fractures in the Bosnian-Serb 
body politic. The greatest challenge for the Accused and Radovan Karadžić in this respect 
was to secure the obeisance of Banja Luka and the Krajina (ARK) region, a Bosnian-Serb 
stronghold, constituted of a well-organized network of strongmen (Radoslav Brđanin, Vojo 
Kuprešanin, Stojan Župljanin, and others), and displaying a worrying political orientation 
away from Sarajevo and towards an abutting Serb enclave in the state of Croatia (also 
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calling itself the Krajina region).TPF1768FPT The Accused deftly handled the political fracture at 
the 28 February 1992 meeting of the Deputies’ Club: “My proposal is that tonight ... all 
municipal committees of the SDS hold meetings with deputies from Krajina in the 
municipalities. So then the municipalities can decide, without any pressure or coercion, 
whether they are in favour of the option of a Serbian, that is to say Krajina state or for an 
integral Serbian BH. Every conclusion should be presented to the Assembly ... There 
would be no pressure. I think that we can find a solution here. Don’t worry that they will 
do something against our will. The essential thing is that if we are not organised, then we 
will lose the battle. ... we must not persuade and pressure the people of Krajina that they 
have to be in Serbian BH if that is not in their interest. We must find a mode to explain 
what is not right. If we do not succeed in explaining it, we are not capable, and then they 
are right.”TPF1769FPT 
906. The Accused had an argument working in his favour, namely that Banja Luka 
would be less exposed militarily were it to submit to the pressure of centralization: “there 
is no force which will allow Krajina to remain unprotected, we gave our word that the 
army must protect Serbian Krajina.”TPF1770FPT 
907. Karadžić used similar rhetoric as Čizmović – also seemingly alluding to the 
December Instructions – at a joint session of the SDS Main and Executive Boards on 14 
February 1992 (the Accused was present): “It’s up to each individual to do his part of the 
job. We shall also talk about that today, but I have to say that we must be wise, unified, 
dedicated in order to take the last drop of power into our hands, in a humane way of 
course, carry it out in a humane way, a just way towards both Muslims and Croats who live 
there, that is particularly important, that there would be no fleeing from our areas. But also, 
that a bird cannot come in without ... your knowledge. ... That is, therefore, the stage 
number two, the second stage in smaller or bigger variations, but you have to implement 
that slowly now, to have absolute control who is traveling along your roads, what are they 
transporting, for which purposes ... you have to have at your disposal ... legal organs, 
reserve police and regular police which has to carry out their duties on orders of civil 
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authorities, because you are civil authorities in most municipalities, in large number of 
municipalities, in all our municipalities it is you.”TPF1771FPT 
908. At this stage in early 1992, respect for the interests of other peoples was still being 
expressed by Karadžić, as separation and homogenization were not yet the declared aim of 
the nascent leadership. In a 1994 speech to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, Karadžić 
remarked upon the benefits that had accrued to the Bosnian Serbs from the early 
establishment of a de facto overall Bosnian-Serb authority: “we won the battle for our 
Republic on 18 March [1992] ... thanks to Mr Krajišnik’s skills. We were talking all the 
time. ... The international community made a huge mistake by sending Cutileiro and 
Carrington to see us before the war and by accepting us as a party in the conflict. If they 
had ignored us, kept silent and acknowledged Bosnia and then said afterwards that some 
rebels were overthrowing their own state, we would have faced difficult problems; nobody 
would have talked to us.” TPF1772FPT 
909. The Accused confirmed in court that this external recognition of a Bosnian-Serb 
authority had been “a great achievement”.TPF1773FPT In reality, however, the Western-style 
democratic structure of the Bosnian-Serb Republic was a veneer meant for international as 
well as local diversion. Behind it, the Chamber has found an accumulation of unchecked 
power in the hands of a few individuals in the name of ethnic chauvinism. One of those 
individuals was the Accused. 
 
6.6 Expansionism and the pursuit of ethnically recomposed territories 
910. As Karadžić recalled in his 1994 speech, the battle for the Republic began on 18 
March 1992, the day on which the Bosnian-Serb leadership, in the person of the Accused, 
made known to the Assembly deputies its wish to pre-emptively take over territories in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, while separating the Bosnian Serbs from the other two ethnic groups. 
911. Such action had been adumbrated already at the Assembly session the week before 
by deputy Rakić (“I propose that we occupy our territories and keep them”). TPF1774FPT “I think”, 
said the Accused on 18 March, “the problem is that they [the Muslims] want Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to be internationally recognised at any cost. They want it to be a state. In this 
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respect, it would be good if we could do one thing for strategic reasons: if we could start 
implementing what we have agreed upon, the ethnic division on the ground. That we start 
determining the territory, and once the territory is determined, it remains to be established 
in additional negotiations whose authorities are to function and in what way. I cannot say 
whether this will be fair in political terms, there is not much fairness in politics after all, 
and yes, if it does not turn out to be fair, the Serbian people will be blamed. But we cannot 
accept a state designed in the mind of the SDA people.”TPF1775FPT 
912. The essence of the Accused’s message to the representatives of the Bosnian-Serb 
people was that he wanted new facts created on the ground in order to strengthen the hand 
of the Bosnian-Serb negotiators, of whom himself and Karadžić were the most prominent. 
(Their prominence is confirmed by Ambassador Herbert Okun, who was the special 
advisor to Cyrus Vance and a participant in the negotiations.TPF1776FPT) The Accused 
acknowledged that strengthening a negotiating position through the creation of facts which 
were the very subject of the negotiations was not a fair method; yet, he insinuated, better 
that the Serbs be unfair to the Muslims, than vice versa. The 18 March speech was a call to 
arms. 
913. The Accused told the Chamber that he had not been talking about territorial 
expansion on that occasion, but “about agreement among the three sides. I was talking 
about the Sarajevo agreement.” TPF1777FPT But it is clear that he was not, or there would not have 
been any mention of an SDA design necessitating pre-emptive action by the Serbs, nor 
would there have been talk of unfairness. An agreement, the Accused was saying on 18 
March, could await the time when the Serbs could negotiate from a position of superiority. 
914. The Accused’s directive was endorsed by deputies. Milovan Bjelošević noted that 
Croats had tried the same political-action model: “their armed units are occupying the 
areas they consider to be theirs.”TPF1778FPT Vidoje Ijačić said: “It has been stressed here that the 
actual situation on the ground was very important, and I would like to add that the more we 
achieve on the ground, the less will have to be said by our negotiators to achieve 
more.” TPF1779FPT Miroslav Vještica pushed the Accused for a deadline for action: “Mr President, 
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I think that you have to give us an order, that after the next Assembly [session] you should 
order this, that we arrange it for the areas where it has not been done and to implement 
this: that the Serbs should occupy their territories so that no other forces could enter 
them.” TPF1780FPT Vještica was from Bosanska Krupa, and his willingness to submit to the 
Accused’s directions on a matter of such vital importance is indicative of the authority the 
Accused had accumulated by mid March 1992.TPF1781FPT 
915. It is clear from all the evidence examined by the Chamber that the Accused 
intended that not only existing Serb-dominated territories should separate from Bosnia-
Herzegovina proper; if that were not so, there would have been no call for the creation of 
new facts on the ground. The Accused’s “ethnic division” on the ground meant expulsion 
of the superfluous ethnicities (as Radoslav Brđanin called themTPF1782FPT) from claimed 
territories where the Serbs were in the minority, giving rise to new Serb-majority lands. 
Even in safe territories already dominated by Serbs, certain Muslim or Croat enclaves had 
to be uprooted and driven out in order to ensure a more complete Serb domination. 
916. At the 18 March Assembly session, speaking after the Accused had launched the 
programme of ethnic-territorial conquest, Goran Zekić asserted the necessity of a separate 
Serb state on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to avoid the result that Muslims 
“with their birth-rate ... will gradually stifle our territories.”TPF1783FPT The Accused, replying to 
Zekić, passed over the remark about the birth rate, as if it were an indisputable fact that 
Muslim prolificacy posed a threat to any Serb-held territory, no matter how favourable to 
the Serbs its ethnic composition happened to be to begin with. TPF1784FPT 
917. At the end of February 1992, the Accused had preached at the Deputies’ Club that 
the Muslims “want the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina; they want the currency; 
they want a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina; they want an Islamic state.”TPF1785FPT The fear of 
Islamization may have been the Accused’s own, or perhaps it was only politics. Karadžić 
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kept a notebook at his meetings with international peace negotiators, and at one of those 
meetings, on 27 February 1992, the day before the aforementioned Deputies’ Club 
meeting, he noted an opinion expressed by the Accused, in the presence of Jose Cutileiro, 
that “Interest of EC is that [Bosnia-Herzegovina] does not fall apart. It should stay within 
present borders. This is against our interests, but we accepted it in order to prevent the 
creation of an Islamic republic in Europe.”TPF1786FPT While some Muslims may indeed have 
called for an Islamic state, the fact that the Accused had adopted such language and put it 
to work for his own political ends, shows that by February 1992 he himself had moved to 
an extreme position in the political spectrum. 
918. The Accused’s point at the Deputies’ Club on 28 February 1992 was that the Serbs, 
on the verge of being swamped, could not afford to share their future, which came down to 
their living space, with the Muslims. (The Accused, giving his explanation of the message 
sent by the Bosnian-Serb leadership to the Serb population, said in court: “If the Muslims 
do not want to live with us in Yugoslavia, if they want to impose a unitary Bosnia on us in 
an unconstitutional way, then we are rightfully afraid to live with them in a sealed-off 
Bosnia-Herzegovina where they are dominant.”TPF1787FPT) 
919. The Accused and Karadžić held this opinion in common; but whereas the Accused 
was a managerial type of comparatively few words, whose key role was to maintain a 
functioning central authority and an illusion of good governance while a new ethnic reality 
was being forged on the ground, Karadžić was the ideologue-visionary who gave 
expression to problems, and legitimization to solutions, which he had come to presume 
were on the mind of every Bosnian Serb:TPF1788FPT “Muslims cannot live with others,” Karadžić 
railed at the same Club gathering in February 1992. “We must be clear on that. They 
couldn’t live with the Hindu, who are as peaceful as sheep”. The populations, he 
continued, would have to be separated in “each and every village” because the Muslims 
“will overwhelm you with their birth rate and their tricks.”TPF1789FPT (Karadžić affected concern 
that the Muslims could “quadruple” their number from one generation to the next.TPF1790FPT) 
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920. According to some Assembly deputies, Muslim “tricks” held in store for the Serbs a 
fate far worse than being an oppressed minority everywhere; as Zekić warned already in 
December 1991, “We need to be particularly aware of another issue – genocide against 
Serbian people, because many areas were depopulated thanks to certain enemies of ours 
that have arisen once again.”TPF1791FPT 
921. The Accused himself worried that his home settlement in a Sarajevo suburb would 
be left behind, as he put it, in “Muslimania” in the course of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
division, and that minority-status Serbs who were not “resettled” in Serb-controlled 
territories would find themselves “in a genocidal position” in the hands of the Muslims.TPF1792FPT 
He expressed fear that the Bosnian Serbs faced “slavery, humiliation and extinction”. TPF1793FPT 
922. The threat of genocide against the Serbs was a constant refrain in the rhetoric of 
Bosnian-Serb officialdom in 1992, as further illustrated by a Ministry of Information 
proclamation from 16 May 1992, signed by the Minister, Velibor Ostojić: “terror equal to 
genocide is being conducted against the innocent Serbian inhabitants in this war forced 
upon the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Day in day out, the hordes of slayers 
and robbers, under the patronage of the fascist authority of the so-called Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, engage in the most brutal actions assaulting the Serbian 
population at their hearths. Mercilessly, the members of the Serbian people are being 
eliminated and massacred, their property plundered, their villages burned, their cities 
destroyed, and the monuments of Serbian culture and history shattered.”TPF1794FPT 
923. The bogey of the Serb holocaust was utilized in the usual, predictable ways by 
Bosnian-Serb politicians, but it also had a deeper ideological significance, as it could be 
deployed in justification of the recovery of territories which in the beginning of 1992 were 
populated by Serb minorities. The invocation of genocide thus worked in two directions. It 
was meant to strike fear, but also to evoke a birthright to historical lands. In a 26 January 
1992 interview with the Oslobođenje newspaper, the Accused revealed how in his own 
thinking the past wrong of genocide and the territorial claims of the present were 
intertwined: “the Republic of the Serb People of BH is composed of Serb autonomous 
areas that are already familiar and of ethnic units where the Serbs are a relative majority, as 
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well as of areas that historically belonged to the Serb people and in which the Serbs are 
now a minority due to the genocide committed against them during the last war.”TPF1795FPT 
924. A related refrain of the Bosnian-Serb leadership was that Bosnian Serbs had a claim 
to at least 65 per cent of the land, even though they represented only 35 per cent of the 
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF1796FPT Radovan Karadžić told Slobodan Milošević about 
the 65 per cent claim on 24 October 1991.TPF1797FPT On 11 April 1992, Karadžić, Nikola 
Koljević, and the Accused met at a hotel in Ilidža. They discussed a map of territory which 
the SDS wanted to place under Serb control. It corresponded to approximately 70 per cent 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and included a part of Sarajevo.TPF1798FPT The same idea is found at 
several levels of the Bosnian-Serb hierarchy. For example, Milutin Vukelić, assistant 
commander for moral guidance in the 1st Krajina Corps, wrote on 21 May 1992: “The 
constituent Serbian people, who live on around 65 per cent of the area and represent more 
than 35 per cent of the population of BH, must struggle for complete separation from the 
Muslim and Croatian peoples and form their own state”.TPF1799FPT The genocide had depleted the 
Bosnian-Serb people but had not diminished the share of territory which the survivors were 
entitled to. (Years later, Slobodan Milošević mocked these ideas: “There were some others 
who had arguments such as: ‘Well, Serbs owned 62% of the territory.’ As if someone 
would believe it! We know that it was all socially owned property. The meadows, grazing 
land, and mountains were nobody’s property. For God’s sake, what kind of owners are 
they talking about? After all, I said to Karadžić: ‘If you had a villa in Geneva, you are an 
owner. Still, you cannot annex Geneva to Republika Srpska if you have a villa there! No 
one would touch your private property’.”TPF1800FPT) 
 
6.7 Knowledge of and support for arming activities 
925. How did the Bosnian-Serb leadership implement the take-over of territories and the 
expulsion of Muslims and Croats from Serb-minority and other areas, following the 
Accused’s call to arms at the Assembly session on 18 March 1992? At this point the 
Bosnian-Serb leadership did not have a regular armed force under its exclusive command. 
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What it had to rely on was an armed population, which could deploy armed units locally, 
and the support and cooperation of the JNA. Miroslav Vještica summarized the situation as 
of that date: “we must urgently establish a Serbian MUP in the Republic of Serbian Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, we must establish national defence, our Serbian army, which is already 
there on the ground, we just need to transform it into what we need to have.”TPF1801FPT The 
“Serbian army” already there on the ground was, at that point, the JNA and the non-
enlisted Bosnian-Serb men of fighting age. 
926. The Accused’s evasions and protestations aside – “it is not that it was totally 
unknown that there was some kind of arming but I didn’t want to get involved in that kind 
of thing”,TPF1802FPT and “Why am I supposed to infer something, and why am I supposed to ask 
whether the rumours are correct? There’s the MUP, there’s the government; let them 
resolve it”TPF1803FPT – the Accused knew that the Bosnian-Serb population was being armed 
beginning around mid 1991.TPF1804FPT (The extent of the arming was discussed in part 2 of this 
judgement.) Already on 24 May 1991 an SDS member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Assembly who was also a member of the SDS Main Board was caught transporting a large 
load of weapons and ammunition.TPF1805FPT Giving evidence before the Chamber, the Accused at 
first denied knowledge of the incident: “I didn’t know anything about this. I didn’t know 
that he had been stopped or that he was seeking immunity, nothing.”TPF1806FPT Then the Accused 
changed his story: “We had a session of the Assembly, and then deputies in the corridors 
started discussing this. ‘You Serbs are arming yourselves’ ... I heard about this, that the 
MPs amongst themselves were mentioning this case, and that is when I learned of it”.TPF1807FPT 
927. On 12 July 1991 Radovan Karadžić addressed an SDS gathering at which the 
Accused was present: “We know that Serbs are arming themselves with smuggled weapons 
and some ancient ones. We as a party do not have a right to arm the people, but we do not 
have the right to discourage it either.”TPF1808FPT 
928. As it turned out, arming did have something to do with the SDS. Witness 636 
testified that he was involved in the distribution of weapons by the SDS between April and 
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September 1991. The weapons originated from the JNA in Croatia and were stored in a 
school in the village of Kamenica, in Drvar municipality. The weapons were distributed 
from there to nearby municipalities. Nenad Stevandić, a member of the ARK crisis staff, 
supervised the distribution. In August 1991 Stevandić invited Radovan Karadžić to witness 
the distribution for himself. Karadžić visited Drvar and toured the Kamenica school.TPF1809FPT 
929. In early November 1991, in a long speech on the meaning of the upcoming 
Bosnian-Serb plebiscite, Karadžić could boast to his audience, which included the Accused 
(“I probably heard it”, the Accused conceded), TPF1810FPT that the Bosnian Serbs were better 
armed than the Muslims, had “got themselves a lot” of weapons, and those weapons were 
in addition to the weapons at the disposal of the pro-Serb JNA.TPF1811FPT (The pro-Serb stance of 
the JNA is discussed in part 3 of this judgement.) By the time General Mladić detailed his 
ideas about a new Bosnian-Serb army before the Assembly on 12 May 1992 (see below), 
the utility of an armed population had already been proven: “We are not starting from 
scratch. That is very important. Our starting point are the armed Serbian people in the 
Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who have, in the course of the war so far, 
responded, insofar as they did, to the call to put a stop ... to the fascist and phantom 
Ustasha dragon. And so far, we have saved this people from being totally wiped out.”TPF1812FPT 
In 1995 Karadžić said: “Distribution of weapons was carried out thanks to the JNA. What 
could be withdrawn was withdrawn and distributed to the people in the Serbian areas, but it 
was the SDS which organised the people and created the army.”TPF1813FPT 
930. Elements of a Bosnian-Serb police force were already in place by 18 March 1992. 
All that had to be done was for the Serb police officers to break away from the Muslim and 
Croat officers. The Assembly promptly set up the Bosnian-Serb MUP, passing a Law on 
Internal Affairs on 27 March 1992, and handing the ministerial post to Mićo Stanišić. He, 
on 31 March 1992, distributed a press release announcing the formation of five CSBs, one 
for each of the self-proclaimed and territorially vaguely defined Bosnian-Serb SAOs 
(Krajina, Herzegovina, Northern Bosnia, Romanija-Birač, and Semberija), and ordered the 
affected police officers to sever their ties with the old republic and swear an oath of 
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allegiance to the new state.TPF1814FPT (The disintegration of the old MUP and the emergence of a 
new Bosnian-Serb police force were discussed in parts 2, 3, and 4 of this judgement.) 
931. On 13 March 1992 Rajko Dukić, president of the SDS Executive Board, had sent a 
letter to SDS municipal boards requiring them “to assess the possibility of establishing a 
Serbian municipality in the areas of your activity”.TPF1815FPT This was followed up by a letter 
from SDS President Karadžić on 23 March (marked “Strictly confidential – Destroy after 
reading”) to all Serb municipality presidents, informing them of the formation of a 
“Republican Operations Center”, and that “The municipalities now face an obligation to 
urgently connect their own information centers with the regional centers ... and provide for 
the personnel and other requirements in order to monitor the situation in the field. ... it 
would be useful if you personally informed yourself on the state of affairs in the 
information centers in your municipality, as well as on their performance capabilities. You 
should also order removal of, or help remove, possible deficiencies and make sure that 
non-stop duty shifts were introduced”. TPF1816FPT 
932. Thus the end of March 1992 saw the rapid establishment of a Bosnian-Serb state. At 
the Assembly session on 24 March, Karadžić had said: “at a desired moment, and this will 
be very soon, we can form whatever we want. ... At that moment, all the Serbian 
municipalities, both the old ones and the newly established ones, would literally assume 
control of the entire territory of the municipality concerned. ... Then, at a given moment, in 
the next three or four days, there will be a single method used and you will be able to apply 
it in the municipalities you represent, including both things that must be done as well as 
how to do them. How to separate the police force, take the resources that belong to the 
Serbian people and take command.” TPF1817FPT The Assembly proceeded on the same day to 
approve the proclamations of “Newly Established Serbian Municipalities passed by 
Municipal Assemblies”: Bihać, Kladanj, Livno, Rajlovac, Donji Vakuf, Konjic, Čapljina, 
Turbe, Bosanski Šamac, Petrovo, Milići, Vogošća, Žepče, Jajce, Mostar, Srebrenica, 
Zavidovići, Bratunac, Modriča, Prijedor, Bugonjo, Kotor Varoš, Stolac, Višegrad, 
Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Brod, Srebrenik, Foča, Brčko, Olovo, Tuzla, Zvornik, Goražde, 
Derventa, and Doboj.TPF1818FPT 
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933. Also on 24 March 1992 the Bosnian-Serb Government was sworn in, with Branko 
Đerić as Prime Minister.TPF1819FPT The Accused instructed the new Government to prepare, by 27 
March, “a plan of assuming power and rendering operational the authorities in the territory 
of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Government will propose the plan 
to the Assembly on Friday”.TPF1820FPT Friday 27 March 1992 was the day on which the 
Constitution of the Republic was proclaimed by the Assembly.TPF1821FPT (The Government plan 
was not submitted until later in April.) Karadžić told the delegates during that session: 
“The moment you arrive in your municipalities, you must urgently establish crisis staffs. 
You must try to organise the people so that they can defend themselves. ... They should 
organise territorial defence and if the JNA is there, they must be placed under its 
command. If they are not, let them be placed under the command of reserve officers.”TPF1822FPT 
934. Thus the Bosnian-Serb leadership completed its preparations for the assumption of 
power. The take-over of municipalities began on 1 April 1992. 
 
6.8 Knowledge of and support for take-over operations 
935. Already in late March 1992, a Muslim delegation from Pale municipality met with 
Nikola Koljević and the Pale chief of police, Malko Koroman. Koljević informed the 
delegation that local Serbs did not want Muslims living in Pale. Koroman added to that that 
he could no longer guarantee the safety of the Muslims, as he could not control the Red 
Berets who had arrived in the municipality.TPF1823FPT By early April 1992, several checkpoints 
had been set up by Serb paramilitaries and reserve soldiers in the region, severely 
restricting the movement of Muslims.TPF1824FPT 
936. But the first take-over was not in Pale but in Bijeljina. In a report to the command 
of the JNA’s 2nd Military District, dated 4 April 1992, General Janković, commander of 
the JNA’s 17th Corps, wrote that “A big influence of the SDS and Arkan’s propaganda is 
felt in the 38th [Partisan Division] and the 17th [Mixed Artillery Regiment], because of 
which some [conscripts] have left their units with arms. ... The situation in the territory is 
extremely complex. The town of Bijeljina is controlled by the SDS and Arkan’s men, who 
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do not even allow our anti-tank unit to reach certain positions in the town. There are about 
3,000 refugees in the barracks and the Cooperative Hall area in Patkovača. A team from 
the BH Presidency led by Fikret Abdić, Biljana Plavšić, the chief of staff of the 2nd 
Military District and the commander of the 17th Corps, has been in Bijeljina barracks since 
1200 hours.” TPF1825FPT General Janković made this prediction: “In the following days further 
deterioration of the entire security and political situation is expected. There is a threat that 
interethnic conflicts in Posavina and Semberija might spread to other parts of the zone of 
responsibility ... Direct armed provocations by SDA, HDZ and SDS paramilitary units 
against commands and units are also possible, as well as attacks by them on military 
warehouses and isolated facilities.” TPF1826FPT 
937. Sead Omeragić, a Muslim journalist, had accompanied Biljana Plavšić and Fikret 
Abdić on this visit to Bijeljina on 4 April 1992. In Bijeljina town the witness saw Serb 
flags on the mosques and broken glass and bullet holes on several buildings.TPF1827FPT He saw 
Arkan’s men in uniforms bearing the insignia “Serbian Volunteer Guard”; members of the 
TO; and members of the White Eagles.TPF1828FPT Omeragić came upon a fellow reporter who 
informed him that the town had been cleaned in order to conceal atrocities that had been 
committed in the last few days. TPF1829FPT Plavšić’s first stop was at the Bijeljina crisis staff to 
take stock of the situation.TPF1830FPT Then Omeragić, along with Abdić and Plavšić, visited the 
barracks at which the large number of displaced persons referred to in General Janković’s 
report had sought refuge. TPF1831FPT Plavšić kept her distance from the displaced persons.TPF1832FPT The 
visiting delegation met with Arkan who, Omeragić observed, was in total control of the 
situation.TPF1833FPT When Plavšić saw Arkan, she kissed him (this image is captured on film).TPF1834FPT 
Plavšić said on several occasions that Arkan had done a good job in saving the Serb 
population from the Muslim threat.TPF1835FPT When Plavšić asked Arkan to hand over control to 
the JNA, he refused, saying that the “job” had not yet been finished, and that he would be 
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going to Bosanski Brod next. TPF1836FPT According to Omeragić, at one point during their tour 
they came upon a journalist from the Oslobođenje newspaper, Vlado Mrkić. In a loud 
voice, he condemned the attack on Bijeljina, telling Arkan, as Omeragić recalled, “You 
will never be forgiven for what you have done to the Muslims in Bijeljina. History will 
judge you.” Arkan demanded Mrkić’s identification card, looked it over, and said “So you 
are a Croat.” At that point, according to the witness, Plavšić interjected: “No, he is a Serb, 
but what kind of Serb?” Arkan told Mrkić to get lost.TPF1837FPT 
938. Plavšić stated in her evidence before this Chamber that she had been instructed by 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency to go to Bijeljina. Alija Izetbegović said that Muslims 
had been massacred there and that the minority Muslim population in the municipality was 
in danger.TPF1838FPT In Bijeljina, on 4 April 1992, Plavšić noticed that a Serb flag had been 
hoisted on the mosque across from the municipality building.TPF1839FPT Plavšić testified that she 
did not see any dead bodies in Bijeljina, but had talked to persons whose family members 
had been killed in the attacks.TPF1840FPT Soon after her the visit to Bijeljina, on 8 April 1992, 
Plavšić resigned from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency.TPF1841FPT Although in her testimony 
she sought to play down her role in the Bijeljina events, a contemporaneous document 
paints a different and more accurate picture. In November 1992, a dispute with MUP 
Minister Stanišić caused Plavšić to defend her early support for Arkan, and more generally 
the methodology that was followed in the first territorial take-overs: “since there has been a 
lot of meaningless talk, mostly about the crime that is destroying our country and our 
people ... I would like to say to Minister Stanišić that it is not just a rumour but it is the 
truth that, after hearing the statement of the President of the Republic, his call to all 
volunteers from the Serbian and orthodox countries, I sent letters ... I tried to gather all 
those people who wanted to fight for the Serbianhood. ... I was looking for men who 
wanted to fight with the Serbs, on the territory of Republika Srpska. Those letters ... went 
to Šešelj, Arkan and Jović.” TPF1842FPT 
939. Around May 1992, Stanišić told Milorad Davidović, a Serb from Bijeljina who 
worked for the Federal SUP, that Arkan’s forces in Bijeljina and Zvornik had his approval 
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to be there and were helping to “liberate” territory that the Bosnian Serbs believed should 
be part of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. Stanišić also spoke of an agreement that Arkan’s 
forces could do as they wished with any property in the “liberated” territories.TPF1843FPT 
940. The municipalities reported power take-overs to the central leadership. For 
example, on 21 April 1992 the Zvornik SJB telephoned the Bijeljina CSB to report the 
“cleansing” of Zvornik by police forces. (As explained in part 4 of this judgement, a 
combination of Serb forces – police, TO, JNA, and Arkan’s men – launched an attack 
against Zvornik town; many civilians were killed during the attack; Arkan’s men looted 
houses in the town and piled dozens of dead bodies – including the bodies of children, 
women, and elderly persons – into trucks; more dead bodies lay in the streets and outside 
houses; many Muslims withdrew to the nearby deserted village of Kula Grad, which was in 
turn attacked and taken over by paramilitaries and local police.) The Zvornik SJB’s report 
was conveyed to both MUP Minister Stanišić and deputy MUP Minister Mandić.TPF1844FPT On 
the basis of the Chamber’s overall appreciation of the role of the Accused at the time, the 
Chamber finds that this information eventually found its way to the Accused. 
941. Another illustration of a municipality take-over conducted under the auspices of the 
Bosnian-Serb leadership is the case of Bratunac. Miroslav Deronjić, the SDS leader in 
Bratunac, testified that around 10 May 1992, after the Muslim population of the village of 
Glogova was forcibly transferred (leaving behind 65 dead in the partially burned village), 
he was summoned to Pale to a meeting of SDS crisis-staff and municipality presidents 
chaired by Ratko Mladić, Radovan Karadžić, and Velibor Ostojić.TPF1845FPT There were about 50 
people in attendance.TPF1846FPT The purpose of the meeting was for local officials to report to 
Mladić on the military situation in the municipalities. Deronjić reported the attack on 
Glogova and the continuing operation to transfer the Muslim population out of Bratunac 
municipality. He said that he received a round of congratulatory applause. Ostojić 
commented that Bratunac municipality could now be painted blue on the map, the colour 
used to represent Serb ethnicity.TPF1847FPT 
942. On 12 May 1992 the Accused heard from a deputy in the Assembly about progress 
in the take-over of the area of Brčko, a municipality where the Serbs were 20 per cent of 
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the population. The deputy, Dr Beli, was responding to a proposal by Radovan Karadžić to 
create a “corridor between Semberija and Krajina.”TPF1848FPT Dr Beli reported that the project of 
taking over control from the Muslims in the corridor area was well underway: “the 
operations to establish this communication [between Semberija and Krajina] have been 
completed, to a degree, in the military aspect. However, Brčko itself, being a fierce 
stronghold, primarily of Muslim forces, remains uncompleted ... for definitive clearing of 
the area it will be necessary to have many more forces there. ... We have not accomplished 
anything if it turns out that after a while we find ourselves in a position where we cannot 
control Brčko”.TPF1849FPT 
943. Also on 12 May the Accused heard about the Bosnian-Serb take-over of power in 
Bosanska Krupa municipality, when Miroslav Vještica addressed the Assembly: “I must ... 
remind you all, that only 24% of the population are Serbs in the Serbian Municipality of 
Bosanska Krupa, there are 14,500 of us and there are 47,000 Muslims. ... We have mined 
the right bank, we have mined the iron bridge, blown up the wooden one ... On the right 
bank of the Una river there are no more Muslims in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska 
Krupa, all the enclaves that were there, Rapuša, Veliki Vrbovik, Ostrožnica, Babić, 
Muslim Jasenica and Zavir, we have evacuated them ... Will they have a place to return to? 
I think it is unlikely.”TPF1850FPT 
944. In the neighbouring municipalities of Bosanski Novi (Serb majority) and Sanski 
Most (Muslim majority), the take-over of power was still a work-in-progress: “I was there 
yesterday”, Vještica informed the Assembly on 12 May: “Bosanski Novi is sealed off. An 
ultimatum has been issued and a deadline set for the Muslims to surrender their weapons. 
Some of them did, some did not. Yesterday there was shooting. What will happen today? I 
believe they will surrender. The same is going on in Sanski Most. I think that the Muslims 
will soon be disarmed there too.” The Accused thanked Vještica for this report.TPF1851FPT (As 
explained in part 4 of this judgement, around the time Vještica gave this report, Serb forces 
were launching attacks on Muslim settlements in Bosanski Novi, including an attack on 
Blagaj Japra using heavy artillery; shells were fired into the village over a period of two 
days and soldiers shot and wounded civilians. The entire Muslim population of the Urije 
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and Prekosanje neighbourhoods of Bosanski Novi town was led away by Serb forces and 
placed in detention.) 
945. The Accused did not need to wonder about the source of the strength of the Bosnian 
Serbs; not only did he know that they had been armed and had activated their own police 
force, not only would he have known about the assistance rendered by paramilitary units, 
he also knew that they were being helped by JNA forces. (In the case of both Bosanska 
Krupa and Sanski Most, the helping hand was given by Colonel Basara of the JNA’s 6th 
Krajina Brigade.TPF1852FPT) On 20 March 1992 General Kukanjac, of the JNA’s 2nd Military 
District, noted in a report on the military situation that the relationship between the JNA 
and the Bosnian-Serb people was generally good, and that on this subject he was soon to 
hold talks with the “leadership” of the Bosnian Serbs, namely “Karadžić, Koljević, Plavšić, 
Krajišnik, Dukić”.TPF1853FPT The Accused conceded that “maybe” there had been such a meeting, 
attended at least by himself and Karadžić.TPF1854FPT 
946. In a letter dated 24 April 1992, General Kukanjac informed his superiors in 
Belgrade that the Bosnian-Serb MUP had presented him with a long list of military 
equipment (including a request for six helicopters) needed by the special-purposes police 
detachment at the Banja Luka CSB. TPF1855FPT The requested equipment was issued.TPF1856FPT On 27 
April the Bosnian-Serb Minister of Defence Bogdan Subotić wrote to the command of the 
JNA’s 2nd Military District requesting the assignment of active-duty military personnel to 
the ranks of the Bosnian-Serb TO.TPF1857FPT Already on 15 April 1992, a JNA colonel had been 
appointed commander of the Bosnian-Serb TO, to supervise and control local TOs.TPF1858FPT 
That such cooperation between the JNA and the Bosnian-Serb leadership was on-going 
was not a closely guarded secret. 
947. The Chamber finds that the Accused knew about the JNA’s cooperation in the 
Bosnian-Serb take-over of power. He was not speaking the truth when he told the Chamber 
that he “possibly” knew that Muslim-majority municipalities were being “liberated” in 
April 1992 but that he did not know which forces were involved on the Bosnian-Serb 
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side.TPF1859FPT Had the Accused not known, he would have inquired. No-one in the Bosnian-Serb 
leadership was better placed to be informed about events in the contested territories than 
the Assembly President. Had he had “no idea”,TPF1860FPT as he put it, about the attacks on 
Muslims in, for example, Bratunac municipality, he would have inquired into the matter at 
the time when he was informedTPF1861FPT of the arrival in Pale under escort of hundreds of 
Bratunac Muslim civilians. And had he really had a need to inquire and be informed about 
goings-on in Bratunac, as he claims he had, he certainly would not have had accepted for 
an answer that “Mr. Deronjić, in revolt, sent the Muslims to the leadership in Pale. That’s 
the only thing I know” – which is the answer he suggests he did receive and did accept.TPF1862FPT 
948. It was conceded by the Accused that taking military control of Muslim-majority 
enclaves was “not right”.TPF1863FPT But for an Assembly President who presided over nineteen 
Assembly sessions in the course of 1992 to claim that “I had no contact whatsoever with 
MPs and they did not report to me what was going on, whether the JNA had been in 
contact with them or not”TPF1864FPT is tantamount to saying that he remained wilfully blind 
throughout that year – a possibility the Chamber does not accept. The Accused made his 
position worse by his insistence that he cared. About detention-camp conditions (discussed 
below) he said, for example, “I would have asked for a debate to see what could be done, 
and if there was anything negative, I would have demanded that those who were 
responsible should take steps. But I was not able to punish anyone or take any steps.”TPF1865FPT 
Power was so partitioned in the Bosnian-Serb Republic, according to the Accused, that in 
effect he was rendered powerless. 
949. The actual reach of the Accused’s power is demonstrated by the following example. 
Milorad Davidović was requested by MUP Minister Stanišić to go to Zvornik, where an 
out-of-control Serb gang was causing havoc, harassing Serbs as well as non-Serbs.TPF1866FPT 
Stanišić told Davidović that Radovan Karadžić and the Accused had had enough. TPF1867FPT The 
gang, which had taken control of the Zvornik SJB, was called the Yellow Wasps, a 
paramilitary unit of 100 to 300 men led by Vojin (Žućo) Vučković and his brother Dušan 
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(Repić).TPF1868FPT Around 29 July 1992, Davidović and his men, together with military and 
special police units,TPF1869FPT arrested some 47 members of the Yellow Wasps, including Žućo 
and Repić.TPF1870FPT Davidović placed some of the men he arrested under the control of the VRS 
so that they might be incorporated into the armed forces.TPF1871FPT Thus, the Accused had direct 
access to the levers of Bosnian-Serb state power. 
 
6.9 Knowledge of and support for crimes related to attacks 
950. Witness 623, of Serb ethnicity, was a senior member of the government of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In April or May 1992 he attended a meeting with the Accused in 
Sarajevo.TPF1872FPT The armed conflict was escalating. Witness 623 asked the Accused to convey 
his appeals to Radovan Karadžić to return to a political solution.TPF1873FPT The Accused was 
“obsessed”, in the witness’s assessment, with the project of ethnic division of Serbs from 
Muslims and Croats.TPF1874FPT The Accused said that the SDS’s most crucial concern was how to 
subdivide territories in such a way as to bring them under exclusive Serb control, 
especially in the Sarajevo region (Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Ilidža, and Vogošća).TPF1875FPT 
The following day, Witness 623 had another meeting with the Accused, which was also 
attended briefly by Karadžić.TPF1876FPT The Accused said at this meeting that joint life with the 
Muslims was not possible anymore, as it was not possible to come to any agreement with 
them.TPF1877FPT At the Geneva peace negotiations, the Accused and Karadžić insisted throughout 
on having an ethnically pure Serb area in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a precondition for a 
peaceful settlement.TPF1878FPT 
951. It is imponderable that the Accused knew nothing about the heavy and 
indiscriminate bombardment by Bosnian-Serb forces of the city of Sarajevo, just down the 
road from Pale, in the course of May and June 1992. TPF1879FPT The Accused claimed, in the 
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alternative, that this was an event he “was not following”,TPF1880FPT or was a problem being 
handled by others (“there must have been complaints through the usual channels”),TPF1881FPT or 
that it was “just fighting” free of shelling.TPF1882FPT When asked whether the Bosnian Serbs had 
taken any offensive military action around the Dobrinja area in Sarajevo, the Accused gave 
four different answers at once: “No, no. Possibly. I don’t know. Probably.”TPF1883FPT He later 
said: “When [military] actions were planned, in the initial stage I knew nothing about any 
of them. Once they were completed, I was informed about them just as everybody was. ... 
We would meet and then we would be provided with information about what had happened 
a day or two before, where our army had liberated a certain territory.”TPF1884FPT The Accused 
readily conceded, though, that “if any shelling is being done, that’s a crime, and it’s not 
only that it’s a crime, it’s that it’s politically damaging”.TPF1885FPT 
952. The evidence shows that the Accused actively supported this “crime” against the 
inhabitants of Sarajevo. As has been mentioned, he wanted to ethnically recompose 
Sarajevo by force. (Months earlier, the Accused had played a role in the creation of the 
Serb municipality of Rajlovac, which split away from the Sarajevo municipality of Novi 
Grad.TPF1886FPT) The Bosnian-Serb leadership started exercising military pressure on Sarajevo 
already in April 1992. The Accused was an ex officio member of the SNB, the highest 
Bosnian-Serb executive organ in the period 27 March to 12 May 1992. At a joint session of 
the SNB and the Government on 22 April 1992, the attendees decided that the Bosnian-
Serb Republic should “maintain the positions that had been taken, especially in Sarajevo”, 
and that Radovan Karadžić, as SNB President, was to “coordinate command over the 
territorial defence forces and over political operations.”TPF1887FPT Nenad Kecmanović brokered a 
meeting between Alija Izetbegović and the Accused at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency 
building in Sarajevo on 28 or 30 April 1992, primarily to try to halt the clashes around 
Sarajevo. At the meeting, the Accused proposed ethnic separation in order to prevent 
further conflict.TPF1888FPT 
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953. On 5 May 1992 Momčilo Mandić, by then Minister of Justice of the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic, said in a telephone conversation with Brano Kvesić, that “we are holding Turks 
under siege [in Sarajevo]. We’ll starve them a bit.”TPF1889FPT He added that “we want to build a 
new and nice Sarajevo ... we don’t like this, old synagogues and mosques, we have to 
change architecture and everything.”TPF1890FPT 
954. The Accused, being at the head of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, enjoyed the services 
of many mouthpieces for his views. He did not need to constantly articulate what was on 
his mind. When he was not generating or echoing extreme political views himself, his 
method was to lend support to aggressive elements in the Assembly by giving them a 
platform for their views. Vojo Maksimović’s statement before the Accused in the 
Assembly in July 1992, that Sarajevo “was a Serb town before the Turks came here, it had 
a different name. The graves under the Assembly building and the Executive Council are 
ours ... no concessions and no big negotiations are needed at this point, not until we have 
achieved a military victory, until we have defeated them in this territory that we consider to 
be ours”,TPF1891FPT is no different from the idea of an all-Serb Sarajevo expressed by the Accused 
in November 1994 (see above). 
955. The Accused said in his defence: “All I could do was chair that Assembly and try to 
come to a high quality outcome ... And whenever you try to say anything in favour of the 
Muslims, they would accuse you of defending them. ... I couldn’t prevent anybody from 
doing anything. ... I was trying to lead a wartime parliament that sometimes sounded as 
being full of warmongers. All I could say to him was, ‘What are you talking about?’”TPF1892FPT 
The Chamber has not found any evidence that the Accused ever tried to defend Muslims in 
the Assembly, or ever tried to prevent any Assembly delegate from “doing anything” 
against Muslims, or ever tried to confront proponents of extreme views with a “What are 
you talking about?” 
956. Some lone voices did try to moderate the policies of the Bosnian-Serb leadership. 
They might have been ignored, but their voices demonstrate that criticism was possible. At 
the same Assembly session at which Maksimović remonstrated against the Turkish 
occupation of Sarajevo, a deputy from Ozren, Miladin Nedić, said: “I am not for waging a 
war in order to enslave some and us to become oppressors. Let us treat the soldiers in 
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accordance with military codes, let us not kill women and children for wearing dimijas 
[Turkish trousers], or whatever. I told a colonel that I am for a knightly warfare and not for 
genocide”.TPF1893FPT 
957. It was not until their meeting of 9 June 1992 that the members of the Presidency 
(joined by General Mladić, General Gvero, and Colonel Tolimir) called off the attack on 
Sarajevo which had begun in May, deciding that “the heavy artillery fire on the town be 
halted”, but also that “a strong unit from Krajina be transferred to assist in fighting around 
Sarajevo”.TPF1894FPT (As explained in part 3 of this judgement, from May 1992 onwards the 
Presidency consisted of Karadžić, Koljević, Plavšić, Đerić, and the Accused.TPF1895FPT According 
to Plavšić, the “core” members of the Presidency, namely Karadžić, Koljević, and herself, 
never met alone.TPF1896FPT Presidency sessions would not be held if neither Karadžić nor the 
Accused were available.TPF1897FPT When Karadžić was not present, sessions were chaired by the 
Accused.TPF1898FPT) The reasons for the decision to halt the bombardment of Sarajevo are not 
given in the minutes, although it is apparent that the decision came after an in-depth 
briefing by Mladić on the “overall situation in the Serbian Army”, including figures on the 
quantities of weapons, ammunition, reserves of oil, and food.TPF1899FPT 
958. The Accused sought to mislead the international community about Bosnian-Serb 
actions in Sarajevo. In a letter dated 27 May 1992 addressed to Lord Carrington, Jose 
Cutileiro, Cyrus Vance, and the UN Secretary-General, among others, the Accused wrote: 
“We strongly and responsibly refuse the allegations that SR BH Army has fired a single 
projectile on Sarajevo or attacked the town, for all the time. On the contrary, we have 
introduced very strict measures in order to prevent any cease fire violations. We convince 
you that our forces are entirely under our control.”TPF1900FPT As for attacks, the reality was quite 
different. For example, on 23 April 1992, deputy MUP Minister Mandić ordered Tomislav 
Kovač of the Ilidža SJB to bomb and destroy a Sarajevo settlement: 
Mandić: “And do you have any heavy weaponry?” 
Kovač: “O.K., we have heavy weaponry on the side ...” 
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Mandić: “Yes, yes, and give a warning, alert stage one ... have to inform Vojkovići and 
Lukavica in time, to shell Sokolović Kolonija in case they attack you.” 
Kovač: “Listen, if this happens, Momo, we have to get this straight, we can’t take this 
anymore, we can’t just be defending here around Ilidža, you understand, we have to organise 
ourselves once and either win this thing or lose. We can’t take this anymore, they attack we 
stop them, they attack again. If there is a chance we should finish them off once for all. I 
suggest that we attack Sokolović Kolonija from both sides.” 
Mandić: “As for me, it should be destroyed. I would level it to the ground.”TPF1901FPT 
Another example: on 14 May 1992, Biljana Plavšić herself became caught up in the 
Bosnian-Serb bombardment of Sarajevo. She telephoned a person named Radmila, on the 
Bosnian-Serb side,TPF1902FPT to protest: 
Radmila: “You are being shelled, ha?” 
Plavšić: “Well, it’s a disaster. ...” 
Radmila: “Well, they are shooting from up there, they must retaliate, you understand. ...” 
Plavšić: “Tell me, please, do they really have to shell civilian targets?” 
Radmila: “I can not tell you anything. I was told not to disclose any information over the 
phone ...” 
Plavšić: “I know, I know we cannot talk. ... only, I was wondering if civilian targets must 
really ...” 
Radmila: “What is being done, had to be done, that is all I can tell you.”TPF1903FPT 
959. Bosnian-Serb attacks on Sarajevo resumed almost immediately after the 9 June 
Presidency decision. Around 10 June 1992 Witness 680 attended a meeting with Ratko 
Mladić, Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, and the Accused, among 
others. General Mladić announced his intention to shell Sarajevo with all available 
means.TPF1904FPT During a long discussion with Mladić in the presence of the political leaders, 
one Bosnian-Serb military expert expressed strong opposition to the bombardment, 
emphasizing that due to the inaccuracy of artillery weapons, civilians would be at risk.TPF1905FPT 
Mladić did not change his mind, and resolved to implement the plan.TPF1906FPT The political 
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leadership did not engage, or show any opposition to Mladić’s proposal.TPF1907FPT Sometime 
between 15 and 20 June 1992 Witness 680, from a vantage point 11 kilometres from the 
city, observed the bombardment of Sarajevo, which took place under Mladić’s 
command.TPF1908FPT In Witness 680’s estimation, most, if not all, of the 200 artillery pieces at the 
SRK’s disposal were used during the 24-hour bombardment. He observed that 
“everything” was being hit, including civilian housing.TPF1909FPT 
960. The Accused was telephoned by his brother, Mirko Krajišnik, on 15 June 1992: 
Momčilo K.: “What’s new?” 
Mirko K.: “Fuck, lots of things, you?” 
Momčilo K.: “My mate Momo is here, so I thought to ask you if you needed him to do 
anything for you? Nothing?” 
Mirko K.: “Nothing. I don’t know what would be worth doing. ... Did they inform you about 
that thing with [Fahrija] Karkin?” 
Momčilo K.: “Yes. ... We called the Presidency um ... but he had gone. ... What did he tell 
you he wanted?” 
Mirko K.: “... He asked of you not to shoot at the JAT skyscraper up there. His mother has 
been wounded and things like that.” 
Momčilo K.: “Not to shoot at the JAT skyscraper?” 
Mirko K.: “Yeah.” 
Momčilo K.: “Damn ...”.TPF1910FPT 
(The Accused said in his defence: “He’s letting me know about his personal problem, 
although that has nothing to do with me or any kind of command nor could I have given 
any orders one way or another, nor was anybody targeting the skyscraper, but it was 
probably somebody doing something inappropriate.”TPF1911FPT) 
961. On 27 June 1992 the Presidency (Karadžić absent) ordered another ceasefire in 
Sarajevo: “The Main Staff of the Army of the Serbian Republic of BH is ordered to cease 
all artillery and infantry operations in the suburb of Dobrinja immediately. The order is 
given to dig in and move from offensive to defensive positions.”TPF1912FPT This restraint did not 
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last long, and the Bosnian Serbs resumed their attacks. In October 1992 the Presidency, 
chaired by the Accused, issued another decision to halt artillery bombardment of Sarajevo, 
apparently because UNPROFOR had been complaining.TPF1913FPT The Accused testified that the 
Presidency “did not have the right to give orders”.TPF1914FPT But whether it had the right to or 
not, it did give orders. Some orders did not even have to be delivered to General Mladić for 
he was right there. The 27 June Presidency order was passed on to field commanders by 
the Main Staff.TPF1915FPT 
962. On 11 April 1992 Witness 583, a member of an international organization, informed 
Radovan Karadžić about events he had experienced in Zvornik, when he had travelled 
through the territory on 8 April. This is what Witness 583 saw, and it is this experience that 
he conveyed to Karadžić: 
I was travelling with a driver from Sarajevo to Belgrade where I had meetings, including 
President Milošević. So we went by road, and I was crossing – arriving to Zvornik when I 
realised that there were hundreds of people in the streets, very excited, many of them crying, 
with a very high level of tension. ... I met with – I say several hundreds of Muslim people 
that were – I would described them as quite terrified, because for several days already – I 
can’t say if it were two days or three days – an increasing tension was created in Zvornik 
with some shooting at nights, some – some explosions, some threats, some killings. And they 
report the presence of foreign ... people from Serbian origin that were not neighbours of 
Zvornik but that came from outside and that were pushing the Serbs from Zvornik to leave 
Zvornik on the basis of threats that the Muslims were going to kill the Serbs in that town. ... I 
mean, Serbs came into Zvornik, start creating tensions and informing the local Serbs living 
in Zvornik that the Muslims have a plan to kill them. So they were pushing the Serbs out of 
Zvornik. All the people in Zvornik, all the Muslims I met and that surrounded my car, told 
me that they knew what happened in Bijeljina and that the radical Serbs were preparing the 
same in Zvornik, which means arrival of people from outside, increasing of tensions, 
rumours, threats, explanations that the Muslims were going to kill the Serbs. ... So the 
Muslims told me that they were terrified because as soon as the Serbs leave the town, it will 
happen what happened in Bijeljina. That means that paramilitary troops were going to enter 
Zvornik, and they were going to kill and expel all the Muslims. TPF1916FPT 
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963. Karadžić told the witness that these crimes, committed by irregular paramilitary 
units, were an inevitable consequence of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s declaration of 
independence. He added that Bosnian Serbs were victims of similar violence, threats, and 
expulsions.TPF1917FPT Another time Witness 583 reported “ethnic cleansing” to the Bosnian-Serb 
leadership was on 23 July 1992, when around 9,000 Muslims and Croats were forced to 
cross into Croatia. As the witness recalled, Karadžić, Koljević, and Plavšić responded that 
“This is a very cruel war. Everybody is committing crimes or whatever. But in that case, I 
think that they were saying it’s better for them to leave. They want to leave. They don’t 
want to stay. They have signed voluntary declarations that they want to leave and that they 
want to exchange properties with others.”TPF1918FPT The Bosnian-Serb leadership had come to 
accept the expansion of criminality as inevitable. (Witness Amir Delić explained the 
meaning of “voluntary” in this context: “all the documents had to state that what we were 
doing was on a voluntary basis and without duress. ... as for leaving, or perhaps running is 
a better term, that was not on our mind at all initially. However, when all that happened to 
us happened, we realised we had to run to save our lives. It didn’t matter where, just as 
long as we got away. ... However, there was no question on our side whether we were 
going or not, whether we had to run or not. And there was no doubt on their side, because 
everything had been done so that we would leave.”TPF1919FPT) 
964. Again in relation to Zvornik, Dragan Đokanović, who travelled to several 
municipalities to set up war commissions, spoke to Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, 
Nikola Koljević, and the Accused about events in Zvornik upon his return to Pale on 16 
June 1992. He conveyed what he had heard about people being killed or driven from their 
homes, specifying that war crimes had probably been committed in that municipality.TPF1920FPT 
965. Around June 1992, members of the VRS and the MUP, as well as Šešelj’s men, 
searched Muslim and Croat houses in the commune of Grbavica for weapons.TPF1921FPT Three 
women, two Muslim and one of mixed ethnicity, were raped during these house searches 
by an armed man named Batko.TPF1922FPT Biljana Plavšić stated that in June or July 1992 she was 
informed by people living in Grbavica that Batko and an armed group associated with him 
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were committing crimes against non-Serbs.TPF1923FPT When she returned to Pale she had a 
meeting with Radovan Karadžić, the Accused, Nikola Koljević, Mićo Stanišić, and 
Momčilo Mandić regarding what she had heard from the people in Grbavica. The reaction 
was one of indifference, Mandić smiling and saying, “Oh, Batko.”TPF1924FPT 
966. In late July 1992 the Bijeljina CSB reported to Radovan Karadžić that paramilitary 
groups in Bijeljina, including Mauzer’s men, together with some members of the local 
MUP, were engaged in criminal activities on a “massive scale”. Muslim residents of 
Bijeljina, as well as some Serbs, were being “terrorized” by these groups through home 
invasions, looting, or rapes. More than ten persons of unspecified ethnicity had been killed. 
Muslims and some Serbs were leaving Bijeljina as a result of this “pressure and 
terrorization”.TPF1925FPT 
967. Milorad Davidović visited Bijeljina regularly in the course of 1992 because his 
family lived there. During those visits he observed widespread looting in the municipality. 
On a number of occasions he saw Radovan Karadžić and the Accused in Bijeljina. 
According to the witness, in early July 1992 the municipality crisis staffs, consisting 
exclusively of SDS members, had set up guards in the villages, who engaged in the 
organized looting of Muslim houses. Some Muslims were expelled by the looters. Others 
who paid to be allowed to stay, later fled the municipality. Their abandoned and looted 
homes were sold to Serb refugees. TPF1926FPT 
968. On 11 July 1992 Doboj CSB chief Andrija Bjelošević reported to MUP Minister 
Mićo Stanišić about the fact that Serbs were committing crimes, mainly looting of 
property, in areas of the municipality recently captured or “liberated” by the army. The 
looting was committed primarily by soldiers and reserve police officers, including 
commanding officers, who went so far as to organize convoys to whisk away the loot.TPF1927FPT 
969. Minister of Justice Momčilo Mandić confirmed that, in mid 1992, looting of non-
Serb property was committed in areas where people had abandoned their homes due to 
military operations and what he called “ethnic cleansing”.TPF1928FPT A MUP report from 17 July 
1992, which was sent to Radovan Karadžić and Prime Minister Đerić, stated that looting 
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generally occurred during “mopping-up operations” and involved Serb police as well as 
military and paramilitary formations.TPF1929FPT The report expressed the need to detect and 
prevent the commission of war crimes by both sides and to ensure cooperation between the 
MUP and Ministry of Justice in prosecuting those who committed crimes. Mandić testified 
that he often met with MUP Minister Mićo Stanišić to discuss the problem of theft and 
destruction of property in conflict zones. It was also discussed at Government sessions. TPF1930FPT 
970. In the case of one large massacre of Muslims, at Korićanske Stijene on 21 August 
1992, the Presidency decided to become involved in what turned out to be a cover-up. 
Defence Minister Bogdan Subotić testified that Karadžić received two reports about the 
massacre, one from the Banja Luka MUP and the other from the ICRC. Karadžić convened 
an informal session of the Presidency with Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević, and invited 
Mićo Stanišić and Subotić. The Accused did not attend, according to Subotić. At the 
meeting, Subotić was instructed to go to Banja Luka to meet with the people involved in 
the investigation of the massacre and to report back to Pale.TPF1931FPT However, according to 
Simo Drljača, the Prijedor SJB chief at the time, an investigation could not be carried out, 
because the officers who had allegedly participated in the massacre were currently 
deployed in the battlefield. TPF1932FPT Undoubtedly the Accused was informed about this event. 
971. In Sokolac municipality, the 2nd Romanija Brigade directed a campaign against 
Muslim villages, the last of which was Novoseoci, attacked on 22 September 1992.TPF1933FPT 
Following the expulsion of women and children from Novoseoci,TPF1934FPT Colonel Radislav 
Krstić orderedTPF1935FPT the massacre of 40 to 45 Muslim male civilians.TPF1936FPT Krstić reported to 
the VRS Main Staff that “During the day the village of Novoseoci was cleansed”. TPF1937FPT 
Krstić’s unit blew up all mosques in Sokolac, including the mosque in Novoseoci.TPF1938FPT 
972. In September 1992 the intelligence service of the Eastern Bosnia Corps Command 
reported to the VRS Main Staff that as of 30 April 1992, Brčko had been flooded by 
“patriotic elements” which were responsible for robberies, rapes, and murders, including 
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murders at Luka camp, and that some of the bodies of those killed had been buried in pits 
and covered with material from demolished mosques. The report stated that the head of the 
war presidency, Đorđe Ristanić, acknowledged that 300 people had been killed. It also 
expressed concern that this information might be leaked.TPF1939FPT 
973. Regular reports on the killings of civilians in military operations in the ARK from 
April 1992 onwards were sent by the 1st Krajina Corps to the VRS Main Staff. These 
included killings during the attack on Čelinac (reports of 16 and 17 August 1992), in 
Keraterm camp (report of 25 July 1992), during a transfer from Omarska to Manjača camp 
in Banja Luka (report of 7 August 1992), on Mt Vlašić (report of 22 August 1992), in 
Kotor Varoš (report of 4 November 1992), in Sasina village in Sanski Most (report of 6 
December 1992), and in Čarakovo village in Prijedor (report of 22 August 1992).TPF1940FPT 
Expert Witness Brown stated that his review of the records of the 1st Krajina Corps 
military prosecutor’s office identified only two or three incidents in which the killing of 
non-Serb civilians in the custody of Bosnian Serbs was followed up through the military 
judicial process; even then, no trial was recorded.TPF1941FPT 
974. The Bosnian-Serb leadership accepted that destruction of civilian settlements would 
be swift and vast. Details of such destruction of towns and villages have been discussed in 
part 4 of this judgement. Trifko Radić reported to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on 12 May 
1992 that “we have no other solution but to shell and destroy towns. We have destroyed 
one third of Visoko, maybe tonight another third will go.”TPF1942FPT There is thus no doubt that 
the Bosnian-Serb leadership, including the Accused, were regularly informed of, and came 
to accept the range of crimes against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats described 
above. These crimes included killings of civilians, at times on a large scale, and looting 
and destruction of civilian property. 
 
6.10 Knowledge of and support for armed forces 
975. The Accused did not just know about the operations of Bosnian-Serb armed forces 
in 1992, he actively supervised them as a member of the leadership. The Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly was a forum for the formulation and coordination of military strategy. On 12 
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May 1992, in a long speech to the Assembly, General Ratko Mladić explained his “vision” 
that the Serbs could prevail in the territories they considered theirs without completely 
destroying the Muslims: TPF1943FPT “we cannot cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so that only 
Serbs would stay, or that the Serbs would fall through and the rest leave. ... I do not know 
how Mr. Krajišnik and Mr. Karadžić would explain this to the world. ... that would be 
genocide.”TPF1944FPT But there was an alternative to genocide. Mladić advised the Bosnian-Serb 
leadership on how to achieve controversial military objectives quietly, cynically, 
ruthlessly, while staying below the radar of international attention: “We should not say: we 
will destroy Sarajevo, we need Sarajevo. We are not going to say that we are going to 
destroy the power supply pylons or turn off the water supply, no, because that would get 
America out of its seat, but ... one day there is no water at all in Sarajevo. What it is we do 
not know ... And the same with the electrical power ... we have to wisely tell the world, it 
was they who were shooting, hit the transmission line and the power went off, they were 
shooting at the power supply facilities ... that is what diplomacy is”.TPF1945FPT 
976. Mladić appealed for unity across politics and military affairs: “that is why we need 
one common wisdom. Well now, the things that Karadžić knows, Krajišnik, Koljević, the 
political leaders ... does not have to be ... on the tongue of each member of our people ... 
Only when the house starts burning will they realise it’s war. ... let us be of one mind, and 
that we are all clear among ourselves”.TPF1946FPT 
977. Mladić’s impassioned speech persuaded his superiors to fast-track the unification of 
the Bosnian-Serb armed forces, under Mladić, who was to be under the Presidency’s 
control. But the most immediate reaction to the speech was that of the Accused. Seizing on 
Mladić’s notion of “diplomacy”, he spoke in support of declaring a unilateral ceasefire 
whose real purpose would be to buy the Bosnian Serbs time to reorganize their armed 
forces as well as gain them some credit at the international level. “A unilateral 
proclamation of a cease-fire, in political terms it is quite useful to have the Assembly of the 
Serbian People adopting, saying, there, we want to do it, see, we are letting the world see”, 
he said.TPF1947FPT The essence of his proposal was for Serbs to fight a war without ever declaring 
it a war: “It would not look good if the conclusion of the Assembly would be that we have 
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chosen the option of war.”TPF1948FPT The Bosnian Serbs themselves would of course not be 
fooled by such a tactic: “it is obvious”, the Accused continued, “that we must not believe 
that we are only playing at war. We are at war, and it will be possible to solve this thing 
with Muslims and Croats only by war.”TPF1949FPT 
978. The Accused saw that territorial expansion presupposed not only a united political 
leadership but a united army: “it will be easier to achieve this [acquisition of territories] 
now, once we establish the Serbian army.”TPF1950FPT “This is a time for being certain”, he 
declared, and what he meant was that the Bosnian Serbs were not to feel any moral 
compunction about Muslims or Croats.TPF1951FPT The Assembly deputies would come to be seen 
as heroes by the generations to come: “let us not compete to see who is the greater Serb. If 
it were up for election, no-one in this hall is a greater one than me. ... if we acquire the 
territories which we agree on and have conceived of today ... this generation will have 
done so much for the Serbian people that this debt will be impossible to re-pay”.TPF1952FPT The 
Accused said in court that he was really making an anti-war speech,TPF1953FPT but the Chamber 
finds the contrary. 
979. The Bosnian-Serb leadership vacillated in its relationship with paramilitary groups, 
including “volunteers” from Serbia, using them opportunistically to terrorize Muslims and 
Croats, or at other times complaining about them when their actions threatened the new 
order of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. There is evidence that, from July 1992 onwards, when 
most of the territories had already been seized, the Bosnian-Serb leadership generally 
regarded paramilitaries as a nuisance.TPF1954FPT 
980. However, back in April 1992, when Serbian volunteers, including Arkan’s men, 
helped seize Bijeljina and Bratunac, their services were certainly appreciated;TPF1955FPT and the 
positive relationship continued into the next month, as the following telephone 
conversation from 13 May 1992 illustrates: 
Unković: “We have some Arkan’s men here.” 
Mladić: “Yes?” 
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Unković: “Are they under our command?” 
Mladić: “All are. All under arms are under my command, if they want to stay alive.” 
Unković: “Excellent! Excellent!” 
Mladić: “So, all shall be under our command. No one shall do things on their own”.TPF1956FPT 
981. As mentioned above, Biljana Plavšić met with Arkan in Bijeljina on 4 April 1992. 
She met with him again on 20 April. (At this meeting she referred to Bijeljina and Zvornik 
as “liberated” towns.TPF1957FPT) She also tried to contact Arkan by telephone on 23 April 
1992.TPF1958FPT 
982. Also in April 1992, Vojislav Šešelj told Branislav Gavrilović, one of his men in 
Sarajevo:TPF1959FPT “I’ve just called Pale, I can’t find Radovan ... But I’ve left a message that if 
they don’t get our men out, we’ll withdraw all our men from the frontlines and we’ll never 
deploy them again”.TPF1960FPT He was referring to a group of his men surrounded by Muslim 
forces at Vraca, in Novo Sarajevo. TPF1961FPT Momčilo Mandić, then deputy MUP Minister, 
testified that around 21 April he was informed about the situation involving Šešelj’s men 
by leading MUP figures. TPF1962FPT Mandić indicated that he had attempted to organize aid for the 
men through Milenko Karišik.TPF1963FPT On 21 April the Accused made three calls to Vraca to 
ask about the situation in the field.TPF1964FPT On getting through, he was told that a part of the 
Bosnian-Serb force was withdrawing after going “down there to try to get those men out of 
the encirclement”.TPF1965FPT This was a reference to Šešelj’s men. 
983. In April or May 1992, Milorad Davidović attended a meeting at Bosanska Villa at 
which Karadžić, Stanišić, the Accused, and Arkan, were present among others.TPF1966FPT During 
the meeting, tasks were distributed to these groups. According to Davidović, Arkan was 
not given specific tasks, but instead was told that he was not to interfere in certain matters. 
Davidović understood that Arkan was being permitted a free hand to do anything that was 
not specifically prohibited.TPF1967FPT Davidović met with Karadžić and General Mladić at the 
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Lukavica barracks in May 1992. Some of Arkan’s men arrived. Mladić asked why the men 
were there, whereupon Karadžić explained that Arkan would be involved in the Sarajevo 
military operations.TPF1968FPT 
984. In August 1992, twenty of Arkan’s men were staying at the same hotel in Pale 
where the Accused resided, according to two police reports addressed to the MUP 
Minister. The Pale SJB chief Malko Koroman was trying to get them to leave the area.TPF1969FPT 
(The Accused said that the report was not credible: “They certainly weren’t staying with 
me. This is a pure lie. I lived in Panorama. I don’t know where they were, but they were 
not where I was.”TPF1970FPT) 
985. The Accused was certainly grateful to Arkan for his services to the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic, praising him publicly in 1993.TPF1971FPT Thus his claim that he was not aware that 
Arkan’s or Šešelj’s men, among other paramilitary formations, fought on the side of the 
Bosnian Serbs cannot be accepted.TPF1972FPT 
986. The paramilitary Wolves of Vučjak and their leader Veljko Milanković, whose 
criminal accomplishments in Prnjavor municipality were discussed in parts 3 and 4 of this 
judgement, also enjoyed the Accused’s praise. In July 1996, at a five-year-anniversary 
commemoration of the creation of the Wolves, the Accused is recorded as saying: “Both 
your friends and your enemies will remember your bravery. Led by your legendary 
commander Veljko Milanković, you will go down in history. You belonged to the unit that 
every Army of this world would be proud of. Your deeds are immortal. You are the heroes 
of the third Serbian uprising and you belonged to the whole Serbian nation!”TPF1973FPT 
 
6.11 The Accused’s style of leadership 
987. The Accused and Radovan Karadžić may have located themselves at recognizable 
nodes of a modern state structure (President of Assembly, President of Republic), but in 
reality they ran Republika Srpska as a personal fief. They intervened and exerted direct 
influence at all levels of Bosnian-Serb affairs, including military operations. 
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988. As indicated above in connection with Šešelj’s men, on 21 April 1992 the Accused 
telephoned Milenko Karišik, commander of a MUP special unit: 
Krajišnik: “Tell me, what’s the situation like down there? I hear there’s chaos there.” 
Karišik: “Well, there’s lots of shooting down there. The members of the TO are engaged.” 
Krajišnik: “... It’s chaos and the Army can’t engage because then we would have real 
problems. Can you make contact with them just so that we know how they’re doing? I need 
to know this, damn it.” 
Karišik: “I can do that.” 
Krajišnik: “Please do.”TPF1974FPT 
The conversation continued in this manner, the Accused pressing Karišik for operational 
details. (The Accused said in court that he was just “curious to know what is going 
on”.TPF1975FPT) 
989. On the same day the Accused made more inquiries: 
Krajišnik: “What’s the situation like down there?” 
Voice: “Well, one part is withdrawing.” 
Krajišnik: “Our men? ... Can they withdraw?” 
Voice: “Well, they’ve tried. They went down there to try to get those men out of 
encirclement.” 
And so on.TPF1976FPT (A “purely personal” interest, according to the Accused.TPF1977FPT) 
990. And then a third link with the field on 21 April: “Momo” Garić, a member of the 
Novo Sarajevo crisis staffTPF1978FPT and TO commander, reported to the Accused about the 
military situation on the ground. The Accused cautioned him not to say too much over the 
telephone and asked him to come to see him.TPF1979FPT 
991. On 27 May 1992 this exchange took place: 
Grković: “How are you Mister President?” 
Krajišnik: “Fine, who’s that?” 
Grković: “Radivoje Grković, the Commander of the Nedžarići battalion.” 
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Krajišnik: “... What’s the situation like in Halilovići, can you give us a ...” 
Grković: “You know what, I can’t tell you much over the phone, it’s tapped.” 
Krajišnik: “Yes I know ... Is anyone attacking the barracks, do you know?” 
Grković: “... Who’s going to attack now? Why should they attack it when it’s empty.” 
Krajišnik: “But it’s not empty.” 
Grković: “How do you mean, it’s not?” 
Krajišnik: “There’s a lot of artillery there and other things. ... A lot of equipment was left 
there, cannons, howitzers, other things.” 
Grković: “... I contacted the barracks commander last night, he said that nothing will be left 
there, they have plenty of vehicles, but that idiot left them the vehicles, the ammunition and 
weapons in the negotiations. ... It looks as if the Maršalka barracks was attacked.” 
Krajišnik: “Well, that’s a minor problem, I’m just interested in that barracks, whether it’s 
being attacked, because it’s full of weapons.” 
Krajišnik: “... Keep in touch with the commanders, don’t do anything on your own.” 
Grković: “We won’t, we won’t.” 
Krajišnik: “You contact them. ... That equipment shouldn’t fall into their hands.” 
Grković: “OK, OK, I’ll ask…to attack again.” 
Krajišnik: “But don’t attack, ask them first.” 
Grković: “I’ll ask them for permission, I’ve already told you.” 
Krajišnik: “Agreed, OK.”TPF1980FPT 
It was an unencumbered style of leadership that cut straight to the source and displayed 
little patience for lines of reporting. 
992. Nedjeljko Prstojević, president of the Ilidža crisis staff, testified that around 17 
April 1992 a meeting was held in Ilidža between local authorities and representatives of the 
Bosnian-Serb leadership, including Radovan Karadžić and the Accused. The meeting 
discussed security and military matters relating to the municipality.TPF1981FPT During 1992, 
according to Prstojević, dozens of meetings were held between the Ilidža crisis staff and 
the Accused, Radovan Karadžić, and Ratko Mladić,TPF1982FPT to discuss the strategic situation 
and cooperation in logistical matters.TPF1983FPT At these meetings, requests were made for 
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material and assistance from Government Ministries. The Accused, according to 
Prstojević, would channel those requests through to the relevant Ministers.TPF1984FPT 
993. The Accused was sought after to give advice on Bosnian-Serb military operations in 
Ilijaš municipality, as a deputy from that municipality, Trifko Radić, reported to the 
Bosnian-Serb Assembly in September 1992: “The Ustasha attack us on all fronts every 
day, we have no help, I went to see Mr. Krajišnik and General Mladić and if they hadn’t 
come we would have fallen a long time ago. If Ilijaš falls, so will Rajlovac, Vogošća and 
others.”TPF1985FPT (The Accused claimed that while this particular deputy would come to see him 
“very often” in Pale, the Accused himself had not visited Ilijaš to offer his services.TPF1986FPT) 
The Chamber received much evidence about this type of contact.TPF1987FPT 
994. The VRS had a plan of action broadly formulated by the political leadership. 
Neither Karadžić nor the Accused found it necessary to become involved in the affairs of 
the VRS on a daily basis. This was done by their trusted commander Ratko Mladić, whom 
Karadžić and the Accused had selected for the job.TPF1988FPT General Mladić was guided by the 
strategic goals articulated by Karadžić and the AccusedTPF1989FPT at the Bosnian-Serb Assembly 
session of 12 May 1992. In Karadžić’s own words: “The first such goal is separation from 
the other two national communities – separation of states. Separation from those who are 
our enemies and who have used every opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us, 
and who would continue with such practices if we were to stay together in the same state. 
The second strategic goal, it seems to me, is a corridor between Semberija and Krajina. ... 
there will be no Krajina, Bosnian Krajina, Serbian Krajina or alliance of Serbian states if 
we do not secure that corridor ... The third strategic goal is to establish a corridor in the 
Drina Valley, that is, elimination of the Drina as a border between two worlds. We are on 
both sides of the Drina, and our strategic interest and our living space are there. ... The 
fourth strategic goal is establishment of the border on the Una and Neretva rivers. The fifth 
strategic goal is division of the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts ... The sixth 
strategic goal is the access of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the 
sea.”TPF1990FPT 
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995. It would be incorrect to place these goals on a pedestal, as the Prosecution does,TPF1991FPT 
for in the final analysis they are anodyne statements, serving as official state policy and 
even qualifying for publication in the Bosnian-Serb Republic’s Official Gazette. If one is 
inclined to find in them insidious hidden meanings, it is because of the context and the 
events that followed. An anachronistic reading of the May goals is not only inadvisable, it 
misses the point, just as an anachronistic reading of the December Instructions misses the 
point. The instructions and the goals lacked substance and utility, but they did symbolize a 
new central authority at a time when the old order had disintegrated. The extent to which 
they found currency among Bosnian Serbs is an indication of the degree of acceptance of 
that new authority. 
996. Much more important in relation to actual policy was the feedback loop of 
coordination and support that existed between the Bosnian-Serb forces on the ground and 
the central leadership. Take-overs, killings, detention, abuse, expulsions, and appropriation 
and destruction of property had begun in the territories claimed by the Bosnian Serbs well 
before the pronouncement of the strategic goals on 12 May 1992. These incidents were 
discussed in part 4 of the judgement, were launched in early April 1992, and were repeated 
throughout the claimed territories in the months to come. This was the Bosnian-Serb 
leadership’s goal, and if there was any goal needed on 12 May, it was the continued pursuit 
of this same goal. 
997. The VRS’s 1993 retrospective report, signed by Karadžić as Supreme Commander 
of the Bosnian-Serb armed forces, whose passage below the Prosecution relies on, is, 
therefore, not without relevance, but its relevance lies more with its affirmation of a 
deliberatative and purposeful Main Staff within the VRS than with any admission of a 
criminal objective: “The strategic objectives of our war which were promptly defined and 
set before the Main Staff of the Army of RS, the Commands and units, served as a general 
guideline upon which we planned the actual operations and concerted battles. This means 
that, objectives were set before us rather than specific tasks spelled out, although the 
President of the Republic, as the supreme commander of the Armed Forces of RS, did 
orally assign a number of tasks which were of general and vital significance to our struggle 
in protecting the Serbian people and its territories. ... We can say with certainty that even 
though often without an operational-tactical link i.e. contact, our operations, the operations 
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of all units are mutually supportive and in pursuit of single goals, which we have defined, 
such as: The defence of the Serbian people against genocide at the hands of the Muslim-
Croat forces. ... The liberation of territories which are ours and which belong to us by 
historical birthright.”TPF1992FPT 
998. In court, the Accused said about Mladić’s contact with political leaders that “He 
was far away, and he acted with ... autonomy.”TPF1993FPT This is contradicted by the facts, some 
of them already mentioned. The following passage from an order Mladić issued to his 
subordinate officers on 22 July 1992 illustrates the integration of Bosnian-Serb political 
and military objectives, and represents the fulfilment of a wish expressed by the Accused 
on 18 March of that same year, that the Bosnian Serbs create facts on the ground for the 
purpose of strengthening their negotiating position: “We liberated the territories we 
consider ours and created conditions for political and military leadership of SR BIH, so 
that they could perform all activities and negotiations regarding the future state of BIH 
from the position of the stronger one in this territory.”TPF1994FPT 
999. By “liberation” Mladić meant both military defeat of the enemy and mass expulsion 
from the conquered territory of persons of a different ethnicity. In an order dated 19 
November 1992, he wrote: “The Drina Corps: From its present positions, its main forces 
shall persistently defend Višegrad (the dam), Zvornik and the corridor, while the rest of its 
forces in the wider Podrinje region shall exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible 
losses on him and force him to leave the Birač, Žepa and Goražde areas together with the 
Muslim population.”TPF1995FPT This language (including the requirement that the Muslim 
population be expelled following the enemy’s surrender) was reproduced in the orders of 
officers down the line of command. TPF1996FPT The political goal of ethnic recomposition had 
become absorbed into regular army orders. 
1000. The Accused conceded that Mladić’s order and its offshoots called for “ethnic 
cleansing” and were “unlawful ... a crime. I don’t know why he did that.”TPF1997FPT In fact, the 
Bosnian-Serb policies, plans, and actions on the ground coincided with the Accused’s own 
ideas, and he served them and supported them willingly throughout 1992. 
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1001. The Accused and Radovan Karadžić could be relied on to communicate the ideas of 
the leadership to the Bosnian-Serb public directly. This was an important role, as it helped 
people make sense of, and lend support to, actions of the higher authorities. There was an 
expectation among deputies in the Assembly that the Accused would make the planned 
aggression more palatable to the Bosnian-Serb public: “so I would ask President Karadžić 
and President Krajišnik”, said Dr Beli, “because they can communicate with the Serbian 
people through the media, to promote this more, and I must say that the Serbian people, 
especially in parts like Brčko, where we are 20% ... are not a conquering people and do not 
get involved easily in these conquests that are currently necessary.”TPF1998FPT (Beli’s speech was 
made on 12 May 1992. The Bosnian-Serb take-over of Brčko, which started on 30 April 
1992 and had been completed by the end of the first week of May 1992, was discussed in 
part 4 of this judgement.) 
1002. Assembly deputies, very often provincial SDS strongmen who controlled armed 
forces of various descriptions, took their policy cues from Karadžić and the Accused and 
translated them into military action on the ground. Referring to the strategic goals of 12 
May 1992, Vojo Kuprešanin said at the July 1992 meeting of the deputies: “This is the 
Serb Assembly here, it makes decisions and when I return to Krajina I want to tell the 
soldiers: ‘Gentlemen, these are our ultimate goals!’ At the last session, in Banja Luka, we 
said that the northern border of the Serb Republic of BiH was the right bank of the Sava 
river. ... We ordered the army to realise that goal.”TPF1999FPT The Accused insisted during his 
testimony that “The assembly could only enact political goals, not military goals.”TPF2000FPT But 
the deputies’ perception of the Assembly’s role refutes this assertion. 
1003. At the Assembly session of 25 July 1992, the Accused asserted that the take-over of 
territories to date had been insufficient: “The people created the borders and we have to 
agree here today on territories that are not under our control right now but to which we 
claim rights ... due to them being ethnic territories”.TPF2001FPT He then sketched the desired extent 
of the emerging Bosnian-Serb state: “the indisputable borders are: the western border is the 
Una River, the northern border is the Sava River, the eastern border is the border with the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, and so on. He proceeded to list the “disputable borders”, 
which he defined as “the points of ethnic contact between the Serb people and other ethnic 
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groups”.TPF2002FPT The Assembly unanimously adopted his delineation of a state, and while the 
language adopted made the borders “subject to corrections and verifications in accordance 
with international agreements”,TPF2003FPT this speech by the Accused set the parameters for 
further military action. 
1004. When the Supreme Command of the Bosnian-Serb armed forces was formally 
established in November 1992, the Accused became one of its members.TPF2004FPT An informal 
Supreme Command had existed before that date, as accepted by the Accused; its members 
were the members of the Presidency together with General Mladić.TPF2005FPT A letter which the 
Accused addressed to Lord Carrington, Jose Cutileiro, James Baker, and Cyrus Vance, 
among others, on 28 May 1992 states: “Since the day members of the Supreme Command 
of the Serbian Army were appointed, all armed forces are under our full control.”TPF2006FPT The 
Accused was, and may have even regarded himself, as one of the most important figures in 
the Bosnian-Serb military establishment at the time. 
1005. While the Accused in court did not deny that he had some contact with the military 
authorities, he claimed that “It was simply a dialogue. They would say: We need food, we 
need clothing ... They saw the civilian authorities as logistical support ... There was no 
discussion of military operative issues, only the support they needed in order to act. And 
all their other problems they could deal with in the Ministry of Defence. That’s where they 
could go.”TPF2007FPT This represents another attempt by the Accused to mislead the Chamber into 
thinking that he was a weak and hierarchically isolated bureaucrat who dealt exclusively 
with inconsequential matters of administration, such as the supply of food and clothing. 
This insistence by the Accused is so incompatible with the evidence built up against him 
that it forced him down paths of obfuscation and incoherence. Asked whether his position 
was that he never bothered to inquire about the military’s objectives, he closed up: “Well, 
you’re asking me to guess now, to speculate. I was in dialogue with them. I can’t 
remember what I did.”TPF2008FPT 
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6.12 Information flows 
1006. Much has already been said about information flows between Bosnian-Serb centre 
and periphery – between the Accused and strongmen on the ground, as well as between the 
Accused and his colleagues in the Bosnian-Serb leadership. The Accused’s cognitive 
immersion in the facts and figures of the project of Bosnian-Serb territorial expansion and 
ethnic domination is further illustrated in this section. 
1007. Radovan Karadžić claimed in 1993 that “This relationship between the command 
structures and the organs of government and the Supreme Command made it impossible 
for the Main Staff to make decisions absolutely on its own, rather every operational battle 
was politically endorsed on the basis of the interests of the Serbian people, and approved 
by the highest authorities of Republika Srpska.”TPF2009FPT Even allowing for the possibility that 
Karadžić was here inflating his own role, there were several forums besides those already 
referred to for the feedback loop between military action on the ground and the Bosnian-
Serb leadership to take effect. 
1008. One such meeting, for example, was called by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency. The 
Chief of Staff of the VRS referred to the event in a letter to the commanders of the VRS’s 
five Corps: “Pursuant to the decision of the Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Main Staff of the Army, a meeting of the political leadership of the 
Republic and the military commanders is to be held in Pale” on 3 June 1992. The Corps 
commanders were ordered to brief the leadership on operational details and objectives in 
10-to-15 minute presentations.TPF2010FPT Asked whether he had attended, the Accused replied, 
“I’m not saying it’s not possible. I probably was there if the others were there as well.”TPF2011FPT 
1009. The Accused was asked about other sources of his knowledge of military action. He 
recalled another conference, along the lines of the one held in Pale in June, which he had 
attended in Bijeljina sometime in 1992.TPF2012FPT At other meetings he had attended, at which 
military briefings were given, “Sometimes it was Mr. Mladić, but it’s hard for me to say 
now. Maybe a member of the Main Staff, maybe the minister of defence, maybe the 
minister of the MUP, maybe Mr. Karadžić.”TPF2013FPT The Accused did not say whether all these 
were meetings of the Presidency, but we have seen that the Accused was briefed by Mladić 
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at the 9 June 1992 session of that body. There was another briefing of Presidency members 
by Mladić at the 2 August 1992 session of the Presidency, when Mladić reported “on the 
assessment of the military situation in Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, describing the 
situation in each combat sector, the necessary tasks ... Due to security considerations and 
the detailed nature of the information, the conclusions and alternatives [that] were adopted 
were not put on record.”TPF2014FPT 
1010. The Accused tried to downplay this last event by saying: “No. He did not really 
conduct a briefing. He came to ask for funds, and that’s the main reason why soldiers came 
to meetings. ... And Karadžić said, well, tell us ... how much you need in terms of 
potatoes”.TPF2015FPT The Chamber finds this answer to be untruthful. The topmost leadership of 
the Bosnian Serbs dealt with matters of utmost seriousness. 
1011. For example, on 10 May 1992, at a joint SNB/Government meeting, an agenda 
prepared for a session of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly included the adoption of an 
amendment to the Bosnian-Serb Constitution relating to “replenishment” of the armed 
forces and a decision to incorporate JNA soldiers into the Bosnian-Serb Army.TPF2016FPT Another 
example: on 15 May 1992 the Bosanski Šamac crisis staff sent a fax to the attention of 
Prime Minister Đerić requesting aviation and armoured mechanized equipment for combat 
use. The text of the fax bore the handwritten notes “Forwarded to the Government at 2300 
hours” and “Very urgent! Personal attention: Karadžić and Krajišnik”.TPF2017FPT (On that day, the 
situation in Bosanski Šamac was discussed at the joint SNB/Government meeting.TPF2018FPT) 
And as a last example, at the 31 August 1992 session of the Presidency, again attended by 
Mladić and General Gvero, the following was noted: “The Generals briefed the Presidency 
in detail on military and strategic questions, the state and position of military units, their 
equipment ... All details were discussed, but they were not put on the record because of the 
level of their confidentiality. Certain conclusions were adopted on the basis of the detailed 
discussion which are not recorded here.”TPF2019FPT 
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1012. The Accused conceded the “possibility” that he was sent a military report now and 
then.TPF2020FPT But it was more than a possibility. The Bosnian-Serb MUP’s first annual report 
summarized the number of internal and external reports produced by the MUP on the 
security situation. These included approximately 150 issues of the “Bulletin of Daily 
Events”. “In addition to this, over 90 various individual reports were sent to the Prime 
Minister, and the President and members of the Presidency received more than 80 various 
reports on the security issues.”TPF2021FPT At the 9 October 1992 Presidency meeting at which the 
Accused presided, the members of the Presidency sought to fine-tune the information the 
Presidency was receiving from Mladić: “It is necessary to determine the way in which the 
Supreme Commander regularly informs us about the situation on the front – every 
day”,TPF2022FPT according to the minutes. 
1013. The political leadership did not stay put in Pale but made the rounds of the claimed 
territories during the course of 1992. We find the Accused in Banja Luka on 12 May 1992 
presiding over the 16th session of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, as well as in attendance at 
the 1st session of the Presidency, also in Banja Luka.TPF2023FPT He returned to Banja Luka on 11-
12 August for the 18th and 19th sessions of the Assembly.TPF2024FPT On 14-15 September 1992 
he and the deputies travelled to Bijeljina for the 20th Assembly session. Next, from 30 
October to 1 November 1992, he convened the Assembly in Prijedor. TPF2025FPT (The ARK 
fracture in the Bosnian-Serb body politic had by this time fully healed. Milan Babić, who 
attended the Prijedor session, observed that “Karadžić and Krajišnik seemed to interact as 
equals, support each other’s views and were treated by the others as the leaders.”TPF2026FPT) And 
on 23-24 November the Accused was in Zvornik, one of those “grabbed” – and by then 
Serbianized – municipalities mentioned by Karadžić, for the 22nd Assembly session.TPF2027FPT 
These adroit political gestures had a democratic overtone (taking the state leadership to the 
people), but they also emphasized unity, commonality of purpose, and central control over 
the provinces. 
1014. At the Bijeljina session of the Assembly in September 1992, Karadžić took the 
opportunity to re-emphasize that he and the Accused were no ivory-tower politicians, but 
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travelled the land learning the facts and conferring with and counselling Bosnian-Serb 
leaders on the ground: “The situation on the Drina has resulted in a more difficult military 
situation than we were in the last time because when pressure on Goražde eased up, this 
enabled their forces to amass and put pressure on Višegrad. Messrs Krajišnik, Koljević and 
I were in Višegrad yesterday and then we went to Rudo. The military leadership of the 
Čajniče Brigade was in Rudo and we discussed the situation. Since easing pressure on 
Goražde meant more tension in those municipalities, we will again have to increase 
pressure on Goražde to ease the pressure from those municipalities. Consultations with 
commanders will be held there tomorrow and we believe that we will adopt some very 
important decisions with them.”TPF2028FPT (The Accused claimed that the commanders were just 
“telling us their strategy”.TPF2029FPT) 
1015. Other events also drew the Accused away from Pale. On 14 May 1992 he was at a 
parade in Banja Luka in celebration of the Bosnian-Serb security services. Karadžić 
addressed large crowds at the parade, saying that the Serbs had been drawn into the 
conflict against their will by the militant part of the leadership of the other two ethnic 
parties, who wanted to reduce Serbs to second-class citizens.TPF2030FPT On 17 May 1992, together 
with Karadžić and General Mladić, the Accused attended a meeting in Sokolac with 
representatives of the Romanija SAO and the municipalities of Olovo and Rogatica. He 
informed those present that “all Serb patriots will have the same emblem, the Serb 
tricolour.” He said that the time had come for separate Croat, Serb, and Muslim areas, 
because a common state was no longer possible; the Muslims had led the Serbs into war, 
despite the Serbs’ desire to find political solutions to all problems.TPF2031FPT 
1016. During his many journeys through the Bosnian-Serb territories, the Accused would 
have seen with his own eyes the destruction wrought by Bosnian-Serb forces on Muslim 
and Croat settlements, and, in particular, on one salient feature, or former feature, of the 
landscape – the mosques.TPF2032FPT 
1017. As indicated already, the Assembly itself was a vast feedback loop for the Accused: 
“When we arrived at an Assembly session, MPs informally informed others about the 
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situation in their municipality, whether the situation was redressed. It was not a formal 
briefing, but I was able to find out from MPs.”TPF2033FPT Deputies and presidents of 
municipalities would also meet with the Accused in his office to discuss, as he put it, 
“various issues”.TPF2034FPT Nedjeljko Prstojević, president of the Bosnian-Serb crisis staff of 
Ilidža municipality, would call on the Accused to discuss local issues, sometimes several 
times a month.TPF2035FPT Witness D9 testified that municipal officials frequently sought 
consultations with the Accused in his capacity as President of the Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly.TPF2036FPT Đerić, the Prime Minister in 1992, testified that he often saw municipality 
representatives, especially from the Sarajevo municipalities, visiting the Accused.TPF2037FPT 
Biljana Plavšić testified that the Accused’s office was always full of deputies and 
municipality representatives.TPF2038FPT “I knew every deputy as well as I know myself”, the 
Accused said.TPF2039FPT 
1018. The armed conflict undoubtedly introduced communication difficulties, but the 
Bosnian Serbs found ways to work around them. The following conversation from 7 May 
1992 further illustrates the forms of communication at the time: 
Karlo: “Greetings, Speaker! How are you? 
Krajišnik: “... Tell me, I’ve just received information that they’re attacking Vraca. Is this 
true?” 
Karlo: “No, they’re not attacking Vraca but this part of the Vrbanja Bridge there.” 
Krajišnik: “... Who told me this? um ... this professor Plavšić, so I um ...” 
Karlo: “Oh, yes, she’s down there, so she hears the echoing and thinks it’s here where we 
are.” 
Krajišnik: “... I hear it’s rather peaceful in Ilidža. They say individual shots are fired, but ... 
nothing special. Alright. I’m glad to have talked to you.” 
Karlo: “Speaker...” 
Krajišnik: “Yes?” 
Karlo: “I was going to pay you a half-hour visit with another gentleman tomorrow.” 
Krajišnik: “Only if I’m not gone on a trip, you know. ... Just check where we went.” 
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Karlo: “Is Mr. President up there?” 
Krajišnik: “Yes, he is. I’m afraid though he too will be away on a business trip, so you 
should check before you leave, ok?” 
Karlo: “... Sure, will do. I don’t think we would take up too much of your time, and you 
could use this.” 
Krajišnik: “... Hold on, please, professor Đerić would like to talk to you.”TPF2040FPT 
And so the conversation continued. 
1019. A large amount of information about military operations was, of course, in the 
public domain: “I could also have learnt it from the media, from a television broadcast, for 
example. There was the SRNA agency.”TPF2041FPT Minister of Information Velibor Ostojić 
testified that one section of the SRNA produced press clippings summarizing foreign press 
releases. These were sent to the President of the Republic and the President of the 
Assembly, among others.TPF2042FPT And the Accused read the newspapers.TPF2043FPT He was, as he said 
in court, “interested in every single village”.TPF2044FPT 
1020. The Accused travelled internationally during the period in question, an experience 
which undoubtedly broadened his sources of information. He was in Brussels and Lisbon 
on 30 or 31 March 1992 for talks with Jose Cutileiro of the European Community. TPF2045FPT He 
went to Lisbon again at the end of April 1992, but the talks were called off; so he travelled 
on to Graz to meet with Croatian representatives.TPF2046FPT At the end of July 1992 the Accused 
was in London for a conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina called by Lord Carrington.TPF2047FPT In 
late August 1992 he visited Belgrade.TPF2048FPT In addition, as discussed below, in mid 
September 1992 the Accused engaged in negotiations in Geneva with Herbert Okun. 
 
6.13 Knowledge of and support for population expulsions 
1021. On 2 June 1992 Nedjeljko Prstojević and Momčilo Mandić had a conversation on 
the politics of ethnic cleansing. The Minister of Justice remarked: “It has come to our 
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attention and that of the Government that you are issuing ultimatums to some Turks; 
evicting people from certain settlements and people respond badly to it. They are abusing 
this, those Muslims and the media and so on.” Prstojević agreed. Mandić continued: “You 
have to be a little bit more flexible there and not touch those Muslims who are willing to 
listen and who are loyal. We cannot ethnically cleanse Ilidža or any other place. At least 
that is the attitude of the Government and political leadership and all. It has already 
reached the top how in some settlement you gave them 24 hours to move out”. Prstojević 
said that at least he had not expressed himself in public and had not written anything down 
– “That’s not our politics”.TPF2049FPT 
1022. Mandić proceeded to air his idea about how to deal with the “motherfuckers” who 
had not yet left: “Fadil Mušanović is a judge, but look, talk to him if he has not already 
fled, place him to work for us, so that we can say that we employ everyone, Muslims, 
Croats and Serbs, regardless of nationality, as long as they are loyal to the Serbian state. 
So, have a look, please, place two or three Muslims somewhere, mother-fuckers”. 
Prstojević was of the opinion that that was easier said than done, for the Muslims were 
despised on account of their conduct towards Serbs in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
(Rajko Dukić gave the Bosnian-Serb Assembly another reason why “all Muslim judges 
from Vlasenica, Bratunac and Zvornik” had been “expelled”: “I would be ashamed and I 
would regret all the victims if I lived in a state in which Muslims and Muslim ideology 
would judge and where their justice was done.”TPF2050FPT) Mandić insisted that, if not a 
judgeship, Prstojević could surely find some position to which to appoint a Muslim. TPF2051FPT 
1023. The take-over and ethnic cleansing of Ilidža had begun in late April 1992. 
Prstojević recalled those early days at a Bosnian-Serb Assembly session on 25 July 1992, 
presided over by the Accused: “when the Serbs started the uprising in Sarajevo and when 
they seized control over certain territories ... we even did not know if Mr Karadžić was 
alive during the first couple of days. When we learnt that he was alive and when he visited 
us in Ilidža and encouraged us, the Serbs from Sarajevo retained control over the territory, 
and even extended their territory in some areas, driving the Muslims out of the territories 
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where they had actually been majority.”TPF2052FPT (Karadžić had attended the Ilidža crisis staff 
meeting around 17 April 1992. TPF2053FPT) 
1024. The forced displacement of Muslims was reported up the VRS line of command to 
the Main Staff, and, therefore, to General Mladić, who kept the Presidency members 
informed about the growth and stabilization of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. There are many 
reports of this kind in evidence, and while it is not the Chamber’s finding that the Accused 
received the reports themselves, the Chamber does find that information of this kind was 
communicated to the Accused, as well as to Karadžić, once it had reached Pale. 
1025. On 14 June 1992 a report from General Talić of the 1st Krajina Corps to the VRS 
Main Staff stated that “The most difficult situation concerns the Muslim and Croat 
refugees in the area of AR Krajina, their security and the provision of food. The attempt to 
expel them to Central Bosnia failed because of transportation difficulties and their 
resistance to leaving their places of residence”.TPF2054FPT On 28 July 1992 the 1st Krajina Corps 
reported to the Main Staff that “In the city of Banja Luka and other large towns there is an 
increased demand for, and organisation of, the departure of Croatian and Muslim 
population. We consider that the municipal and regional authorities should work much 
harder at this.” TPF2055FPT 
1026. Another 1st Krajina Corps report to the Main Staff, on 2 August 1992, described the 
situation on the ground: “Control and security measures in the city of Banja Luka have 
been stepped up. Methods of exercising pressure are increasing, as are organised 
expulsions of the Muslim and Croat population from the area of Bosnian Krajina and 
further afield.”TPF2056FPT (The Accused was in Banja Luka ten days later for the 18th and 19th 
sessions of the Assembly.) The Main Staff was also informed by the 1st Krajina Corps on 
14 December 1992 of a convoy of buses transporting 1,008 detainees from Manjača camp 
in Banja Luka to Gradiška in Croatia. Security during the journey was provided by General 
Kelečević of the VRS.TPF2057FPT On 16 December 1992 the 1st Krajina Corps informed the Main 
Staff of another 1,001 detainees from Manjača being moved out of the territory of the 
Bosnian-Serb Republic.TPF2058FPT 
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1027. Predrag Radić was SDS president of the Banja Luka municipal assembly and a 
member of the SDS Main Board. Between the start of the war and the end of 1992, Radić 
saw Radovan Karadžić in Banja Luka about 20 to 25 times,TPF2059FPT as well as the Accused 
when the Assembly sessions were held there.TPF2060FPT On one occasion in 1992, the witness was 
present at a meeting attended by the Accused, among others. Karadžić complained that 
insufficient steps had been taken to remove Muslims and Croats from Banja Luka,TPF2061FPT and 
that non-Serbs still held positions in municipal organs.TPF2062FPT 
1028. That Banja Luka municipality had begun to fall behind in its cleansing efforts was a 
problem that Radoslav Brđanin remarked upon in mid July 1992. After touring combat 
zones and detention facilities in Prijedor, he praised efforts there to create a new Serb state: 
“What we have seen in Prijedor is an example of a job well done and it is a pity that many 
in Banjaluka are not aware of it yet, just as they are not aware of what might happen in 
Banjaluka in the near future. Due to the circumstances, there is a constantly growing 
number of superfluous Muslims in Banjaluka who have fled the surrounding municipalities 
and who are already planning to join the jihad.” TPF2063FPT (See part 4 of this judgement for a 
summary of the situation around this time in the municipalities of Banja Luka and 
Prijedor.) For Brđanin, even reduced to a minority, Muslims were a danger to Serbs, and 
could not be trusted: “They are showing loyalty simply because they still constitute a 
minority. Because we suffered from the illusion that they had accepted the Serbian state 
and the AR Krajina, we had 55 casualties in Kotor Varoš”.TPF2064FPT 
1029. In Rogatica municipality, Rajko Kušić, member of the SDS Main Board and leader 
of a 50-man-strong paramilitary unit, was also worried about lagging behind with the 
expulsion programme. Kušić told Muslim detainees at the Veljko Vlahović school – a 
house of horrors even by the standards of the time – that they had to be more cooperative, 
as he was now having to report to the leadership in Pale on why he was running late with 
the cleansing of Rogatica. The slow progress could cause him problems with Pale, he told 
a witness. According to this witness, Kušić mentioned on several occasions both his 
obligation to report to Pale and decisions made in Pale on the number of Muslims who 
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could remain in Rogatica.TPF2065FPT (Slobodan Kuruzović, an SDS member and TO commander 
who was in charge of Trnopolje camp, told Trnopolje detainees that the Serb plan was to 
reduce the number of Muslims in Prijedor to 10 per cent or less, and then later to reduce 
this to 2 per cent or less.TPF2066FPT) 
1030. Witness 583 was a member of an international organization. In July 1992 his 
organization informed the mayor of Bosanski Novi, as well as Radovan Karadžić, Nikola 
Koljević, and Biljana Plavšić that the forced mass population transfers out of that 
municipality on ethnic grounds were illegal.TPF2067FPT The response from the three leaders was 
that the Muslims were leaving voluntarily.TPF2068FPT Similar protests were addressed on a regular 
basis to Plavšić, Koljević, and General Mladić.TPF2069FPT 
1031. On several occasions Herbert Okun and Cyrus Vance discussed with the Bosnian-
Serb leadership, including the Accused, the widespread “ethnic cleansing” taking place in 
the country. This issue was at the forefront of two meetings attended by the Accused in 
Geneva on 18 and 19 September 1992. The meeting on the first day dealt with the situation 
of Muslims and Croats who had been forcibly removed from their homes and were being 
held by the Bosnian Serbs in camps. The route along which these civilian detainees were to 
be evacuated from Bosnia-Herzegovina was discussed in the presence of a UNHCR 
representative, Sadako Ogata. Okun’s notes from the meeting on the second day show that 
the situation of persons detained by Serbs in camps was again discussed. The witness 
testified that when the issue of “ethnic cleansing” was raised at the negotiations, the 
Bosnian-Serb leaders did not deny that it was taking place. Their standard response, often 
expressed by Karadžić and Koljević, was to point to crimes allegedly committed by 
Muslims or Croats against Serbs, or to cite the genocide carried out against Serbs in the 
Second World War.TPF2070FPT 
1032. An expulsion of hundreds of Muslims from Grbavica commune, in Novo Sarajevo 
municipality, occurred in the period up to 30 September 1992.TPF2071FPT General Morillon, of 
UNPROFOR, wrote to Karadžić on 1 October 1992 expressing his dismay, especially in 
light of the fact that the expulsion happened “while you were in Geneva endeavouring to 
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restore the image of your side”. He urged Karadžić to rectify the situation.TPF2072FPT According 
to a Serbian press report dated 2 October 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Presidency reacted 
“urgently” to the Grbavica expulsion, sending Biljana Plavšić to the area.TPF2073FPT A statement 
by the Bosnian-Serb authorities, carried by SRNA on 1 October, cynically stated that there 
had been no “ethnic cleansing” in Grbavica, but rather that “This was a case of some 
groups arbitrarily trying, through expulsion of Muslim citizens, to pressurise the Muslim 
authorities in former Bosnia-Hercegovina into implementing the conclusions of the 
London and Geneva agreement on free movement of civilians, which the Muslim side is 
not honoring.” The official statement then criticized UNPROFOR “for not condemning the 
Muslim side for genocide carried out against Serbs in Sarajevo, Bihac and other 
towns”. TPF2074FPT On 8 October 1992 Plavšić again denied that there had been “ethnic cleansing” 
in Grbavica, and stated euphemistically that “The truth is that Muslims have been able 
freely to leave the suburb, accompanied and protected” by the VRS.TPF2075FPT 
1033. A letter sent by Radovan Karadžić on 19 July 1992 to the municipalities of Novo 
Sarajevo, Pale, Ilidža, Hadžići, Rajlovac, Sokolac, and Han Pijesak requested an inventory 
of “all housing facilities ... that are vacant following the voluntary departure of Muslims”. 
The housing stock was to be used to accommodate Serbs leaving the Muslim part of 
Sarajevo.TPF2076FPT The influx of Serbs from other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina would help to 
consolidate Serb ethnic domination in the acquired territories. 
1034. The Mazowiecki report, dated 27 October 1992, states that “the principal objective 
of the military conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the establishment of ethnically 
homogenous regions. Ethnic cleansing does not appear to be the consequence of the war, 
but rather its goal. This goal, to a large extent, has already been achieved through killings, 
beatings, rape, destruction of houses, and threats.” The report continues that the “Serbian 
leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not ready to desist in their plans. The Muslim and 
Croatian populations, in the territory controlled by Serbian authorities, live under 
enormous pressure and terror. Hundreds of thousands of people are being forced to leave 
their homes and to abandon their belongings in order to save their lives.”TPF2077FPT A follow-up 
report by Mazowiecki, dated 17 November 1992, states that “The greater prevalence of 
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ethnic cleansing in Serbian-occupied territories is undoubtedly related to the political 
objectives formulated and pursued by Serbian nationalists, namely, ensuring Serbian 
control over all territories inhabited by significant numbers of Serbs, as well as adjacent 
territories assimilated to them owing to logistical and military considerations. It should be 
noted that ethnic cleansing is not practiced exclusively in areas where Serbs form a 
majority of the population. In some of the cities, most strongly affected by Serbian ethnic 
cleansing, such as Prijedor, Muslims and Croats were in the majority.”TPF2078FPT 
 
6.14 Knowledge of and support for detention of civilians 
1035. A decision to establish a central commission for the exchange of prisoners-of-war 
was forecast at an SNB meeting, on 24 April 1992, TPF2079FPT and eventually formalized by the 
Prime Minister of the Bosnian-Serb Republic on 8 May 1992. TPF2080FPT It was followed by a 6 
June 1992 order of the Central Exchange Commission to municipal SJBs and commissions 
of exchange, among others, to the effect that lists of persons deprived of their liberty were 
to be submitted by the municipal commissions to the central commission “for the purpose 
of co-ordination and establishment of unique register”.TPF2081FPT No detainee was to be released 
or exchanged without an order from the central commission except for “All women whose 
detention or deprivation of liberty is not related to the war or war activities, all the children 
and minors up to 16 years of age, old and helpless persons should be released immediately 
and ensure their return according to their own free will without setting any conditions to 
them or exchanging them”. TPF2082FPT The 400 Muslim civilian men expelled from Bratunac via 
Pale, on 14 May 1992, were processed by this commission. TPF2083FPT 
1036. The Accused testified that he had “no idea” whether the Central Exchange 
Commission came to deal with civilians held captive by the Bosnian-Serb authorities. TPF2084FPT 
He said that he knew nothing about detention of civilians by the Bosnian Serbs, at least not 
before the first week of August 1992: “Who opened Sušica, Batkovići, Manjača, I didn’t 
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know anything about that. I didn’t know that these camps existed.”TPF2085FPT Only at the 
Presidency session of 6 August 1992 did the Accused hear allegations, purportedly for the 
first time, that “the accommodation of prisoners is not good, etc.”TPF2086FPT 
1037. The Chamber finds, on the contrary, that many of the facts about detention of 
civilians were known to the Accused well before August 1992. 
1038. Prime Minister Đerić acknowledged in a 28 April 1992 letter to the MUP and the 
TO that both military and civilian prisoners were being held by the Bosnian-Serb 
authorities.TPF2087FPT Indeed, soon after its establishment, the VRS issued written orders for the 
detention of all Muslim men fit for military service.TPF2088FPT The massive and widespread 
detention of Muslim and Croat civilians by Bosnian-Serb authorities has been detailed in 
part 4 of this judgement. 
1039. On 10 June 1992, at a Presidency session attended by the Accused, Prime Minister 
Đerić was assigned the task of reporting back to the Presidency “on prisoners, with 
proposed measures”.TPF2089FPT Đerić held a Government meeting on the same day, at which it 
was decided that “the Ministry of Justice should make a Report about prisoners. This 
Report should pay special attention on treatment of civilian population, prisoners of war, 
accommodation, food etc. The Report would be considered by the Government, after 
which it would be submitted to the Presidency of the Republic”.TPF2090FPT This sequence of 
events alone shows that the Accused was not speaking the truth when he said that he did 
not know about detained civilians. 
1040. On 22 June 1992 the Accused engaged in a conversation on civilian prisoners with 
his brother Mirko Krajišnik: 
Mirko K.: “... Vlatka Krsmanović. She is some kind of professor from Sarajevo. Do you 
know her?” 
Momčilo K.: “Yes.” 
Mirko K.: “She is allegedly detained up there.” 
Momčilo K.: “And who wants to intervene?” 
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Mirko K.: “The town wants her back. Mirko Pejanović does. ... Can she be exchanged so that 
she can come back? She is a Serb.” 
Momčilo K.: “What do you mean, a Serb?” 
Mirko K.: “Is she a Croat then?” 
Momčilo K.: “Sorry?” 
Mirko K.: “What is she then? I don’t know.” 
Momčilo K.: “... Pejanović is only asking for matters that interest him. Release people from 
Dobrinja, that one from ... the one that Bradina has from Novi grad. Say hello to him and tell 
him please that they are in Bradina ... Serbs. Let him engage a bit more as a Serb. They 
should let it go. ... People will be released. There is a Committee for that. He should not be 
dealing with it.”TPF2091FPT 
(When testifying, the Accused claimed that he no longer recalled which committee he had 
been talking about at the time. TPF2092FPT) 
1041. A conversation which took place on 26 June 1992 between the Accused and 
Momčilo Mandić, by that time Minister of Justice, gives much away about the Accused’s 
knowledge and involvement in the detention of civilians and forced displacement via 
prisoner exchanges: 
Mandić: “There is this Vuković, a member of the youth organisation, a Serb who is 
criticising us because we er ... have four hundred prisoners here, you know?” 
Krajišnik: “... Filip Vuković? ... Communist?” 
Mandić: “Yes, yes.” 
Krajišnik: “What does he want?” 
Mandić: “He is the President of that Exchange Commission.” 
Krajišnik: “Their Commission?” 
Mandić: “Yes.” 
Krajišnik: “And what is it that he wants?” 
Mandić: “War prisoners, no they are ex for them [sic]. They are hardly interested in people, 
they are interested in ammunition and meat and now we let those women and children go to 
Vrbanja, to go to their own people, he says that’s ethnic cleansing what we do.” 
Krajišnik: “... And where is he now?” 
Mandić: “Somewhere there, I do not know.” 
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Krajišnik: “With them, isn’t he?” 
Mandić: “Yes.” 
Krajišnik: “That means he is theirs?” 
Mandić: “Yes, yes, yes.” 
Krajišnik: “God, traitors are all around.”TPF2093FPT 
1042. The “traitor” Vuković was the chairman of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state 
Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War and Detainees. He had faxed a letter to 
his counterparts at the Central Exchange Commission of the Bosnian-Serb Republic on the 
same day as the above conversation. He was attempting to secure the release of a large 
number of detainees, including women and families. He referred to persons previously 
exchanged at Vrbanja bridge, as well as to an attachment listing 3,441 prisoners yet to be 
released. He added: “It is our opinion that, once released, the detainees should be sent to 
their places of residence, i.e. to their domicile address. Otherwise, this would signify 
typical deportation, exile and ethnic cleansing of the area.”TPF2094FPT It is this fax which caused 
Mandić to raise the matter of Vuković with the Accused. 
1043. Vuković’s opinion as reported by Mandić was echoed in the Mazowiecki report of 
28 August 1992: “The detention of civilians is clearly being used as a method of pressuring 
them to leave the territory.”TPF2095FPT The links between detention, exchange, and expulsion are 
further illustrated by an order of 28 May 1992 from the commander of the VRS 1st Birač 
Brigade to the Zvornik TO: “The moving out of the Muslim population must be organised 
and co-ordinated with the municipalities through which the moving is carried out. Only 
women and children can move out, while men fit for military service are to be placed in 
camps for exchange.”TPF2096FPT 
1044. On 16 June 1992, Witness 239, a Croat woman from Novo Sarajevo was detained in 
the “Šoping” building in Grbavica where she was questioned and beaten by Serb soldiers. 
Biljana Plavšić entered the room and told the soldiers to take away the witness and two 
other detainees, who showed visible signs of having been beaten, because she was trying to 
have breakfast in the room next door. Witness 239 was transferred to the Lukavica 
barracks in Novo Sarajevo where she was kept in poor conditions with 26 other persons. 
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One day she saw the Accused, Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, and Nikola Koljević 
arrive together at Lukavica by helicopter.TPF2097FPT 
1045. Planjo’s house in Semizovac, Vogošća municipality, was a pick-up point for forced-
labour assignments.TPF2098FPT The Vogošća war commission, on 7 July 1992, temporarily turned 
the house over to the Ministry of Justice for use as a prison.TPF2099FPT On 6 August 1992, the war 
commission sought approval from the Ministry to “occasionally” engage detainees in 
construction and other works. TPF2100FPT Minister of Justice Mandić, approved the request on 10 
August.TPF2101FPT On 16 August a person introducing himself as the Minister of Justice, 
accompanied by police in camouflage uniform, visited detainees in the village of 
Podlugovi and told the detainees that they would be moved to a location in Semizovac 
where they would be given work duties. The next day they were transferred to Planjo’s 
house.TPF2102FPT Around 150 Muslims and Croats were detained there in August through October 
1992.TPF2103FPT The man who had introduced himself as the Minister of Justice visited the 
detainees once at Planjo’s house.TPF2104FPT At the end of August 1992, Serb military personnel 
began to take Muslim detainees from Planjo’s house to perform labour at the front lines in 
Ravne and Žuč. The work included digging trenches, carrying ammunition, and removing 
the bodies of Serb soldiers killed in battle.TPF2105FPT 
1046. Momčilo Mandić confirmed the existence in some municipalities of “prisons, 
collection centres, and other facilities where POWs were sheltered or people who had 
undergone ethnic cleansing ... were held by the army or police.”TPF2106FPT He said that some of 
those detention facilities were taken over by the Ministry of Justice in the course of 
1992. TPF2107FPT (Mandić appointed Milorad Krnojelac warden of the Foča detention camp on 17 
July 1992.TPF2108FPT) Mandić knew of two detention facilities in the Sarajevo area. Muslims and 
Croats were detained at Lukavica in Novo Sarajevo, a facility under army jurisdiction,TPF2109FPT 
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and at a facility known as KP Dom Butmir, or Kula, under MUP jurisdiction until the 
beginning of August 1992, when it was taken over by the Ministry of Justice.TPF2110FPT Detainees 
at Kula were forced to perform manual labour such as digging trenches and graves.TPF2111FPT On 
20 May 1992, the Ilidža and Novi Grad SJBs urged the MUP and Ministry of Justice to 
resolve the status of the detainees at Kula, citing the inadequacy of accommodation, food, 
and hygiene, and the poor state of health of detainees.TPF2112FPT Radovan Karadžić visited the 
prison around July 1992 and spoke with the detainees.TPF2113FPT On 26 June 1992, Mandić told 
the Accused about the presence of 400 detainees at the Kula detention facility. TPF2114FPT 
1047. Mandić testified that by mid 1992 he had specifically informed the Accused about 
all matters within his knowledge concerning irregularities and inhumane treatment in 
detention facilities.TPF2115FPT Thus the Accused was both involved in the maintenance of 
detention centres for civilians and knew about the inhumane treatment of persons held 
there. 
1048. On 24 May 1992, Prime Minister Đerić wrote to the US Secretary of State, James 
Baker, on behalf of the Bosnian-Serb Government, assuring him that the “Serbian side is 
holding no hostages, operating no concentration camps and is not killing unarmed civilians 
in Bosnia. The reports alleging such crimes, appearing in the U.S. press and elsewhere, are 
not based on facts.” TPF2116FPT But the large-scale arrest of Muslims and Croats was creating 
problems for the Bosnian Serbs, diverting manpower from the front and raising political 
risks. As Milovan Milanović acknowledged before the Accused at the July 1992 session of 
the Assembly, “We have a huge problem with captured people of other nationalities, we 
have hundreds and thousands of these prisoners.”TPF2117FPT (This came immediately after 
Milanović’s acknowledgment that “boozing” and “totally plastered” Serb soldiers, 
paramilitaries, and private armies roamed Banja Luka engaging in criminal activities, 
which went unpunished.TPF2118FPT) 
1049. A 15 July 1992 report from an assistant commander in the 1st Krajina Corps to his 
command notes that “There are more than 2500 prisoners in the POW camp of the 1st 
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Krajina Corps, but the number of detainees in Omarska, Prijedor and Trnopolje is much 
higher. The local authorities are slow in determining what crimes they are responsible for, 
and want to shift responsibility to the military organs.”TPF2119FPT 
1050. Stojan Župljanin, as chief of the Banja Luka CSB, represented one of those local 
authorities. At a meeting of MUP officials on 11 July 1992, presided over by MUP 
Minister Mićo Stanišić, Župljanin noted, according to the minutes of the meeting, that 
“The army and Crisis Staffs/Wartime Presidencies demand gathering as many Muslims as 
possible and leave such non-defined camps to the Internal Affairs. The conditions in these 
camps are poor: there is no food, some individuals do not comply with the international 
standards because, among other things, the concentration centres are not appropriate or for 
other reasons.” TPF2120FPT The meeting resolved to hold talks with the Ministry of Justice to solve 
“the question of the moving out of certain inhabitants, villages, etc. which is not the 
jurisdiction of the MUP but some are trying to attribute it to the MUP”.TPF2121FPT 
1051. Hence, at least in early July 1992 Stanišić knew about the illegal and widespread 
detention of Muslim and Croatian civilians in inhumane conditions. He reported the 
situation to Radovan Karadžić and the Prime Minister on 17 July 1992 using words from 
the minutes of the meeting the week before: “The Army, crisis staffs and war presidencies 
have requested that the Army round up or capture as many Muslim civilians as possible, 
and they leave such undefined camps to internal affairs organs. The conditions in some of 
these camps are poor: there is no food, individuals sometimes do not observe international 
norms, etc. ... Special emphasis should be placed on the issue of relocating certain citizens, 
villages, etc. because this does not fall within the competence of the MUP”.TPF2122FPT Here is the 
logic of ethnic cleansing cast in the banal language of officialdom: round up civilians, 
place them in camps, camps and their staff do not meet international standards, citizens and 
whole villages are thus relocated. 
1052. It was around this time that the international community began to request access to 
– and to produce reports critical of – Bosnian-Serb detention facilities. As the Accused put 
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it, “terrible accusations were made by the international community” (he corrected himself: 
“not terrible accusations but accusations”).TPF2123FPT 
1053. Sometime in July 1992 the Minister of Information, Velibor Ostojić, accompanied 
foreign journalists on a visit to detention camps. (Velibor Ostojić testified that he 
accompanied journalists to Prijedor, but that he himself did not visit any camps. TPF2124FPT The 
Chamber does not accept the latter part of Ostojić’s assertion as truthful.) The Accused 
claimed that Ostojić, upon his return from the visit, had lulled him into thinking that 
“everything was fine”.TPF2125FPT The Prime Minister and, it would seem, the whole of the 
Presidency were also lulled into this thought, according to the Accused. TPF2126FPT 
1054. The Chamber does not accept the Accused’s version of events. The Accused would 
not have accepted such an account by Ostojić, even if that had been Ostojić’s account. The 
Bosnian-Serb leadership initiated superficial improvements at camps in advance of visits 
by journalists, as illustrated by General Mladić’s order of 3 August 1992, giving notice of a 
forthcoming tour by foreign journalists and ICRC representatives of several detention 
facilities, including Omarska and Trnopolje.TPF2127FPT (There are other such examples of 
attempts to deceive international visitors.TPF2128FPT) The authorities engaged, in other words, in a 
cover-up. 
1055. The civilian detention centres were an instrument, as much as they were an 
intermediate step, in the logic of dislocation and expulsion. In early August 1992, the 
Bosnian-Serb leadership was still hoping to prolong the operations of detention centres. On 
5 August 1992 Karadžić boasted in an interview with Belgrade television that “What we 
have are prisons for prisoners of war and prisons for criminals. We have excellent 
conditions in all prisons, or in almost all prisons ... the fact is that we do not have camps 
for civilians”.TPF2129FPT 
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1056. The suffering of civilians in the camps was known to the members of the 
Presidency. The ICRC sent a report prepared on 22 July 1992 to Karadžić, copied to 
Biljana Plavšić, about its visit to Manjača camp from 14 to 16 July 1992. On 7 August 
1992, Karadžić forwarded the report to Prime Minister Đerić, asking him to “take prompt 
action, through the Ministries of Justice and Interior, to improve the living conditions in 
the prisons on our territories that are being held by civil authorities”.TPF2130FPT According to the 
ICRC report, whose assessment would have been made known to the Accused as a 
member of the Presidency: 
The ICRC visit was terminated prematurely at 12.15 on 16.07 when delegates observed that 
two detainees had been subjected to ill treatment during the visit. All eight delegates present 
in camp observed on detainees frequent and widespread traces of recent and often severe 
beatings; those most often were fresh haematomas inflicted in a time period since arrival at 
Manjaca. ... General living conditions with regard to food, hygiene, clothing and 
accommodation ... are absolutely insufficient. Many detainees show marked weight loss and 
signs of anaemia with severity often corresponding to length of detention. Facilities for 
washing are limited by inconsistent water supply and inadequate provision of taps. Prisoners 
have the opportunity to take a shower twice a month. Facilities for clothes washing are 
nonexistent and most prisoners don’t have a change of clothes. Stables are not suitable for 
the housing of prisoners and provide inadequate sanitary conditions and protection from the 
elements. ... Basic conditions of poor nutrition and hygiene, along with ill treatment, were 
assessed by delegates to be the biggest health problems. These create a risk of infectious 
disease spread, injury and general physical and mental deterioration for even the healthiest 
detainees. They also represent serious health hazards for a large number of detainees with 
prior illness or injury. These include: more than a dozen detainees with interrupted 
tuberculosis treatment, several of whom have signs of active disease; dozens of patients 
suffering from chronic physical or mental illnesses who are unable to obtain needed 
medications or therapy; more than a dozen war wounded patients who are without the 
physical therapy, sanitary conditions, or good nutrition needed for proper healing and 
recovery of function, at least ten handicapped or disabled persons who are unable to work 
normally because they walk, hear or see only with severe limitations. ... Detainee medical 
team provides competent and conscientious medical care, but is without the means to meet 
the multitude of medical needs: medications are limited and scarce, and special facilities for 
care of sick are grossly inadequate. TPF2131FPT 
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The ICRC recommended that “Manjaca camp is not suitable for detention and should be 
closed, with civilian detainees released and military detainees transferred to adequate 
facilities”.TPF2132FPT Two weeks passed before the Bosnian-Serb authorities gave any indication 
that they were taking measures to comply. 
1057. A document dated 20 August 1992 contains an account of a meeting held at 
Manjača regarding the “treatment and processing of the persons who participated in armed 
rebellion”. Major Stupar, of the 1st Krajina Corps, is recorded as having made 
“introductory remarks about the views of the Presidency of Republika Srpska”.TPF2133FPT The 
topic of the meeting is somewhat misleading, because what the participants actually 
considered, according to the minutes, was a “List of 92 persons for whom there is no 
evidence that they carried out – participated in combat activities and who have serious 
health problems and attract the attention of journalists and the representatives of 
humanitarian organisations because of their physical appearance.”TPF2134FPT The minutes list 39 
detainees suffering from a variety of ailments or disabilities, such as heart disease, 
epilepsy, spinal fracture, severed limbs, diabetes, loss of bowel-movement control, kidney 
disease, tuberculosis, mental illness, and retardation.TPF2135FPT The person described as retarded 
was 17 years old at the time.TPF2136FPT All had been in detention since May or June 1992. 
Another twenty or so detainees on the list (their health status is not specified) were aged 17 
to 18 years.TPF2137FPT 
1058. Besides what to do with the Manjača sick and adolescents, the participants were 
tasked “To review the list of 400 persons for whom there is no evidence that they 
committed the crime of armed rebellion.”TPF2138FPT 
1059. The Accused said that he did not know whether the Presidency had ordered these 
reviews.TPF2139FPT He tried to play down the significance of this item of evidence.TPF2140FPT However, 
the Presidency was following events closely, and on 6 September 1992 its members 
(absent Đerić) spent the whole session on the Manjača question. According to the minutes: 
“The Military Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps 
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submitted to the Presidency of the Serbian Republic a list of a certain number of prisoners 
of war held in the Manjača camp and a proposal for the adoption of a decision that they be 
spared further criminal prosecution. ... The Presidency of the Serbian Republic considered 
the proposal of the Military Prosecutor’s Office, recognised the reasons and circumstances 
of the proposal for pardon and unanimously adopted the decision to spare the persons 
named in the list enclosed with proposal of Military Prosecutor’s Office from criminal 
prosecution.” TPF2141FPT 
1060. A list of names of those “pardoned” was attached to the original Presidency 
minutes, but the attachment has not been preserved. Fortunately, another document assists. 
On 11 September 1992 the 1st Krajina Corps reported receipt of a Presidency directive, 
under Karadžić’s name, exempting 69 persons from criminal prosecution, pursuant to a 
decision reached by the Presidency at its 6 September session.TPF2142FPT (The Accused did not 
acknowledge a connection: “I cannot confirm anything. I don’t know. I just see that there 
was a discussion about this. I don’t think that this list was at the meeting.” TPF2143FPT) 
1061. Karadžić’s list, which gives names but no other details, refers to three of the persons 
who also appear on the 20 August 1992 list of sick and adolescents: Gromilić (a seventeen-
year-old); Salihović (suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis); and Dedić (kidney 
disease).TPF2144FPT These three were among the 92 which Major Stupar, of the 1st Krajina Corps, 
knew were being held at Manjača for no legitimate reason whatsoever. 
1062. The Accused said in court: “I was present at this meeting that was dealing with the 
pardon. ... I did not know about their condition. I did not know whether they were sick or 
not. ... I only knew that this was done, and I felt it was positive. But what the reason was, I 
can’t recall that.”TPF2145FPT The Chamber does not accept this explanation. The Presidency would 
have been informed by the military prosecutor about the reasons these persons were being 
“pardoned”. The sanitized minutes, the figment of a deliberatative process, the pretence of 
a pardon, were all meant to conceal the Bosnian-Serb leadership’s determination in late 
August 1992 that civilian detention camps had become too costly politically, and were to 
be phased out. 
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1063. This did not bring the detention-centre crimes to an end. For example, on 30 
September 1992 Witness 666, joined a large crowd, including Radovan Karadžić, Nikola 
Koljević, and Velibor Ostojić, to attend a funeral of 28 young Serb men in Vlasenica. In 
his speech, Karadžić said of the deceased that “we will never and must never forget. Nor 
may we forget their executors and attackers. I do not know whether I am allowed to say 
that we must never forgive either”. Following the funeral, concerns were expressed to 
certain senior Serb officials, including the local MUP chief, that Karadžić’s inflammatory 
words might lead to violence against the Muslims detained at Sušica camp. That same 
evening, 140 to 150 detainees were taken from the camp by MUP officers and killed.TPF2146FPT 
1064. A combat report from the 1st Krajina Corps to the VRS Main Staff dated 4 
November 1992 describes a “massacre” of about 200 captured Muslim men in the village 
of Večići in Kotor Varoš municipality, the area of responsibility of the Kotor Varoš Light 
Infantry Brigade, carried out in retaliation for the wounding or killing of VRS soldiers.TPF2147FPT 
There is no evidence of any action taken by the Bosnian-Serb authorities. The commander 
of the Brigade remained in his post until at least 1993.TPF2148FPT 
 
6.15 Cover-up of detention-centre crimes 
1065. On 6 August 1992 Radovan Karadžić ordered the MUP and Ministry of Justice to 
collect information on the conditions and treatment of “prisoners of war” by the Bosnian-
Serb authorities, and to deliver a report within 10 days. TPF2149FPT On 9 August 1992 the 
Government formed two commissions, linked to Momčilo Mandić as Minister of Justice, 
to look into conditions in detention centres and speed up the procedure of categorizing 
detainees. One commission was headed by Vojin Lale, Assistant Minister of Justice and 
Administration, and by Mirko Erkić, Police Inspector in the MUP. TPF2150FPT The other 
commission consisted of Slobodan Avlijaš, an official with the Ministry of Justice, and 
Goran Sarić, a MUP official. Both were a whitewash. 
1066. The Lale/Erkić commission visited the detention centres of Trnopolje, Omarska, 
and Keraterm in Prijedor municipality, Manjača in Banja Luka, Krings in Sanski Most, and 
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the Middle School Centre in Bosanski Šamac. It filed a classified report on 17 August 
1992, which gave an overall positive description of the conditions in those camps: TPF2151FPT 
With respect to Trnopolje, the report stated that it was an “open refugee centre”, where 
people gathered voluntarily. People moved freely in and out, provided that “certain 
personal documents” were shown and that departures were organized.TPF2152FPT The report 
concluded that regulations concerning the treatment of civilian refugees did not exist, 
and that “the problem of the open refugee centre in Trnopolje should be dealt with in 
such way that the refugees can leave the region as soon as possible”.TPF2153FPT 
With respect to Omarska, the report mentioned 174 men detained, including “those who 
were arrested in combat zones and are of no security significance”. Prisoners were 
accommodated in a hall with military beds and clean toilet facilities, and were provided 
with food and medical care.TPF2154FPT 
With respect to Keraterm, the report stated that at the time it was empty, although prior 
to 5 August 1992 about 4,000 people had been divided into refugees (sent to Trnopolje 
in Prijedor municipality) and prisoners of war (sent to Manjača in Banja Luka 
municipality).TPF2155FPT  
With respect to Manjača, the report stated that about 3,500 prisoners there (95 per cent 
Muslims, 5 per cent Croats) were treated in accordance with international conventions, 
and that Red Cross and foreign journalists had visited the camp. Around 20 prisoners 
not of military age were to be released pending a short investigative procedure.TPF2156FPT The 
report did remark on the “extremely poor conditions of accommodation” in 
Manjača.TPF2157FPT 
With respect to Krings, the report stated that 112 prisoners of military age, captured in 
combat operations against the Bosnian-Serb Army, were kept there in good conditions. 
In both Manjača and Krings the detainees slept on concrete floors, covered with 
blankets.TPF2158FPT 
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1067. The report’s conclusions stressed the unsatisfactory accommodations, as most 
facilities visited had “inadequate rooms of poor quality” and lacked proper beds. The 
report urged the Government to continue to monitor the situation and set up regulations on 
“treatment of prisoners in refugee and investigation centres”.TPF2159FPT 
1068. On 19 August 1992 a “special closed Government session” was held to discuss this 
report.TPF2160FPT The minutes of the session reveal that the Government adopted the report as 
accurately describing the situation, and concluded it would arrange for municipal organs to 
ensure that conditions and accommodation are in accordance with international 
conventions.TPF2161FPT 
1069. On 22 August 1992 the Avlijaš/Sarić commission issued its report on visits to 
Trebinje, Gacko, and Bileća municipalities. They established that there were no longer 
detention facilities in Trebinje and Gacko, while the prisoners in the Bileća barracks had 
been exchanged the day before. About 140 Muslims were accommodated in isolation 
under the authority of the Bileća SJB, and were reported to be “in reasonably good 
conditions”.TP F2162FPT The report was discussed and adopted by the Bosnian-Serb Government 
on 7 September 1992.TPF2163FPT 
1070. The conditions in the detention centres as portrayed in the two commission reports 
to the Bosnian-Serb Government of 17 August and 22 August are in stark contrast to the 
conditions as described by witnesses before this Chamber, in the Mazowiecki report, and 
in the factual accounts attested to in previous trials before the Tribunal of which this 
Chamber has taken judicial notice. The Keraterm and Omarska detention facilities both 
received positive assessments in the report of the Lale/Erkić commission. In contrast, 
witnesses gave detailed accounts of unsatisfactory conditions at those facilities (such as 
overcrowding, poor hygiene, and lack of food), severe mistreatment by guards (such as 
beatings, sexual abuse, and torture), and executions. The 17 August report described 
satisfactory conditions at Krings Hall in Sanski Most municipality, save for the fact that 
detainees slept on blankets on concrete floors. Witness 481, who was detained at Krings 
hall from 4 July to 4 August 1992, described it as extremely unhygienic, and stated that 
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detainees were regularly beaten.TPF2164FPT The report is more critical of Manjača camp, although 
it still found that detainees were treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. In 
contrast, the Chamber has heard substantial testimony of unhygienic conditions, severe 
beatings, and executions at Manjača. 
1071. Similarly, the 22 August report of the Avlijaš/Sarić commission stated that 
detainees at the Bileća police station and the Đački Dom dormitory, also in Bileća, were in 
“reasonably good condition”. In contrast, Witness Murguz, who was detained at this 
facility from July to October 1992, testified that he and other detainees were regularly 
mistreated and subjected to electric shock and tear gas.TPF2165FPT 
1072. Detention facilities such as Batković camp in Bijeljina municipality, Kula in Novo 
Sarajevo, and various locations in Foča municipality, were not included in the 
investigation, despite the fact that they were operational at the time of the inspections. The 
commissions’ reports do not indicate why some detention centers were not investigated, 
nor do they reveal how the commissions determined which facilities to visit. 
1073. The commissions did not report comprehensively on those detention facilities they 
did inspect. The 17 August report mentioned Keraterm in Prijedor, acknowledging that 
4,000 detainees were known to have passed through this facility. Virtually no information 
is provided on the facility or the conditions which existed during its use as a detention 
facility, due to the commission’s finding that no detainees were at the time being held at 
the facility. Similarly, the 22 August report did not provide any details on detention 
facilities in Trebinje and Gacko due to its finding that detainees were not currently being 
held in those areas. 
1074. On 22 October 1992 Momčilo Mandić sent Radovan Karadžić, the Accused, and the 
Prime Minister a report on the situation in prisons and collection centres for prisoners of 
war in the territory of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. The report, compiled after visits between 
10 and 17 October 1992 by Slobodan Avlijaš, covered the municipalities of Vlasenica, 
Zvornik, Brčko, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Doboj, Banja Luka, Ilidža, and Hadžići, and 
represents another whitewash: TPF2166FPT 
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With respect to Vlasenica, the report stated that no prisoner was kept in the so-called 
“Luke” camp, while a number of Muslims had been briefly kept there at the beginning 
of the hostilities and later exchanged.TPF2167FPT 
With respect to Zvornik: 64 Muslims were detained under the supervision of the local 
SJB because “the other side” was refusing to conduct exchanges.TPF2168FPT 
With respect to Brčko: there was no prison or camp for the temporary accommodation 
of detained enemy soldiers. Avlijaš visited the town and met with Bosnian-Serb 
officials to verify the claim by the ICRC that about 2,500 Muslims had been 
“liquidated” there. He ascertained that mass graves with 226 corpses existed in a suburb 
of Brčko; he was told that they had died either of natural causes or during combat 
activities.TPF2169FPT 
With respect to Prijedor: “officially” there were no facilities for prisoners of war in the 
municipality, but 3,000 people gathered spontaneously in Trnopolje after being 
misinformed that this was the only way to leave. The ICRC was notified that the 
Bosnian-Serb Republic did not consider Trnopolje under its jurisdiction.TPF2170FPT 
With respect to Sanski Most: no camp existed, and the only four people taken prisoner 
were transferred to Manjača in Banja Luka municipality.TPF2171FPT 
With respect to Doboj, the district prison was used by both the military and the civilian 
authorities and was awarded “high marks” upon a visit by the ICRC. TPF2172FPT 
With respect to Banja Luka: prisoners in Manjača camp were being exchanged and 98 
Muslims requested permission to leave the town of Banja Luka.TPF2173FPT 
With respect to Ilidža: the local SJB detained prisoners of war in satisfactory conditions 
in a secondary school, but they would be transferred shortly to the Butmir Correction 
House in Vogošća.TPF2174FPT 
With respect to Hadžići: ninety prisoners of war were detained in the sports centre under 
the authority of the local SJB awaiting exchange with Serbs.TPF2175FPT 
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1075. On 27 October 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Government discussed the Avlijaš report 
and decided that “existing illegal camps and assembly centres are to be dissolved as soon 
as possible. The existing penal institutions legally formed in large centres in Republika 
Srpska are to be used, since the conditions there are suitable for legal treatment of 
prisoners and inmates.” TPF2176FPT According to Trbojević, who was present at the 27 October 
meeting, there had been no discussion on prosecuting the persons responsible for the 
establishment and the management of the “existing illegal camps”.TPF2177FPT 
 
6.16 The achievement of Momčilo Krajišnik’s objectives 
1076. Towards the end of 1992 (sometime between September and December, according 
to Herbert Okun TPF2178FPT), when the enterprise which the Accused had helped lead had largely 
achieved its criminal objective of ethnic recomposition of territories through forcible 
expulsion of Muslim and Croat populations, the Accused was able to capitalize on the 
realization of his demand of March 1992 that new ethnic facts be created on the ground. 
With thousands of Muslims and Croats killed and more than one hundred thousand driven 
out of the territories, the Accused was now in a position to claim, not untruthfully, that the 
Bosnian Serbs were only desiring to hold on to territories in which they were the majority. 
Speaking on Kanal S, a television channel in Serbia, with a colour-coded map of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in the background, Momčilo Krajišnik gestured at the new home for Serbs 
that he and Karadžić had carved out of a once-multicultural corner of the Balkans, and 
announced to his audience: “We are standing in front of the ethnic map of former Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, with marked borders of the territory that is presently possessed by the 
Bosnian Serb Army. I can only say that what was being said, that we are possessing the 
territories ethnically populated by the other national communities, that is not true, which 
can be seen on the ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which [we] can cover with the 
transparent sheet on which the territories are exactly marked, which is possessed by our 
Army, that those are in fact areas that belong to our people.”TPF2179FPT The unfulfilled aspiration 
of an ethnically cleansed Serb Sarajevo notwithstanding, “this continuity of our territory”, 
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the Accused emphasized, “it is in one piece, if I may say so ... What is a condition is that 
our Republic be integral, and not divided into several parts.”TPF2180FPT 
1077. At a Vogošća municipal assembly meeting, on 14 November 1992, where the 
Accused was a guest of honour, he joked: “There are no Muslims around so one should 
look for an Albanian in order to prevent that Serbs quarrel with each other.”TPF2181FPT In an 
interview from late November 1992, he took credit for rescuing his people from slaughter 
and genocide.TPF2182FPT On another occasion around this time he sounded wistful about the 
Bosnian Serbs’ slow progress in achieving control over Sarajevo: “Sarajevo is a separate 
problem. At the moment ... the area of [the] city proper is marked as Muslim territory, but 
we shall plead for demilitarisation and division between the two national 
communities.”TPF2183FPT Overall, however, the Accused had, by the year’s end, achieved most of 
his goals. 
 
6.17 Conclusions on the Accused’s responsibility 
1078. From the above considerations, the Chamber concludes that the Accused committed 
crimes mentioned in part 5 of this judgement as a member of a JCE. The features of the 
JCE in which he participated are summarized below. 
 
6.17.1 Plurality of persons 
1079. Paragraph 7 of the indictment alleges the existence of a group in the following 
terms : 
Numerous individuals participated in this joint criminal enterprise. Each participant, by acts 
or omissions, contributed to achieving the objective of the enterprise. Momčilo Krajišnik and 
Biljana Plavšić worked in concert with other members of the joint criminal enterprise, 
including Radovan Karadžić and Nikola Koljević. Other members of the joint criminal 
enterprise included: Slobodan Milošević, Željko Ražnatović (aka “Arkan”), General Ratko 
Mladić, General Momir Talić, Radoslav Brđanin, and other members of the Bosnian Serb 
leadership at the Republic, regional and municipal levels; members of the SDS leadership at 
the Republic, regional and municipal levels; members of the Yugoslav People’s Army 
 
P
2180
P P70.A, pp. 1-2. 
P
2181
P P762, tab R.A, p. 3. 
P
2182
P P851, p. 5. 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik Part 6 
 Accused’s responsibility 
 
 
387 
(“JNA”), the Yugoslav Army (“VJ”), the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, later the army of the Republika Srpska (“VRS”), the Bosnian Serb Territorial 
Defence (“TO”), the Bosnian Serb police (“MUP”), and members of Serbian and Bosnian 
Serb paramilitary forces and volunteer units and military and political figures from the 
(Socialist) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of 
Montenegro. 
1080. In its final trial brief, the Prosecution allowed for the existence of a JCE constituted 
of a “core group” of persons: 
Should the Trial Chamber find that the members of the JCE consisted only of a core group 
(such as Krajišnik, Karadžić, Plavšić, Koljević, Mladić, Mićo Stanišić and Mandić), liability 
still attaches to Krajišnik for participation in that JCE, as the physical perpetrators of the 
crimes were acting as instruments of that JCE. Similarly, insofar as any crimes were 
committed by local Bosnian Serbs who were not members of the JCE, those Serbs were 
acting as instruments under the direction of participants in the JCE. TPF2184FPT 
1081. The Prosecution was invited by the Chamber to comment on the kinds of evidence 
which would distinguish perpetrators of crimes acting as part of a JCE from persons not 
part of that JCE but who were committing similar crimes. The Prosecution listed some 
distinguishing factors: 
Whether the perpetrator was a member of, or associated with, any organised bodies 
connected to the JCE; whether the crimes committed were consistent with the pattern of 
similar crimes by JCE members against similar kinds of victims; whether the perpetrator 
acted at the same time as members of the JCE, or as persons who were tools or instruments 
of the JCE; whether the perpetrator’s act advanced the objective of the JCE; whether the 
perpetrator’s act was ratified implicitly or explicitly by members of the JCE; whether the 
perpetrator acted in cooperation or conjunction with members of the JCE at any relevant 
time; whether any meaningful effort was made to punish the act by any member of the JCE 
in a position to do so; whether similar acts were punished by JCE members in a position to 
do so; whether members of the JCE or those who were tools of the JCE continued to affiliate 
with the perpetrators after the act; finally – and this is a non-exhaustive list – whether the 
acts were performed in the context of a systematic attack, including one of relatively low 
intensity over a long period.TPF2185FPT 
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1082. The Chamber accepts the submissions in the previous paragraph, which essentially 
identify indicia (from an indefinite range of such indicia) concerning connections or 
relationships among persons working together in the implementation of a common 
objective. A person not in the JCE may share the general objective of the group but not be 
linked with the operations of the group. Crimes committed by such a person are of course 
not attributable to the group. On the other hand, links forged in pursuit of a common 
objective transform individuals into members of a criminal enterprise. These persons rely 
on each other’s contributions, as well as on acts of persons who are not members of the 
JCE but who have been procured to commit crimes, to achieve criminal objectives on a 
scale which they could not have attained alone. 
1083. One aspect of the Accused’s defence was to deny that he was linked to any persons 
who might have been connected with the commission of crimes: “Everybody had their own 
province of work.”TPF2186FPT Moreover, the officials in the municipalities had “great” 
autonomy.TPF2187FPT 
1084. The Accused said about the MUP’s July 1992 reporting on civilian detainees: “I 
really don’t understand why they would tell me about this. It is their job to get this done, to 
take measures, to punish, to investigate. All of that is up to them, the government.”TPF2188FPT 
“For me, it was sufficient that they would take care of it.”TPF2189FPT And, somewhat 
inconsistently: “If you wouldn’t be interested in this kind of thing, then you would be 
committing a crime.” TPF2190FPT About detention of civilians the Accused said, “Officially, I knew 
nothing.”TPF2191FPT Asked whether he would have reacted to rumours of abuse of detention 
powers, the answer was drowned in legalisms: “this was under the jurisdiction of the 
government. It [the Assembly] would have to interfere with the powers of the government. 
It was for the government to investigate this, to submit a report to the Assembly ... That is 
the proper channel.”TPF2192FPT Even though as both leader of the Assembly and member of the 
Presidency the Accused’s powers were enormous, in the witness box, he tried to cast 
himself as a pathetic figure: “I could only suggest ... I could not ask for a report on my own 
... I could speak out within the Presidency, and that was the end of all my activity. I 
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couldn’t punish. ... I couldn’t not trust the government ... I could say, Wait a minute, is this 
correct? if there were any indications elsewhere that this was not the case, but there was 
nothing I could do.”TPF2193FPT 
1085. According to Biljana Plavšić, Momčilo Mandić of the Ministry of Justice and Mićo 
Stanišić of the MUP were very close to the Accused and Karadžić, and Prime Minister 
Đerić had no control over the two Ministers.TPF2194FPT This is borne out by other evidence. Đerić 
was Prime Minister in little more than name only, a cover for the dictatorial ways of a core 
group which had amassed unto itself all important executive powers. Đerić’s statement that 
“Mr Karadžić considered Mr Krajišnik to be his very own, private Prime Minister”,TPF2195FPT is 
apposite. Momčilo Mandić testified that, in terms of power and influence, Karadžić was 
“absolute number one”. In Mandić’s opinion, the Accused was number two.TPF2196FPT This 
assessment is equivalent to Đerić’s, and in light of all the evidence, the Chamber finds it to 
be correct. 
1086. It is clear that paragraph 7 of the indictment alleges a JCE consisting of a large and 
indefinite group of persons. The Chamber does not find it possible on the evidence to 
specify fully the membership of the JCE; and even if it were possible, it is neither desirable 
nor necessary to do so. What is necessary is to be convinced that the Accused was 
sufficiently connected and concerned with persons who committed crimes pursuant to the 
common objective in various capacities, or who procured other persons to do so. 
1087. The Chamber finds that the JCE of which the Accused was a member consisted of 
persons situated throughout the territories of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. There was a Pale-
based leadership component of the group, including, but not limited to, the Accused, 
Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, Momčilo Mandić, Velibor Ostojić, 
Mićo Stanišić, and, as of 12 May 1992, General Ratko Mladić. The JCE rank and file 
consisted of local politicians, military and police commanders, paramilitary leaders, and 
others. It was based in the regions and municipalities of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, and 
maintained close links with Pale. 
1088. The local component included Arkan (Željko Ražnatović),TPF2197FPT Dr Beli (proper name 
Milenko Vojnović: a local SDS official, deputy to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, and SDS 
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Main Board member),TPF2198FPT Mirko Blagojević (paramilitary leader),TPF2199FPT Radoslav Brđanin 
(ARK crisis staff president and deputy to Bosnian-Serb Assembly),TPF2200FPT Simo Drljača (chief 
of Prijedor SJB), TPF2201FPT Rajko Dukić (president of SDS Executive Board and SDS Main 
Board member),TPF2202FPT Gojko Kličković (president of Bosanska Krupa war presidency and 
SDS Main Board member),TPF2203FPT “Vojo” Kuprešanin (president of ARK and SDS Main 
Board member),TPF2204FPT Rajko Kušić (SDS leader of Rogatica, paramilitary leader, and SDS 
Main Board member),TPF2205FPT Mauzer (paramilitary leader; proper name Ljubiša Savić),TPF2206FPT 
Jovan Mijatović (member of Zvornik crisis staff and deputy to Bosnian-Serb 
Assembly),TPF2207FPT Veljko Milanković (paramilitary leader),TPF2208FPT Nedeljko Rašula (president of 
Sanski Most municipal assembly and deputy to Bosnian-Serb Assembly),TPF2209FPT Momir Talić 
(commander of 1st Krajina Corps),TPF2210FPT Jovan Tintor (president of Vogošća crisis staff and 
SDS Main Board member),TPF2211FPT Vojin (Žućo) Vučković (paramilitary leader),TPF2212FPT and 
Stojan Župljanin (chief of Banja Luka SJB),TPF2213FPT among others. 
 
6.17.2 Common objective 
1089. The second element of JCE responsibility, namely the common objective of the 
enterprise, is pleaded in the indictment as being “the permanent removal, by force or other 
means, of Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat or other non-Serb inhabitants from large areas 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the commission of crimes which are punishable under 
Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Statute”, and that “The crimes enumerated in all the Counts of 
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this indictment were within the object of the joint criminal enterprise, and Momcilo 
Krajišnik ... held the state of mind necessary for the commission of each of these 
crimes.” TPF2214FPT 
1090. The Chamber finds that the above allegations have been proven in relation to 
Article 5 of the Statute (crimes against humanity). The Bosnian-Serb leadership wanted to 
ethnically recompose the territories under its control by expelling and thereby drastically 
reducing the proportion of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats living there. In the words 
of a decision of representatives from Bihać, Bosanski Petrovac, Sprska Krupa, Sanski 
Most, Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, and Ključ, on 7 June 1992, “Muslims and Croats should 
move out of our municipalities until a level is reached where Serbian authority can be 
maintained and implemented on its own territory in each of these municipalities”.TPF2215FPT 
1091. The evidence does not show that the Accused or other members of the JCE had the 
mens rea of genocide (Article 4 of the Statute). Nor does it support the conclusion that the 
Accused was complicit in genocide. The Chamber has classified all proven killings under 
Article 5 of the Statute, so the allegation regarding Article 3 of the Statute (violations of 
the laws or customs of war), which was charged in the alternative to murder as a crime 
against humanity, is rendered moot. 
1092. An explanation of the Chamber’s conclusion in relation to Article 4 of the Statute is 
in order. The evidence does not show that the crime of genocide formed part of the 
common objective of the JCE in which the Accused participated. When reviewing 
speeches and statements, witness evidence and documentation, in search of evidence of 
genocidal intent, utterances must be understood in their proper context.TPF2216FPT Statements and 
speeches of the Accused and others in the Bosnian-Serb leadership hinged on two main 
ideas, namely that Serbs had to separate from Muslims and Croats (since it was impossible 
for them to live together), and that there existed historically Serb territories. Even the more 
extreme statements of the Accused, such as his speech at the Bosnian-Serb Assembly 
session of 8 January 1993, do not enable the Chamber to conclude that his intent went 
further than the removal of Muslims and Croats from territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The discriminatory remarks uttered by the Accused at that time, and the Assembly 
resolution adopted in this connection, served, as the Chamber explained above, to 
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retrospectively legitimize the forcible removal. They did not reveal an intent to destroy an 
ethnic group in whole or in part. 
1093. The Chamber must consider whether all of the evidence taken together 
demonstrates a genocidal mental state.TPF2217FPT A review of the crimes committed in the 
indictment municipalities during 1992 provides some of the context of the speeches and 
statements of the Accused and his associates. The Chamber has found that, on the evidence 
presented, at least 3,000 Muslims and Croats were killed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against them. These persons were killed over a period of many months in 
a variety of circumstances. Yet the main focus of the JCE was to forcibly remove Muslims 
and Croats from the indictment municipalities, which it succeeded in doing in very large 
numbers. Killings and ill-treatment were often carried out with the aim to instill fear and 
force the population to leave. Destruction and appropriation of property was seen as a 
measure to prevent expelled people from returning. 
1094. As explained in part 5, the Chamber has not found in the evidence that crimes of 
genocide were committed in the indictment municipalities, which of course is not to say 
that such crimes did not occur. It is only to say that the evidence is not conclusive beyond 
reasonable doubt as to the commission of genocide. Proof of genocide is not possible 
without proof of the mens rea at some level of the hierarchy of actors. This may be present 
from the start, or materialize later. Considering all the evidence, the Chamber does not find 
that the evidence supports a finding beyond reasonable doubt that at any time during the 
indictment period the common objective of the JCE came to include the crime of genocide 
(JCE form 1). Since JCE form 3 is not activated except through the commission of a crime 
of genocide by a co-perpetrator or agent of the JCE – something which has not been 
proven in this case – the charges of genocide must be dismissed. 
1095. The indictment charges the Accused with persecution, murder, extermination, 
deportation, and forced transfer. The underlying acts of persecution are the imposition and 
maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures, killings during and after attacks, 
cruel or inhumane treatment during and after attacks, forced transfer or deportation, 
unlawful detention, killings related to detention facilities, cruel or inhumane treatment in 
detention facilities, inhumane living conditions in detention facilities, forced labour at front 
lines, use of human shields, appropriation or plunder of property, and destruction of private 
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property, cultural monuments, and sacred sites. The Chamber, in part 5 of this judgement, 
has found that the full range of these crimes was committed against Muslims and Croats in 
the indictment municipalities, although the use of human shields has been incorporated 
under the heading of killing (murder). 
1096. The question arises whether one or more of these crimes was not part of the 
common objective of the JCE (JCE form 1) but rather was a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of the implementation of the JCE’s common objective (JCE form 3) or fell 
outside the JCE altogether. In relation to the crime of persecution, the same question arises 
for a second time: were any of the underlying acts not part of the common objective but 
rather the natural and foreseeable consequences of that objective? 
1097. The Chamber finds that the crimes of deportation and forced transfer (as charged 
under counts 7 and 8 of the indictment and as incorporated in the charge of persecution in 
count 3) were necessary means of implementing the common objective of removal by 
force of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from large areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The Chamber will refer to these crimes as “original” crimes. These were the crimes which 
constituted the JCE’s common objective as of late March 1992, when the Accused called 
for “implementing what we have agreed upon, the ethnic division on the ground”. Witness 
583 reported “ethnic cleansing” to the Bosnian-Serb leadership in July 1992, when around 
9,000 Muslims and Croats were forced to cross into Croatia. The Main Staff was informed 
by the 1st Krajina Corps in December 1992 of a convoy of buses transporting 1,008 
detainees from Manjača camp to Croatia. At around the same time, the 1st Krajina Corps 
informed the Main Staff of another 1,001 detainees from Manjača being moved out of the 
Bosnian-Serb Republic. The Bosnian-Serb authorities tried to misinform the world about 
the forced-transfer crimes, such as when they denied in a press release that there had been 
“ethnic cleansing” in Grbavica, claiming that it was a case of some groups acting 
arbitrarily. In October 1992 Biljana Plavšić again denied that there had been ethnic 
cleansing in Grbavica, stating euphemistically that “The truth is that Muslims have been 
able freely to leave the suburb, accompanied and protected” by the VRS. 
1098. These are just some examples of the knowledge the Bosnian-Serb leadership had on 
crimes of forcible displacement. Whether other crimes were “original” to the common 
objective or were added later is of course a matter of evidence, not logical analysis. The 
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Chamber’s preference is for a strictly empirical approach which does not speculate about 
the crime-profile of the original JCE objective, but conceptualizes the common objective 
as fluid in its criminal means. An expansion of the criminal means of the objective is 
proven when leading members of the JCE are informed of new types of crime committed 
pursuant to the implementation of the common objective, take no effective measures to 
prevent recurrence of such crimes, and persist in the implementation of the common 
objective of the JCE. Where this holds, JCE members are shown to have accepted the 
expansion of means, since implementation of the common objective can no longer be 
understood to be limited to commission of the original crimes. With acceptance of the 
actual commission of new types of crime and continued contribution to the objective, 
comes intent, meaning that subsequent commission of such crimes by the JCE will give 
rise to liability under JCE form 1. 
1099. Notwithstanding the above, even before the Bosnian-Serb take-overs began in April 
1992, the Accused and Radovan Karadžić were aware that an armed conflict between the 
ethnic groups would have devastating consequences. On 15 October 1991, speaking before 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, Radovan Karadžić said: “This is the road that you want 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to take, the same highway of hell and suffering that Slovenia and 
Croatia went through. Don’t think you won’t take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell and 
Muslim people in possible extinction.”TPF2218FPT Three days earlier, he had said in a telephone 
conversation with Gojko Đogo that the Bosnian Serbs would fight against secession from 
Yugoslavia, that “Sarajevo will be a black cauldron where 300,000 Muslims will die”, and 
that “they’d be up to their necks in blood and that the Muslim people would disappear”.TPF2219FPT 
Other evidence confirms that the Accused knew where the events he had helped set in train 
were heading. Witness 623, of Serb ethnicity, was in 1992 a senior member of the 
government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He stated that the leading figures of the SDS, 
including the Accused, had created a policy of ethnic cleansing in full awareness that it 
entailed the use of force.TPF2220FPT In April or May 1992 he attended a meeting with the Accused 
in Sarajevo.TPF2221FPT He expressed his view to the Accused that any ethnic separation for the 
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purpose of creating an entity under Serb rule could not be achieved without the violent 
displacement of civilians, causing bloodshed among them.TPF2222FPT 
1100. If unlawful detention of civilians was not an original crime of the common 
objective of the JCE of which the Accused was a member, it very soon joined the intended 
crimes of deportation and forced transfer. As mentioned above, the Bosnian-Serb take-over 
of Bijeljina in early April 1992 immediately caused a large population of displaced persons 
to seek refuge at the JNA barracks in town. Biljana Plavšić, who had invited Arkan to 
Bijeljina, saw around 3,000 displaced persons when she visited the barracks. After that first 
Bosnian-Serb take-over operation, displaced persons were herded into public buildings and 
other structures that served as detention centres. Miroslav Deronjić sent hundreds of 
detained Muslim civilians under escort to Pale after the take-over of Bratunac municipality 
in May 1992. This fact was known to the Accused at the time. The acts of Rajko Kušić, 
who told Muslim detainees at the Veljko Vlahović school in Rogatica that he was having 
to report to the leadership in Pale on why he was running late with ethnically cleansing his 
municipality further illustrate this point. Kušić mentioned decisions made in Pale, on the 
number of Muslims who could remain in Rogatica.TPF2223FPT 
1101. Similarly, if cruel or inhumane treatment of detainees were not original crimes of 
the common objective, they too came to be added to the crimes of deportation and forced 
transfer. Stanišić knew about the illegal and widespread detention of Muslim and Croatian 
civilians and their inhumane treatment, and reported the situation to Radovan Karadžić and 
Prime Minister Đerić in July 1992: “The Army, crisis staffs and war presidencies have 
requested that the Army round up or capture as many Muslim civilians as possible, and 
they leave such undefined camps to internal affairs organs. The conditions in some of these 
camps are poor: there is no food, individuals sometimes do not observe international 
norms, etc.” – the last being a euphemism for the mistreatment of detainees. 
1102. In June 1992, Biljana Plavšić entered a room where Witness 239 was being 
questioned and beaten by Serb soldiers. She told the soldiers to take away the witness and 
two other detainees, who showed visible signs of having been beaten, because she was 
trying to have breakfast in the room next door. Milanović told the Bosnian-Serb Assembly 
in July 1992 that “We have a huge problem with captured people of other nationalities, we 
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have hundreds and thousands of these prisoners.” He acknowledged that “boozing” and 
“totally plastered” Serb soldiers, paramilitaries, and private armies roamed Banja Luka 
engaging in criminal activities which went unpunished. 
1103. The ICRC reported mistreatment directly to the Bosnian-Serb leadership. The 
ICRC’s July 1992 report stated that “detainees had been subjected to ill treatment during 
the visit. All eight delegates present in camp observed on detainees frequent and 
widespread traces of recent and often severe beatings ... Basic conditions of poor nutrition 
and hygiene, along with ill treatment, were assessed by delegates to be the biggest health 
problems.” The Bosnian-Serb leadership did not give up their programme of expulsion . 
1104. Killings in detention were also known to the Bosnian-Serb leadership and became a 
crime of the common objective. The records of the 1st Krajina Corps military prosecutor’s 
office identify only two or three incidents in which the killing of non-Serb civilians in the 
custody of Bosnian Serbs was followed up through the military judicial process; even then, 
no trial was recorded. A combat report from the 1st Krajina Corps to the VRS Main Staff 
from November 1992, which would have put General Mladić and other members of the 
Bosnian-Serb leadership on notice, describes a “massacre” of about 200 Muslims prisoners 
of war in the village of Večići in Kotor Varoš municipality. 
1105. Sexual violence was committed against persons in and out of detention and reported 
to the Bosnian-Serb leadership. In late July 1992 the Bijeljina CSB reported to Radovan 
Karadžić that Mauzer’s men, together with some members of the local MUP, “terrorized” 
Muslim residents of Bijeljina through crimes including rapes. Around June 1992, three 
women, two Muslim and one of mixed ethnicity, were raped during house searches by an 
armed man named Batko. Biljana Plavšić stated that she was informed by people living in 
Grbavica that Batko and an armed group associated with him were committing crimes 
against non-Serbs. When she returned to Pale she had a meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 
the Accused, Nikola Koljević, Mićo Stanišić, and Momčilo Mandić regarding what she had 
heard. In September 1992 the intelligence service of the Eastern Bosnia Corps Command 
reported to the VRS Main Staff that as of 30 April 1992, Brčko had been flooded by 
“patriotic elements” which were responsible for robberies, rapes, and murders, including 
murders at Luka camp, and that some of the bodies of those killed had been buried in pits 
and covered with material from demolished mosques. 
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1106. In August 1992, the Vogošća war commission sought approval from the Ministry of 
Justice to engage detainees at Planjo’s house in Semizovac in construction and other 
works. Minister of Justice Mandić, approved the request. A man introducing himself as the 
Minister of Justice visited detainees at Planjo’s house. He knew that they had been 
transferred there to perform labour assignments. They were in fact forced by Serb forces to 
perform labour at front lines. 
1107. Inhumane living conditions and cruel or inhumane treatment at detention centres 
were issues that the Bosnian-Serb leadership actively tried to cover up. In August 1992 
Karadžić said in a television interview that “We have excellent conditions in all prisons, or 
in almost all prisons ... the fact is that we do not have camps for civilians”. 
1108. If murder of civilians during attacks on towns and villages had not been intended 
from the outset by the members of the JCE, it was soon incorporated as an intended crime. 
Biljana Plavšić knew that civilians had been killed during the attack on Bijeljina in early 
April 1992. Her reaction was to say that Arkan had done a good job in saving the Serb 
population from the Muslim threat. The Bosnian-Serb leadership very soon came not only 
to accept killings in connection with attacks as part of the JCE, but also to encourage them. 
The indiscriminate bombardment of Sarajevo is a case in point. In June 1992, the Bosnian-
Serb leadership, in a meeting with Mladić, did not oppose Mladić’s decision to attack 
Sarajevo with artillery. The attack was massive and indiscriminate. 
1109. Extermination of Muslims, such as the incident at Korićanske Stijene in August 
1992, was also reported to the Bosnian-Serb leadership. Its reaction to this particular event 
was to try to cover it up. 
1110. The Serb attacks on Muslim and Croat enclaves were associated with cruel or 
inhumane treatment, and this was known to the Bosnian-Serb leadership. In April 1992, 
Witness 583 reported to Karadžić about the terror inflicted on the Muslim population of 
Zvornik. Karadžić answered that such crimes, committed by paramilitary units, were 
inevitable. In May 1992 Momčilo Mandić said in a telephone conversation that “we are 
holding Turks under siege [in Sarajevo]. We’ll starve them a bit.” Physical and 
psychological abuse of the citizens of Sarajevo through indiscriminate bombardment of the 
city was a prominent aspect of the Bosnian-Serb aggression. 
1111. As to plunder and appropriation of property, the Chamber mentioned Davidović’s 
evidence that Mićo Stanišić spoke of an agreement that Arkan’s forces could do as they 
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wished with any property in the “liberated” territories. During Davidović’s visits to 
Bijeljina in the course of 1992 he observed widespread looting in the municipality. The 
abandoned and looted homes of Muslims were sold to Serb refugees. In July 1992, the 
Doboj CSB reported to the MUP Minister that Serbs were committing crimes, mainly 
looting of property, in areas of the municipality recently “liberated” by the army; the 
systematic looting was committed by soldiers and reserve police officers. Mandić testified 
that he often met with Stanišić to discuss the problem of theft and destruction of property. 
It was also discussed at Government sessions. 
1112. When Witness 583 reported “ethnic cleansing” to the Bosnian-Serb leadership in 
July 1992, Karadžić, Koljević, and Plavšić responded that it was a cruel war in which 
everybody was committing crimes. They insisted that the Muslims did not wish to remain 
in the territories, citing as proof that the Muslims had signed voluntary departure 
declarations and had exchanged their properties. A letter sent by Radovan Karadžić in July 
1992 to several municipalities requested an inventory of “all housing facilities ... that are 
vacant following the voluntary departure of Muslims”. The housing stock was to be used to 
accommodate Serbs leaving the Muslim part of Sarajevo. 
1113. Appropriation of property, as a crime, if not intended originally, had become a 
means of forcible ethnic recomposition. 
1114. The same is true of destruction of cultural monuments and sacred sites, which was 
systematic and was reported to the Bosnian-Serb leadership; they, in any case, could see 
the results of the destruction for themselves when they traveled through the Bosnian-Serb 
territories. Krstić reported to the VRS Main Staff, and therefore to Mladić, in September 
1992 that “During the day the village of Novoseoci was cleansed”. Krstić’s unit blew up all 
the mosques in Sokolac municipality, including the mosque in Novoseoci. 
1115. At the Assembly session of 25 July 1992, the Accused asserted that the take-over of 
territories to date had been insufficient. Despite all that he knew by that time about the 
range of crimes being committed in pursuit of the common objective, he wanted the 
programme of expulsion to continue unabated. Moreover, he never expressed regret about 
the crimes committed by the Bosnian-Serb authorities in 1992. At no time did he desist. At 
the Geneva peace negotiations from 1992 to 1994, the Accused and Karadžić insisted 
throughout on having an ethnically pure Serb area in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a 
precondition for a peaceful settlement. 
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1116. In January 1993, unrepentant, the Accused questioned the very existence of a 
Muslim identity: “the Muslims are a communist creation and that they are a religious group 
of Turkish orientation”, he said. In August 1994 he publicly announced that “We simply 
want to separate because we cannot live together”. This echoed Karadžić statement of July 
1994, that the Bosnian Serbs had to “get rid of the enemy in our house, meaning the Croats 
and Muslims”. In November 1994, the Accused called for the ethnic cleansing of Sarajevo: 
“The Muslims will have to look for a capital outside of Sarajevo, somewhere else. That is 
the natural course of things. This town will belong to the Republika Srpska in its totality.” 
This implies that he would have had the same range of crimes, which he knew to be 
associated with ethnic cleansing, repeated against Muslim and Croat citizens of Sarajevo. 
1117. In summary, in the months following March 1992, reports about crimes detailed in 
parts 4 and 5 of this judgement reached the Bosnian-Serb political leadership, including the 
Accused. The leadership did not discontinue its discriminatory forced displacement 
programme in light of the increasing number and range of crimes being reported, but rather 
persisted with its territorial conquests and demographic recompositions. 
1118. The Chamber finds that, whereas in the early stages of the Bosnian-Serb campaign 
the common objective of the JCE was discriminatory deportation and forced transfer, soon 
thereafter it became clear to the members of the JCE, including the Accused, that the 
implementation of the common objective involved, as a matter of fact, the commission of 
an expanded set of crimes. These crimes came to redefine the criminal means of the JCE’s 
common objective during the course of the indictment period. In accordance with the 
reasoning set out earlier in this section, acceptance of this greater range of criminal means, 
coupled with persistence in implementation, signalled an intention to pursue the common 
objective through those new means. As this is an evidentiary matter, the Chamber’s 
conclusion does not exclude the possibility that the “original” crimes of the common 
objective were not limited to deportation and forced transfer. To speak of an increase in 
criminal means is only to say that the evidence confirms that at the given point in time 
indicated by the evidence the accepted means were what they were. 
1119. The Accused held a central position in the JCE. He not only participated in the 
implementation of the common objective but was one of the driving forces behind it. The 
Accused knew about, and intended, the mass detention and expulsion of civilians, he had 
the power to intervene, and his evasiveness in the witness box confirmed to the Chamber 
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that he was not interested and did not care about the predicament of detained and expelled 
persons. He wanted the Muslims and Croats moved out of the Bosnian-Serb territories in 
large numbers, and if suffering, death, and destruction were necessary to achieve Serb 
domination and a viable statehood, he accepted that many Muslims and Croats of all ages 
would pay a heavy price. He therefore had the mens rea required for the commission of the 
crimes which the Chamber, in part 5 of this judgement, has found were committed. 
 
6.17.3 Contribution 
1120. Paragraph 8 of the indictment alleges the Accused’s contributions to the JCE: 
“Momčilo Krajišnik ... acting individually, and through the associations, positions and 
memberships enumerated in paragraphs 12 and 13 below, and in concert with other 
members of the joint criminal enterprise, participated in the joint criminal enterprise in the 
following ways: ...”, following which eleven paragraphs particularize the alleged 
contributions. In the Chamber’s view, the Accused’s overall contribution to the JCE was to 
help establish and perpetuate the SDS party and state structures that were instrumental to 
the commission of the crimes. He also deployed his political skills both locally and 
internationally to facilitate the implementation of the JCE’s common objective through the 
crimes envisaged by that objective. 
1121. The Chamber will now state its findings on each of the alleged contributions on the 
basis of evidence discussed above. For the sake of clarity, evidence is used to illustrate the 
findings where necessary. 
(a) Formulating, initiating, promoting, participating in, and/or encouraging the development 
and implementation of SDS and Bosnian Serb governmental policies intended to advance the 
objective of the joint criminal enterprise; 
The above allegation has been proven. 
(b) Participating in the establishment, support or maintenance of SDS and Bosnian Serb 
government bodies at the Republic, regional, municipal, and local levels, including Crisis 
Staffs, War Presidencies, War Commissions (“Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental 
Organs”) and the VRS, TO, and the MUP (“Bosnian Serb Forces”) through which [he] could 
implement the objective of the joint criminal enterprise; 
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The above allegation has been proven, except in relation to the establishment of the SDS 
party and the establishment of the TO. 
(c) Supporting, encouraging, facilitating or participating in the dissemination of information 
to Bosnian Serbs that they were in jeopardy of oppression at the hands of Bosnian Muslims 
and Bosnian Croats, that territories on which Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats resided 
were Bosnian Serb land, or that was otherwise intended to engender in Bosnian Serbs fear 
and hatred of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats or to otherwise win support for and 
participation in achieving the objective of the joint criminal enterprise; 
The above allegation has been proven. 
(d) Directing, instigating, encouraging and authorizing the Bosnian Serb Political and 
Governmental Organs and the Bosnian Serb Forces to carry out acts in order to further the 
objective of the joint criminal enterprise; 
The above allegation has been proven. In his speech before the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on 
18 March 1992 the Accused called for the “ethnic division on the ground”, thus instigating, 
encouraging, and authorizing the implementation of the common objective. Some other 
examples may be considered. On 24 March 1992, the Accused instructed the new 
Government to prepare a plan for “assuming power and rendering operational the 
authorities” in the territory of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. It was under the Accused’s 
direction that the Assembly, on 27 March 1992, set up the Bosnian-Serb MUP, and then 
proceeded to approve the proclamations of “Newly Established Serbian Municipalities”. 
On 21 April 1992, the Accused made three telephone calls to Vraca to inquire about a front 
line situation involving Šešelj’s men. During one of those conversations he spoke to 
Milenko Karišik, commander of a MUP special unit, and explained to him that the JNA 
could not get involved “because then we would have real problems”. The Accused then 
instructed Karišik to make contact with the JNA so that leadership would know “how 
they’re doing”. In his capacity as an SNB member, the Accused supported the conclusions 
of a joint session of the SNB and the Government on 22 April 1992 that the Bosnian-Serb 
Republic should “maintain the positions that had been taken, especially in Sarajevo”, 
referring, of course, to military gains achieved by the armed forces in the area. At the 12 
May 1992 Assembly session which saw the establishment of the VRS, the Accused openly 
advocated violence against Muslims and Croats, saying “it will be possible to solve this 
thing with Muslims and Croats only by war.” On 17 May 1992, the Accused, together with 
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Karadžić and Mladić, attended a meeting in Sokolac with representatives of Romanija 
SAO and the municipalities of Olovo and Rogatica. There the Accused said that the time 
had come for ethnically separate areas because a common state was no longer possible. At 
the Assembly session of 25 July 1992, the Accused asserted that the take-over of territories 
to date had been insufficient and then proceeded to sketch the desired borders, establishing 
parameters for further military action. Around 10 June 1992, the Accused attended a 
meeting with the other members of the Presidency in which General Mladić announced his 
intention to shell Sarajevo. The Accused expressed no opposition to this proposal, which 
was implemented shortly thereafter. 
(e) Exercising effective control over the Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs 
and Bosnian Serb Forces which participated in or facilitated the commission of crimes 
identified in this indictment; 
In relation to (e), “effective control” is a technical term which must be proven in 
connection with certain modes of liability. It is not a required element of JCE liability. For 
effective control, proof is required of a material ability on the part of a “superior” to 
directly or indirectly prevent, punish, or take measures resulting in disciplinary or criminal 
proceedings against the principal perpetrators of the crimes.TPF2224FPT While evidence in the 
present case demonstrates that the Accused had power and influence over those bodies 
which the indictment refers to as the Bosnian-Serb political and governmental organs and 
Bosnian-Serb forces, it does not demonstrate that he himself had effective control over 
those bodies. The above allegation therefore has not been proven. 
(f) Encouraging, assisting or participating in the acquisition of arms or in the distribution of 
them to Bosnian Serbs to further the objective of the joint criminal enterprise; 
In relation to (f), the Accused knew about and accepted the fact that the Bosnian-Serb 
population was being armed through the SDS, among other methods. But the evidence 
does not prove that he encouraged, assisted, or participated in the acquisition and 
distribution of arms. Therefore the allegation has not been proven. 
(g) Requesting the assistance of or facilitating or co-ordinating the participation of JNA/VJ 
forces and/or Serbian paramilitary units and Bosnian Serb paramilitary and volunteer units to 
further the objective of the joint criminal enterprise; 
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The above allegation has not been proven. 
(h) Directing or encouraging [his] subordinates in the Bosnian Serb Political and 
Governmental Organs and in the Bosnian Serb Forces to direct, assist or request assistance 
from JNA/VJ forces, Serbian paramilitary units and Bosnian Serb paramilitary and volunteer 
units in the commission of acts to further the objective of the joint criminal enterprise; 
The above allegation has not been proven, as the evidence does not establish that there was 
a “superior-subordinate” relationship between the Accused himself and the Bosnian-Serb 
political and governmental organs and Bosnian-Serb forces. The proven relationship 
between the Accused and those organs and forces is dealt with under paragraph (d), above. 
(i) Directing, supporting or encouraging the incorporation into the Bosnian Serb Forces [of] 
members of paramilitary forces and volunteer forces known to have participated or suspected 
of having participated in crimes; 
The above allegation has not been proven, insofar as it is limited to the “incorporation” of 
paramilitary forces. The Accused’s association with, and support for, paramilitary activity 
is another matter, which has been discussed above. 
(j) Aiding or abetting or instigating the commission of further crimes by failing to 
investigate, to follow up on investigations, and to punish subordinates in the Bosnian Serb 
Forces for crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats or other non-Serbs 
throughout the period described in this indictment; or 
The above allegation has been proven in relation to failure to investigate and failure to 
follow up on investigations. It has not been proven in relation to failure to punish 
subordinates, since it has not been shown that the Accused personally had such a power. 
(k) Engaging in, supporting or facilitating efforts directed at representatives of the 
international community, non-governmental organizations and the public denying or 
providing misleading information about crimes against Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats or 
other non-Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina and about the role that Bosnian Serb Forces had 
played in those crimes. 
The above allegation has been proven. 
 
6.17.4 Activation of the criminal enterprise 
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1122. Having found that there existed a JCE which included the Accused, it remains to 
determine the starting point of the crimes committed through the JCE. 
1123. The Prosecution was asked to specify the first crime which the Accused committed 
as part of the JCE alleged in the indictment: 
The first charged crime committed pursuant to the JCE is scheduled incident 1.1 in schedule 
A, which is the killing of at least 48 Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat men, women and 
children in the town of Bijeljina on the 1st or 2nd of April. ... As pleaded in our indictment, 
the objective of the joint criminal enterprise was the permanent removal by force or other 
means of Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, or other non-Serb inhabitants from large areas of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina through the commission of crimes punishable under the Statute of 
the Tribunal. It was a vast criminal enterprise, and, like any vast criminal enterprise, its 
membership was not static. The members of the JCE participated in different ways, in 
different geographical areas, with the shared intent to secure the objective of forcibly 
removing non-Serbs from the targeted territory across great parts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. At the end of March 1992, and at the time of the first crimes charged in the 
indictment, the joint criminal enterprise already included a great number of individuals, 
including Krajišnik, Karadžić, Koljević, Plavšić, Arkan, Milošević, Mauzer, Mićo Stanišić, 
Mandić, Brđanin, and Kukanjac. It also included those Serb Crisis Staffs which had been 
established, members of the RS MUP, the Serb TO, and paramilitary groups and JNA 
personnel. Your Honours may ask why Mladić is not in that list. Mladić and other VRS staff 
became part of the joint criminal enterprise on the 12th of May, 1992, on the establishment 
of the VRS. TPF2225FPT 
1124. The Chamber accepts this analysis and finds that the Accused’s criminal 
responsibility arises with the attack and crimes committed in Bijeljina municipality in the 
beginning of April 1992. 
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6.18 Findings on the charges 
1125. The Chamber finds Momčilo Krajišnik NOT GUILTY of the following charges in 
the indictment: 
Count 1: genocide; 
Count 2: complicity in genocide; 
Count 6: murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war. 
1126. The Chamber finds Momčilo Krajišnik GUILTY of the following charges in the 
indictment pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute: 
Count 3: persecution as a crime against humanity; 
Count 4: extermination as a crime against humanity; 
Count 5: murder as a crime against humanity; 
Count 7: deportation as a crime against humanity; 
Count 8: inhumane acts (forced transfer) as a crime against humanity. 
 
6.19 Restrictions on cumulative convictions 
1127. The Accused has been found criminally responsible pursuant to Article 7(1) of the 
Statute for the offences charged under count 3: persecution on political, racial and religious 
grounds, a crime against humanity; count 4: extermination, a crime against humanity; 
count 5: murder, a crime against humanity; count 7: deportation, a crime against humanity; 
and count 8: inhumane acts (forced transfer), a crime against humanity. 
1128. Cumulative convictions entered under different statutory provisions but based on 
the same conduct are permissible only if each statutory provision in question has a 
materially distinct element not contained in the others. An element is materially distinct 
from another if it requires proof of a fact not required by the other. When this test is not 
met, the Chamber must enter a conviction on the more specific provision only.TPF2226FPT 
1129. The Chamber has found Momčilo Krajišnik responsible for persecution, 
extermination, murder, deportation, and other inhumane acts (forced transfer) as crimes 
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against humanity. The acts underlying the findings of persecution as a crime against 
humanity include the acts underlying the findings of murder, extermination, deportation, 
and other inhumane acts (forced transfer). 
1130. Persecution as a crime against humanity has a materially distinct element from 
murder as a crime against humanity in that persecution requires proof that an act or 
omission discriminates in fact, and proof that the act or omission was committed with 
specific intent to discriminate. Conversely, murder as a crime against humanity requires 
proof that the accused caused the victim’s death, which is not an element required for proof 
of persecution. As a result, a cumulative conviction for persecution and murder under 
Article 5 of the Statute is permissible. The same reasoning applies to extermination, 
deportation, and forced transfer as an inhumane act. 
1131. The Accused has been found responsible for both deportation and other inhumane 
acts (forced transfer). There is no cumulation in this case, because the underlying acts are 
different. Where it was not known to the Chamber that the forced displacement of persons 
met all the elements of the crime of deportation, the Chamber has made a finding of forced 
transfer. The findings are thus supplementary and do not overlap. 
 407 
7. Sentencing law and facts 
 
7.1 Applicable law 
1132. The provisions of the Tribunal’s Statute and Rules which relate to sentencing are set 
forth below: 
Article 24 of the Statute 
Penalties 
1. The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In 
determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the 
general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia. 
2. In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers should take into account such factors as the 
gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.  
3. In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any property and 
proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their rightful 
owners. 
Rule 101 
Penalties 
(A) A convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up to and including the 
remainder of the convicted person’s life. 
(B) In determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall take into account the factors 
mentioned in Article 24, paragraph 2, of the Statute, as well as such factors as: 
(i) any aggravating circumstances; 
(ii) any mitigating circumstances including the substantial cooperation with the 
Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after conviction; 
(iii) the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former 
Yugoslavia; 
(iv) the extent to which any penalty imposed by a court of any State on the convicted 
person for the same act has already been served, as referred to in Article 10, paragraph 3, 
of the Statute.  
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(C) Credit shall be given to the convicted person for the period, if any, during which the 
convicted person was detained in custody pending surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial 
or appeal. 
1133. When imposing a sentence, the Appeals Chamber has stated that the following 
factors must be considered: (i) the gravity of the offences or the totality of the conduct; (ii) 
individual circumstances of the convicted person, including aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances; (iii) the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the 
former Yugoslavia; (iv) the credit to be given for time spent in detention pending the 
Chamber’s judgement; and (v) the extent to which any penalty imposed by a court of any 
State on the convicted person for the same act has already been served.TPF2227FPT The last item is 
not applicable in this case. 
 
7.2 Purposes of sentencing 
1134. The case law of the Tribunal indicates three primary purposes of sentencing, 
namely retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. TPF2228FPT  
1135. As a form of retribution, punishment expresses society’s condemnation of the 
criminal act and of the person who committed it.TPF2229FPT To fulfil the objective of retribution, 
the Chamber must therefore impose a punishment which properly reflects the personal 
culpability of the wrongdoer. 
1136. Both special and general deterrence are important purposes of sentencing in 
criminal law. The rationale of special deterrence is to dissuade the wrongdoer of recidivism 
in the future, whereas general deterrence aims at discouraging others from committing 
similar kinds of crime.TPF2230FPT The chance that Momčilo Krajišnik will commit similar kinds of 
crime in the future is very low, which considerably reduces the relevance of special 
deterrence. Therefore, the Chamber does not expect punishment in this case to have an 
important special deterrent effect. 
1137. As far as general deterrence is concerned, persons who believe themselves to be 
beyond the reach of international criminal law must be warned that they have to abide by 
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the fundamental norms of substantive criminal law or face prosecution and sanctions.TPF2231FPT 
Nonetheless, it would be unfair, and would ultimately weaken respect for the legal order as 
a whole, to increase the punishment imposed on one person merely for the purpose of 
deterring others.TPF2232FPT The Chamber is confident that an appropriate sentence for the 
Accused in his case will have general deterrent effect. 
1138. Rehabilitation is also considered to be a relevant, though less important, factor in 
the determination of the appropriate sentence.TPF2233FPT 
 
7.3 Sentencing factors 
7.3.1 Introduction 
1139. The starting point for consideration of an appropriate sentence is the gravity of the 
crimes committed by the convicted person.TPF2234FPT Whereas Article 24(2) of the Statute obliges 
the Chamber, when imposing a sentence, to take into account the gravity of the offence and 
the individual circumstances of the convicted person, Rule 101 of the Rules specifically 
mentions aggravating and mitigating circumstances. However, since Article 24 of the 
Statute does not set minimum or maximum terms of imprisonment for the crimes falling 
under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, aggravating and mitigating circumstances do not play the 
role they usually play in domestic legal systems, which is to allow a court to go above or 
below the range set by the law as the “standard” sentence for a specific crime. Seeking to 
analyse the gravity of the crimes and any aggravating circumstances separately would be 
an artificial exercise.TPF2235FPT 
1140. For the above reasons, the Chamber will examine the crimes of which Momčilo 
Krajišnik has been convicted to assess their inherent gravity, together with any factors 
which may increase or decrease the relative seriousness of his conduct. By taking this 
approach, the Chamber also avoids the risk of double-counting any specific factor. TPF2236FPT 
Parts 4, 5, and 6 of this judgement, which dealt in turn with the events in the indictment 
municipalities, with the elements of the crimes committed, and with Momčilo Krajišnik’s 
responsibility, will serve as a reference. Only factors which have been proven beyond 
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reasonable doubt may be used to increase the seriousness of a crime and the penalty 
imposed.TPF2237FPT The Chamber will assess the seriousness of Momčilo Krajišnik’s overall 
criminal conduct in part 7.3.2. 
1141. The Chamber will also make findings, on the balance of probabilities,TPF2238FPT on factors 
that might mitigate the sentence to be imposed on Momčilo Krajišnik. The weight to be 
given to mitigating factors lies within the discretion of the Chamber.TPF2239FPT These factors 
include those not directly related to the offence.TPF2240FPT They do not detract from the 
seriousness of the crime nor diminish responsibility.TPF2241FPT The Chamber will assess factors to 
be considered in mitigation in part 7.3.3. 
 
7.3.2 Gravity of overall criminal conduct 
1142. Seriousness of the crimes committed. The Chamber has found that the Bosnian-Serb 
leadership, including Momčilo Krajišnik, wanted to ethnically recompose the territories 
under its control by expelling and thereby drastically reducing the proportion of Bosnian 
Muslims and Bosnian Croats living there. The Chamber also found that this objective was 
pursued through the commission of crimes, all of which were very serious.  
1143. Momčilo Krajišnik has been found responsible of the killing, through murder or 
extermination, of approximately 3,000 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Murder and 
extermination are very serious crimes as they entail the taking of other persons’ lives. 
1144. With respect to deportation and forced transfer, Momčilo Krajišnik has been found 
responsible of participating in the forcible removal of more than one hundred thousand 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats from a large area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These crimes are 
serious in view of the fact that people are illegally moved against their will or without a 
genuine choice from the area in which they are lawfully present. Forcible removal in this 
case was part of the campaign of persecution, which began, at least in certain 
municipalities, with non-Serbs being fired from their jobs and being, in general, 
discriminated against. This process culminated in many tens of thousands of people being 
excluded from the economic and social life of their communities. 
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1145. Persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds consists of a deliberate 
intention to discriminate against a particular group of people in the context of a widespread 
and systematic attack on a civilian population. The acts underlying persecution in this case 
include: killings; cruel and inhumane treatment, physical or psychological abuse, and 
sexual violence; unlawful detention; forced transfer and deportation; forced labour; 
intentional or wanton destruction of property; and plunder. The Chamber finds that these 
acts, considered in combination, and examined in their context as described in part 4 of this 
judgement, are of extreme seriousness. 
1146. There is no need to retell here the countless stories of brutality, violence, and 
depravation that were brought to the Chamber’s attention. But hidden amidst the cold 
statistics on the number of people killed and forced away from their homes, lies a 
multitude of individual stories of suffering and ordeal – psychological violence, mutilation, 
outrages upon personal dignity, rape, suffering for loved ones, despair, death. A sentence, 
however harsh, will never be able to rectify the wrongs, and will be able to soothe only to a 
limited extent the suffering of the victims, their feelings of deprivation, anguish, and 
hopelessness.  
1147. Victims. The Prosecution submitted that consideration for the victims of the crimes 
plays a major role in determining the sentence. The Prosecution emphasized that, in 
assessing the impact on victims in a case such as this one, each victim should be 
considered. According to the Prosecution, the victims in this case were vulnerable, the vast 
majority were non-Serb civilians, of all ages, violently uprooted from their homes and 
settlements, abused, put in camps, or cast out into the unknown with little or no means of 
survival at their disposal. TPF2242FPT The Defence did not add anything to these submissions. TPF2243FPT 
1148. When determining the relative seriousness of the crimes, the Chamber must 
consider the number of people killed, the physical and mental trauma suffered and still felt 
by those who survived, and the consequences of the crimes for those close to the 
victims.TPF2244FPT The Chamber may also consider the economic and social consequences 
suffered by the targeted groups, including the consequences of destruction of the property 
of its members and their cultural and religious monuments. TPF2245FPT 
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1149. The Chamber may also take into account the special vulnerability of some victims, 
such as children, the elderly, the disabled or wounded, and those held in confinement. TPF2246FPT 
1150. The Chamber finds that the number of victims, their vulnerability, and the social 
and economic consequences for the region stemming from the crimes, assist in the overall 
assessment of the gravity of Momčilo Krajišnik’s conduct. The Chamber adds that not only 
the targeted groups, but also others who did not participate in achieving the JCE objectives, 
including Serbs, suffered because of the crimes committed. Killings detailed in part 4 of 
this judgement were often overly brutal, showing unjustified hatred or appalling lack of 
concern. In detention centres, women and men, young and elderly, were held in cramped 
and poor hygienic conditions, at the mercy of their captors. While being held in inhumane 
living conditions, victims were beaten, raped, and subjected to psychological and physical 
abuse. More than one hundred thousand Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were forced 
to leave their homes. Many of them were forced to relinquish their property to Bosnian-
Serb authorities, and were separated from their families. Their houses and places of 
worship were destroyed on a massive scale, their property abandoned to plunder. 
1151. Immense suffering was inflicted upon the victims in this case, and the consequences 
that the crimes have had on the entire Muslim and Croat community in Bosnia-
Herzegovina have been profound. The consequences of the crimes of which Momčilo 
Krajišnik has been found guilty as a co-perpetrator in a JCE will persist in Bosnia-
Herzegovina for decades, affecting hundreds of thousands of people. The Chamber finds 
these aspects to be of outmost importance when considering an appropriate sentence. 
1152. Scope of the criminal conduct. The Prosecution submitted that the long period of 
time over which of the crimes were committed, from the end of March 1992 until 
December 1992, should be considered in aggravation of the sentence.TPF2247FPT The Defence did 
not add anything to this submission. TPF2248FPT 
1153. In determining the relative seriousness of the crimes, the Chamber is entitled to take 
into consideration the geographical scope and the length of time over which the crimes 
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continued.TPF2249FPT In this case, the criminal campaign spanned a long period of time. Crimes 
were committed in all of the 35 indictment municipalities. On the evidence, detention 
centres where Muslim and Croat civilians were unlawfully held existed in 33 of them. 
More than 350 detention centres run by the Bosnian Serbs were operational in 1992. The 
periods of unlawful detention ranged from a few days to many months. In numerous 
detention centres the Bosnian-Muslim and Bosnian-Croat detainess were treated with 
extreme cruelty over a considerable period of time. The Chamber finds that the scope of 
the criminal campaign waged by the JCE, and the range of crimes of which Momčilo 
Krajišnik has been found guilty, increase the relative seriousness of the criminal conduct. 
1154. Momčilo Krajišnik’s role in the commission of the crimes. The Prosecution 
submitted that Momčilo Krajišnik, as an intelligent and educated man, used his positions of 
power to implement a massive campaign of persecution and destruction against the Muslim 
and Croat populations, instead of protecting Muslims and Croats from the perils they were 
exposed to. According to the Prosecution, Momčilo Krajišnik abused his position of 
authority and the trust of the civilian population, and this should affect the sentence.TPF2250FPT 
The Defence did not add anything to these submissions. TPF2251FPT 
1155. When determining the relative seriousness of the crimes, the Chamber must 
consider the level of intent and the level of participation of the convicted person in the 
commission of the crime.TPF2252FPT 
1156. The position of leadership held by a person criminally responsible under Article 
7(1) of the Statute increases the relative seriousness of the crime, if this person abuses or 
wrongfully exercises the power stemming from the person’s position.TPF2253FPT The degree to 
which a leadership position may increase the relative seriousness of crimes depends upon 
the actual level of authority.TPF2254FPT A person who has authority over a large group of people 
has the ability to inflict more damage by means of this group than he or she would be able 
to inflict alone.TPF2255FPT Moreover, he or she may serve as an example for others to act in a 
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similar way and, therefore, his or her criminal behaviour is likely to entail more serious 
effects.TPF2256FPT  
1157. Closely related to the issue of a leadership position is the question of whether the 
convicted person held a public position, or a position of public duty. If a person in such a 
position exploits it in order to commit or facilitate a crime, the relative seriousness of the 
crime is increased by the breach of duty and the legitimate expectations attaching to this 
position.TPF2257FPT The education and professional background of a convicted person have also 
been considered factors increasing the seriousness of crimes.TPF2258FPT 
1158. The Chamber finds that a sentence must reflect the degree and the form of Momčilo 
Krajišnik’s involvement in the commission of the crimes. As described in part 6 of this 
judgement, the evidence in this case shows that his role was crucial. As President of the 
Bosnian-Serb Assembly, member of the SDS Main Board, member of the SNB, and 
member of the Presidency, Momčilo Krajišnik played a vital role in implementing the 
objective to permanently remove Muslims and Croats from parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
His positions gave him the possibility to propagate his views, as well as the authority to 
enable local authorities, military, police, and paramilitary groups to implement the 
objective of the JCE. The fact that Momčilo Krajišnik was not a principal perpetrator of the 
crimes does not make him any less responsible. 
1159. As a political leader, holding several important public positions, Momčilo Krajišnik 
had a duty to tend to the well-being of the entire population. TPF2259FPT The Chamber finds that 
Momčilo Krajišnik used his powers to implement a campaign of persecution against the 
Muslim and Croat populations, instead of protecting them. This factor increases the 
relative seriousness of the crimes committed. The Chamber further finds that Momčilo 
Krajišnik’s influence was very extensive, and that he was a well-respected leader. The 
Chamber finds it appropriate to consider Momčilo Krajišnik’s public positions when 
imposing a sentence. 
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1160. Moreover, Momčilo Krajišnik was one of the top leaders in the Bosnian-Serb 
leadership. He is an intelligent and educated man. In all positions he held, he had a public 
duty to uphold law and order, and persons residing in the relevant territories were entitled 
to expect that a person of his authority would work to prevent or punish crimes committed 
against the population, rather than taking part in their commission. The Chamber finds that 
these facts further increase the gravity of his conduct. 
 
7.3.3 Individual circumstances of Momčilo Krajišnik 
1161. The Prosecution identified as mitigating factors the fact that Momčilo Krajišnik has 
no prior convictions and that he behaved well while in detention. According to the 
Prosecution, given the magnitude and the scale of the crimes in this case, little weight 
should be given to these factors.TPF2260FPT The Defence added that Momčilo Krajišnik is 61 years 
old and that a high sentence would in practice amount to a life sentence.TPF2261FPT  
1162. The convicted person’s lack of prior criminal record,TPF2262FPT good conduct in 
detention,TPF2263FPT age and family situation,TPF2264FPT character,TPF2265FPT and good conduct 
contemporaneous to the crimes,TPF2266FPT may be given consideration in mitigation. The rationale 
for mitigation based on age rests on the fact that physical deterioration associated with 
advanced years makes serving the same sentence harder for an older person. Moreover, an 
older person may have few years left to be lived in freedom, upon release.TPF2267FPT Good 
conduct contemporaneous to the crimes may serve as a mitigating factor when the 
convicted person had taken steps to save lives or alleviate the suffering of the victims.TPF2268FPT 
The Chamber may mitigate a sentence where the convicted person provided selective 
assistance to the victims or persons of the same ethnicity as the victims, even though his or 
her actions had little practical effect.TPF2269FPT The mitigating effect is less, however, where the 
convicted person is shown to have been in a position to take steps to control or prevent all 
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acts of violence. In such case, sporadic benevolent acts or ineffective assistance may be 
disregarded.TPF2270FPT 
1163. Momčilo Krajišnik made some efforts during the indictment period to provide help 
to non-Serb individuals. On some occasions, he assisted in releasing non-Serb individuals 
from detention, either personally or through other persons within the Bosnian-Serb 
leadership.TPF2271FPT He also brought medications to Muslim individuals he knew, or had 
humanitarian aid distributed evenly among the different ethnicities.TPF2272FPT While these acts 
did show some benevolence in respect of Muslims and Croats, they did not impede the 
achievement of the common objective of the JCE. Keeping in mind the magnitude of the 
crimes of which Momčilo Krajišnik is found responsible, the assistance provided by him 
was sporadic. By occupying a central position within the leadership of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Momčilo Krajišnik had the power to provide assistance to the victimized 
population on a larger scale, had he wished to do so. 
1164. Momčilo Krajišnik has no prior convictions and the Chamber has no reason to 
doubt his good conduct during detention at the United Nations Detention Unit. The 
Chamber also finds that his age should be considered when imposing a sentence. The 
Chamber further observes that he has three grown-up children and that he lost his wife in 
August 1992. The Chamber notes the impact that a prison sentence of substantial length 
might have on Momčilo Krajišnik’s life and on the lives of his relatives. 
1165. The Chamber is aware that the indictment against Momčilo Krajišnik was sealed 
until the day of his arrest on 3 April 2000. However, Momčilo Krajišnik was most likely 
aware that charges might be brought against him. He nevertheless did not attempt to 
abscond. This element has a very limited impact in his favour when imposing a sentence.  
1166. Momčilo Krajišnik spent a long period in detention, between his arrest on 3 April 
2000 and 3 February 2004, when his trial started. 
1167. The evidence the Chamber received on the history of the conflict and on the 
growing inter-ethnic tensions preceding it, as well as the awareness that violence was not 
used exclusively by Bosnian Serbs, has led the Chamber to an understanding of the conflict 
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in which Momčilo Krajišnik committed the crimes. The totality of the conduct which the 
Chamber has considered comprises these circumstances, although they are not in the 
foreground. 
1168. While each of the above-mentioned factors, by itself, does not constitute a 
mitigating circumstance, taken together these factors amount to personal circumstances of 
a kind which may be accorded some, although very limited, weight in mitigation. 
1169. The Chamber received conflicting evidence on the personality of the Accused. 
Despite the fact that some witnesses described him as being moderate in his public 
attitudes,TPF2273FPT other witnesses described him as cynical and radical, and as a person who 
often emphasized the impossibility of Serbs and Muslims living together.TPF2274FPT The 
discriminatory attitude displayed by Momčilo Krajišnik during the indictment period was 
analysed in part 6 of this judgement. Additional character evidence was considered by the 
Chamber, but, on the balance, the Chamber has not found it of assistance in determining a 
sentence. 
 
7.3.4 General practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia 
1170. The Chamber is required to consider “the general practice regarding prison 
sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia” in determining the appropriate penalty. 
This does not mean that the Chamber is obliged to conform to that practice.TPF2275FPT The 
Tribunal may impose a sentence in excess of that which would be applicable under the 
relevant law in the former Yugoslavia,TPF2276FPT and the Appeals Chamber has held that this 
sentencing practice does not violate the principle of nulla poena sine lege because a 
defendant would have been aware that the crimes for which he or she is indicted constitute 
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serious violations of international humanitarian law, punishable by the most severe of 
penalties.TPF2277FPT Moreover, the Chamber may diverge from the sentencing practice of the 
former Yugoslavia if this practice is inadequate in light of international law.TPF2278FPT 
1171. Article 24(1) of the Statute and Rule 101(B)(iii) of the Rules refer to actual practice 
in courts of the former Yugoslavia. It is however settled practice within the Tribunal that 
the sources to be consulted pursuant to these provisions are not limited to case law from 
the former Yugoslavia, but also include statutory provisions TPF2279FPT in force in the former 
Yugoslavia at the time of the commission of the crimes in question.TPF2280FPT 
1172. In 1991 and 1992, the sentencing law in Bosnia-Herzegovina was regulated by the 
Criminal Code of the SFRY, adopted by the Federal Assembly on 28 September 1976, and 
in force since 1 July 1977 (SFRY Criminal Code), and by the Criminal Code of the 
Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina of 10 June 1977 (Bosnia-Herzegovina Criminal 
Code). The SFRY Criminal Code regulated the general aspects of criminal law and a few 
specific offences, such as crimes against the security of the SFRY, genocide, and war 
crimes, while the Bosnia-Herzegovina Criminal Code primarily regulated the specific 
offences, and some general matters not addressed in the SFRY Criminal Code. Both 
criminal codes remained in force after Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence in 
1992. 
1173. Momčilo Krajišnik has been found guilty of persecution, extermination, murder, 
deportation, and the inhumane act of forced transfer, all crimes against humanity. Chapter 
16 of the SFRY Criminal Code is entitled “Criminal acts against humanity and 
international law” and covers crimes committed during armed conflict. It does not, 
however, codify crimes against humanity, with their specific actus reus and mens rea 
requirements. The punishment provided for specific crimes which do not require proof of 
these distinguishing elements does not reflect the seriousness of crimes against humanity. 
It is thus not an adequate basis for determining the punishment to be imposed for this 
category of crimes.TPF2281FPT 
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1174. The general provisions of the SFRY Criminal Code regarding punishment provide 
that the maximum term of imprisonment is 15 years,TPF2282FPT but that for the most serious 
crimes the death penalty may be imposed,TPF2283FPT or, instead of the death penalty, a prison 
sentence of 20 years.TPF2284FPT The Appeals Chamber has upheld sentences of more than twenty 
years of imprisonment by Trial Chambers of this Tribunal as not infringing the principle of 
nulla poena sine lege.TPF2285FPT 
1175. The present Chamber takes all of these factors relating to sentencing practices in the 
former Yugoslavia into consideration in making its determination of this case. 
 
7.4 Determination of sentence 
1176. The Appeals Chamber has emphasized that sentencing is a discretionary decision 
and that it is inappropriate to set down a definitive list of sentencing guidelines.TPF2286FPT The 
sentence must always be decided according to the facts of each particular case and the 
individual guilt of the convicted person. TPF2287FPT 
1177. The Chamber has also ensured that Momčilo Krajišnik is not being punished twice 
for the same offence, nor that any adverse element is considered more than once in 
determining an appropriate sentence. 
1178. The Chamber has reviewed the sentencing practice in this Tribunal and has 
considered the range of sentences imposed on persons at all levels of seniority in political 
or military structures, as well as in loose or undefined structures, found responsible for 
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. 
1179. Considering the above, the Chamber finds the appropriate sentence in the present 
case to be a single sentence of twenty-seven (27) years of imprisonment. 
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1180. Momčilo Krajišnik has been detained since his arrest on 3 April 2000. Pursuant to 
Rule 101 (C) of the Rules, he is entitled to credit for the time spent in detention, which as 
of the date of this judgement amounts to 2,369 days. 
 421 
8. Disposition 
 
1181. The Chamber finds Momčilo Krajišnik NOT GUILTY of the following charges in 
the indictment: 
Count 1: genocide; 
Count 2: complicity in genocide; 
Count 6: murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war. 
1182. The Chamber finds Momčilo Krajišnik GUILTY of the following charges in the 
indictment pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute: 
Count 3: persecution as a crime against humanity; 
Count 4: extermination as a crime against humanity; 
Count 5: murder as a crime against humanity; 
Count 7: deportation as a crime against humanity; 
Count 8: inhumane acts (forced transfer) as a crime against humanity. 
1183. The Chamber hereby sentences Momčilo Krajišnik to a single sentence of twenty-
seven (27) years of imprisonment. 
1184. Momčilo Krajišnik has been detained since his arrest on 3 April 2000. Pursuant to 
Rule 101(C) of the Rules, he is entitled to credit for the time spent in detention, which as of 
the date of this judgement amounts to 2,369 days. 
 
Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative. 
 
Dated this 27th day of September 2006 
At The Hague,  
The Netherlands 
 
 
 
 Joaquín Martín Canivell Alphons Orie Claude Hanoteau 
 Judge Presiding Judge Judge 
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Appendices 
 
A. Sources and uses of evidence 
1185. The sources of evidence in the present case include the testimony of witnesses 
appearing before the Chamber (“viva voce” witnesses) and called by the Prosecution, the 
Defence, or the Chamber; transcripts of the testimony of witnesses who were heard by 
other Trial Chambers of this Tribunal, admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis (C) and (D) of the 
Rules; written witness statements admitted pursuant to Rules 92 bis (A) or 89 (F); 
documents produced as exhibits in connection with witness (or expert) testimony, or 
admitted in “dossiers” pursuant to Rule 89 (C), such as expert reports, orders, transcripts of 
intercepted communications, exhumation reports, photographs, maps, news agency 
reports,TPF2288FPT and audio tapes; admissions of fact by the Defence;TPF2289FPT and factual findings 
from other proceedings (adjudicated facts) admitted pursuant to Rule 94 (B). In the 
paragraphs below, the Chamber outlines its approach on several evidentiary and procedural 
matters. 
1186. Applicable rules of evidence. The Chamber has assessed the aforementioned 
evidence in accordance with the Statute, the Rules, and the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, 
and where no guidance was found in these sources the Chamber decided matters of 
evidence in such a way as would best favour a fair determination of the case in consonance 
with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law. TPF2290FPT 
1187. Admissibility of evidence. According to Rule 89 (C), a party introducing evidence 
must show that it is relevant and has probative value. Generally, the reliability of evidence 
is a factor going to weight rather than admissibility, although where the evidence is so 
patently unreliable as to have no probative value whatsoever the Chamber has the 
discretion not to admit it.  
1188. Citation of exhibits. Documents were generally admitted in both English and Serbo-
Croatian. The exhibit number for the translated version is marked by the Registry with the 
annex “.1”. In this judgement, citations always refer to the English version of the 
document, even when the “.1” does not appear. 
1189. Use of “illegally” obtained intercepts. According to Rule 95, evidence shall not be 
admitted if it was obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability, or if 
its admission would be antithetical to – and would seriously damage – the integrity of the 
proceedings. It was argued in this case that certain intercepted communications from the 
period 1991/92 are not admissible because they were illegally obtained. The Chamber’s 
position is that the intercepts were not inadmissible per se, even if, for argument’s sake, 
they were not obtained strictly in compliance with state legislation applicable at the 
time.TPF2291FPT There is no indication that the methods by which the intercepts were obtained 
amounted to a violation of human rights, such that the proceedings would be tainted 
through association with those methods. TPF2292FPT 
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1190. Hearsay. Evidence of events occurring outside the testifying witness’s own direct 
experience constitutes hearsay. The jurisprudence of the Tribunal is that hearsay evidence 
is not inadmissible per se. A variety of documents – for example, witness statements 
admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis – have been admitted on the footing that their content is 
generally accurate. The Chamber has carefully examined whether the proffered hearsay 
evidence is relevant, reliable, and has probative value.TPF2293FPT For example, in those cases 
where a witness did not specify the source of the hearsay, the Chamber has generally not 
relied on the hearsay. 
1191. Corroboration. The testimony of a single witness on a material fact does not, as a 
matter of law, require corroboration.TPF2294FPT Sometimes, however, the lack of corroboration 
allows the Chamber not to consider the evidence.  
1192. Inconsistencies/discrepancies. The time elapsed between the events of 1991/92 and 
the dates on which witnesses in this case gave statements or testimony naturally has led to 
an erosion of memory, which in turn is the cause of occasional discrepancies between viva 
voce testimonies and prior written statements.TPF2295FPT The Chamber is aware that other causes 
might also explain such discrepancies. Where discrepancies were minor, the Chamber 
generally did not treat them as diminishing a witness’s credibility or reliability.TPF2296FPT The 
Chamber took into account the effects of the passage of time also when faced with minor 
imprecisions in the testimony of witnesses. In the course of questioning, a witness would 
sometimes recall details previously forgotten, or provide reasonable explanations of what 
had appeared to be a discrepancy or inconsistency in his or her evidence.TPF2297FPT But some 
discrepancies were serious enough to necessitate caution, or to discredit a witness’s 
testimony, at least in part. 
1193. Expert versus fact witnesses. Expert witnesses are distinguished from witnesses of 
fact. The testimony of a witness of fact is generally limited to matters about which the 
witness had personal knowledge, although this does not always exclude certain opinions 
and conclusions, especially if they could be developed on the basis of experience. An 
expert is a person who, by virtue of specialized knowledge or skill, can assist the Chamber 
to understand or determine an issue in dispute.TPF2298FPT Expert witnesses are afforded leeway to 
give opinions and draw conclusions within their field of expertise. According to the 
Chamber’s practice, the central item of evidence, is the expert’s report. On 17 May 2005, 
the Chamber instructed the party calling an expert witness to limit its examination to 
matters of central importance to the case which are likely to be controversial and which 
require further explanation, clarification, or illustration in terms of how the opinion was 
arrived at by the expert.TPF2299FPT Documentation utilized in this process may be admitted into 
evidence, but not all documentation underlying the expert report will be admitted into 
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evidence.TP F2300FPT The Prosecution called seven expert witnesses, while the Defence did not 
call any expert witnesses.TPF2301FPT  
1194. The Chamber heard evidence from Melika Malešević, the former secretary of an 
NGO whose main aim was to gather information about detention centres in Bosnia-
Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995,TPF2302FPT including the number of detainees in each 
detention centre and the conditions of detention, regardless of ethnicity.TPF2303FPT The data 
compiled by the NGO was based on declarations made by victims, which had to be 
corroborated by at least two other persons with direct experience of the centre or by the 
ICRC. TPF2304FPT Malešević and her associates would often go into the field to inspect places 
alleged to have been detention centres.TPF2305FPT The Chamber finds Malešević’s evidence 
reliable with respect to the existence of all the detention centres mentioned in her 
testimony and that mainly Muslim and Croats civilians were detained in those centres in 
1992. With regard to many of those detention centres, the Chamber has also heard specific 
and credible evidence from witnesses who had been detained there.  
1195. Another report was presented by Mirsad Tokača, which contained evidence on 
Muslim civiliansTPF2306FPT who were killed or went missing in 1992. He pointed out that 
information was still being collected, therefore the total numbers were merely 
indicative.TPF2307FPT The figures presented by the witness distinguished civilians from “soldiers” 
killed or missing, based on information obtained by the witness from official and unofficial 
sources.TPF2308FPT The persons reported on were categorized by municipality, based on their 
residency in that municipality.TPF2309FPT According to Tokača, for civilians, the place of 
residence and the place of death was usually the same in the cases which he had analyzed, 
although considerable work on this question remained to be done. TPF2310FPT The Chamber 
considered this expert report as supporting or corroborating evidence only. 
1196. Standard for making inferences. In making its findings, the Chamber relied to some 
extent on inferences from circumstantial evidence. A finding must be more than a 
reasonable inference from the circumstances; it must be the only reasonable inference.TPF2311FPT 
On occasion, the evidence of witnesses lacked specificity as to the identity of the alleged 
perpetrators. The Chamber inferred their identity, where it was possible to do so beyond 
reasonable doubt, from the context of a witness’s testimony, as well as from evidence 
received by the Chamber through other witnesses or sources.  
1197. Adjudicated facts. The Chamber took judicial notice of a number of adjudicated 
facts pursuant to Rule 94 (B).TPF2312FPT Adjudicated facts admitted into evidence are presumed to 
be accurate and do not need to be proven again at trial. However, the opposing party may 
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bring evidence to disprove them.TPF2313FPT Thus, the Chamber has carefully evaluated 
adjudicated facts in this case in light of all the evidence received. 
1198.  Use of witness statements and trial transcripts. As noted above, the Chamber has 
admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis the evidence of several witnesses in the form of written 
statements or in the form of transcripts of evidence given in other Tribunal cases. At 
several points during the trial, summaries of the evidence of these Rule 92 bis witnesses 
were read into the record, for the benefit of the public audience.  
1199. Rule 89 (F) procedure. This procedure was implemented for the purpose of 
reducing the amount of time spent in examination of witnesses, by focusing on the most 
important points of their expected testimony. Witness statements were admitted under this 
procedure where the witness who made the statement was present in court, was available 
for cross-examination and questioning by the judges, and attested that the statement 
accurately reflected what he or she had said at the time the statement was given – and what 
he or she would say if examined upon it.TPF2314FPT The procedure was used only in relation to 
evidence in written form which did not concern significant acts or conduct of the Accused, 
did not relate to issues pivotal to the Prosecution’s case, and did not concern persons or 
events significantly proximate to the Accused.TPF2315FPT Rule 89 (F) witnesses were examined on 
the most significant points of their statement, prior to commencement of cross-
examination.  
1200. Closed/private sessions. Pursuant to Article 22 of the Statute, the Chamber ordered 
various measures to protect victims and witnesses, including in-camera proceedings. The 
Chamber was mindful of the Accused’s right to a fair and public hearing, and of the 
public’s interest in following the proceedings, and for that reason granted protective 
measures only where necessary, and then only measures of the least restrictive kind. Thus, 
a certain amount of material cited in the footnotes of this judgement remains under seal. In 
many cases a pseudonym is used to refer to a witness, and information which might 
identify that witness has been withheld. The test used by the Chamber for a grant of 
protective measures was the demonstration of an objectively grounded risk to the security 
or welfare of the witness or the witness’s family. 
1201. Presumption of innocence. Pursuant to Article 21 (3) of the Statute, the Accused is 
entitled to a presumption of innocence. Pursuant to Rule 87 (A), the standard of proof 
required is guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, each and every element of the 
offences charged against the Accused on which no concessions have been made must be 
proven beyond reasonable doubt. This burden remains on the Prosecution throughout the 
trial,TPF2316FPT but can also be proven through Chamber’s evidence. An Accused must be 
acquitted if there is any reasonable explanation of the evidence accepted by the Chamber 
other than the guilt of the accused.TPF2317FPT 
1202. Testimony of the Accused. Rule 85 (C) provides that the Accused may appear as a 
witness in his own defence if he so wishes. In the present case the Accused chose to testify. 
In doing so he did not accept any onus to prove his innocence. TPF2318FPT The Accused testified 
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for 40 days commencing on 25 April 2006 and concluding on 22 June 2006. Twenty-three 
days were spent on examination-in-chief, 13 days on cross-examination, 1 day on re-
examination, and 3 days on the Judges’ questions. The Accused was the last witness in the 
Defence case. 
1203. Testimony of other accused or convicted persons. Some of the witnesses in this case 
had pleaded guilty and were awaiting sentencing at the time of their testimony. The 
Chamber is aware of the problems associated with such testimonies – notably the witness’s 
incentive to testify untruthfully for the purpose of improving his or her chances at the 
sentencing stage. The Chamber has used the testimonies of such witnesses with great 
caution.TPF2319FPT It is settled jurisprudence of the Tribunal that a Trial Chamber may find some 
parts of a witness’s testimony credible, and rely on them, while rejecting other parts as not 
credible.TPF2320FPT 
1204. Chamber witnesses. On 30 March 2006 the Chamber decided to obtain additional 
evidence by calling Chamber witnesses pursuant to Rule 98 of the Rules.TPF2321FPT The Chamber 
decided to hear persons who, on the basis of earlier evidence, had close contact with the 
Accused during the relevant period.TPF2322FPT The Chamber’s use of Chamber witnesses is 
further described in Appendix B. 
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B. Procedural history 
1205. Indictment. An indictment against Momčilo Krajišnik was confirmed on 25 
February 2000 by Judge Wald. On the same day, the judge issued an arrest warrant for the 
Accused.TPF2323FPT This initial indictment charged the Accused with nine counts under Articles 
2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Statute.TPF2324FPT  
1206. Arrest, transfer, and initial appearance. The Accused was arrested by SFOR in 
Sarajevo on 3 April 2000 on the basis of a sealed indictmentTPF2325FPT and transferred to the 
United Nations Detention Unit in The Hague on the same day.TPF2326FPT The case was assigned 
to Trial Chamber III the next day.TPF2327FPT At his initial appearance before Judge Richard May, 
on 7 April 2000, the Accused, represented by Mr Igor Pantelić, pleaded not guilty to all 
counts. Trial Chamber III ordered his detention on remand.TPF2328FPT On 3 May 2000 the 
Registrar assigned Mr Goran Nešković as temporary counsel.TPF2329FPT 
1207. Preliminary motions. On 8 June 2000, counsel for the Accused filed a preliminary 
motion on defects in the form of the indictment, alleging that the indictment’s supporting 
material did not relate to the charges. Counsel also sought more detailed information on the 
Accused’s alleged functions and positions, as well as on his alleged responsibility under 
Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute. The motion was rejected by Trial Chamber III on 1 
August 2000.TPF2330FPT 
1208. On 8 June 2000 the Accused filed a preliminary motion on jurisdiction, challenging 
the lawfulness of the Tribunal.TPF2331FPT This motion was denied by the Trial Chamber on 4 
August 2000.TPF2332FPT The appeal was dismissed on 25 May 2001. TPF2333FPT 
1209. Joinder of cases. On 23 January 2001 the Prosecution filed a motion for joinder of 
two cases, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik and Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić. The joinder 
was granted on 23 February 2001. A consolidated indictment was filed by the Prosecution 
on 9 March 2001. TPF2334FPT 
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1210. On 1 August 2001, Trial Chamber III issued another decision on the form of the 
indictment, denying a motion filed by the Defence on 17 July 2001 aiming at striking the 
words “ordering” and “committing” from the consolidated indictment.TPF2335FPT 
1211. Assignment of counsel. At the request of the Accused, on 10 April 2001 the Registry 
withdrew Mr Nešković as counsel and assigned in his place Mr Deyan Ranko Brashich.TPF2336FPT 
1212. Provisional release motions. On 8 August 2001 the Accused filed a motion for 
provisional release.TPF2337FPT On 8 October 2001, Trial Chamber III denied the motion on the 
ground that the Accused’s assurances, as well as those of the Governments of Republika 
Srpska and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, did not meet the required criteria.TPF2338FPT 
Application for leave to appeal was denied on 14 December 2001 by a bench of the 
Appeals Chamber.TPF2339FPT 
1213. A renewed motion for provisional release, filed on 29 December 2001, was based 
on an alleged change in circumstances (the substitution of one of the pre-trial judges) and 
on a new date for the beginning of the trial.TPF2340FPT This motion was rejected by the Trial 
Chamber on 24 January 2002. TPF2341FPT 
1214. Agreement on facts and judicial notice. On 31 August 2001 the Prosecution filed a 
copy of the consolidated indictment with highlighted portions, indicating matters about 
which there was no disagreement with the Accused (“List of Matters Admitted by 
Krajišnik”). A list of adjudicated facts from previous judgements of the Tribunal was 
agreed upon by the Defence in a letter to the Prosecution dated 30 October 2002 and in a 
filing of 29 January 2003. The Chamber took judicial notice of these as well as of other 
facts, which were consolidated into a final list on 24 March 2005.TPF2342FPT 
1215. Amendment of consolidated indictment. On 31 January 2002 the Prosecution 
proceeded to amend the consolidated indictment in order to provide, among other things, 
“greater detail regarding the nature of the criminal responsibility of the accused”.TPF2343FPT In 
particular, the Prosecution proposed to set forth more clearly the forms of responsibility 
charged, clarifying that “committing” should be understood in the sense of the Accused’s 
being a co-perpetrator in a JCE and asked for the alleged violation of Article 2, contained 
in count 6, to be struck. The Prosecution also sought to attach four schedules to the 
consolidated indictment. Schedules A and B referred to alleged killings in detention 
facilities and elsewhere; Schedule C listed the alleged detention facilities; and Schedule D 
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particularized the alleged destruction of cultural monuments and places of worship.TPF2344FPT On 
14 February 2002 the Defence filed a response opposing the motion. On 4 March 2002 the 
Prosecution’s motion was granted. The Prosecution filed the “amended consolidated 
indictment” (referred to in this judgement simply as the indictment) on 7 March 2002.TPF2345FPT 
1216. Third motion for provisional release. On 4 June 2002 the Defence filed another 
motion for provisional release, suggesting that a new standard for provisional release had 
been set by the Appeals Chamber and that factual circumstances had changed with the 
passage of new legislation in the Republika Srpska.TPF2346FPT A hearing was held on 10 July 
2002, attended by a representative of the Government of Republika Srpska.TPF2347FPT Trial 
Chamber III denied the motion on 18 October 2002, on the grounds that it was not satisfied 
that the Accused would appear for trial.TPF2348FPT 
1217. Motions relating to intercepted communications. On 11 June 2002 the Defence filed 
a motion for an order to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to disclose documents 
relating to the electronic surveillance of telephone calls made by the Accused during the 
indictment period.TPF2349FPT A hearing on the matter was held on 10 July 2002, attended by a 
representative of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.TPF2350FPT On 24 July 2002 Trial 
Chamber III issued an order to Bosnia-Herzegovina to disclose to the Defence all notices 
received by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency relating to electronic surveillance of 
telephone conversations involving Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, Radovan Karadžić, 
Nikola Koljević, Vojislav Maksimović, or Branko Đerić.TPF2351FPT A notice of compliance by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, filed on 13 September 2002, states that no notice or authorization 
relating to wiretap surveillance could be found in the archive of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Presidency.TPF2352FPT 
1218. On 13 September 2002 the Defence filed a motion seeking to suppress what it 
referred to as illegally intercepted communications on the grounds of a violation of the 
right to privacy. TPF2353FPT The Prosecution replied on 27 September 2002, arguing for the legality 
of the intercepts.TPF2354FPT Pursuant to a confidential order by Trial Chamber I, on 17 April 2003, 
seeking additional information on the intercepted communications, the Prosecution, on 24 
April 2003, supplied that information, including the names of the people who had carried 
out the wiretapping and the recording of the intercepts.TPF2355FPT On 29 January 2004 the 
Chamber issued a decision rejecting the Defence’s motion, noting however that it was open 
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to the Defence in the course of the trial to object to the admission of intercepts on other 
grounds.TPF2356FPT 
1219. First set of motions on legal aid. On 17 June 2002 the Defence filed a motion 
before Trial Chamber III arguing that the resources it was granted by the Registry were 
insufficient to accomplish the tasks of the Defence. The Chamber invited the Registrar’s 
comments,TPF2357FPT which were to the effect that the resources given to the Defence were 
adequate.TPF2358FPT On 5 July 2002 the Accused himself filed a request with Trial Chamber III, 
stating that his contacts with the Registry had failed to solve certain problems affecting the 
quality of his defence, and in particular the composition of the Defence team.TPF2359FPT On 12 
July 2002 the Registrar was again invited to comment. TPF2360FPT On 18 October 2002 the 
Chamber issued a decision dismissing the motion of 17 June 2002, on the grounds that the 
Defence had not been able to demonstrate a need for additional resources.TPF2361FPT 
1220. Pre-trial briefs. On 31 August 2001 the Prosecution filed its “provisional” pre-trial 
brief. TPF2362FPT This was followed on 2 May 2002 by the Prosecution’s pre-trial brief, together 
with a list of 406 witnesses.TPF2363FPT On 14 October 2002 the Defence filed its own pre-trial 
brief. TPF2364FPT 
1221. Severance of cases. On 25 November 2002, in consequence of Dr Biljana Plavšić’s 
guilty plea, Trial Chamber III ordered the severance of the two cases in the joined 
indictment. Despite the severance, the wording of the indictment was not changed. 
1222. Witness lists and assignment of case to Trial Chamber I. By the same decision 
which decided the severance, Trial Chamber III allowed the Prosecution to call a 
maximum of 119 viva voce witnesses in the present case and a maximum of 178 witnesses 
by way of Rule 92 bis. The decision gave 10 January 2003 as the deadline for the 
Prosecution’s final witness list.TPF2365FPT 
1223. On 28 November 2002 the President of the Tribunal assigned the present case to 
Trial Chamber I.TPF2366FPT On 28 February 2003 this Chamber issued a decision reducing the 
number of witnesses to be called by the Prosecution to 101 viva voce witnesses and 168 
Rule 92 bis witnesses.TPF2367FPT 
1224. On 11 March 2003 Judge Orie was designated as pre-trial judge in the case.TPF2368FPT A 
revised list of witnesses was submitted by the Prosecution on 21 March 2003.TPF2369FPT On 8 
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May 2003 the President of the Tribunal assigned Judge Canivell (ad litem judge) to the 
case, replacing Judge Liu.TPF2370FPT 
1225. On 4 December 2003 the Prosecution submitted a second revised list of witnesses. 
This contained 93 viva voce witnesses and 168 Rule 92 bis witnesses; the Prosecution 
stated that it would name the remaining eight viva voce witnesses at a later date.TPF2371FPT 
1226. Motion for recusal. On 14 January 2003 the Defence filed an application for the 
withdrawal of Judge Orie from Trial Chamber I, pursuant to Rule 15(B) of the Rules.TPF2372FPT 
The reasons given were that he had been involved in the Tadić case, as co-counsel, and that 
Duško Tadić would probably be a witness in the present case.TPF2373FPT On 22 January 2003 
Judge Liu denied the application, finding that “there is no ground for challenging the fact 
that Judge Orie is fully capable of applying his mind to the merits of this case in a 
completely unprejudiced and impartial manner.”TPF2374FPT 
1227. Reconstitution of Defence team. On 2 May 2003 the Registrar issued a decision 
withdrawing Mr Brashich as lead counsel for the Accused, reassigning him as legal 
consultant for a period of three months.TPF2375FPT The decision was in response to a US court 
order, dated 1 April 2003, suspending Mr Brashich from the practice of law for a period of 
one year, effective 1 May 2003. The commencement of the trial, which had been scheduled 
for 12 May 2003,TPF2376FPT was as a result delayed. 
1228. On 30 July 2003 the Registrar issued a decision assigning Mr Nicholas Stewart as 
lead counsel for the Accused.TPF2377FPT Pursuant to a request filed by Mr Stewart on 15 August 
2003, the Registrar assigned Ms Chrissa Loukas as co-counsel for the Accused on 16 
September 2003.TPF2378FPT 
1229. Second set of motions on legal aid. On 12 June 2003 the Registrar issued a decision 
regarding the financial status of the Accused and the level of legal aid he was entitled to 
for the duration of the trial. The decision was based on an investigation of the Accused’s 
means. In his declaration of means, the Accused gave his status as “indigent”, claiming 
entitlement to full legal aid. The Registrar concluded that the Accused was only partially 
indigent. He was held liable for partial remuneration of defence costs, amounting to 
$12,970 per month over the 48-month period over which the trial was then expected to 
last.TPF2379FPT 
1230. On 8 July 2003 the Accused himself filed a motion before the Chamber requesting 
review of the Registrar’s decision, on the ground that the underlying investigation report 
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into his means was inaccurate.TPF2380FPT On 15 July 2003 an English translation of a long and 
detailed document was filed to supplement the motion of 8 July.TPF2381FPT On 19 September 2003 
the Registry responded by making six concessions on the value of the Accused’s assets and 
monthly household income. The concessions had the effect of lowering the Accused’s 
assessed contribution to the costs of his defence to $10,912 per month.TPF2382FPT 
1231. On 4 November 2003 the Chamber received the Accused’s reply to the Registrar’s 
response.TPF2383FPT The Registrar and the Accused, who by then was assisted by Mr Stewart, 
made oral submissions on the matter on 19 November 2003. On 10 December 2003 the 
Chamber received the Accused’s additional explanatory memorandum.TPF2384FPT 
1232. On 20 January 2004 the Chamber issued a decision finding that several of the 
Registrar’s calculations were erroneous or were based on unreasonable assumptions. The 
Chamber quashed the Registrar’s decision and requested the Registrar to reconsider his 
decision in the light of the Chamber’s findings, including the fact that the cost of family 
visits was not taken into account when assessing the Accused’s available means. TPF2385FPT 
1233. On 3 February 2004 the Registrar issued a new decision conforming to the findings 
of the Chamber in all respects except for the Chamber’s suggestion regarding the cost of 
family visits. According to the Registrar’s decision, the Accused’s assessed liability was 
$9,589 per month, for a period of 30 months (the revised expected duration of the trial).TPF2386FPT 
1234. On 19 February 2004 the Defence again requested the Chamber to review the 
Registrar’s decision, this time on the issue of the cost of family visits.TPF2387FPT On 14 May 2004 
the Chamber directed the Registrar to reconsider the impugned decision in the light of the 
Chamber’s recommendation of 20 January 2004.TPF2388FPT On 30 July 2004 the Deputy Registrar 
confirmed his decision of 3 February 2004, mainly on the basis that the cost of family 
visits was not incurred by the Accused himself but financed from contributions by third 
parties. On 3 August 2004 the Defence requested review of the Deputy Registrar’s 
decision, on the principal ground that the Deputy Registrar did not correctly assess the 
Accused’s access to sources of revenue to cover the cost of family visits.TPF2389FPT On 1 
September 2004, the Chamber denied the motion, stating that the Defence had not shown 
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that the Deputy Registrar, in exercising his discretion, acted unreasonably, of had based his 
decision on irrelevant material, or had failed to take account of relevant material.TPF2390FPT 
1235. Commencement of trial. The state of readiness of the new Defence team 
necessitated the postponement of the commencement of the trial to 2 February 2004. The 
schedule also allowed 30 days of recess between 2 February and 12 April 2004, during 
which period the court sat only 18 days. 
1236. Inquiry into agreement on facts. In April 2004 the parties, encouraged by the 
Chamber, began to explore the possibility of expanding their agreement on facts and other 
matters relevant to the indictment. The Chamber ordered an adjournment for this purpose 
lasting four weeks (from late April to late May). On the basis of positive reports from both 
parties, the Chamber granted another adjournment, from late June onwards; this lasted until 
the Defence, on 12 July 2004, informed the Chamber that it had decided to discontinue the 
talks. It also announced that no facts had been finally agreed upon during the negotiation 
process.  
1237. Defence motion for adjournment. On 14 July 2004 the Defence filed a motion 
seeking an adjournment until 4 October 2004 to give the Defence more time to prepare.TPF2391FPT 
The Chamber denied the motion orally on 16 July 2004,TPF2392FPT with written reasons given on 
21 September 2004.TPF2393FPT 
1238. Reduction in number of Rule 92 bis witnesses. On 19 July 2004 the Chamber issued 
an order to the Prosecution limiting the number of prospective Rule 92 bis crime-base 
witnesses to 61. At the time of the order, 33 such witnesses had already been admitted into 
evidence. The order thus created an upper limit of 94 crime-base Prosecution witnesses 
under Rule 92 bis (reducing by about 54 the overall number of such witnesses). The 
Chamber explained that the reduction was necessary because of the time consumed in 
processing the admission of Rule 92 bis material, which was having the effect of 
unreasonably prolonging the trial. 
1239. Motion by Accused to conduct supplementary cross-examination. On 20 September 
2004 the Accused made an oral application to the Chamber to be permitted to supplement 
the cross-examination of his counsel by asking further questions of a witness, after cross-
examination by counsel had concluded.TPF2394FPT On 21 September 2004, in denying the 
application, the Chamber stated that one of the consequences of the choice to be assisted 
by counsel, and not to conduct one’s own defence, is that counsel must be allowed to 
conduct the defence at trial. A division of labour risked confusing the presentation of the 
defence case. The Chamber also took into account the Accused’s inexperience with trial 
procedure. However, the Chamber allowed that, in exceptional circumstances, it would 
consider a submission from the Accused showing good cause to deviate from the above 
rule.TPF2395FPT 
1240. Withdrawal of Judge El Mahdi and assignment of Judge Hanoteau. At a hearing 
held on 10 December 2004, Judge El Mahdi announced his decision to withdraw from the 
case as of 14 January 2005, citing the fact that his mandate as a judge elected by the UN 
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General Assembly was to expire prior to the expected conclusion of the case. In 
accordance with Rule 15 bis (C) of the Rules, the Presiding Judge invited the Accused to 
declare whether he consented to the continuation of the proceedings with a substitute 
judge.TPF2396FPT On 14 December 2004 the Accused, through his counsel, stated his position that 
he wished to have a rehearing. The next day Judges Orie and Martín Canivell heard the 
parties’ submissions on the matter. On 16 December 2004 the two judges issued a decision, 
under Rule 15 bis (D), to continue the proceedings with a substitute judge.TPF2397FPT 
1241. On 25 January 2005 the President recomposed the Trial Chamber, replacing Judge 
El Mahdi with Judge Claude Hanoteau. On 25 February 2005 Judge Hanoteau certified that 
he had familiarized himself with the record of the proceedings, as required by Rule 15 bis 
(D) of the Rules. The trial resumed on the same day.TPF2398FPT 
1242. Second Defence motion for adjournment. The Defence filed a second adjournment 
motion on 22 February 2005. The Defence requested a six-month suspension of 
proceedings to permit it more time in preparation. In dismissing the motion, the Chamber 
held that the applicable test was that in determining whether a fair trial had been achieved, 
the entirety of the proceedings were to be considered, meaning not only the time and 
facilities afforded to an accused’s most recently appointed defence team, but also, 
normally, the time and facilities afforded to the accused himself or herself since the 
beginning of the case.TPF2399FPT The Chamber found that, from this perspective, the Accused had 
been afforded adequate time and facilities. Constant monitoring by the Chamber would 
ensure that the pace of proceedings did not undermine the fairness of the trial. An appeal 
by the Defence was denied by the Appeals Chamber on 25 April 2005.TPF2400FPT 
1243. General scheduling order. On 26 April 2005 the Chamber issued a scheduling order 
for the remainder of the proceedings, up to and including the delivery of the judgement.TPF2401FPT 
The order provided, among other things, for the Prosecution case to close on 22 July 2005, 
for the Defence case to close on 10 March 2006, and for the judgement to be delivered on 
or before 28 April 2006. The Prosecution case closed on the date scheduled, but it 
subsequently became necessary to change some other dates in the schedule, for reasons 
explained below. 
1244. Decision on self-representation. On 24 May 2005 the Accused announced that he 
wished to represent himself in all proceedings before the Tribunal. On 22 July 2005 the 
Chamber gave an oral decision denying the Accused’s application for self-
representation.TPF2402FPT On 18 August 2005 the Chamber gave written reasons for the decision, 
stating that the Accused’s request had been persistently equivocal.TPF2403FPT The Chamber added 
that even if the request for self-representation had not been equivocal, it would have been 
denied as a matter of principle. The reason was that while an accused has, in the 
jurisprudence of this Tribunal, a presumptive right to self-representation prior to the 
commencement of the trial, the effect to be given to that right when it is asserted after the 
commencement of trial is subject to the public interest in the efficient administration of 
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justice. The Chamber has broad discretion to deny an accused’s request to continue 
unrepresented when the request is made at mid trial and has the potential to heavily disrupt 
trial proceedings.  
1245. Involvement of Accused in examination of witnesses. Following the Accused’s 
request to represent himself, on 24 May 2005, the Chamber issued a provisional decision, 
on 26 May 2005, to the effect that the Accused was to be represented by counsel without 
interruption, until the issue of legal representation was finally resolved. In accordance with 
the provisional decision, the Accused was allowed, as an exception to the usual regime, to 
supplement his counsel’s cross-examination with his own questions to witnesses.TPF2404FPT 
1246. The Chamber’s final decision on legal representation, delivered on 18 August 2005, 
did not further discuss the Accused’s role in examination of witnesses. The Chamber 
returned to the subject on 28 September 2005, when giving guidance on the conduct of the 
Defence case.TPF2405FPT The Chamber extended the practice it had initiated with its provisional 
decision of 26 May 2005, thereby allowing the Accused a limited role in complementing 
his counsel’s examination-in-chief, subject to the Chamber’s supervision. 
1247. Guidance on Rule 98 bis procedure. On 27 April 2005 the Defence expressed 
concern that the date for the Defence’s possible Rule 98 bis submissions, as established by 
the 26 April 2005 scheduling order, fell too close to the tail end of the summer recess, 
leaving little time for summer vacations for members of the Defence team. On 17 May 
2005, in its oral guidance on the Rule 98 bis procedure,TPF2406FPT the Chamber explained that the 
procedure had been amended in 2004 so as not to be the work-intensive exercise it once 
was. The Chamber said that it would not accept written submissions on the Rule 98 bis 
motion; the Defence was to make its arguments orally. The Chamber advised the Defence 
to aim to finalize any Rule 98 bis submissions it intended to make by the time of the last 
Prosecution witness.  
1248. Rule 98 bis decision. On 16 August 2005 the Defence applied for acquittal under 
Rule 98 bis.TPF2407FPT The Defence made a general submission that the Accused had no case to 
answer whatsoever,TPF2408FPT and a specific submission that that there was insufficient evidence 
to support the allegation that there had been a genocide against Bosnian Croats.TPF2409FPT 
Moreover, the Defence argued that the amendment to Rule 98 bis on 8 December 2004, 
which had changed the rule to an oral procedure, was prejudicial to the rights of the 
Accused because it no longer allowed for a comprehensive review of all matters contained 
in the indictment.TPF2410FPT On 19 August 2005 the Chamber gave an oral decision dismissing 
the Defence motion in all respects.TPF2411FPT Since the Defence had made no preliminary request 
concerning the level of detail of its Rule 98 bis submissions, the assertion that a 
comprehensive review had been ruled out by the rule-change was merely an 
assumption. TPF2412FPT Thus, the Defence had not demonstrated the existence of any actual 
prejudice. As for the substance of the motion, the Chamber held that the Accused had a 
case to answer on all eight counts of the indictment and, more specifically, that there was 
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sufficient evidence for the purposes of Rule 98 bis to find that genocide had been 
committed against both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. TPF2413FPT 
1249. Rule 65 ter conference and order on variation of trial schedule. On 23 August 2005 
a Rule 65 ter conference was held for the purpose of determining a deadline for the 
Defence to discharge its obligations under Rule 65 (G). In informal submissions Defence 
counsel stated that the Defence was not in a position to start its case on 12 September 
2005, as foreseen by the scheduling order of 26 April 2005. On 26 August 2005 the 
Chamber ordered a variation of the trial schedule, postponing the beginning of the Defence 
case to 3 October 2006, and noting that this discretionary relief was not based on a 
showing of good cause.TPF2414FPT The same order required the Defence to meet its Rule 65 ter 
(G) obligations by filing the required information no later than 26 September 2005. On 26 
September 2005 the Defence filed a motion for extension of time for filing the Rule 65 (G) 
material.TPF2415FPT The Chamber denied the motion on 28 September.TPF2416FPT The decision provided 
for the Rule 73 ter pre-defence conference to be held on 6 October 2005 and for the 
Defence case to commence on 10 October 2005. 
1250. Commencement of Defence case. On 4 October 2005 the Defence filed a list of 
witnesses pursuant to Rule 65 (G). The Rule 73 ter pre-defence conference was held, as 
ordered, on 6 October 2005.TPF2417FPT The Defence case commenced on 10 October 2005. 
1251. Defence appeal against Rule 98 bis decision. On 16 September 2005 the Defence 
purported to appeal the Chamber’s Rule 98 bis decision directly to the Appeals 
Chamber.TPF2418FPT On 4 October 2005 the Appeals Chamber held that the Defence could not 
appeal the Rule 98 bis decision directly, but only upon certification by the Trial 
Chamber.TPF2419FPT On 6 October 2005, the Defence filed a motion for extension of time to apply 
for certification to appeal the Rule 98 bis decision, along with a motion for 
certification.TPF2420FPT On 12 October 2005 the Trial Chamber denied these motions.TPF2421FPT 
1252. Extension of time for completion of Defence case. On 18 November 2005 the 
Chamber issued a second amendment to its scheduling order of 26 April 2005. The 
Chamber extended the closing date of the Defence case by seven weeks, from 10 March 
2006 to 28 April 2006, citing difficulties of preparation and presentation faced by the 
Defence. The Chamber noted that the Defence’s Rule 65 ter (G) filings were not detailed 
enough to enable the Chamber to plan the Defence phase of the case in the manner 
envisaged by Rule 73 ter (B) and (C). In view of this situation, the Defence was instead 
granted a fixed amount of time during which to call its most relevant witnesses, the time 
granted to be utilized largely at the discretion of Defence, under the supervision of the 
Chamber, and on the condition that two weeks’ notice of the Defence’s developing 
schedule was given. The Chamber stated that, unless exceptional circumstances prevailed, 
the seven-week extension was considered final. An application by the Defence for 
certification to appeal the Chamber’s threshold of “exceptional circumstances” was denied.  
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1253. On 27 February 2006 the Chamber granted the Defence 20 days for the 
examination-in-chief of its last witness, Momčilo Krajišnik. After several postponements, 
the Accused began his testimony on 25 April 2006. On 19 May 2006 the Chamber granted 
an additional day of examination-in-chief in order to compensate for the time spent on 
procedural matters.TPF2422FPT On 22 May 2006 the Defence requested three additional days for 
the examination-in-chief of the witness,TPF2423FPT which was denied by the Chamber on 23 May 
2006. TPF2424FPT 
1254. Motion to disqualify Judge Canivell. On 10 April 2006, the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1668/2006, in which it decided that Judge Canivell could continue to 
sit on the bench until the completion of this case, despite the fact that his service at the 
Tribunal would exceed the three-year limit set by Article 13 ter (2) of the Statute.TPF2425FPT On 
16 May 2006, the Defence filed a motion to challenge the validity of Resolution 1668 and 
its applicability by the Tribunal, alleging a breach of the right of the Accused to be 
prosecuted only in accordance with the provisions of the Statute.TPF2426FPT On 16 June 2006, the 
Chamber decided that the extension of the mandate of Judge Canivell did not encroach 
upon the independence, impartiality, or judicial function of the Tribunal. The Chamber 
qualified the Resolution as an administrative act allowing the Chamber to complete the 
case without undue delay and dismissed the motion.TPF2427FPT On 23 June 2006 the Chamber 
granted the Defence application for certification to appeal.TPF2428FPT On 18 September 2006 the 
Appeals Chamber dismissed the Appeal, ruling that Resolution 1668 was directed to 
administrative matters and did not interfere with the Tribunal’s judicial function. It added 
that preventing Judge Canivell from sitting in this case until the end of the trial would in 
fact be detrimental to the rights of the Accused.TPF2429FPT 
1255. Procedure on calling and examining Chamber witnesses. On 30 March 2006 the 
Chamber announced that it would call Chamber witnesses pursuant to Rule 98 of the 
Rules.TPF2430FPT The Chamber prepared a procedure for calling and examining Chamber 
witnesses.TPF2431FPT The parties were invited to propose changes to the draft. The procedure was 
finalized on 24 April 2006.TPF2432FPT According to this procedure, the Chamber was to make a 
final decision on whether to call persons to give evidence as Chamber witnesses at the 
close of the Defence case. The Chamber was supposed to establish contact with such 
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witnesses through its legal officers, to conduct preliminary interviews, to compile witness 
statements based on the preliminary interview, and to provide the parties with the witness 
statements.TPF2433FPT On 11 April 2006 the Chamber announced the names of four potential 
Chamber witnesses: Bogdan Subotić, Velibor Ostojić, Biljana Plavšić, and Branko 
Đerić.TPF2434FPT The Chamber also called two crime-base witnesses, Amin Delić and Emir Purić.  
1256. The Chamber made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Branko Đerić, and in 
the end had to issue a subpoena for him to appear as witness before the Chamber. When 
Đerić failed to comply with the subpoena, the Chamber issued an order in lieu of 
indictment for contempt, after which Đerić cooperated with the Tribunal.TPF2435FPT The Chamber 
withdrew the indictment.TPF2436FPT  
1257. Velibor Ostojić and Biljana Plavšić refused to testify voluntarily, and were therefore 
subpoenaed.TPF2437FPT  
1258. Final briefs and closing arguments. On 11 August 2006 the Chamber denied the 
Prosecution’s request for leave to exceed the word limit for final briefs from 60,000 to 
125,000 words.TPF2438FPT The case closed on 14 July 2006, and both parties filed their final briefs 
on 18 August 2006. TPF2439FPT On 29 August 2006, the Prosecution presented its closing 
arguments, followed on 30 August 2006 by the Defence. On 31 August 2006 the Chamber 
heard the Prosecution’s rebuttal and the Defence’s rejoinder. The Chamber granted the 
Accused’s request to make a statement pursuant to Rule 84 bis of the Rules.TPF2440FPT The trial 
proceedings concluded with the conclusion of the Accused statement. 
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